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
# JOURNAL *of the* Royal United Service Institution.



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
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
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
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
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### II.

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### III.

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
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### TURKISH FORT IN THE DARDANELLES IN 1853.

[From a Water-colour Drawing by the Widow of the late Admiral Lord Hood of Ardenia G.C.B. now in the Museum of the Royal United Service Institution.]



## SECRETARY'S NOTES.

---

### I.—Council.

At the Anniversary Meeting on Tuesday, March 7th, the following officers were re-elected to the vacancies on the Council, viz. :—

Admiral-of-the-Fleet Sir A. D. Fanshawe, G.C.B., G.C.V.O.

Major-General Sir T. Fraser, K.C.B., C.M.G.

It is notified that Lieut.-General H. D. Hutchinson, C.S.I., Chairman of the Council, has been re-elected to the office of Chairman for the ensuing year.

### II.—Entrance Fee Temporarily Suspended.

At the Annual General Meeting of the Institution held on March 7th last, it was unanimously resolved that for the present, and as a temporary measure, the payment of any entrance fee on joining the Institution should be dispensed with.

### III.—Life Membership: Reduced Terms.

It was at the same time decided that the amount payable for Life Membership should be temporarily reduced from £15 to £10.

### IV.—New Members.

The Council have pleasure in reporting that, taking advantage of these concessions, 152 Ordinary Members, and 8 Life Members, have joined the Institution between the dates March 8th and April 30th, 1916.

It is hoped that many more will gradually come in, as the favourable terms now offered become more widely known.

#### NEW MEMBERS ENROLLED ON THE OLD TERMS.

Six officers joined the Institution on the old rates during the period February 1st to March 7th, 1916. Full lists below.

Joined between February 1st and March 7th, as Ordinary Members on the old terms :—

Lieut.-Colonel Sir G. T. Campbell, Bart., late K.R.R.C.

Captain A. C. Bruce, R.N.

Major A. L. Ashwell, 8th Bn. Sherwood Foresters (T.F.).

Lieutenant G. V. Kenyon, R.N.

Lieutenant W. E. Loudoun-Shand, R.F.A.

Lieutenant R. Ussher, R.N.

Joined between March 8th and April 30th, as Ordinary Members on the new terms :—

Commander A. G. Craufurd, R.N.

Colonel The Lord Kenyon, K.C.V.O., T.D., A.D.C., Welsh Horse.

Captain H. F. Lee, O.T.C.  
Captain D. V. Pirie, M.P., late 3rd Hussars.  
Lieut.-Colonel G. Rippon, 8th Bn. Liverpool Regiment (T.F.).  
Major E. Sleight, 5th Bn. Lincolnshire Regiment (T.F.).  
Lieut.-Colonel W. N. E. Smith, R.M.L.I.  
Captain H. J. P. Thompson, 3rd Bn. Royal West Surrey Regiment.  
Second-Lieutenant G. T. C. Watt, O.T.C.  
Lieut.-Colonel W. H. Persse, 2nd Reserve Regiment of Cavalry.  
Major M. David, Royal Monmouthshire R.E.  
Lieutenant A. E. Durham, R.N.  
Colonel C. E. English, R.A.  
Brevet Colonel E. R. Hartigan, 8th (Reserve) Bn. Northamptonshire Regt.  
Major F. M. Ingram, T.D., O.T.C.  
Captain N. G. B. James, O.T.C.  
Lieut.-Colonel J. R. S. Leslie, 7th Bn. Scottish Rifles (T.F.).  
Captain M. K. Matthews, 1st County of London Yeomanry.  
Lieutenant T. W. Moore, R.N.R.  
Hugh Murray, Esq., C.I.E., War Office Staff.  
Lieut.-Colonel G. Reavell, T.D., 7th Bn. Northumberland Fusiliers (T.F.).  
Major W. H. Robinson, Kent Cyclist Bn. (T.F.).  
Captain C. H. R. Thorn, R.E. (T.F.).  
Major C. Bamford, R.E. (T.F.).  
Lieutenant F. G. Bowen, R.M.L.I.  
Captain F. L. Field, R.N.  
Lieutenant F. A. P. Foster, R.N.  
Captain C. F. Gethen, A.S.C.  
Captain E. J. Hardy, 2nd Dragoons.  
Major F. O. Hodgins, Royal Canadian Engineers.  
Lieut.-Colonel P. J. Preece, T.D., 8th Bn. London Regiment (T.F.).  
Major R. G. Baker, 20th (Service) Bn. Middlesex Regiment.  
Captain C. Bathurst, Duke of Wellington's Regiment.  
Lieutenant A. F. C. Bentley, R.F.A. (T.F.).  
Lieutenant R. E. Birch, R.N.  
Colonel H. W. Brackenbury, R.F.A. (T.F.).  
Lieut.-Colonel W. B. Eddowes, 10th (Service) Bn. Yorkshire Regiment.  
Lieutenant G. N. Gilbertson, R.N.  
Captain D. M. Murray-Lyon, Highland Light Infantry.  
Paymaster-in-Chief C. Roach-Smith, R.N.  
Major A. H. T. Rouse, I.A.  
The Reverend F. K. Scott, Army Chaplain.  
Captain J. W. Tipton, 19th Alberta Dragoons, Canadian Forces.  
Commander J. C. Hamilton, R.N.  
Captain F. R. Humphreys, R.A.M.C. (T.F.).  
Lieut.-Colonel A. B. King, late Royal Irish Regiment.  
Captain E. M. Phillpotts, R.N.  
Assistant Paymaster P. Smiles, R.N.  
Lieutenant I. W. S. Symons, Royal West Surrey Regiment.  
Captain A. C. H. B. Wight-Boycott, R.F.A. (T.F.).  
Lieutenant G. P. Gibson, 5th Bn. Royal Welsh Fusiliers (T.F.).  
Second-Lieutenant P. A. Aitchison, Staffordshire Yeomanry.  
Lieut.-Colonel A. C. Churchman, 6th Bn. Suffolk Regiment (T.F.).  
Major R. H. Gillespie, Leicestershire Regiment.  
Lieut.-Colonel C. H. Haig, 9th (Service) Bn. Leicestershire Regiment.



Lieutenant K. C. Helyar, R.N.  
 Lieut.-Colonel P. L. Ingpen, West Yorkshire Regiment.  
 Second-Lieutenant R. St. G. Lake, 4th Bn. Oxfordshire and Buckingham  
 Light Infantry.  
 Captain G. L. Parry, R.M.L.I.  
 Captain G. F. Reynolds, 9th Lancers.  
 Major B. P. Richardson, Royal Canadian Engineers.  
 Lieutenant A. B. Sadler, 6th Bn. Black Watch (T.F.).  
 Captain F. M. Steel, 27th Canadian Infantry.  
 Second-Lieutenant C. R. Stone, 22nd (Service) Bn. Royal Fusiliers.  
 Lieut.-Commander L. A. D. Sturdee, R.N.  
 Second-Lieutenant F. M. Wheatley, 5th Bn. London Regiment (T.F.).  
 Lieutenant C. H. L. Woodhouse, R.N.  
 Surgeon-Major W. Hammond, late 2nd V.B., D.C.L.I.  
 Captain J. E. Laurie, Seaforth Highlanders.  
 Captain H. E. S. Pears, 4th Bn. D.C.L.I. (T.F.).  
 Lieut.-Colonel R. I. Rawson, Gloucestershire Regiment.  
 Major J. R. Siddall, 6th Dragoons.  
 Lieut.-Colonel A. E. FitzGerald, 15th (Service) Bn. Durham Light Infantry.  
 Lieutenant F. H. M. Lewes, 5th Bn. The Sherwood Foresters (T.F.).  
 Captain A. J. Millard, 11th (Service) Bn. Royal Warwickshire Regiment.  
 Captain D. Wilson-Barker, late R.N.R.  
 Second-Lieutenant S. C. Askwith, R.F.A.  
 Lieutenant R. G. P. Borthwick, Reserve of Officers, 10th Hussars.  
 Lieut.-Colonel L. T. Bowles, late East Surrey Regiment.  
 Captain A. T. B. de Cologan, 5th Bn. London Regiment (T.F.).  
 Second-Lieutenant V. A. C. Findlay, R.F.A.  
 Engineer-Lieutenant D. P. Green, R.N.  
 Engineer-Lieutenant H. O. Hill, R.N.  
 Major A. K. Hobbins, 49th Canadian Infantry.  
 Lieut.-Colonel J. G. Ross, Canadian Army Pay Corps.  
 Captain R. C. Woods, R.F.A. (T.F.).  
 Lieutenant J. H. Mitchell, R.N.  
 Second-Lieutenant W. A. C. Smelt, Essex Regiment.  
 Major G. E. Morgans, Royal Marines.  
 Lieutenant A. W. La T. Bisset, R.N.  
 Captain S. Wheeler, 24th Bn. London Regiment (T.F.).  
 Captain J. Falvey-Beyts, 11th (Service) Bn. Royal Warwickshire Regiment.  
 Lieut.-Colonel J. A. Gunn, 24th Bn. Canadian Infantry.  
 Second-Lieutenant D. A. Learmont, R.F.A.  
 Brig.-General A. E. Marchant, C.B., A.D.C., R.M.L.I.  
 Lieut.-Commander H. R. Priston, R.N.  
 Captain W. L. B. Hill, late Gloucestershire Regiment.  
 Lieutenant Hon. J. M. Kenworthy, R.N.  
 Commander F. W. Chaine, R.N.  
 Lieut.-Colonel H. R. Headlam, D.S.O., York and Lancaster Regiment.  
 Paymaster W. D. T. Morrish, R.N.  
 Second-Lieutenant H. F. Smith, D.C.L.I.  
 Lieut.-Colonel F. B. Bowyer-Lane, late Shropshire Light Infantry.  
 Captain V. L. S. Cowley, Royal Irish Rifles.  
 Captain C. C. Hewitt, Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers.  
 Captain R. G. Gregory, late R.N.  
 Major F. J. F. Edlmann, 12th (Service) Bn. Northumberland Fusiliers.

Captain G. H. Brunner, 5th Bn. Cheshire Regiment (T.F.).  
 Fleet-Paymaster J. P. Ratcliff, R.N.  
 Lieutenant H. Forrester, R.N.  
 Captain P. G. Barton, Royal Fusiliers.  
 Lieut.-Commander G. W. Hallifax, R.N.  
 Second-Lieutenant E. W. F. Knight, 9th (Reserve) Bn. Royal Fusiliers.  
 Lieutenant G. R. Doyle, A.O.D.  
 Lieutenant A. P. M. Lewes, R.N.  
 Captain C. S. Rattigan, 7th (Reserve) Bn. Royal Fusiliers.  
 Second-Lieutenant J. M. Troutbeck, 12th Bn. London Regiment (T.F.).  
 Second-Lieutenant A. H. Wilson, Royal Fusiliers.  
 Second-Lieutenant R. B. T. Kelly, R.F.A.  
 Surgeon-Major E. W. Livesey, R. Alderney Artillery and Engineers.  
 Second-Lieutenant G. L. Troutbeck, Bucks. Bn., Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry (T.F.).  
 Captain D. Barnett, 2nd (Garrison) Bn. Royal Welsh Fusiliers.  
 Lieut.-Colonel W. H. Hussey-Walsh, 2nd (Garrison) Bn. Royal Welsh Fusiliers.  
 Captain A. C. Charnier, late Lincolnshire Regiment.  
 Lieut.-Colonel D. A. Callender, C.M.G., The Royal Scots.  
 Second-Lieutenant G. E. C. Collinson, Cameron Highlanders.  
 Second-Lieutenant F. Crawford, Royal Irish Fusiliers.  
 Captain T. Edwards, 11th (Service) Bn. Worcestershire Regiment.  
 Captain D. A. Fletcher, Cameron Highlanders.  
 Captain R. L. McCall, Cameron Highlanders.  
 Lieutenant G. St. J. Llewellyn, R.N.  
 Lieut.-Colonel C. W. D. Lynch, 9th (Service) Bn. K.O. Yorkshire Light Infantry.  
 Lieut.-Commander E. O. B. S. Osborne, R.N.  
 Captain A. F. Palmer, R.A.M.C.  
 Lieut.-Colonel R. J. I. Hesketh, 7th (Reserve) Bn. Royal Fusiliers.  
 Captain A. P. Davidson, R.N.  
 Captain F. Larken, R.N.  
 Lieut.-Commander F. P. Saunders, R.N.  
 Captain W. J. Allen, 16th (Service) Bn. Royal Irish Rifles.  
 Lieutenant R. Shelley, R.N.  
 Lieut.-Colonel H. C. Jackson, D.S.O., Bedfordshire Regiment.  
 Major R. L. Beasley, Gloucestershire Regiment.  
 F. A. Medwin, Esq., late Midshipman, R.N.  
 Captain G. Nicholson, Hampshire Regiment.  
 Lieutenant M. Goolden, R.N.  
 Captain A. MacD. Ritchie, Argyll & Sutherland Highlanders.  
 Captain J. W. Webber, 3rd South African Infantry.  
 Lieutenant M. P. Lothian, Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders.  
 Lieutenant R. H. O. Hanbury, 15th Hussars.  
 Brevet Major F. G. Powell, Dorsetshire Regiment.  
 Major A. A. Soames, K.R.R.C.  
 Lieutenant A. B. White, 5th Bn. London Regiment (T.F.).

Joined as Life Members between March 8th and April 30th on the new terms:—

Lieut.-Colonel G. E. N. Booker, 1st Reserve Regiment of Cavalry.  
 Lieut.-Colonel A. W. H. Hay-Drummond, 6th Bn. Black Watch (T.F.).  
 Captain D. A. Browne, Royal Irish Rifles.  
 Captain H. E. Stewart, 8th (Service) Bn. Royal Sussex Regiment.

Captain A. W. W. Row, Middlesex Regiment.  
 Major N. A. Flower, 13th Bn. London Regiment (T.F.).  
 Lieutenant F. A. L. Lawrence, Middlesex Regiment.  
 Lieut.-Colonel A. W. Jarvis, C.M.G., M.V.O., T.D., 3rd County of London  
 Yeomanry.

## V.—Library Subscription Reduced.

The Council have pleasure in announcing that for the present, and as a temporary measure, it is decided to reduce the subscription to the Lending Library from 10s. per annum to 5s. per annum. The Library is rich in works of reference, Military and Naval, Historical, Scientific, etc.; a subscriber can take out as many as four volumes at one time.

## VI.—The R.U.S.I. Journal.

### PAYMENT FOR CONTRIBUTIONS.

Naval and military officers, whether Members of the Institution or not, are invited to send papers, essays, experiences, narratives, etc., which may appear to be of general interest, for the consideration of the Editor, with a view to publication in the Quarterly JOURNAL of the Institution.

## VII.—The Museum.

The amount taken for admission to the Museum during the past quarter was:—

£30 11 6 in February.  
 £30 5 6 in March.  
 £67 5 0 in April.

### ADDITIONS.

- (6784) Badge of the new decoration of the Royal Red Cross (second class), which was instituted by Royal Warrant on November 10th, 1915.—Given by the Army Council.

- (6785) Specimen of a device for detonating a land mine adopted by the Germans during the late campaign in South-West Africa.

The device is a T-shaped piece of iron piping. Inside the T-piece was a small glass phial on which rested an iron rod, and round the phial some chemical substance was placed. The phial contained a liquid chemical which, on the phial being broken by the iron rod, caused an explosion.

The T-piece was buried under the ground amongst a quantity of explosive and scrap metals, the other end of the rod just projecting above the surface of the ground.—Given by Major-General C. W. Thompson, C.B., D.S.O., G.O.C., South African Military Command.

- (6786) Silver Cup "presented by his friends and late brother officers to Captain John Phillips (now) of the 7th Royal Veteran Battalion, as a token of their individual esteem for his private worth, and as a public testimony of the assistance they received from nearly nine years' devotion of his military knowledge to the formation and establishment of the 2nd Royal Lancashire Regiment of Militia, February 1st, 1806." Bequeathed by the late Miss A. E. C. Clark.

- (6787) Small Bog Oak Box, stated to have belonged to Sir Francis Drake. —Bequeathed by the late Miss M. B. Tolhurst.
- (6788) Presentation Sword given to Major-General Sir John Malcolm, East India Company.  
Sir John Malcolm was born in 1769 and entered the service of the East India Company in 1782; Secretary to Sir Alured Clarke, Commander-in-Chief in Madras from 1795 to 1797; and to his successor, Lord Harris, 1797-98; sent by Lord Wellesley as Envoy to Persia, 1799-1801; Political Agent to Lord Wellesley during the Mahratta War, 1803; sent on a mission to Teheran, 1808-09; K.C.B., 1815; as Brigadier in the Mahratta War, 1817-18; Governor of Bombay, 1826-30. He died in 1833.—Given by Field-Marshal Sir Evelyn Wood, V.C., G.C.B., G.C.M.G.
- (6789) Chinese Trench Mortar taken by the donor from the Shiker Arsenal, 1900, during the Boxer Rebellion.—Given by Major J. H. R. Cox, late 6th Inniskilling Dragoons.

#### VIII.—Distribution of the Journal—Members' Addresses.

Owing to the War, Members' addresses have become so uncertain, and are so constantly changing, that punctual distribution of the JOURNAL is quite impracticable, and many Members must fail to receive their copies. As a matter of fact, a great many copies of the last number have been returned to the Institution, through the Post Office, "Addressee not found." It is notified, therefore, that any Member who does not receive a copy of the present issue can be supplied by applying to the Secretary and giving an address.

**THE JOURNAL**  
OF THE  
***Royal United Service Institution.***

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VOL. LXI.

MAY, 1916.

No. 442.

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[Authors alone are responsible for the contents of their respective Papers. All communications (except those for perusal by the Editor only) should be addressed to the Secretary, Royal United Service Institution.]

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**THE MARCH OF CRAUFURD'S LIGHT BRIGADE  
TO TALAVERA: JULY 28-29, 1809.**

**AN OLD LEGEND CORRECTED, FROM THE PAPERS OF  
SIR JOHN BELL, K.C.B.**

By PROFESSOR C. OMAN, M.A.

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EVER since William Napier published the second volume of his monumental "Peninsular War," the legend has been current that Robert Craufurd's famous "Light Brigade," the nucleus of the still more famous "Light Division," marched 62 miles in 26 hours, thus establishing a record for rapid movement among all the marches of formed bodies of disciplined troops down to this day. The legend has been attacked more than once, but still preserves its vitality. I find it repeated once more in the excellent "History of the Oxford and Bucks Light Infantry," by Sir Henry Newbolt, which appeared only last winter. The vehemence and eloquence of Napier's narrative, in this case, as in several others, has borne down all criticism, and his story still holds the field, though it is manifestly incorrect. The critics had the best of the argument, but the volumes of Napier are in every library, and are utilized without suspicion by the modern writers, who



are unaware of their inaccuracies, and have never read the works of those who corrected them. In this particular case the efforts of Sir G. Pomeroy Colley, and Colonel Furse,<sup>1</sup> the author of the standard book on military marching, seem to have been spent in vain. It is much the same with Macaulay's "History of England," where vivid writing has in so many cases triumphed over the truth, despite of all the efforts of the friends of accuracy.

In recent years I chanced to purchase a considerable packet of the letters and papers of an old 52nd Officer of great reputation, Sir John Bell, K.C.B., who had in his day done his best to get the legend corrected, "in the interest of military truth" as he puts it, and who, having failed, had consigned his arguments and evidence to the form of a memorandum. He had made the famous march himself, which William Napier (as we shall see) had not: and he was scandalized to find an incredible story substituted for the record of what had been a most creditable piece of military work, within the limits of the possible.

The tale is one which has crept from Napier's pages into the large majority of modern English military books. It is the allegation that Robert Craufurd, on hearing that Wellesley and the French were in close touch on the Tagus, and that a battle was imminent, succeeded in marching 62 miles in 26 hours with his three famous regiments, and arrived too late for the action indeed, but within 12 hours of its end. That the march had been a hard one every man knew, and in the books printed before Napier published his eloquent volumes there is generally an acknowledgment of its severity, though all that Lord Londonderry, the first general historian of the war, thought fit to say was that "on the morning after the battle we were joined by General Craufurd's Brigade from Lisbon. Had it arrived only a few hours earlier, more perhaps might have been done: but it came at a moment when our successes were not sufficient to reconcile us to our position."<sup>2</sup> This is a rather ungracious remark, considering the energy which the brigade had expended in getting to the front. But the contemporary diarists in the Light Brigade gave themselves full and proper credit for their exertions.

The legend, however, came into full existence with the publication of William Napier's second volume in the year 1829. We must give it in his own terms, as much of Sir John Bell's criticism of it turns on the exact wording of the story. The paragraphs run as follows:—

"The 29th, at daybreak, the French army quitted its position, and was before 6 o'clock again in order of battle behind the Alberche. That day Robert Craufurd reached the British camp, with the 43rd, 52nd and 95th Regiments, and at once took charge of the outposts. These troops had been, after a march of 20 miles, huddled near Malpartida de Plasencia, when the alarm spread by the Spanish fugitives spread to that part. Craufurd, fearing for the army, allowed only a few hours' rest, and then, withdrawing about 50 of the weakest from the ranks,

<sup>1</sup> See Furse's "Art of Marching," pp. 230-2.

<sup>2</sup> Londonderry, Vol. i., p. 413.



recommended his march, with a resolution not to halt till the field of battle was reached. As the brigade advanced, crowds of runaways were met with, not all Spaniards, but all propagating the vilest falsehoods:—'*Sir Arthur Wellesley was killed—the French were only a few miles distant*'—nay, some, blinded by their fears, pretended to point out the enemy's advanced posts on the nearest hills. Indignant at this shameful scene, the troops hastened rather than slackened their impetuous pace, and, leaving only 17 stragglers behind, in 26 hours crossed the field of battle in a close and compact body; having in that time passed over 62 English miles in the hottest season of the year, each man carrying from 50 to 60 pounds weight upon his shoulders. Had the historian Gibbon known of such a march, he would have spared his sneer about 'the delicacy of modern soldiers.'"<sup>1</sup>

It is stated with sufficient clearness in this paragraph that the starting-place was Malpartida de Plasencia, and that the day of the march was the 28th, since, if after 26 hours of movement the brigade reached the battlefield early on the 29th, it must have started on the



preceding day, neither earlier nor later. Moreover, we are given 62 miles as the mileage covered, and that fairly tallies with the actual distance between Malpartida and Talavera, which modern maps represent as being 68 miles by rail and 63 by road. But these figures would appear to be the only exact detail given in Napier's paragraphs. For, as we shall presently see, the brigade left Malpartida not on the 28th but on the 26th of July; the place from which it made its hurried march to Talavera was not Malpartida at all, and the distance which it covered, after Craufurd got the alarm and began to force the pace of his men, was a little over 40 and not 62 miles. That is to say, the rate at which the continuous march was executed was about one mile and a half per hour, not two miles and a third. Or when the necessary halts, lasting six hours, are deducted—of which more anon—the rate worked out at the very possible average of two miles an hour, not at the impossible three miles—a scale that could not be kept up by any formed body of men for such a long time.

<sup>1</sup> "Napier," Vol. ii., pp. 178-79.

Napier is often quoted as an eye-witness of the march, and as having himself taken part in it. This is, however, not correct. It may suffice to quote the autobiography of his brother, Sir George Napier, on the point (p. 107):—

"An officer of the 43rd told me my brother William was taken very ill, and was unable to proceed with his regiment. I immediately went to him, and found he was very ill indeed, and in consequence of the quantity of blood the surgeon had found it necessary to take from him, he could not stand. So I got a bullock car, and placing him in it, with some straw, I went to Plasencia with him, to the hospital which had been established there. Upon arriving, the commandant gave me a good quarter for him, I put him into a comfortable warm bed, and in about five or six hours, after a good sleep, I left him in the care of his servant and the doctor, and started to overtake the regiment, which was no easy matter, as an express had arrived with orders for the brigade to make a forced march and join the army as quickly as possible."

What followed was infinitely to William Napier's credit, but proves sufficiently that he did not accompany his regiment any further than the hospital at Plasencia, where his brother left him stowed away comfortably in the warm bed.

"He was lying in the extremity of weakness, when a rumour came in of the defeat of Sir Arthur Wellesley, and the advance of Soult upon Plasencia. He sprang out of bed, walked 40 miles to Oropesa, got a horse there, and rode on to Talavera. At the city gate he fainted, and some Spaniards, mistaking him from his blue overcoat for a Frenchman, would have put him to death, had not an officer of the 45th Regiment happened to come up. By and by, his brother George heard of the state in which he was, and, arriving with a mule, carried him to the Light Brigade, then at the outposts of the enemy."

This last paragraph I add, not from Sir George Napier's autobiography—which, oddly enough, says nothing about the invalid after Plasencia—but from one of Sir John Bell's many notes. But the facts are also narrated on pages 53-4 of Sir William's official biography by his relative, H. A. Bruce, which appeared shortly after his death, in very much the same words that Sir John uses. There can be no doubt about the incident. Napier made an heroic effort, and in a condition of dreadful bodily weakness rejoined his regiment some little time—it may have been a day or perhaps even more—after it had reached Talavera. He was not present with it on the march, and he cannot have been, for some time after, in a condition to calculate hours and miles. As Sir John Bell remarks in another note, "his evidence about them is, after all, only hearsay."

Let us turn, then, to the evidence of those who were actually with the Light Brigade during its famous march. They are unanimous in stating that on the 28th, the day that the forced march of 26 hours began, Craufurd and his men were at Naval Moral, a place only some 40 miles from Talavera, and *not* at Malpartida, the village named by Napier, which is really some 63 miles from the battle spot.

Sir John Bell collected all the evidence which lay before him, but several then unpublished diaries and books of reminiscences by Light Brigade veterans have been printed since he made his enquiries in 1860. The authorities which he cites are :—

(1) The official monthly return of the strength of the army in Spain—now at the Record Office. He obtained a copy of this document, with a certificate from the Adjutant-General's office, to the effect that "first battalions of the 43rd, 52nd, and 95th Regiments were at Malpartida on July 25th, according to the return signed by Sir Arthur Wellesley." This is conclusive as far as it goes, proving that the brigade was at Malpartida three days before the date on which William Napier states that it left that village. And it could not have halted there three days, as is proved by the following diaries quoted by Sir John Bell.

(2) Journal of Lieutenant (afterwards Major-General) John Cox, 1st Battalion 95th Regiment. His widow enclosed an extract of it to Sir John, which is among the latter's papers :—

"July 24th. Marched to Gallistea, a strongly-situated walled town on the Allagon.

July 25th. Moved over a plain (with the Sierra de Gata tipped with snow in view) to Malpartida on the River Calzones.

July 26th. Crossed the River Tietar by a flying bridge, and had a most fatiguing march to Venta de Bazzagona.

July 27th. To Naval Moral, heat oppressive.

July 28th. Marched at daylight to the town of Calzada, where an express met us from the Commander-in-Chief, Sir Arthur Wellesley, ordering the brigade to proceed without delay to his position on the River Alberche at Talavera de la Reyna. We pushed on two leagues to Oropeza, and halted there four hours, having already marched 26 miles under a burning sun. [The real distance from Naval Moral to Oropeza is only 19 miles.]

The bugles sounded 'fall in' and onward we marched, completing 30 miles more during the night, through heavy, sandy roads, and arriving at Talavera next morning after the most celebrated march on record, viz., 56 miles in 25 hours." [But Talavera is only 21 miles from Oropeza, and Oropeza 19 from Naval Moral, so that the total is only about 40.]

(3) Sir John Bell's own notes, found among his papers :—

"July 22nd, Saturday; moved to Coria.

" 23rd, Sunday; halt at ditto.

" 24th, Monday; moved to Galisteo: regiments mustered.

" 25th, Tuesday; to Malpartida.

" 26th, Wednesday; to Venta de Bazzagona, on left bank of the Tietar.

" 27th, Thursday; Naval Moral.

" 28th, Friday; Oropeza—thence by forced march to—

" 29th, Saturday; Talavera, arriving about sunrise."

(4) Journal of Colonel J. Leach, C.B., published 1831, after Napier's Talavera volume had appeared, under the title of "Rough Sketches of the Life of an old Soldier":—

"During the 24th, 25th, 26th and 27th we continued our march, under a burning sun. In those days we passed from Coria to Naval Moral, many miles of the route being through extensive and very thick forests of ilex and cork.

On the evening of the 27th, vague rumours reached us at Naval Moral relative to the hostile armies. We knew nothing certain, further than that Sir Arthur Wellesley and the Spanish General Cuesta had united their forces in the plains some leagues to our front: and as the French under Victor were known to be not far distant from the allied army, a general action might be expected daily.

July 28th. Before day dawned we were off again, and ere long something like a distant cannonade was heard. Our suspense and anxiety may easily be imagined, aware as we were of the proximity of the hostile forces to each other. We arrived at Orapeza (*sic*) at mid-day, where General Crawford (*sic*) considered a short halt necessary indispensably. He then directed the commanding officers of regiments to select and leave at Orapeza such men as were thought incapable of enduring the forced march which he determined to make, and not to halt till we reached the British Army, which was known to be engaged in our front, as the distant but unceasing cannonade plainly announced. Having rested his brigade in this burning plain, where water was not to be procured, General Crawford put it in motion toward Talavera de la Reyna.

We soon met wounded Spanish soldiers and Spanish soldiers *not* wounded, bending their course in a direction from the field of battle. I wish I could assert with equal truth that this retrogression was confined to our Spanish allies, but the truth must be told, and I regret to say that stragglers from the British Army, some without a wound, were also taking a similar direction to the rear. As they passed our column they circulated all sorts and kinds of reports of a most disheartening nature: 'The British Army was utterly defeated and in full retreat': 'Sir Arthur Wellesley was wounded,' and, by others, 'he was killed.' In short, all was suspense and uncertainty.

We pressed forward until 10 o'clock at night, when, having reached a pool of stagnant water, in which cattle had been watered during the summer, and where they had constantly wallowed, a halt was made. Those who have never been in similar circumstances may doubt my veracity, when I state that the whole brigade, officers and soldiers, rushed into this muddy water, and drank with an eagerness and avidity impossible to describe.  
 . . . . . Excessive thirst knows no laws.

After a short repose on the banks of this horsepool we again got under weigh, and, without another halt, joined the British Army in its position at Talavera. . . . . To show that our



brigade did all that men could to reach the field of action in time, suffice it to say that in 24 hours it passed over upwards of 50 miles [really 40] of country; as extraordinary a march, perhaps, as is to be found on record; particularly when it is remembered that each soldier carried from 60 to 80 rounds of ammunition, a musket or rifle, a great coat, and (if I remember rightly) a blanket; also knapsack complete, with shoes, shirts, etc., etc., a canteen and haversack, belts, etc. . . . Very few men comparatively were left upon the road. The constant cannonade heard in front was a stimulus which had a most beneficial effect, and made them forget for a time their extraordinary fatigue." [pp. 81-2.]

Leach, as I have noted above, published his book after Napier's second volume had appeared. He says that he kept a daily journal and put together his "rough sketches" by writing it up "with the aid of a tolerably good memory." I think that no impartial reader will fail to acknowledge that his narrative, just given, shows traces of Napier in it. But it will be observed that he clearly makes Naval Moral the starting-place of the great march, not Malpartida. And he only claims that the distance covered was "over 50" miles, not 62.

The sources used by Sir John Bell were his own and Cox's Journals, and Leach. But since he engaged in his controversy, which ran over the years 1860-64, several more first-hand authorities have come to light, viz., "The Memoirs of Sir George Napier of the 43rd" (William Napier's brother), first printed in 1886, "The Journal of George Simmons of the 95th," which came out in 1899, and "The Autobiography of Sir Harry Smith," published in 1901.<sup>1</sup> George Napier and Harry Smith wrote their narratives long after the Great Wars were over, in the evening of their lives, and when William Napier's great book was every Peninsular veteran's Bible. Both of them give an account of the march in which I think that traces of that great book may be discovered. But George Napier ends up with saying that the Light Brigade marched "50 miles in 22 hours";<sup>2</sup> he does not give the starting-place, mentioning neither Malpartida nor Naval Moral. Sir Harry Smith mentions neither of these names, but his very short narrative gives another starting-place, obviously an impossible one. "We had some very harrassing and excessively hot marches. In the last 28 hours we marched from Oropeza to Talavera, a distance of 14 Spanish leagues, 56 miles, our soldiers carrying their heavy packs, and the riflemen 80 rounds of ammunition. But the Battle of Talavera was thundering in our ears, and created a spirit in the brigade which cast away all idea of fatigue."<sup>3</sup> Now, if anything is a geographical certainty, it is that Oropeza is not 56 miles from Talavera, but just over

<sup>1</sup> There is also a short extract from the unpublished diary of Lieutenant Pollock of the 43rd in Levinge's "Historical Record" of that regiment. But the figures furnished are even wilder than Napier's—"66 miles in 30 hours." Pollock, however, rightly gives Naval Moral as the starting point, not Malpartida.

<sup>2</sup> "Passages of the Early Military Life of Sir George Napier, K.C.B.," p. 109.

<sup>3</sup> "Autobiography of Sir Harry Smith," Vol. i., p. 19.

21—as witness any map, and the record of the invaluable Baedeker. Smith was writing *currente calamo*, and in pouring out his vivid and spontaneous paragraphs did not trouble to look at works of reference—not even at Napier, of whom traces may be found in other parts of his autobiography.

The evidence of the third eye-witness, whose work was published too late to be used by Sir John Bell, viz., George Simmons of the 95th, lands us in a new and puzzling problem. Simmons' Journal is practically identical in matter, and often identical in wording also, with the Journal of Colonel Cox, also of the 95th, which Bell had before him, and of which the extracts, written by the hand of Mrs. Cox, in 1864, now lie before me. To make this clear, I print them opposite each other.

*Cox's Journal.*

24th.—Marched to Gallistea, a strongly-situated walled town on the Allagon.

25th.—Moved over a plain (with the Sierra de Gata, tipped with snow, in view) to the village of Malpartida on the River Calzones.

26th.—Next day crossed the River Tietar by a flying bridge and had a most fatiguing march to Venta de Bazagona.

27th.—To Naval Moral, heat oppressive.

28th.—Marched at daylight to the town of Calzada, where an express reached us from the Commander-in-Chief ordering us to proceed without delay to his position on the River Alberche, at Talavera de la Reyna. After a short rest we pushed on to Oropeza, halting there four hours, having already marched 26 miles under a burning sun. The bugles sounded "fall in" and onward we marched, completing 30 miles more during the night, through heavy sandy roads, and arriving at Talavera next morning after the most celebrated march on record, viz., 56 miles in 25 hours.

*Simmons' Journal.*

24th.—Marched to Gallistea, a town strongly situated and walled all round, upon the Alagon.

25th.—Marched to Malpartida, and saw at a distance the Gata mountains, with their summits covered with snow.

26th.—Marched to the River Tietar, and crossed by a bridge of boats: the day exceedingly hot and the column much fatigued. Arrived at Venta de Bazagona.

27th.—Marched to Naval Moral. Heat very oppressive.

29th.—Marched very early to the town of Calzada where an express arrived from Sir Arthur Wellesley directing the brigade to make the least possible delay in joining the Army. The brigade, after a short rest, marched to Oropeza where it halted four hours to cook, having marched under a scorching sun. We again commenced the march all night, in very deep and sandy roads, and arrived upon the field of battle at Talavera de la Reyna this morning, having marched 62 English miles in 26 hours.



Now I think that no reader can peruse these two journals without coming to the conclusion that either Cox lent his diary to Simmons, or Simmons lent his diary to Cox, and that one or the other copied the paragraphs of the lender, making deliberate alteration of words, but keeping to the arrangement of the narrative. Their only divergence is as to the miles marched and time spent in marching, one giving 56 miles in 25 hours, the other 62 in 26. The only fact contained in one diary, but not in the other, is the trivial one that the halt at Oropesa was to allow the men to cook. I take it to be psychologically impossible that two officers, without seeing each other's journals, could each have mentioned nothing but precisely what the other had written. I leave it to the critical student of texts to discover which is likely to have been the borrower and which the lender, from the forms of words used.

As authorities the two run together. And both are equally out, according to the map, in their calculation of distances. But both start the forced march at Naval Moral, and not (like Napier) at Malpartida.

It remains to explain how Sir John Bell came to take up the controversy as to times and distances. In 1860 the officers of the 52nd, both those on the Retired List and those still with the regiment, were busy in raising the funds by the aid of which Captain Moorsom's excellent "Historical Record" of their famous corps was compiled and printed. They appointed a "Committee of Direction," on which served their few surviving Peninsular veterans, notably the Duke of Richmond, Sir Frederick Love, Sir John Bell (the "only begetter" of this long-delayed correction of an old legend), Sir William Moore, and Colonel George Napier; Captain Moorsom submitted his chapters, as they were written, to such members of the committee as desired to see them. When the Talavera chapter came to hand, Sir John Bell at once raised objections to the reproduction of the long-received narrative of William Napier. Here is his formal note to the compiler:—

"May 8th, 1860.

"MY DEAR MOORSOM,

"I promised to put in writing my reasons for questioning the accuracy of Sir Wm. Napier's account of the Light Brigade's march to Talavera, and I now fulfil that promise.

"Until the last two days I had not read that account since the 2nd volume of the 'History of the War in the Peninsula' came out. It ran as follows [full copy given].

"Condensing his narrative into a few words, it stands thus:—The Brigade had already marched 20 miles: it then rested a few hours, and marched 62 miles more. Thus, if there be any meaning in words, the total distance marched must have been 82 miles, not 62. I must therefore deal with this enormous '20 + 62 miles' march,' as if it was really performed, *which I most distinctly and emphatically deny.*

"But as a simple denial of the alleged fact will carry no authority, I proceed to enquire whether the thing was *possible.*

"The brigade halted five minutes in every hour for an obvious reason. Fifty-five minutes' march at the regulated pace gives the rate of  $23\frac{1}{2}$  minutes per mile, or  $2\frac{3}{4}$  miles 165 yards for each hour, halts included. General Shaw Kennedy, in supporting Napier's statement, says 'the brigade marched generally at 3 o'clock in the morning,' and such was the fact. Therefore at the usual rate of march it could not have reached its ground [Napier's alleged starting-point] before 10 a.m., his march of 20 miles requiring seven hours.

"Now, then, we have the 26 hours reduced to 19, out of which *must* come the six hours for cooking, rests, and sleep. Consequently only 13 hours remain in which to march the 62 miles. Let us try whether this be possible.

"The simple but unerring 'Rule of Three' tells us that if seven hours give 20 miles marched, then 13 hours will give only  $37\frac{1}{2}$  miles, not 62. But the men *did* the feat, it seems! And I, who was there, must have done it with them—none of us dreaming that we were doing anything calculated to 'shut up Gibbon,' if he had lived to hear of it. However, 'the troops hastened rather than slackened the impetuosity of their pace.' So let us try to ascertain what was the rate per hour at which they marched to come to 'time.' The trial is easily made, for the same rule tells us that if you mean to do your distance handsomely you must step out at the rate of  $4\frac{3}{4}$  miles 135 yards per hour!

"After this, I think, the 20-mile portion of the march must be given up. So much the better for poor Gibbon.

"Let us now try whether Napier's real meaning was not simply this—the brigade had done its day's march of 20 miles, and then was pushed on, and did the remaining 42 miles—making only 62 miles in the 26 hours.

"Still, as before, only 13 hours remain for marching, as is already shown, and the distance could not be done at the regulated rate of infantry. The rate required for such an effort is three miles 406 yards per hour, or 456 yards per hour above the ordinary pace, allowing for the hourly halt. It is next to impossible to believe that 3,000 men, just come off a 20-mile march, could have kept up such a rate for 13 hours, by night as well as by day. The truth is simply that *they did not*.

"How, then, was the march really performed—in what time, and for what distance? I'll tell you, now that the ground is cleared.

"We left our night's bivouac at Malpartida on the morning of the 26th, not the 28th, and bivouacked that night in the wood on the left bank of the Tietar, near the Venta de Bazagona. Next morning to Naval Moral, and bivouacked for the night of the 27th.

"On the morning of the 28th at the usual hour, I think 3 a.m., we marched for Oropesa. The distance was considerable, and the day very hot, so I think we could hardly have arrived before 11 o'clock. The firing at Talavera was distinctly heard on the march, loudly pro-

claiming that our army in front was engaged. The brigade cooked, and rested for about four hours, resumed its march, and met crowds of runaways. We halted for about two hours in the night near a very muddy pool, started again, and reached the right of the battlefield shortly after sunrise. After some little delay, waiting for orders, we finally moved up to the right bank of the Alberche river, and thus completed our march.

"You are already aware that I never could make out that the march exceeded 52 miles, at the utmost. And Arrowsmith's map has now pretty well satisfied me that 48 would be nearer the mark. [Even this is much too high a figure.] The mere length of the march was not so remarkable as the *splendid* style in which the men did their work—arriving, as they did, at its close, fresh as if they had only done an ordinary day's march, and ready for anything.

"It is useless to conjecture now what could have led to Sir William Napier's fixing on Malpartida as the second point of departure instead of Oropesa. It must have been a mere mistake between the two names, which necessarily led him unawares into error in computing distances.

"I have prepared this, my Record, for you to keep, in case the alteration should expose you to any questions on the subject. The survivors of the Light Brigade will scarcely thank me for endeavouring to deprive them of so large a portion of the credit which, in common with myself, they have so long enjoyed on the faith of Napier's account of an event in which he was himself a participator. My only excuse for having done so is this—I *did not like to see an erroneous statement in the service-record of my own well-beloved regiment.*

"Believe me,

"Yours, etc.,

"J. B."

As Sir John had foreseen, his attempt to get the true distances and place-names inserted in Moorsom's "Historical Record of the 52nd Light Infantry" brought him much trouble, and a considerable amount of acrimonious correspondence with other Light Division veterans. Moreover, he failed to get the facts stated according to his version in the book whose issue raised the controversy. Moorsom's paragraph runs as follows—(pp. 114-15):—

"The route of the brigade was by Santarem, Abrantes, and Plasencia, and it arrived at Oropesa on the forenoon of the 28th, having that morning performed a tiresome march of 24 miles. Here some of the Spanish fugitives from the first day's fighting at Talavera spread the alarm which cowards usually bring as to the defeat of their own party, and Craufurd, fearing that the British Army might be pressed, resolved to press vigorously forward. The regiments had just bivouacked, when they were ordered to prepare to march again. As soon as the men had cooked and eaten their dinners the march was resumed, and these regiments arrived in the vicinity of Talavera before daylight on the morning of the 29th, having performed a forced march of 48 miles in excessively hot weather, in addition to the 24 miles on

the preceding day; in all, 62 miles in 26 hours,<sup>1</sup> each man carrying his arms, ammunition, and accoutrements, weighing between 50 and 60 pounds."

Moorsom, as it is evident, carefully avoided giving the starting-point of the Light Brigade—he neither names Malpartida nor Naval Moral. And therefore it is impossible for the reader to convict him of giving either the wrong starting-place [Malpartida] or the wrong date of the departure from it [28th instead of 26th July] as did Napier. But Napier nevertheless is the real parent of his paragraph. The sources quoted above sufficiently show that Naval Moral was the place left on the 28th and that the distance from thence to Talavera is only a little over 40 miles. No one would suspect these facts from reading the "Historical Record of the 52nd."

Sir John Bell was not unnaturally vexed to see his very clear and lucid proof of the actual distance of the march rejected by Moorsom, and continued his protests, endeavouring to induce other Light Division veterans to join him in setting the matter right—in case a second edition of the "Historical Record" should ever appear. He met with some support, but with more resistance—his old friends would not give up the "62 miles in 26 hours," which had been for so many years their pride and glory.

How Sir John's efforts were generally received may be judged by a letter which he got from General Sir J. Shaw Kennedy, once Craufurd's aide-de-camp and brigade-major.

"8 Circus, Bath,

"May 13th, 1864.

"MY DEAR BELL,

"I see by your letter, and to my very great regret, that you are inclined to make a persevering attack upon Napier's account of the march of the Light Division to Talavera. I think this most unfortunate, as it appears most clearly to me that if the account was disputed, the proper time to bring the question forward was during Napier's life. To this you seem to reply that you brought it forward on the occasion of the 'History of the 52nd' being written.

"To this I must reply that as you knew Napier very well, and were so long with his brother George—and probably had some communication with William when you succeeded him in the command at Guernsey—no one had a better opportunity than you of mentioning the subject to him. My great regret is that you had not let him know the view you took of the matter. This would have drawn from Napier a full discussion of the subject, and given him an opportunity of stating the authorities on which he founded his account of the march.

"The subject being brought up after Napier's death renders this impossible. I have no idea from where he got his information, nor had I the least idea of his opinions about the march to Talavera until

<sup>1</sup> Observe the intentional obscurity of the dates. But taking the 26 hours backward from an arrival at Talavera at daybreak, Moorsom commits himself to making the distance from Naval Moral to Talavera 62 miles!



the publication of his History. Of this, however, I make no doubt, that his authorities were what he considered ample, for the labour which he took to verify everything which he stated in his great work was quite wonderful, as everyone was made to feel who wished to test his accuracy. He had the most ample means of informing himself upon the subject, for he was not only on the ground himself, but must have talked over the subject with many able men who were his friends and constant companions, and who had made the march themselves.

"I think that the continuation of this controversy after Napier's death is truly unfortunate. For a period extending to not less than 30 years Napier's book was before the world, while he was alive and ready to receive and reply to all objections. During this very long period the statement regarding the march of the Light Division remained unimpeached, and has been adopted as historical fact by the military writers of both Europe and America. . . .

"When the statement appeared in his History many of the officers of the 43rd were alive who had made the march, and I never heard its accuracy disputed by any one of them. I adopted it so completely as being correct, that I don't recollect ever having spoken to one of them on the subject. So much was this the case that I never entered into any investigation of the matter, until I heard from Rowan that it was to be impugned in Moorsom's Work. It is now 55 years since the march took place. I can perfectly understand anything apparently at the time of importance, or anything calculated to strike the imagination, being clearly borne in memory for that time, but I cannot understand it for the days, hours, and distances of a march. I could, for example, quote to you conversation that I had with you at Gallegos and Fuente Guinaldo 54 years ago—but I could not name the hours and distances and places of a stupid and tiresome march which occurred 55 years ago. If no actual notes or journal, written at the time, exists to change the features of the story, what proof, resting on your memory alone, can be stronger than Napier's, who, above all men that ever I knew, was gifted with the greatest powers of memory? . . . .

"You say that you are 83, and from all that I hear of you from those who have seen you, and from what I observe in your letters, you are a wonderfully hale man for that age. It gives me great pleasure to know and hear that it is so. . . .

"Believe me, my dear Bell,

"Very sincerely yours,

"J. SHAW KENNEDY."

In short, the typical Peninsular veteran was inclined to regard Napier as infallible, and declined to discuss a question in which the accuracy of that splendid writer was called in question. It was a little hard on Sir John Bell that Shaw Kennedy took it for granted that he had no contemporary journals or notes to show, when he had cited at least three—his own, Leach's and Cox's diaries—in setting forth his case to Moorsom. Sir John brought them to bear upon Shaw Kennedy

also—but to no effect. The latter refused to be drawn into a controversy, and stuck to his belief in the inspired text of Napier. So did most of the other veterans.

Bell's efforts to set matters right failed, and his packet of correspondence and memoranda, which passed by chance into my hands, is a somewhat melancholy collection. I trust that now that the glamour of Napier's personal ascendancy has been somewhat dimmed by the passing of another 50 years, the public interested in military history will take more note of the laudable endeavours of this aged champion of accuracy, and propitiate his *manes* by gradually extruding from standard authorities the legend of the "62-mile march."





## NAVAL EVENTS OF THE RUSSO-TURKISH WAR OF 1787-1791.

By R. C. ANDERSON, Lieut. R.N.V.R.

AFTER nearly a century of striving to oust the Turks from the northern shores of the Black Sea, Russia did at last compel them, in 1774, to recognise the Crimea as independent. This state of affairs had but a short existence in fact, and lasted even on paper only nine years. Within a year of the conclusion of peace at Kutchuk Kainardyi, Russian agents had stirred up civil war among the Tartars, Russian troops had brought about the flight of the Khan and Russian support had established his successor. Three years later, in 1778, further interference by Russia led almost to hostilities with Turkey; Russian ships were, in fact, seized at Constantinople, but the Porte could find no ally, and was obliged in the end to acquiesce not only in Russian meddling with the affairs of the Crimea, but in actual annexation, which took place amid scenes of wanton cruelty in April, 1783. Soon, however, it became obvious that the absorption of the Crimea was merely an incident in the Russian and Austrian scheme for a general advance. The foundation of a naval base at Sevastopol and the spectacular visit of Ekaterina and Joseph of Austria to the new city of Cherson, together with many other signs, all pointed one way, and at last, on August 16th, 1787, the Sultan, driven to desperation, declared war on Russia.

In spite of the fact that the war was entirely Russia's doing, her fleet in the Black Sea was by no means ready, and had done nothing to make up for its weakness by concentration. It was, in fact, divided into three quite distinct bodies, in the Dnieper, at Sevastopol, and in the Don, a state of affairs brought about primarily by lack of dockyard accommodation in any one district. Neglecting the small craft, there were two battleships and five frigates at Cherson on the Dnieper, three battleships and nine frigates at Sevastopol, and six frigates at Taganrog on the Don, a total of 25 ships with 1,134 guns.<sup>1</sup> Against this the

<sup>1</sup> At Cherson: "Iosif II.," 80, "Vladimir," 66, "Aleksandr," 54, "Skoryi," 40, "Cherson," 40, "Sv. Nikolai," 40, "Boristen," 24. At Sevastopol: "Slava Ekateriny," 66, "Sv. Pavel," 66, "Maria Magdalina," 66, "Sv. Georgii," 54, "Sv. Andrei," 54, "Krym," 40, "Stryela," 40, "Pobyeda," 40, "Perun," 40, "Legkii," 40, "Ostorozhnyi," 40, "Pospyeshnyi," 40. At Taganrog: "Kinburn," 40, "Vryatchislav," 40, "Fanagoria," 40, "Taganrog," 40, "Vyestnik," 32, "Potchtalon," 24. ("Materials for the History of the Russian Fleet" (in Russian) xv., 43-4 and 52).

Turks, with proper management, might have brought odds of about six to five in ships and three to two in guns, a force of 22 battleships and eight frigates, with some 1,700 guns.<sup>1</sup>

The river Dnieper (or Dnyep'r), flowing for the last part of its course almost due west, expands near its mouth into a broad but shallow lagoon, the Liman of the Dnieper. The Bug also flows into this lagoon from the north, and the water of the two rivers makes its way to the sea by a comparatively narrow passage between the twin fortresses of Otchakov and Kinburn. The former of these was still in Turkish hands, but the latter had become Russian in 1774, so that at this point each of the combatants had an important position to defend, and an equally important one to attack.

The Turks assumed the offensive, though with very inadequate means; on August 27th they arrived at Otchakov with a force consisting of three battleships, one frigate, one bomb vessel, eight shebeks, and 21 smaller rowing vessels,<sup>2</sup> and three days later hostilities began. Two ships of the Russian fleet, the "Skoryi," 40, and "Bityug," 12, had been stationed near Kinburn to await the arrival from Cherson of the "Vladimir," 66, "Aleksandr," 54, and some storeships. On August 30th they were cut off from Kinburn and attacked by 11 of the Turkish small craft, including the bomb vessel. The action was quite indecisive, for, after three hours, the Russian ships withdrew towards Cherson with a loss of only four men.

Kinburn was, of course, the Turkish objective, and with the limited force at their command they did everything possible to reduce it, not only by bombardment, but by a series of landings, in each case unsuccessfully. At first the Russian garrison was unsupported by any naval force, but at length, on September 26th, the galley "Lesna," 17, arrived from Cherson, her commander, Sub-Lieutenant Lombard, having taken it upon himself to go where there was fighting to be had, without waiting for orders. The previous evening the Turkish Fleet had sustained a serious loss by the blowing up of one of its battleships, a ship of 54 or 60 guns; this may have had a demoralizing effect, at any rate the one Russian galley was able to do far more than would have been expected. The seven galleys, built in 1785 for Ekaterina's journey down the Dnieper, had been armed with one 6-pounder forward and a number of 3-pounders on the broadside; it was intended to substitute a 36-pounder carronade for the 6-pounder long gun in each galley, but so far the "Lesna" was the only ship in which the change had been carried out.

<sup>1</sup> According to the statements of a Greek from the Turkish service, the Turkish Fleet in commission was distributed as follows:—At Otchakov: Three battleships and four frigates. West of Otchakov, in reserve: Six battleships and four frigates. In the Bosphorus: Two battleships. At Sinope: Two battleships. At the mouth of the Danube: Two battleships. In the Mediterranean: Seven battleships. There were in reserve four old battleships. (Mat. xv., 518-521).

<sup>2</sup> This estimate of the Turkish force is given in the "Life of Ushakov," p. 51. There are several other estimates, but their general effect is much the same.

At 7 o'clock in the morning of September 27th the Turks opened fire on Kinburn. The "Lesna" at once advanced against the Turkish ships, and after an engagement of two hours and a half forced them to retire<sup>1</sup>; next day she went close enough to bombard Otchakov. During the night of September 28th-29th she was again in action, and on the 30th, in an engagement with 17 gunboats and three bomb vessels, she had her big gun disabled.

Meanwhile the Russian ships at Cherson were getting ready to advance. This probably urged the Turks to hasten the taking of Kinburn, and on October 12th the great attack took place; 5,000 men were landed, but only 500 returned to their ships, the rest were killed or taken prisoners. At the same time two gunboats and a shebek were sunk and one shebek blew up.<sup>2</sup>

On October 13th Rear-Admiral Mordvinov left the mouth of the Dnieper with a miscellaneous force, consisting of the "Vladimir," 66, "Aleksandr," 54, "Skoryi," 40, "Cherson," 42, "Boristen," 24, five galleys, two floating batteries, and two gunboats. His idea was to concentrate on the Turkish ships east of Otchakov, cut them off from their base and their main body, and crush them between the Russian fleet and the northern shore of the Liman. At 6 p.m., on October 14th, Mordvinov anchored two miles from Otchakov, and found that the entire Turkish fleet, consisting of three battleships, five frigates, seven shebeks, four bombs, 12 gunboats, and 30 other small craft, was lying on the west or outer side of Otchakov. The same night he sent one of his floating batteries and two galleys, with two other galleys in reserve, to attack the ships at the southern end of the enemy's line; unfortunately the galleys failed to do their share, the battery was left unsupported all night, and at 10 a.m. next morning her captain, Berekov, was obliged to make sail and retreat westward, in spite of the fact that he thereby got further away from any possibility of support. He was pursued by three shebeks, a bomb, and three galleys, and in the end, with his retreat cut off by the Turkish reserve fleet, he had to run his ship ashore near where Odessa now stands, and surrender to the Turkish land forces.<sup>3</sup>

At the same time there had been more fighting at the mouth of the Liman. At 4 p.m., on the 15th, the Turkish gunboats had opened fire on the Russian ships. They were soon engaged by the smaller Russian vessels, and by 6 o'clock they had been driven back towards Otchakov. The Russians followed up their success and engaged the Turkish fleet and fortifications all night. This was the last effort by the Turks; on the 17th they left Otchakov to rejoin their reserve fleet

<sup>1</sup> Mat. xv., 512. Report of Suvorov from Kinburn. Mordvinov reported from Cherson that the "Lesna" had attacked eight Turkish ships and sunk one of them. (Mat. xv., 53).

<sup>2</sup> "Life of Ushakov," p. 55. Not mentioned elsewhere.

<sup>3</sup> Lombard had been in command of one of the galleys told off to support Berekov, but had left his galley to go on board the battery, and was therefore also taken prisoner.

and proceed to Constantinople for the winter. There was little further fighting of interest; the Russian small craft bombarded Otchakov on the night of the Turkish withdrawal, a few days later they burnt a Turkish merchantman and took another, but winter was approaching, and on October 31st Mordvinov withdrew towards Cherson, leaving a few small vessels off Otchakov. On November 10th he handed the fleet over to Captain Ushakov for the winter.

The fleet at Sevastopol had attempted active operations but with disastrous results. On September 11th Rear-Admiral Count Voinovitch put to sea with the following fleet, bound for Varna, to attack any Turks that might be found there:—

"Slava Ekateriny" ...	66	"Legkii" <sup>3</sup> ...	...	44
"Sv. Pavel" ...	66	"Pobyeda" <sup>4</sup> ...	...	44
"Maria Magdalina" ...	66	"Krym" <sup>5</sup> ...	...	44
"Sv. Georgii" <sup>1</sup> ...	50	"Stryela" <sup>6</sup> ...	...	44
"Sv. Andrei" <sup>2</sup> ...	50	"Perun" <sup>7</sup> ...	...	44

On September 19th the fleet was in sight of C. Kaliakra, 25 miles N.E. of Varna. That evening a gale sprang up from the W.N.W. and wrought havoc among the badly-equipped and badly-manned ships. The "Maria Magdalina," 66, lost all her masts, both anchors, and her rudder, and eventually, after six days of helpless drifting, fetched up near the Bosphorus and was captured. The "Krym," 44, foundered with all hands. The rest of the fleet, all more or less disabled, got back to Sevastopol about October 1st.

The naval history of 1787 had been unimportant but simple; that of 1788 was decisive but obscure. The lack of information from the Turkish side and the conflicting nature of the various stories from the Russian, make the preparation of a satisfactory account a matter of the greatest difficulty. At first sight it seems almost as if nothing more could be said than that the Turkish fleet was driven from the Liman with considerable loss, and that, subsequently, Otchakov was taken. Still an attempt has been made to produce a rather more detailed story, though it must be acknowledged that in view of the difficulties and uncertainties of the whole subject, any account must be looked on as at best no more than an approach to the truth.

As in the previous year, the Liman of the Dnieper was the focus of the activities of the two sides, but this time it was the turn of the Russians to attack. Their forces were divided into three sections, the army under Suvorov, the gunboat flotilla under Prince Charles of Nassau Siegen, a German adventurer, and the sailing-ship fleet under

<sup>1</sup> Also known as "Apostol Andrei."

<sup>2</sup> " " " " "Sv. Georgii Pobyedonosets."

<sup>3</sup> " " " "Pyatnadtsatyi" (15th) and as "Kiril Byelozerskii."

<sup>4</sup> " " " "Trinadtsatyi" (13th) and as "Matvyei Evangelist."

<sup>5</sup> " " " "Desyatyi" (9th).

<sup>6</sup> " " " "Dvyenadtsatyi" and as "Ioann Voinstvennik."

<sup>7</sup> " " " "Tchetyrnadtsatyi" (14th) and as "Sv. Ambrosii Mediolanskii."



the famous Scottish-American Paul Jones; Potemkin acted as Commander-in-Chief, but did little save to hamper his subordinates and help to inflame their mutual jealousies.

On March 19th the sailing ships moved from the neighbourhood of Cherson to an anchorage off C. Stanislav on the north side of the Liman, halfway between Cherson and Otchakov. Jones had not yet arrived, and the squadron was for the present under the orders of Alexiano, a Greek in the Russian service. It was composed as follows:—

"Vladimir" 66	"Malyi	"Bogomater
"Aleksandr" 54	"Aleksandr" 34	Turlenu" —
"Skoryi" 40	"Boristen" 24	"Sv. Anna" —
"Nikolai" 40	"Taganrog" —	"Potemkin" —
"Cherson" 40	"Pitchela" —	"Bityug" —

Nassau Siegen reached Cherson on April 21st, and three days later brought his flotilla out into the Liman. For more than a month nothing of interest took place; the Turkish fleet had not arrived, and the Russians were not yet ready for an advance on Otchakov. There seemed a possibility of bringing the Sevastopol fleet round into the Liman before the arrival of the Turks, and with this in view Rear-Admiral Voinovitch left Sevastopol on May 27th with a force consisting of two battleships, two 50-gun ships, and eight frigates,<sup>3</sup> besides 23 small craft and five fireships. Bad weather forced him back to port at once, but even if he had been able to proceed he would in all probability have been intercepted by the Turkish fleet, which arrived off Otchakov on May 31st.

Estimates of the force under the orders of the Kapudan Pasha, Hassan el Ghazi, vary in the most confusing manner. This is partly caused by the fact that he only sent part of his fleet into the Liman and kept the rest some way off to the westward. Suvorov, writing from Kinburn on the day of the Turks' arrival, put their strength on the spot at a total of 74 ships, including four battleships and 38 rowing vessels of various kinds,<sup>4</sup> with a reserve of 10 battleships, 10 frigates, and 16 small craft at a distance. The biographies of Ushakov, Suvorov, and Nassau Siegen, basing their figures on an account published in 1791, give them at Otchakov 10 battleships, six frigates, four bomb vessels, six shebeks, 15 gunboats, 19 kirlangitches (or galleys), and nine feluccas, with a reserve of eight battleships, eight frigates, 21 shebeks, and three bomb vessels. Another Russian account, of June 2nd, gives quite a new set of figures; it ignores the sailing ships at Otchakov, and mentions five galleys, 10 kirlangitches or pinks, eight pinks fitted as fireships, nine bombs, 15 gunboats, and five shebeks or transports, while for the reserve fleet it gives 13 battleships, 15 frigates, one brig, five kirlangitches, four bombs, three shebeks, and four transports. In some points this version agrees with the previous one, and in a general

<sup>1</sup> Formerly "Shestnadsatyi" (16th).

<sup>2</sup> "Sedmoi" (7th).

<sup>3</sup> See p. 318 for list.

<sup>4</sup> Mat. xv., 115-6 and 521-2.

way it is reasonably consistent with an account from Constantinople of April 8th, which states that the Turkish fleet then comprised 12 battleships, 13 frigates, two bombs, two galleys, 10 gunboats, and six fireships.

Still further complications are introduced by the difficulty of assessing the military value of the various types. The term battleship, or "ship of the line," might be supposed to represent a definite idea, but, apparently, some of those which entered the Liman were merely armed merchantmen or "caravellas." Jones states in his journal that all of the so-called battleships with which the Russian Cherson fleet had to deal were of this nature, and in this he is supported by Eton, who adds that these ships carried an armament of 40 guns. Jones lays stress on the fact that two of the wrecks which he had had measured were only 135 or 130 feet long on the gun deck, but the ship preserved measured 141 feet by 44½ feet, and was afterwards armed by the Russians with 60 to 64 guns, while Jones refers to her as a "caravella of one battery with four pieces between decks."<sup>1</sup> Jones' object was to minimise the achievements of Nassau Siegen in destroying these ships; it is quite probable that the bigger Turkish ships were not fully armed, but as the ship taken was not a flagship it seems that at least two others are likely to have been as big as she or bigger.

A shebek (a corruption of Xebec) was apparently a type of large-oared vessel carrying 30 or more guns, a kirlangitch was practically the same as a galley, and carried about 14 guns, mostly of small calibre, a gunboat carried one or two big guns forward.

On the Russian side the two largest vessels, the "Vladimir" and "Aleksandr," were unable for reasons of draught to mount all their guns, and carried in reality only 48 and 40 respectively, while the frigates, though equipped with a large number of guns, had few of much weight. On the other hand the flotilla was more formidable than would appear at first sight. It consisted of seven galleys, seven floating batteries, four barges, seven double sloops, and a number of so-called "Cossack boats," armed each with one gun, and in every case it carried guns of remarkably heavy calibre for the size of the boats on which they were mounted. This advantage was due to the enterprise of Samuel Bentham, an English engineer, who had been given practically a free hand in the flotilla's construction and equipment.

The first fighting took place on the very day of the Turks' arrival. Saken, the commander of the Russian double sloop "No. 2," waited until too late before retiring from Kinburn towards his main body. He was pursued by some 30 of the Turkish small craft and engaged by 11 of them near the mouth of the Bug. Finding escape impossible he ordered his crew to save themselves and blew up his ship.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The published version reads "corvette," but there can be no doubt that it should be "caravella." The Journal was written in French, and in that language the difference in the two words would be very small. The ship captured was of the same beam as contemporary English 64-gun ships, but a good deal shorter.

<sup>2</sup> A 736-ton torpedo gunboat, "Kapitan Saken," was launched in 1889; a 605-ton destroyer of the same name was launched in 1906.

Paul Jones had reached Cherson on May 30th and had at once gone on board the "Vladimir," but had not hoisted his flag, and had left again for Kinburn to study the theatre of operations and to confer with Suvorov. Together they decided on the construction of a battery at the end of the promontory of Kinburn to command the channel into the Liman, an important step which might well have been taken earlier. Jones then returned to the "Vladimir," and hoisted his flag as a Russian Rear-Admiral on June 6th.

Otchakov being the Russian objective, the army under Suvorov began a slow advance along the north shore of the Liman, with the flotilla and the fleet on its left flank. Four ships, the "Malyi Aleksandr," 34, "Boristen," 24, "Ptchela," —, and "Potemkin," —, were at Nassau Siegen's request told off by Jones to support the flotilla, and on June 10th the "Boristen" and "Ptchela" drove off a pair of Turkish galleys which had approached to investigate. By the 12th the entire fleet and flotilla were concentrated off C. Sarykel; from thence the advance continued with the rowing craft in front. Some of Nassau Siegen's vessels were in action with a few Turkish ships in the evening of June 17th, and the day ended with the Russians at anchor about three miles from the Turks on a line N.N.E. and S.S.W. Next morning at 7 o'clock five Turkish galleys and 36 other small craft advanced with a north-westerly breeze and attacked the inshore end of the Russian line. The greater part of Nassau Siegen's command was distributed along the sailing ship line, so that on the right, when the blow fell, there were only six galleys, four barges, and four double sloops. Firing began about 7.30, and at once both Jones and Nassau Siegen started to advance the outer ends of their respective lines to bring their whole force into action. Four of the Russian galleys on the right were for some time in serious difficulties, and the arrival, about 10 o'clock, of the Kapudan Pasha in person, with 12 fresh ships, increased the danger; fortunately the rest of the Russian flotilla got into action about the same time, and thus saved the situation. At 10.30 the Turks withdrew with the loss of two or three<sup>1</sup> vessels burnt and blown up. Firing ended about 11 o'clock, and by noon the Russian flotilla had rejoined the sailing ships.<sup>2</sup>

For nine days nothing happened; then, on June 27th and 28th, the decisive action was fought. The entire Turkish fleet got under way about noon on June 27th with a S.W. wind, and steered for the left or windward end of the Russian line. The movement was, however, checked by the grounding of the flagship, a 64-gun ship, at about 2 o'clock, some two miles from the Russian line; the rest of the Turkish

<sup>1</sup> Jones' account and the log of the "Boristen" (Mat. xv., 227) say two ships, but Nassau Siegen's report (Mat. xv., 133) says one bomb, one gunboat, and one shebek. In his private correspondence (Nassau Siegen, 233) he explains that possibly two ships blew up together, which would make three.

<sup>2</sup> Nassau Siegen stated in his report that the action went on till 7 p.m., and the "Life of Ushakov" says 4 p.m., but the "Boristen's" log is quite definite on the point, and is confirmed by Nassau Siegen's letter to his wife.



ships at once anchored in utter disorder. Nassau Siegen proposed to attack, though Jones, seeing that, under the circumstances, it would be impossible for the sailing fleet to do much, urged him not to advance alone. His advice was not heeded, Nassau Siegen fully intended to attack, but the wind freshened and his vessels could make no headway. All that could be done was to bring forward the Russian right wing to a line N.W. and S.E., so as to form an obtuse angle with the rest of the fleet; for this both Jones and Nassau Siegen claim the credit.<sup>1</sup> The point is unimportant, since very shortly after the operation was completed the wind shifted to N.N.E. and enabled the Russians to advance instead of waiting to be attacked. Seeing this, at about 2 a.m., the Turks, whose flagship was again afloat, weighed anchor and attempted to form line. About 4 a.m. the entire Russian force advanced.

Nassau Siegen's flotilla had been strengthened by the arrival of 22 new gunboats, and now consisted of one yacht (flagship), seven galleys, six batteries, four barges, seven double sloops, 42 gunboats (or Cossack boats), and four transports, while the sailing fleet, with the exception of the addition of one small ship, the "Melent," was the same as at the opening of the campaign. Jones' command was in action by 5.15 and soon afterwards the ship of the Turkish Second-in-Command went aground on the south side of the Liman. Nassau Siegen at once sent the whole of his strength on the left wing to attack her, and this prevented him from dealing effectively with the Turkish flotilla on the right of the Russian line; in consequence, some of the Russian sailing ships were hard pressed, and the "Malyi Aleksandr," 34, was sunk by the fire of the Turkish bomb-vessels. This loss was, however, balanced by that of the Turkish battleship, which was burnt by the Russian small craft, and soon afterwards the Turkish flagship suffered the same fate. According to Jones both these ships might easily have been captured, and had indeed lowered their flags before being burnt; but by Nassau Siegen's version they refused to surrender and kept up a continual small-arm fire until they were destroyed. The "Boristen's" log supports Jones' story to some extent, while one version has it that the first Turkish ship to go aground had actually struck to the "Sv. Nikolai," 40. Still, a little desultory musketry firing might easily be overlooked by watchers at a distance and magnified into serious resistance by those close at hand, and naturally it was easier for small rowing vessels to destroy the big ships opposed to them rather than attempt to capture them by boarding. Firing went on till 9.30, by which time the Turkish fleet and flotilla had withdrawn under the guns of Otchakov.

The Turkish attack had failed. In spite of the lack of co-operation between the two main divisions of the Russian forces, they had repulsed the enemy with more loss than they had suffered themselves. Accordingly, the Kapudan Pasha decided to withdraw from the Liman, at any rate with the sailing ships, and that night he attempted to effect this withdrawal. Now the new battery on Kinburn Point showed its value by forcing the Turks to keep so far to the north that no fewer than

<sup>1</sup> Jones ii., 25. Mat. xv., 144.

nine of their ships went hard and fast aground. Soon after daybreak these ships and some smaller vessels were surrounded by the Russian flotilla and destroyed, with the exception of one of the battleships, which was taken.<sup>1</sup>

It is difficult to be certain as to the exact losses of the Turkish fleet. According to Nassau Siegen he had destroyed, on June 28th, two battleships of 64 guns, and on the 29th five battleships of from 40 to 60 guns, two frigates of 34 guns, one bomb, two shebeks, one galley, and one transport. He had also taken one battleship of 54 guns. Jones' statements on this subject have already been mentioned; it is very probable that Nassau Siegen exaggerated the force of the vessels destroyed, but he is unlikely to have misstated their number, and it seems fairly clear that the Turks did lose in the two days' fighting a total of 15 vessels, 10 of which were sailing ships of some size. Jones claimed also that the victory was won by his fleet and not by the flotilla. This was, of course, untrue; the sailing ships had probably some share in the repulse of the Turkish attack on June 27th, and even in the opening stages of the Russian advance on the next day, but after that the credit or discredit for the destruction of the Turkish ships belonged entirely to the battery on Kinburn Point and to the flotilla. The Turkish loss in men must have been enormous; 885 prisoners were taken by the Russians on the 28th, and 788 on the 29th. The Russian flotilla lost 18 killed and 67 wounded in the two actions.

On July 1st the Kapudan Pasha appeared again off Berezan and began to work in towards Otchakov with the idea of relieving those of his small craft that had taken refuge there. Naturally he hesitated to run the gauntlet of the Kinburn batteries again, and at length, on July 9th, he put to sea again to meet the Russian Sevastopol fleet. The same day the Russian land forces began their attack on Otchakov; this made it desirable to remove the Turkish flotilla, so on the 11th Potemkin issued orders for a general attack. About 1 a.m. on July 12th the Russians began to advance; their flotilla consisted of seven galleys, seven double sloops, seven floating batteries, seven so-called "decked-boats," and 22 gunboats, reinforced by the ships' boats and supported to some extent by the sailing ships themselves. The Turks had two 20-gun frigates (or shebeks), five 5-gun galleys, one 12-gun kirlangitch, one 16-gun brigantine, one bomb-vessel, and two gunboats. Firing began at 3.15 a.m., and almost at once one of the Turkish frigates caught fire. Jones attacked the Turkish galleys and took two of them, but had difficulty in getting one of them away, and finally saw her burnt by Alexiano's orders. Besides the one galley<sup>2</sup> the Russians took the two gunboats; the rest of the Turkish flotilla was burnt. Firing stopped at 9.30 a.m.; the Russians had lost 24 killed and 80 wounded.

It has been mentioned that the main Turkish fleet left the neighbourhood of Otchakov on July 9th to meet the Russians from

<sup>1</sup> She was named by the Russians "Leontii Mutchenik."

<sup>2</sup> She was given the Russian name "Makropolea." In 1790 she was rebuilt as a frigate and renamed "Sv. Mark."

Sevastopol. Count Voinovitch had put to sea for the second time on June 29th; he was delayed somewhat by foul winds, but was off the island of Tendros, south of Kinburn, on July 10th. The same afternoon, at 5 o'clock, he sighted the Turks to the N.W. For three days the two fleets manœuvred or lay becalmed in sight of one another. At last, on July 14th, they were off Fidonisi, or Serpent Island, 20 miles E. of the Danube Delta, and 100 miles S.W. of Kinburn. The Russians formed in line-of-battle on the port tack, steering first N.E., and eventually S.E., as the wind veered. At about 2 p.m. the Turks began to bear up to attack from their position to windward.

The Russian fleet consisted of 12 ships with 552 guns; two 66's, "Preobrazhenie Gospodne"<sup>1</sup> and "Sv. Pavel," two 50's, "Sv. Andrei"<sup>2</sup> and "Sv. Georgii,"<sup>3</sup> and eight 40-gun frigates, "Berislav," "Fanagoria," "Stryela," "Legkii," "Kinburn," "Taganrog," "Perun," and "Pobyeda." The Turks had 17 battleships (five of them 80's), eight frigates, three bombs, and 21 shebeks; they must therefore have had between two and three times the strength of the Russians.

To the Russians it seemed that the Turkish fleet attacked in two bodies, but this was probably due simply to an accidental gap in its line. Firing began at 3.5 p.m. The two leading Russian ships, the "Berislav," 40, and "Stryela," 40, forced their immediate opponents to tack and leave the line; for a time these two ships were in danger of being cut off, but this was averted by the prompt action of Rear-Admiral Ushakov, the Russian Second-in-Command, who made sail in the "Sv. Pavel," 66, and closed up the gap. The Kapudan Pasha himself now attacked the leading Russians, while his Vice and Rear-Admirals engaged the "Preobrazhenie Gospodne," 66, the flagship of Count Voinovitch. The Turkish flagship was no more fortunate than her predecessors; she, too, had to tack, suffering considerably in the operation, and finally, at 4.55, the Turks withdrew, having lost one shebek sunk. The Russians had only seven killed and wounded, so the action cannot have been very close; the "Berislav," 40, and "Fanagoria," 40, were their most damaged ships. One of the Turkish battleships is said to have had to go to Inkerman for repairs.

Next day, July 15th, the Turkish fleet was some way to the North. Voinovitch steered E.S.E. till 11 a.m. on the 16th, when he was in sight of Cape Tarchan Kut, the westernmost point of the Crimea. The Turks were then sighted steering N.N.E. with a N.W. wind; Voinovitch followed suit, and the Kapudan Pasha at once altered course to South, followed, somewhat to the East, by the Russians. Both fleets held on southward during the 17th, though with very little wind; finally, on the 18th, when the Russians were close to Cape Khersonese, near Sevastopol, the Turks turned away westward and disappeared. Voinovitch sent the four frigates, "Berislav," "Fanagoria,"

<sup>1</sup> Ex "Slava Ekaterina."

<sup>2</sup> Or "Apostol Andrei."

<sup>3</sup> Or "Sv. Georgii Pobyedonosets."

"Stryela," and "Kinburn" to Sevastopol for repairs, and soon followed them thither with the rest of his fleet.

Meanwhile little had been happening at Otchakov. Nassau Siegen was sent off to Sevastopol on July 21st, and the flotilla was put under the command of Brigadier de Ribas. It was decided to occupy the island of Berezan, and with this in view Jones detached the "Skoryi," 40, "Boristen," 24, "Cherson," 40, "Taganrog," —, "Ptchela," —, and "Sv. Anna," —, to prevent communication between the island and Otchakov. This was on July 24th, but on the 28th Potemkin decided to abandon the project. The troops were disembarked and the frigates, with the exception of the "Sv. Anna," were sent away up the river to be refitted "en batterie"; to make up for this, Jones was given 21 gunboats and five bombs. On the night of the 31st he attacked two Turkish gunboats lying close inshore opposite Berezan, took one and destroyed the other. Next day he established a blockade of Otchakov, but on August 5th many of his gunboats, having been ordered by Potemkin to move in closer, were driven ashore. All save six were refloated, and Jones was given four more in the place of those lost, but he moved his command towards Kinburn to avoid a repetition of this misfortune.

On August 9th<sup>1</sup> or 11th<sup>2</sup> the main Turkish fleet arrived once more off Berezan, after repairs. It consisted now of 15 battleships, 10 frigates,<sup>3</sup> 10 shebeks, 12 kirlangitches, 15 gunboats, four bombs, and three transports, but attempted little or nothing. Jones was offered the command of the Sevastopol fleet, but declined. On September 10th there was some unimportant fighting between the Turkish troops and the Russian gunboats to the East of Otchakov, noteworthy only as intensifying the bad feeling between Jones and Nassau Siegen, who was again in command of the greater part of the flotilla.

The Sevastopol fleet put to sea again on September 3rd. It consisted of two 66's, two 50's, seven 40-gun frigates,<sup>4</sup> two small craft, "Pobyedoslav Dunaiskaya" and "Poltosk," and two fireships, together with 15 privateers (mainly Greek). It met with bad weather at once and was back in port on the 6th, with the exception of the frigate "Pokrov Bogoroditsy,"<sup>5</sup> which was unable to get back before the 12th. On that date Voinovitch sent out some of the privateers to reconnoitre. One of them went as far as Samsun, on the coast of Asia Minor, and there, on September 18th, took two small Turkish ships; one she burnt and the other she brought back to Sevastopol on the 25th. This success induced Voinovitch to send out four more of his privateers under Captain Senyavin. Leaving Sevastopol on September 27th, Senyavin met five Turkish ships near Sinope on the 30th, drove one ashore and took one. Working East he took a Turkish

<sup>1</sup> "Life of Ushakov."

<sup>2</sup> Jones.

<sup>3</sup> Previous accounts gave 17 battleships and eight frigates; probably there were two 50's, which could be counted as either.

<sup>4</sup> Probably the "Berislav" was still under repair.

<sup>5</sup> Ex "Kinburn."



vessel on October 1st, took two and forced two ashore on the 2nd; next day, at Vonna, he destroyed a small vessel and some storehouses ashore; finally, at Kereson, on October 6th, he took one ship and destroyed three, losing nine killed and 13 wounded from the fire of the forts. He reached Sevastopol on October 17, having taken one more prize on the way.

Ten small craft from the Turkish fleet managed to reach Otchakov in the night of September 19th-20th, but were destroyed next day by the Russian flotilla under Captain Kilenin. Early in October the Turkish fleet disappeared for a day and returned with some more small craft. Three of these tried to get into Otchakov late on the 19th; one was sunk by the Russian batteries. On the 20th the Russian flotilla made another attack. They were driven close inshore by heavy weather, and suffered a good deal, losing a galley blown up and a total of 33 killed and 23 wounded. One of the Turkish gunboats was left aground. Jones sent a party to spike her guns in the night of October 21st-22nd, and on their failure tried in person, but equally unsuccessfully, next night. Potemkin forbade further attempts, and eventually the boat was burnt by the Cossacks.

Nassau Siegen had left for Petersburg soon after the affair of October 20th. Jones was also superseded, and on October 29th Rear-Admiral Mordvinov took charge of both fleet and flotilla; at the same time the last of the "rebuilt" frigates rejoined. No more naval fighting took place. Voinovitch left Sevastopol with his fleet on November 13th and was off Tendros next day, but failed to intercept the Turks, who left Berezan on the 15th and arrived at Constantinople on the 20th. Voinovitch approached the mouth of the Liman on November 23rd, found the Turks gone, and was back at Sevastopol on the 30th. Berezan was taken by the Cossacks on November 18th; two days later Jones left for Kherson on his way to Petersburg. On November 25th four Russian gunboats were wrecked in the Liman, and on December 11th the same fate overtook the "rebuilt frigate" "Vasilii Velikii,"<sup>1</sup> the transports "Dnyepri" and "Kritchev," and a lighter. At last, on December 17th, Otchakov was taken by storm, and the year's operations ended.

Next year, 1789, there was practically no naval fighting in the Black Sea. It had been intended to repeat the Tchesma campaign by sending a Russian fleet from the Baltic to the Mediterranean. This fleet was to consist of three ships of 100 guns, seven of 74, five of 66, and eight frigates, besides a number of small craft, and was to be under the command of Admiral Greig. The three 3-deckers had actually left Kronstadt on June 15th, 1788, but war with Sweden had begun almost at once, and they had gone no further than Copenhagen, while the rest of Greig's fleet had been employed in the Gulf of Finland. Thus deprived of support the Russian Black Sea fleet was unable to attempt active operations. Its total strength was not more than nine battleships, including three 50-gun ships, and these were in two divisions, at

<sup>1</sup> Ex "Kherson," ex "Sedmoi."

Kherson and at Sevastopol, while the Turks could and did muster a fleet of 15 battleships in one body. It was obviously essential for the Russians to concentrate, but that was not easy in the face of such superiority, and was not accomplished until October.

Eighteen Russian privateers left Sevastopol on April 28th. Next day they took a Turkish vessel off the mouth of the Dneister, 50 miles S.W. of Kinburn, and on the 30th were off the Danube Delta, where four Turkish ships were burnt to prevent their capture. On May 1st they landed a force at Kustendji (Costanza) and burnt some Turkish stores. A week later they took another Turkish ship.

From her they heard something of the doings and intentions of the enemy. Twelve Turkish frigates had been sent out about the middle of March, six to Sinope, six with four small craft to the coast of Rumelia. The main Turkish fleet was to consist of 15 battleships and 10 frigates, and was to be under the command of Hussein Pasha, formerly chief of the Constantinople dockyard; his predecessor, Hassan el Ghazi, was to be employed ashore. The Turkish fleet arrived off Cape Hadji Bey (near the modern Odessa) on June 23rd; on the 25th they moved towards Beresan, and in the afternoon of the 26th 13 of their ships approached Otchakov. The Russians were in no condition to oppose them; Voinovitch, who was now in charge of the Kherson fleet, could at best muster only four battleships, and of these the "Maria Magdalina," 66, had only just been brought down the river unarmed and unrigged, while the other three, the "Iosif II.," 80, "Leontii Mutchenik," 60, and "Aleksandr Nevskii," 50, were by no means ready for service. The flotilla was in a somewhat better state, but its crews were untrained; it was included in Voinovitch's command and was under the immediate direction of Captain Achmatov.

Fortunately for the Russians Hussein Pasha made no attempt to attack, and contented himself with a few unimportant movements between Tendros and Hadji Bey. Meanwhile the two Russian fleets were getting ready; at Sevastopol Rear-Admiral Ushakov was able to hoist his flag on July 3rd at the head of a force of five battleships and 10 frigates, while Voinovitch, on August 14th, had under his orders the following fleet:—

*Battleships:—*

"Iosif II."	...	80
"Maria Magdalina"	...	66
"Leontii Mutchenik"	...	60
"Aleksandr Nevskii"	...	50

*Frigates:—*

"Grigorii Bogoslov"	...	40
"Grigorii Velikii Armenii"	...	40
<i>Schooner:—</i>		
"Spiridon Triumfskii"	...	—

with one yacht, three galleys, six double-sloops, six sloops, five floating batteries, two bomb vessels, two cutters, one brigantine, six "lansons," 29 gunboats, and 21 privateers.

On September 25th Hadji Bey was taken by the Russian land forces. This drew off the Turkish fleet and gave an opportunity for the Russian concentration. On October 1st Ushakov sailed from Sevastopol, and two days later Voinovitch left Berezan, having heard that the Sevastopol fleet had been sighted off Tendros on the 3rd.



On October 4th Voinovitch arrived at Hadji Bey, left the flotilla there, and put to sea again; the Turkish fleet was sighted to the West, but the wind was S.E., and the Russians therefore to windward. On the 6th the Russian Fleet was off Tendros and the Turks at anchor off Akerman; they weighed anchor to attack, but fell into disorder and gave up the idea. On October 9th the Turks sighted and chased the Sevastopol fleet, and on the 10th both Russian fleets entered Sevastopol. Two new frigates from Taganrog, the "Apostol Petr," 46, and "Ioann Bogoslov," 46, had just arrived there, so that the Russian fleet consisted now of the following ships:—

"Iosif II." ...	80	"Fedot Mutchenik" ...	40 <sup>4</sup>
"Maria Magdalina" ...	66	"Ioann Voinstvennik" ...	40 <sup>5</sup>
"Preobrazhenie Gospodne" ...	66	"Matveyi Evangelist" ...	40 <sup>6</sup>
"Sv. Pavel" ...	66	"Ambrosii Mediolanskii" ...	40 <sup>7</sup>
"Vladimir" ...	66	"Kiril Byelozerskii" ...	40 <sup>8</sup>
"Maria Magdalina" ...	66	"Pokrov Bogoroditsy" ...	40 <sup>9</sup>
"Leontii Mutchenik" ...	60 <sup>1</sup>	"Nestor Prepodobnyi" ...	40 <sup>10</sup>
"Aleksandr Nevskii" ...	50	"Sv. Ieronim" ...	40 <sup>11</sup>
"Apostol Andrei" ...	50	"Luka Evangelist" ...	40 <sup>12</sup>
"Georgii Pobyedonosets" ...	50	"Ostorozhnyi" ...	40 <sup>13</sup>
"Apostol Petr" ...	46	"Sv. Mark Evangelist" ...	32 <sup>14</sup>
"Ioann Bogoslov" ...	46	"Antonii" ...	24 <sup>15</sup>
"Grigorii Bogoslov" ...	40 <sup>2</sup>	"Feodosii" ...	24 <sup>16</sup>
"Grigorii Velikii Armenii" ...	40 <sup>3</sup>	"Nikuta Mutchenik" ...	20 <sup>17</sup>

With nine battleships and some small craft Voinovitch left Sevastopol on October 19th.<sup>18</sup> Two days later, when off Akerman, the fleet was overtaken by heavy weather which lasted till the 26th. From October 27th to November 3rd it remained in the neighbourhood of the Danube Delta, sometimes under way, sometimes at anchor, and from November 4th to 12th it lay near Tendros. Finally, on November 15th, it entered Sevastopol for the winter.<sup>19</sup> Meanwhile the Russian Army had been making steady progress. Akerman had fallen on October 11th; Bender, some way up the Dneister, was taken on November 14th, and two days later the Russian flotilla returned to Kherson and Nikolaiev.

The year 1790 was probably the most active and the most successful in the history of the Russian Navy, both in the Baltic and in the Black Sea. The southern fleet was under the orders of Rear-Admiral Ushakov, the most famous of native Russian admirals, and he at

<sup>1</sup> The Turkish ship captured in 1788. <sup>2</sup> ex "Boristen." <sup>3</sup> ex "Ptchela."  
<sup>4</sup> ex "Skoriyi," ex "Shestnadsatyi." <sup>5</sup> ex "Stryela," ex "Dvynadsatyi."  
<sup>6</sup> ex "Pobyeda," ex "Trinadsatyi." <sup>7</sup> ex "Perun," ex "Tchetyrnadsatyi."  
<sup>8</sup> ex "Legkii," ex "Pyatnadsatyi." <sup>9</sup> ex "Kinburn." <sup>10</sup> ex "Fanagoria."  
<sup>11</sup> ex "Taganrog." <sup>12</sup> ex "Berislav." <sup>13</sup> ex "Vosmoi." <sup>14</sup> ex "Makropolea,"  
the Turkish galley captured in 1788 rebuilt. <sup>15</sup> ex Pink No. 1. <sup>16</sup> ex Pink No. 2.  
<sup>17</sup> ex "Potchtalon," transferred from the Mediterranean Fleet in 1775.

<sup>18</sup> Details from "Materials" xv., 278. "Life of Ushakov" says 10 battleships, five frigates, two small craft, and gives date as October 18th.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid. 281. "Life of Ushakov" says November 14th.

once adopted a vigorous offensive. On May 27th he left Sevastopol with a light squadron consisting of the three 50-gun ships "Sv. Aleksandr Nevskii," "Sv. Andrei," and "Sv. Georgii Pobyedonosets," the four 44-gun frigates "Ieronim," "Ambrosii Mediolanskii," "Ioann Voinstvennik," and "Nestor Prepodobnyi," the small vessel "Polotsk," and 11 privateers. Approaching Sinope on May 31st he detached the privateers, partly to reconnoitre, partly to do what harm they could; the following day they were all in action with various small Turkish vessels, while Ushakov moved in towards the town, sending the "Polotsk" to their support. On June 2nd he was close enough to count the Turkish ships in the harbour, two frigates, one schooner, one kirlangitch, one half galley, three "lansons," and one "tchektyrm," with one battleship and two saiks on the stocks. He at once detached the "Ioann Voinstvennik," 44, and "Nestor Prepodobnyi" to cover the privateers, and at about 10 a.m. entered the harbour and opened fire. The bombardment lasted about two hours, but produced little effect, although the "Sv. Georgii Pobyedonosets," 50, advanced to very close range; still it served as a cover for the operations of the privateers, who took eight Turkish ships and drove four ashore. June 3rd accounted for eight more Turkish ships—two burnt by their captors in sight of Sinope, three others also captured, and three driven ashore; two more suffered this same fate on the 4th.

Next day Ushakov moved East to Samson; the privateers entered the harbour and engaged the defences, but Ushakov, finding merely three small Turkish merchantmen, decided to proceed at once to Anapa, where he had been told by his prisoners that there was a Turkish battleship and a frigate. Arriving there on June 9th he found eight Turkish ships, a battleship, a frigate, a "shaiti," and five armed merchantmen. The same evening from 9 o'clock to 11 he bombarded the ships and forts; he was unable to get into range on the 10th, but about 6 p.m. on the 11th he was again engaged for two hours. Meanwhile the Turkish ships had been moved close inshore, so that even a third bombardment, lasting from noon on the 12th to midnight, produced little effect; accordingly, at 6 a.m. on June 13th, Ushakov left for Sevastopol, where he arrived on the 16th.

A month later, on July 13th, he left Sevastopol with a fleet consisting of the following ships:—

"Rozhdestvo Christovo" ...	84 <sup>1</sup>	"Sv. Ieronim" ...	44
"Maria Magdalina" ...	66	"Pokrov Bogoroditsy" ...	44
"Sv. Pavel" ...	66	"Nestor Prepodobnyi" ...	44
"Preobrazhenie" ...	66	"Kiril Byelozerskii" ...	44
"Sv. Vladimir" ...	66	"Ambrosii Mediolanskii" ...	44
"Sv. Andrei Pervozvannyi" ...	50 <sup>2</sup>	"Ioann Voinstvennik" ...	44
"Sv. Georgii Pobyedonosets" ...	50	"Polotsk," repeater.	
"Sv. Aleksandr Nevskii" ...	50 <sup>2</sup>	"Sv. Ieronim," bomb.	
"Petr Apostol" ...	46 <sup>2</sup>	Two fireships.	
"Ioann Bogoslov" ...	46 <sup>2</sup>		

<sup>1</sup> Ex "Iosif II."

<sup>2</sup> The 46-gun ships were more heavily armed than the 50's, which were really frigates. Both classes were, however, usually reckoned as battleships.

*Privateers*:—"Feniks," "Abeltash," "Panagia Dusenoi," "Karl Konstantine," "Printsessia Elena," "Kliment Papa Rimskii," "Panagia Apotumengana," "Sv. Nikolai," "Sv. Aleksandr," "Slava Sv. Georgia," "Krasnosele," "Panagia Papandi," "Panagia Turlyani."

The Turkish fleet had been sighted off the Southern coast of the Crimea, steering East, as if bound for the Straits of Kertch, the entrance to the Sea of Azov; Ushakov therefore sailed in that direction. On July 17th he was at Theodosia, 50 miles West of Kertch, and at 7 a.m. on the 19th he anchored at the mouth of the Straits, sending out the privateers to look for the enemy. At 10 a.m. they were signalled to the eastward and half an hour later they were in sight, coming down in a body, with a fair wind from the E.N.E., 10 battleships, eight frigates, and 36 small craft. Ushakov at once weighed anchor and formed line on the port tack in the following order:—

"Maria Magdalena," 66 (Brigadier-Captain Golenkin), "Sv. Vladimir," 66, "Sv. Ieronim," 44, "Ioann Bogoslov," 46, "Pokrov Bogoroditsy," 44, "Preobrazhenie Gospodne," 66, "Rozhdestvo Christovo," 84 (Rear-Admiral Ushakov), "Sv. Georgii Pobedyonovets," 50, "Kiril Byelozerskii," 44, "Sv. Petr Apostol," 46, "Sv. Aleksandr Nevskii," 50, "Ambrosii Mediolanskii," 44, "Sv. Pavel," 66 (Captain Shapilov), "Sv. Nestor Prepodobnyi," 44, "Ioann Voinstvennik," 44, "Sv. Andrei Pervosvannyi," 50. Sixteen ships—854 guns; or, without frigates, 10 ships—590 guns.

The Turks, who were probably about 20 per cent. superior to the Russians on paper, came on before the wind, wore and formed line on the port tack parallel to the Russians and to windward; the action began at about noon. Seeing that the Kapudan Pasha had only his 10 battleships in line, Ushakov ordered his six frigates to form a second line to leeward and closed up his line to correspond with that of the enemy. For three hours an indecisive artillery duel went on; at last, about 3 o'clock, the wind backed from E.N.E. to N.N.E., and this change led to closer action. The Russians luffed up to close and at the same time the Turks began to get on to the starboard tack, some wearing and some tacking. Two Turkish ships were badly damaged; one lost her mizzen mast and another, the flagship of the Second-in-Command, formerly the leading ship, lost both fore and mizzen topsails; both fell off towards the Russian line, but managed to clear it. Eventually the Turks got into line again on the starboard tack, with their two damaged ships to leeward and their places filled by bringing in five of the frigates. Ushakov saw his chance of getting to windward, so went about, signalling to his van squadron to tack together, and to the rest of the fleet to take station as convenient astern of the flagship. This manoeuvre brought the Russian fleet into line to windward, but astern of the Turks, with Ushakov's flagship, the "Rozhdestvo Christovo," 84, as the leading ship. With his rear thus threatened the Kapudan Pasha bore up and retreated, steering about S.W. Firing stopped about 6 p.m.; Ushakov pursued all night, but the Turkish ships with their copper bottoms, their light sails, and the help of their rowing vessels,

were too fast for him, and by the morning they were nowhere to be seen. The Russians had lost 29 killed and 68 wounded, but their ships were very little damaged. They spent the evening of July 20th and the morning of the 21st at anchor off Theodosia, and arrived at Sevastopol on the 23rd.

After the necessary repairs had been carried out, Ushakov put to sea, on September 5th, to join the ships at Otchakov. He had with him the same fleet as before, except that the bomb-vessel "Sv. Ieronim" had been replaced by the "Rozhdestvo Christovo,"<sup>1</sup> and that he had now four more privateers, the "Berezan," "Keli-Tavro," "Panagia Kalechania," and "Dunai." At 6 a.m., on September 8th, as he was passing Tendros with the wind at S.E. by E., he sighted the enemy at anchor to leeward. The Turks weighed anchor and formed line on the port tack; they had 14 battleships in line, with eight frigates and 23 small craft. Ushakov kept his fleet in its "order of sailing" in three columns, and steered for the enemy's rear. The Russian order was as follows:—

Port Column.		Centre Column.	
"Kiril Byelozerskii" ...	44	"Sv. Andrei Pervosvannyi" ...	50
"Ambrosii Mediolanskii" ...	44	"Sv. Ieronim" ...	44
"Sv. Nestor Prepodobnyi" ...	44	"Sv. Vladimir" ...	66
"Ioann Voinstvennik" ...	44	"Sv. Aleksandr Nevskii" ...	50
"Sv. Petr Apostol" ...	46	"Rozhdestvo Christovo" ...	84
"Sv. Pavel" ...	66	(Rear-Admiral Ushakov)	

(Capt. Shapilov)

Starboard Column.	
"Preobrazhenie Gospodne" ...	66
"Sv. Ioann Bogoslov" ...	46
"Pokrov Sv. Bogoroditsy" ...	44
"Sv. Georgii Pobyyedonosets" ...	50
"Maria Magdalina" ...	66

(Brigadier Golenkin).

Seeing his rear threatened, Hussein Pasha ordered his ships to wear in succession and form line on the starboard tack. Ushakov therefore, after forming his three columns into a single line on the port tack, imitated the Turkish manœuvre and put his line parallel to the enemy and to windward. These evolutions were completed by about 2 p.m. It is not quite certain how the Russian fleet got into its final formation. The plans in "The Life of Ushakov" show it as coming down in three columns with the flagships astern of their respective squadrons, and with the van squadron to starboard; they then show the three columns forming into line on the port tack with the port column leading and the flagship of the van squadron as the last ship in the line; finally, they show the fleet on the starboard tack in exactly reversed order, i.e., with the "Maria Magdalina" as leading ship. This implies a wearing together from the port to the starboard tack, whereas Ushakov's own account states that he signalled to his fleet "to turn by counter-march" or *in succession*; if it had done so the result

<sup>1</sup> Distinct from the battleship of the same name.



would have been to bring the fleet into action in reversed order with four frigates as the leading ships. One of two alternatives seems probable: either the wearing took place together, or else the three flagships led their respective columns and the starboard column took its natural place in the van as soon as the fleet formed into line. This second alternative seems the more reasonable, though the difference is not really important.

At any rate, by about 2 o'clock the Russian fleet was disposed in line-of-battle parallel to the enemy and to windward, heading about E.N.E. with the wind S.E. by S., and still veering. The Turks had 14 battleships in line and eight frigates to leeward; the Russians had in their line 10 battleships and six frigates, but before bearing up to the attack Ushakov took a frigate from each squadron, the "Pokrov Sv. Bogoroditsy," "Sv. Ieronim," and "Ioann Voinstvennik," and stationed them to windward of his van, a precaution against a possible attempt at "doubling" on the part of the enemy. This left him in the line 13 ships with 722 guns, as against 14 ships with probably some 800 to 900 guns, again a difference of some 20 per cent. in favour of the Turks.

About 3 p.m. the action began. The Turks soon began to bear up and by 5 o'clock they were in full retreat. The Russians followed, inflicting a good deal of damage; in particular the flagship of the Turkish Vice-Admiral was engaged by the Russian "Ioann Bogoslov," 46, and the ships of the Kapudan Pasha and his Rear-Admiral by Ushakov in the "Rozhdestvo Christovo," and his next ahead, the "Preobrazhenie Gospodne." Presently the better sailing of the Turkish ships began to tell; they drew clear and hauled to the wind on the port tack, heading about West; soon after 8 p.m. firing stopped. Ushakov also hauled to the wind, went about to the starboard tack, and finally anchored.

Next morning, September 9th, the Turks were seen working to windward. The majority of their ships were out of reach, but two that had been injured on the previous day, the "*Kapitania*," 74, flagship of the Second-in-Command, and the "*Meleki Bachr*," 66, were still to leeward. The latter surrendered without resistance to Golenkin in the "*Maria Magdalena*," 66, supported by the "*Aleksandr Nevskii*," 50, and the "*Ioann Bogoslov*,"<sup>1</sup> 46. The "*Kapitania*" made a stout resistance; she was engaged about 10 a.m. by the "*Sv. Andrei Pervosvannyi*," 50, which brought down her fore-topsail, and then by the "*Sv. Georgii Pobiyedonosets*," 50, and "*Preobrazhenie Gospodne*," 66, and other ships. By noon she was entirely surrounded, but still fought on; at last, about 2 p.m., Ushakov himself, in the "*Rozhdestvo Christovo*," 84, shot away all three masts of the Turkish vessel, and then, leaving the "*Sv. Georgii Pobiyedonosets*" on her beam, put his flagship across her bows. This decided the matter, and at 3 o'clock Said Bey, the Turkish Vice-Admiral, surrendered after a splendid

<sup>1</sup> "Life of Ushakov," p. 359. Ushakov's Journal says 2 battleships and 2 frigates.

defence. Greatly to the disappointment of the Russians the ship was seen to be on fire; in fact, only the Vice-Admiral, his flag-captain, and 18 men could be taken off before the "*Kapitania*" blew up. Out of some 800 men on board only 81, besides these, were saved.

Some Russian ships were still pursuing the main body of the Turkish fleet, but they were evidently losing ground, and about 4.30 Ushakov recalled them. The same evening, while at anchor, he was joined by de Ribas from Otchakov with the "*Navarchia Vosnesenie Gospodne*,"<sup>46</sup> "*Makropolia*,"<sup>1</sup> 36, "*Fedot Mutchenik*,"<sup>2</sup> 28, "*Grigorii Velikii Armenii*,"<sup>3</sup> 26, and 17 rowing vessels; the rest of the flotilla was off Hadji Bey, where it had been sighted before the action. The Russian privateers, sent out to look for any stragglers from the Turkish fleet, brought in three small craft, a "lanson" of five guns and 29 men, a brigantine of 10 guns, deserted by her crew, and a floating battery of five guns and 42 men. In all the Turkish prisoners numbered 733 men, while their losses in matériel were increased by the foundering of a 74-gun ship and several small craft on the way to Constantinople. The Russians had several ships damaged in spars and rigging, but no serious injuries; their loss in men was only 21 killed and 25 wounded.

Ushakov remained at anchor all through September 10th, but sent the rowing vessels to join the rest of the flotilla at Hadji Bey; he was also joined by Golenkin with the detached ships and their prize, the "*Meleki Bachr*." Next day he moved to Hadji Bey, where the fleet was inspected by Potemkin. On the 15th Ushakov detached the two 44-gun frigates, "*Kiril Byelozemkii*" and "*Ioann Voinsvennik*," and the three privateers, "*Kepi Tavro*," "*Meshlet*,"<sup>4</sup> and "*Karl Konstantin*," to join the flotilla; on the 16th he sent the captured "*Meleki Bachr*" to Cherson for repairs; on the 17th he weighed anchor with the whole fleet, and on September 19th he arrived at Sevastopol.

This was the last fighting of the year as far as the sailing-ship fleet was concerned. It will, however, be simplest to mention its further movements before discussing the doings of the flotilla. Ushakov left Sevastopol for the fourth time on October 27th; he had now 14 battle-ships, the 10 of his former fleet, the "*Leontii Mutchenik*," 62, which had been undergoing alterations at Sevastopol, the "*Navarchia, Vosnesenie Gospodne*," 46, from Cherson, and the two new ships "*Tsar Konstantin*," 46, and "*Fedor Stratilat*," 46, which had arrived from Taganrog under Brigadier Pustoshkin a fortnight before. On the other hand he had only four frigates, the "*Sv. Ieronim*," 44, "*Nestor Propodobnyi*," 44, "*Makropolia Sv. Marka*," 36, and "*Grigorii Velikii Armenii*," 28; the rest of the 44-gun frigates were no longer seaworthy and were disarmed. He had also 17 privateers, a fireship, a bomb-vessel, and a repeater. After a visit to Akerman he proceeded to the Sulina mouth of the Danube to support the flotilla in its operations on

<sup>1</sup> Or "*Sv. Mark*"; the former Turkish galley rebuilt and renamed.

<sup>2</sup> Ex "*Skoryi*."

<sup>3</sup> Ex "*Ptchela*."

<sup>4</sup> Not in previous list.



that river; he lay there from November 2nd to 21st, and was back at Sevastopol on the 25th. There he was joined on December 10th by two ships from Otchakov, the new "Sv. Nikolai," 50, and the "Ioann Predtetcha," 74, the captured "Meleki Bachr" renamed.

Meanwhile the Russian flotilla, under General Major de Ribas, had been busily employed on the Danube in conjunction with the army. Leaving Hadji Bey on October 28th he was off the Kilia mouth of the Danube on the 30th. His force consisted of 22 "lansons," six double sloops, three cutters, one schooner, one palander, two sloops, two boats, one brigantine, 48 Cossack boats, and two ships, "Konstantin" and "Ipogrifa." On October 31st he landed troops, and with their support advanced against the batteries and the 23 rowing vessels at the Sulina mouth. After an action lasting from 2 p.m. to 7 p.m. on the 31st and from 1 a.m. to 2 p.m. on November 1st, the batteries were taken and the flotilla entered the river; one Turkish vessel was blown up and seven storeships were taken, the rest escaped up the river. The next action took place on November 17th and 18th, at Tultcha, just above the junction of the Sulina and St. George's mouths. A Russian detachment under Captain Achmatov, together with troops ashore, engaged the Turkish flotilla, destroyed some gunboats, and took four others, and finally captured the Turkish positions, together with one warship and 38 storeships; many other vessels were destroyed by the Turks themselves.

This opened the way for the Russian flotilla to move to the top of Tchatal Island, at the junction of the Kilia and Sulina mouths. Here de Ribas divided his force into three parts, one to proceed further up stream to attack the fortress of Isak, one to remain at Tchatal, and one, his own division, to go down the Kilia river to join the army in its attack on Ismail; two privateers sent by Ushakov, the "Aleksandr" and "Simferopol," were to act as connecting links above and below Tchatal. The upper division, under Captain Lieutenant Litke, was engaged on November 24th with the Turkish batteries at Isak and a flotilla of one shaiti, one kirlangitch, and 30 lansons. The Turks soon abandoned both forts and flotilla and left the stores of Isak for the enemy; most of the Turkish vessels were burnt. De Ribas himself arrived at Ismail on November 29th, and was engaged almost at once with the Turkish forts and flotilla. Six lansons, two sloops, two boats, and the ship "Ipogrifa," under Major de Ribas, brother of the chief commander, fought a brisk action with five Turkish lansons, sinking one and driving the rest to the shelter of the forts; the Russians had five men killed and 12 wounded. In the night of November 30th—December 1st the Russian flotilla bombarded the town from both sides. The following morning de Ribas tried a fireship attack on the Turkish ships, but unsuccessfully; on the other hand a series of direct attacks by the flotilla, lasting from 9 a.m. to 4 p.m., resulted in the burning or sinking of one large Turkish "shaiti," 19 lansons, 32 storeships, and over 40 barges, with a loss to the Russians of three lansons sunk, 87 men killed, and 239 wounded. Another bombardment on December 2nd accounted for 15 Turkish lansons, six boats, and two storeships.

After this the bombardment was continued day by day by the Russian flotilla and their newly-constructed shore batteries; one lanson, four boats, and four storeships were destroyed on the 4th, three lansons on the 5th, two lansons and two storeships on the 6th, three lansons and five storeships on the 7th. At last, on December 8th, de Ribas, feeling that he had done all that a flotilla could do unaided, re-embarked his guns and retired. The various attacks had cost the Turks one "shaiti," 44 lansons,<sup>1</sup> 10 boats, 45 storeships, and some 40 barges; the Russians had lost three lansons, and had had 97 men killed and 251 wounded. Ismail was eventually taken from the land side on December 22nd; eight lansons, 20 barges, and 22 boats of various sizes were included in the list of Russian captures.

The Danube had been the scene of the last naval actions of 1790, and it was also that of the first of 1791. Russian troops left Galatz on April 4th to attack Brail, 10 miles up the river. Supported by de Ribas' flotilla they were soon successful; Brail fell on April 11th. The Turkish loss in ships amounted to 11 gunboats and four bomb-vessels sunk or burnt. After this success the Russian vessels returned to Galatz, but on July 9th, during the battle of Machin, some miles above Brail, they were again engaged by a force of 30 Turkish oared vessels. Three Turks were blown up, three sunk, the rest retired somewhat damaged.

Meanwhile Ushakov had assembled in the harbour of Sevastopol a fleet of 16 battleships, two frigates, and many small craft, while Hussein Pasha had left Constantinople with 18 battleships, 17 frigates, and more than 40 small craft. Part of this Turkish fleet was stationed at Varna and part sent eastward to relieve Anapa, which was by now hard pressed from the land side. On June 21st Ushakov left Sevastopol to intercept this latter division; the same day he sighted the enemy off the southern coast of the Crimea, but they were well to windward, and in spite of a pursuit lasting four days he was unable to come up with them; on June 29th he was back at Sevastopol. The Turks arrived off Anapa on July 4th, only to find that the place had been taken by storm on the previous day; they therefore returned to Varna to concentrate. On August 8th the Russian fleet left Sevastopol for the second time, and about mid-day on the 11th found the Turks at anchor just South of C. Kaliakra, 25 miles N.E. of Varna.

Ushakov's fleet was as follows:—

<i>Starboard Column.</i> (Brigadier Golenkin).	<i>Centre Column.</i> (Rear-Admiral Ushakov).
"Sv. Petr Apostol" ... 46 "Sv. Nestor Prepodobnyi" ... 44 "Maria Magdalina" (f) ... 66 "Sv. Nikolai" ... 50 "Tsar Konstantin" ... 46 "Navarchia Voznesenie Gospodne" 46	"Sv. Georgii Pobedyonsets" 50 "Sv. Aleksandr Nevskii" ... 50 "Rozhdestvo Christovo" (f) 84 "Sv. Andrei Pervosvannyi" 50 "Feodor Stratilat" ... 46 "Ioann Predtetcha" ... 74

<sup>1</sup> Including the one sunk on November 29th.

*Port Column.*

(Capt.-Brigadier Pustoshkin).

"Sv. Ioann Bogoslov" ... ..	46
"Makropolia Sv. Mark Evangelist" ...	36
"Sv. Vladimir" (f) ... ..	66
"Sv. Pavel" ... ..	66
"Preobrazhenie Gospodne" ... ..	66
"Leontii Mutchenik" ... ..	66

18 ships, 998 guns.

*Bombs*:—"Sv. Ieronim" and "Rozhdestvo Christovo."*Repeater*:—"Polotsk." One fireship, 17 privateers.

The Turkish fleet consisted of 18 battleships, 10 large frigates, seven smaller frigates, and 43 small craft. It could therefore put in line 28 ships and probably some 1,500 or 1,600 guns, a superiority of, roughly, 55 per cent. It was at anchor close under the Cape with its small craft inshore, then a line of 10 ships from the Barbary States under Admiral Said Ali of Algiers, and finally a line of 18 Turkish ships under Hussein Pasha in person. A number of batteries had been thrown up on the Cape.

The wind being North, Ushakov was obliged to do one of two things, go to leeward of the enemy or pass close under the batteries. To the surprise of the Turks he chose the latter course; at 2.45 p.m. the Russians rounded the Cape, still in three columns, and pressed on towards the Turkish small craft. At once the Turks cut their cables and fell into utter confusion, some going off on one tack, some on the other. Two ships collided, one losing her bowsprit and the other her mizzen; the former ran for Varna, but the latter stayed with the fleet, though merely as an encumbrance. At last Said Ali got away on the port tack, heading E., with the wind N.N.E.; the Kapudan Pasha followed, and in the end the larger Turkish ships were all in line on the port tack. This necessitated a rather complicated evolution on the part of the Russians, a change of formation from three lines on the starboard tack to one on the port, with each column in reversed order, and with the former centre column as van squadron. As this was being carried out, Admiral Said Ali went about to the starboard tack with the idea of concentrating on the Russian van. Ushakov at once left his place in the line, passed to leeward of the three leading Russian ships, and attacked him at close quarters, bearing up across his bows and forcing him to leeward. This was about 4.45 o'clock. At the same time the rest of the Russian fleet bore up to the attack, and the action became general. Gradually the Turks bore away, until, at 8.30, when darkness put an end to the action, they were in full retreat, steering S.W. Next morning, August 12th, they were seen well on their way to Constantinople; there was no hope of catching them, and Ushakov anchored off C. Eminah, 30 miles South of Varna. Neither side had lost a ship, though several Turks had suffered severely aloft. The Russians had 17 killed and 28 wounded; the "Sv. Aleksandr Nevskii," 50, was a good deal damaged in her hull, but was able to stay with the fleet.

The very day of this action an armistice had been arranged and negotiations for peace had begun. There were, however, a few small engagements before this became known. The "Makropolia Sv. Mark Evangelist," 36, with the privateers, destroyed a number of Turkish storeships on August 12th, and on the 13th one of the privateers, the "Panagia Apotumengana," took and burnt a large Turkish shebek. Two days later the Russian cruisers gave chase, though unsuccessfully, to a force of four Algerian shebeks and 12 small craft from Varna. On the 16th Ushakov got under way for Varna, and on arriving there on the 19th he was informed of the armistice. On August 31st he was back at Sevastopol with his whole fleet.

Peace was definitely concluded at Jassy on January 9th, 1792. England and Prussia had hoped to force Russia to give up all her conquests, as she had done in the case of Sweden, and as her ally Austria had done in the South. Pitt, indeed, went as far as the preparation, in March, 1791, of a "Russian Armament" of 36 battleships, and the despatch of a joint Anglo-Prussian ultimatum, insisting on the restoration of all territorial gains, but English public opinion was against him, and he had to give way. In the end Russia gave up a large part of her conquests, and contented herself with the cession of Otchakov and of all the territory between the Bug and the Dneister. Anapa was returned to Turkey.

The Russian Black Sea Fleet had gained greatly in strength during the war. In 1787 it had consisted of eight battleships, in 1792 it had 21, the 16 of Ushakov's last action with five new ships, the "Bogoyavlenie Gospodne," 66, "Sv. Troitsa," 66, "Soshestvie Sv. Ducha," 46, "Grigorii Velikii Armenii," 50, and "Kazanskaya Bogoroditsa," 46. One of its ships had been taken by the enemy, but this loss had been outweighed by the capture of two Turkish battleships and the destruction of two others. Five years' vigorous work in the dockyards had done the rest. Henceforth, until the disaster at Sevastopol in 1854, the Russian Southern Fleet was always able to give a good account of itself.



## PAUL BENEKE AND THE GERMAN NAVAL CAMPAIGN AGAINST ENGLAND IN THE 15th CENTURY.

By COLONEL C. FIELD, R.M.L.I.

THAT portion of English History which deals with the "Wars of the Roses," that long-drawn-out conflict between the Houses of York and Lancaster, is a period which requires somewhat careful study if a full understanding of the events chronicled is to be obtained. But the course of the war on land is plain sailing when compared with that of the operations at sea which attended it. The English fleets were, of course, divided. There were what may be called Yorkist squadrons and Lancastrian squadrons. Warwick, better known as "the Kingmaker," took rather a prominent part in the Naval fighting, and, it will be remembered, fought first for, and afterwards against, Edward IV. of York. Then there was the French Fleet, the Burgundian Fleet, the Fleet of the Duke of Brittany, and, in addition, a considerable number of ships belonging to the formidable German Confederation known as the Hansa, which seem to have been mainly conspicuous for their piracy even in those days when the line separating Royal Ships, Traders, and Pirates, was very indefinite indeed. All these fleets fought each other in varying combinations and alliances. The modern German Navy, powerful as it is, is a parvenu among the world's Navies, and of mushroom growth, dating only from 1848, and those who fostered its expansion set themselves to work to provide it with an ancestry, which, of course, had to include heroes that could be paraded as a set-off to Drake, Blake, Du Quesne, Suffren, and Nelson. The piratical deeds of the Hanseatic armed merchantmen are therefore exploited to the full. In a popular work on the Deeds of the German Navy, published a few years ago,<sup>1</sup> the author follows the process with which we are familiar in German war bulletins. He takes a number of facts and dates, but does not arrange them in their proper sequence or comparative importance. What he does is to place them in an ornamental mosaic, pleasing to the German eye, and bind the whole collection together with a cement almost entirely composed of fiction. The great Dutch Admirals Van Tromp and De Ruyter are also impressed into service, and a share of their glory is claimed as a varnish to the German mosaic. But the exploits of Paul Beneke, a Dantzic sea-commander, against the English and French in the 15th century are the "bonne bouche" of the book, and are related with great relish—though garbled and magnified to a ridiculous degree.

The story opens in the year 1468. In this year certain men of Lynn, refusing to be bound by the terms of a treaty between England

<sup>1</sup> "Bilder aus den Deutschen Seekriegs-Geschichte," by Vice-Admiral A. D. Reinhold Werner, Munich, 1899.



and Denmark, which (as was usually the case in bargains made between the Kings of England and the northern nations) handicapped the trade of our merchants, sailed to Iceland and attempted to open trade with the inhabitants. Friction naturally ensued, followed by actual hostilities in which the English traders seem to have been victorious, for it is stated that they not only slew the Danish Viceroy, but carried off the contents of the Government money chest and devastated the island.

Such conduct was by no means pleasing to Christian I., King of Denmark, and he at once set about making reprisals. He fitted out a number of ships of war, in charge of which he placed captains borrowed or hired from the Hansa, "whom, after the bitter experience he had had, he might well consider more able and energetic than his own countrymen who had so often sustained such disastrous defeats at their hands."

It was not long before the Danish squadron made a considerable number of English prizes, which gave our King Edward IV. his "long-wished for pretext for declaring war on the whole Hanseatic Confederation."

As was to be expected, the Hansa merchants domiciled in the Steelyard—where Cannon Street Station now stands—sustained the first brunt of his attack. He informed them that, in his opinion, they were at the bottom of the whole affair—as in all probability they were—closed the Steelyard, imprisoned its inhabitants, and, it is stated, even strangled a number of them. This is the German version, but from what we know of the King it seems doubtful whether he had been in quite such a hurry to kill the bird which had laid him so many golden eggs—principally at the expense of his own subjects, by the way. At the same time he demanded £20,000 compensation for the captured English ships, and fitted out a squadron of fourteen ships to attack the Hanseatics at sea.

The chiefs of the Hansa are stated to have received the news "of this barbarous act of violence—although not of its full extent—two days after the closing of the Steelyard," by way of Bruges, their most important "kontor" or trading depôt in the West. As the headquarters of the Confederation were at Lubeck, this seems to have been a record pace for news to travel at that period. The notorious German "wireless" of the present day could hardly beat it, though it probably equals it in veracity. At this time two Hanseatic ships, the "Mariendrache" and the "Anholt," were lying in the Zween.<sup>1</sup> They were under the command of a famous Hansa Captain, Paul Beneke by name, whom later German writers have endeavoured to exalt to a pedestal on the level with those occupied by Drake, Jean Bart, or Paul Jones. Whether this hero was a Prussian, or even a German, is open to doubt. He may equally as well have been a Dane, a Swede, or even an Englishman by birth. In point of fact he was a foundling picked up at sea, strange to say—according to the story—by the "Mariendrache," the very ship of

<sup>1</sup> Generally referred to as Sluys.



which he was now in command. In October, 1442, she had been crossing the North Sea, homeward bound for Dantzic, when one night, in rather heavy weather, she had run down an unknown vessel. Attempts were made to save her crew, but a baby of eighteen months was the only soul the "Mariendrache" was able to rescue. On arrival at Dantzic the foundling was adopted by Councillor Beneke of that city and, when old enough, was apprenticed to the sea. Now, 26 years later, we find him a leading commander in the Hansa Fleet. In those days, just as now, the Germans had excellent ways and means of information as to the intents and proceedings of their opponents, so that Paul Beneke had very early word of the sailing of five English ships of war, among which was the "big St. John,"<sup>1</sup> with the intention of blockading him in the Zween.

Paul seems to have been a sort of Sherlock Holmes in his way. He had the gift of divining everything pretty accurately beforehand and of instantly deciding on the best way of dealing with it. On this occasion he had—naturally—no intention of waiting for the arrival of the English squadron, so, on the morning after he had received his warning, he and his two ships slipped out to sea at day-break and stood over to the Downs, where he let go his anchors off Deal. From what follows one is almost forced to the conclusion that the sailing of the "St. John" and her consorts was but a small portion of the news which he had received from England. He had anchored under French colours. This may have been an ordinary ruse of war, but it is probable that there was more in it than that.

On Deal beach a vast crowd had assembled to greet Thomas Cook, Lord Mayor of London,<sup>2</sup> who had been sent to Paris on some kind of diplomatic duty and who was expected back that morning on board the "Madeline," of Caen, escorted by the "Cygne," of Dieppe. The Mayor of Deal was there, his Town Council, and all the "big men" of the neighbourhood. Of course, everybody at once jumped to the conclusion that the two strangers were the expected Frenchmen, and off went the Mayor and other notables to greet the First Magistrate in the Kingdom. That the many "old salts" of Deal, who, we may be sure, abounded on the beach, should have been equally deceived is difficult to believe, but the touching confidence of the Mayor of Deal is necessary for the glorification of Paul Beneke in his character of Brer Fox. Arrived on board, the Mayor was paralysed to find himself a prisoner in the hands of the dreaded "Easterlings," and was "persuaded" by Beneke to send a letter ashore to the effect that the Lord Mayor of London would not land as he was in haste to make the Thames mouth, but would prefer to receive those who wished to pay their respects on board his ship. This trap provided Paul with thirty other notable captives. But before putting to sea again, bent on making a still more valuable haul, he made up his mind to give the "perfidious English"—"perfidious" seems strangely inapplicable to them in this case—"another fearful lesson."

<sup>1</sup> Possibly the "John Evangelist of Dartmouth."

<sup>2</sup> Vide Note I.

As he weighed anchor, up fluttered the Dantzic flag to his mast-heads, which the natives of Deal "recognized with paralysed horror." But, after all, Paul was not a modern German naval officer, and he "refrained from battering the town to ruins," though he lowered his boats and set eighteen English merchantmen in flames, "which were lying in the harbour." As Deal never had a harbour, incredulous people may doubt the veracity of this statement. Still, the writer may have meant the "Downs," and in any case Germans always—like poets—expect a little licence to be accorded to their accounts of their deeds of "derring do."

So Paul Beneke sailed away on a southerly course, leaving the horizon astern well blackened with the smoke of the burning English ships, and in a couple of hours sighted the "Madeline" and the "Cygne." As these vessels were but weakly armed they were no match for the formidable Dantzigers, and "lay to" at once on a shot being fired from the "Mariendrache." Thomas Cook, the Lord Mayor, was brought on board Beneke's ship together with all the English goods which could be found on board the Frenchmen, who were then allowed to depart.

Paul now determined to make his way back to the Zween, probably to land his prisoners, plunder, and the Lord Mayor, who, strange to say, at this point slides entirely out of the story and is not referred to again. But it came on to blow and it was three days before he made his harbour, only to sight the mast-heads of the five English blockaders, who—also for the purposes of the story—are made to assume that Paul had been there all the time. However, Beneke was equal to the occasion. Standing out to sea till after dark, he closed the land again and, during the night, slipped into the anchorage between the English ships and the shore. The night was still young when the Hansa ships let go their anchors, and there were enough hours of darkness left to cover a further enterprise conceived by the wily Paul Beneke. His doings—according to this semi-veracious story—rather bring to mind those of the little Hunnish rascals "Max and Moritz," celebrated in a poem of our nursery days; the relation of their every exploit concluding with the couplet:—

"Here ends the —nd naughty trick,  
And the next will follow quick."

The night was a dark one with a thin drizzle of rain which added to the obscurity. Towards the end of the first watch, that is to say shortly before midnight, the big "St. John," as she lay at anchor off the harbour mouth, was hailed by a small fishing boat containing two men. We need hardly say that these were Paul Beneke and a shipmate in disguise. There were no "tin fish" in those days—though there were stories of ships having been scuttled by augers from without—and the English officer of the watch saw no reason to refuse the supposed fishermen's request to be allowed to hook on astern in order to light their fire and cook their supper of "beer soup" under the shelter of the warship's big overhanging stern. The fire was lit on the stone carried for the purpose in the bottom of the boat, and the soup made very hot indeed, for, in point of fact,

it was molten lead, with which Beneke and his mate very soon filled up the sockets in which the rudder hung by its pintles, thus jamming it hard and fast. Very soon afterwards the fishing boat let go her painter, and, with a cheery "good-night" to the obliging officer of the watch, she and her crew were swallowed up in the darkness.

We can guess the sequel. The night drizzle thickened into a fog, under cover of which the "Mariendrasche" and the "Anholt" came suddenly upon the English ships pretty early in the morning and let go their broadsides at the "St. John." Taken by surprise the English at once cut their cables and made sail. But the unfortunate "St. John," the only ship among them equal to either of the Hanseatics, was taken aback at once, and, being neither able to sail or steer, fell a victim to Paul Beneke. Ranging up under her stern, where she could not get a gun to bear, he explained the trick he had practised upon her rudder and demanded her instant surrender on pain of being sunk. "The English foamed with rage," but had no choice but to haul down their flag. The smaller ships escaped to sea. "Without losing a man the two Dantzigers had made the English suffer a terrible defeat, and when they had run into the Zween with their prize, the fame of Paul, who had been the moving spirit of the whole affair, filled the land, and hundreds of daring seamen streamed from all quarters to enrol themselves on board the 'St. John,' the command of which had been assumed by Beneke himself."

The chronicler now harks back to explain how Cologne, which would not join the Hansa against England, was banished from the confederation "and robbed of her former rights," how her goods were boycotted, and the same fate threatened against any Hansa town which should follow its bad example. The Hansa also resolved to "prevent any connection with England by a Continental blockade," and decreed that "every large ship should have twenty armed men on board." This seems a small complement for a "large ship" of those days.

Dantzic was filled with joy and confidence on hearing of Paul's "great deeds." Eight ships were fitted out for war and the "Peter of Rochelle," a big French merchantman, was added to their number. She had come into the possession of Dantzic in a somewhat peculiar way. Driven there by stress of weather she came into port in a badly damaged condition and had to undergo considerable repairs before being ready for sea. When these were completed, sufficient ready money to meet the Dantzic shipbuilders'—doubtless extortionate—demands was not forthcoming. So the town settled the matter by seizing the ship, so gaining a valuable vessel for the cost of its repair. Pretty sharp practice it must be admitted, but we must remember that, according to Prussian ethics, "Might is Right."

The "Peter" then was armed with twenty Carthouns<sup>1</sup> and a dozen "field-pieces," and manned by a crew of 360 men, but her

<sup>1</sup> Stated to have been 12 pounders, and the other guns 6 to 8 pounders. A Carthoun, however, is supposed to have been another name for the double cannon or 66 pounder. Field guns may be taken literally, as guns on high-wheeled field carriages appear in 16th century prints of ships.

commander, one Pawest, proved to be neither a seaman nor a disciplinarian. He took three months to get from Dantzic into the North Sea; his men were in a state of mutiny, and he could do nothing with them. He wrote reams of complaints to the Council at Dantzic and finally fell ill with worry and annoyance at his own incapacity, and was eventually superseded in his command—by Paul Beneke, of course.

But this hero had not been idle in the meantime. Assisted by the ships of Hamburg and Bremen he had been "practising fearful retribution." Not only was every English ship captured at sight, but raiding parties penetrated as far as twenty or thirty miles inland, where they "robbed and devastated everything and hung all the English whom they caught on their yardarms, in revenge for the cruel treatment of the Germans in the Steelyard." These words were written a dozen years before the German character made itself fully known by its methods of "frightfulness" in Belgium, so that the writer, even though a German himself, thinks that they might possibly tarnish the splendour of his hero. He therefore adds that "It is uncertain whether Paul also took part in this kind of warfare, as in the chronicles only the men of Hamburg and Bremen are mentioned, but his character being mild, as it was energetic, it is not probable."<sup>1</sup>

When the Dantzic ships reached Flanders, their fleet, including English prizes, counted fourteen ships, which were divided into three squadrons. Beneke in the "St. John" had charge of six ships, Eber Bokelmann in the "Mariendrache" four, and the remaining four were commanded by one Bardwig. The Zween was open to them as a base where they could obtain provisions, repairs, and stores. It was just at this time that Warwick—the "kingmaker"—fell out with Edward IV. and drove him out of the country. Paul, we may be sure, knew all about this, and hearing from a prize which he made while cruising on the east coast of England that the fugitive King was leaving Lynn for Flanders on the day following, made up his mind to intercept him, "in order to extort benefits for the Hansa." He succeeded in heading him off just outside the harbour of Marsteif, in Zealand, made him a prisoner and captured his four ships.<sup>2</sup> All had anchored in the harbour when the Count de Vere,<sup>3</sup> Admiral of the Coast, came off to greet King Edward in the name of his master the Duke of Burgundy. When he found him a prisoner in the hands of the Hanseatics he was naturally furious and threatened Beneke with the vengeance of his master. Beneke, "conscious of being in the right"—"more Germanico"—refused to release his prisoner, but eventually called the English King and de Vere to a consultation with him in his cabin. An agreement was arrived at that Edward was to be supported with money, arms and men by Charles the Bold, and that Beneke, with fourteen Hansa ships, was to escort him back

<sup>1</sup> *Vide* Note II.

<sup>2</sup> Quite untrue. *Vide* Note III.

<sup>3</sup> *Vide* Note IV.



to his kingdom and remain fourteen days in his service. In return for this Edward, when replaced on the throne, engaged to pay an indemnity to the Hansa, and not only restore their ancient privileges but even increase them. The Hansa was at this time pledged to assist Margaret, the wife of Henry VI., who had just re-ascended the throne, but the writer gets over the difficulty by suggesting that Paul, despite his uncanny foreknowledge in other matters, was ignorant of this arrangement.

In the meanwhile, his lieutenant, Bardwig, had been engaged in raiding in the Channel, and, as a state of war existed between France and Charles the Bold of Burgundy, whom Beneke's ships were now serving, he made prizes of four French ships. Shortly afterwards, running short of ammunition, he landed at the English port of Calais for the purpose of replenishing his magazines. Unfortunately for Bardwig, he was recognized by some Frenchmen and slain in the street. Two of his ships soon afterwards fell into the hands of the French, who had put to sea with seventeen ships to make an end, if possible, of the piracy of the Hanseatics. Bokelmann, with his squadron, went to the rescue of Bardwig's two remaining vessels, while Beneke on his return to the Zween, hearing of the state of affairs in the Channel, where a junction was expected between the French and English fleets, also made sail to join his consorts. He soon found Bokelmann, who was discovered battling with the Frenchmen off the estuary of the Maas. He had disabled five of the seventeen French ships, but the remainder were rather more than he and his four vessels could manage. Bokelmann himself, in the "Mariendrache," was heavily engaged with the "Colombe"—the biggest of his opponents, and was being simultaneously attacked by three smaller vessels.

Paul Beneke saw all this, but the wind dropping, he could not get near enough to render any assistance to the hardly-pressed Prussians. At last a gust of wind ruffled the water and he was able to run the "St. John" right alongside the "Colombe," their yardarms knocking together as he did so. Then, at this close range, Paul fired his broadside<sup>1</sup> into the Frenchman, which not only severely damaged her, but caused her three smaller consorts to sheer off "terror-stricken."

But the end was not yet. As Paul looked towards the sorely-pressed "Mariendrache," he was horrified to see wisps of smoke curling from her hatchways. The smoke grew thicker and thicker, and presently flames began to lick her rigging till everything was in a blaze and the fine old ship was spouting fire like a volcano. Paul could do nothing, and the fire, reaching her magazine, she blew up with a stunning detonation, and disappeared below the surface of the waves. Paul is stated to have "stood petrified." The French, even, were "paralysed" for a moment, but, one of their biggest opponents having

<sup>1</sup> "Broadside" were not very formidable at this period. A fleet of 36 ships assembled at Flushing by Charles the Bold about this time, which Commynes says was the finest fleet ever heard of, only mounted 121 guns—less than four per ship.



been "done in," lost no time in continuing the fight. This roused Paul, who commenced operations by running close under the stern of the nearest Frenchman, and sinking her with a raking broadside at pistol-shot distance. The Germans, thanks to the favourable quarter in which the wind had arisen, had the weather-gage, and as they now outnumbered the French, the latter "turned to fly." Beneke, however, closed with the "Colombe," and carried her by boarding. The French fought desperately, and Paul himself was placed *hors de combat* by the thrust of a pike. This disheartened the Germans, but being rallied by "a bold gunner" to revenge their leader's fall, they redoubled their exertions, whereupon the French crew took refuge below and "begged for mercy"—the "Colombe" was captured. At the end of the battle the French had lost fourteen of their seventeen ships, while only three of the Germans had succumbed to their fire.<sup>1</sup>

The French Fleet had been put out of action, but the Germans had been more or less damaged, their three best leaders had been killed or badly wounded, and there was news of an English Fleet of 20 sail being at sea. The Hansa squadron, therefore, took shelter in the Zween to refit in security, and to await the arrival of the "colossal" "Peter of Dantzig" (late "of Rochelle"), commanded by the egregious Pawest. When she did arrive, she, also, was found to be in need of a refit, but she put to sea again in January, 1471, and stood up and down in the Channel for "nine long weeks," where her "mere appearance spread such terror that no Englishman dared to go to sea!" The writer adds, that if they had known her commander and the state of his ship's company, they would soon have done for the "Peter of Dantzig." This formidable vessel only succeeded in making one very diminutive prize and returned to the Zween to refit, having been badly knocked about by heavy weather. In the meanwhile Paul had carried out his compact to conduct Edward IV. to England. What had become of the 20 English ships whose menace had driven the Germans into the Zween, does not appear. We must believe—if we can—that fear of the "Peter of Dantzig" had kept them in harbour.

However, since King Edward did not at once carry out all that the Hansa had expected from his promises, we find Paul executing a series of raids on the English coast. "He appeared first here, then there, to frighten the enemy," says the veracious chronicler, "disabled many ships at sea, and pushed with unheard-of daring into their harbours, to cut out or burn their ships." The result of these operations was the Treaty of Utrecht, one of the most ignominious surrenders in English history. One might imagine that, for the time, Paul's operations were at an end. But his historian wishes to pile on a few more exploits, so he says that the signing of the treaty was delayed, of course, "by the fault of the English." Whereupon Paul received orders to attack the English ships on the Spanish coast, "as they did not dare to let themselves be seen in the Channel." But before he

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<sup>1</sup> Vide Note V.

started he had a scheme of his own which he wished to carry out. There were two big Italian ships lying in the Zween, very richly laden. The omniscient Paul knew that though Florentine in origin, and though they flew the flag of the Duke of Burgundy and were decorated with his arms, they and their cargoes had in reality been bought by the English, though sailing under a neutral flag "for fear of the 'Peter of Dantzig.'" When they sailed he followed them out to sea in the "Peter," to which he had been appointed, *vice* Pawest. "He did not attack them till they arrived in English waters, in order that he could take advantage of the maxim: 'hostile waters, hostile ship.' Dantzig, moreover, had warned all neutrals betimes not to carry goods to the enemy."<sup>1</sup> The bigger Italian, or rather Florentine, ship seems to have even overtopped the formidable "Peter," and when Paul brought her up alongside and demanded where they were going, the "Patron" gave him what the bluejacket calls an "evasive answer," and referred him to the flags and arms he bore. Paul, however, called upon him to strike and hand over his cargo, which belonged to the English. The Florentine captain replied by a cannon-shot, which, for a time, disconcerted his enemies considerably. For, as has been already indicated, the crew of the "Peter" were a more or less demoralized gang of pirates, and seeing the size of the enemy, her heavy armament and defiant attitude, could not be brought up to the scratch. They wanted to 'bout ship and make off. But Paul harangued his men, asked them, as Germans, if they could swallow the insults which were being shouted at them from the Florentine, and exhorted them that if they would do as their fathers, "and be German with heart and hand, the booty would not escape us, and we should enjoy it all the rest of our life!" Whether it was the prospect of the plunder or not, Paul's words so transfigured his crew that "the Prussians began to prove themselves Germans,"<sup>2</sup> grappled and boarded the enemy ship, whose captain and mariners "fell on their knees, beating their breasts and supplicating the Germans as if they were gods!" As for Paul Beneke, "the noble German blood could not do otherwise than have compassion on those who, being overwhelmed, humbled themselves and sought for mercy." As for the smaller Italian, she had made herself scarce. Besides the ship herself the value of the prize amounted to no less than 1,500,000 marks—quite "good business."

But the best of us are liable to be misunderstood. Charles the Bold was naturally affronted at Beneke's proceedings, and made things so hot for him with his masters the Hansa, that they ordered him to return his prize to the Duke forthwith. "But Paul would not be persuaded to do so. *He knew* he was in the right," and even a Bull from the Pope addressed to his "dear son Paul Beneke the Pirate" failed to make him disgorge his plunder. Lubeck and Hamburg forbade him on pain of death to sell the stolen property in their dominions, but

<sup>1</sup> We seem to have heard something of the same sort quite recently.

<sup>2</sup> Nowadays the Germans have taken to proving themselves Prussians—hence their atrocities.

having "squared" the Bishop of Bremen with a little ready cash, he was able to bring his prize into the Elbe and sell his booty at Stade. But all's well that ends well. Though long under the ban of Dantzic and the Duke of Burgundy, Paul's last piratical exploit is stated to have caused the humbling of England by the final signing of the Treaty of Utrecht on 28th February, 1474, and so brought about the aggrandisement of the Hansa. So "here closes the fighting career of Paul Beneke, a true German sea-hero," concludes the writer, "for peace reigned till his death. Rich in money and land, he lived in great honour in Dantzic," till when barely 40 years of age he was carried off by "a raging epidemic" in the year 1480.

Thus, then, is German naval history written, or rather edited, for the purposes of the German naval propaganda. Calculated inexactitude, exaggeration, hatred and belittling of England and the English all play their allotted parts. But the horn and cloven hoof of the latest incarnation of Apollyon—Prussian Kultur—peep out ever and again, despite the laboured disguise of heroism and honourable conduct patched together by the author of this semi-veracious history, in order to provide the German Navy with the traditions which it lacks.

NOTE I.—Thomas Cook was not Lord Mayor of London in 1468, but in 1462, which somewhat detracts from the veracity of this story.

According to the "Danziger Chronik," the capture of the Lord Mayor took place in 1471—"In the same Lent Paul Beneke took the 'Magdalen' of Dieppe, and the 'Swan' of Caen. On this he took prisoner the Mayor of London, whose name was Thomas Cook."

As this was *after* Beneke had escorted Edward IV. back to England, the writer seems to have got hopelessly mixed as to his dates—possibly of set purpose.

It is curious, however, to find the same reference to Thomas Cook—unless in those days it was the case that once Lord Mayor the title was always retained as a sort of courtesy title. As a matter of fact the Lord Mayor of London in 1468 was William Taylor, and in 1471 William Edward.

The fact is that Thomas Cooke, or Sir Thomas Cooke, fled from England as soon as he heard of Edward's landing in 1471, as he seems to have been in the Lancastrian interest. He was captured, not returning in honour to England from France, but flying from England to take refuge in that country. He and his son, who was with him, were kept "many days" in prison in Flanders, and finally given up to King Edward IV. The story as presented by Admiral Werner could not well be more hopelessly incorrect.

NOTE II.—This is practically an admission that the author has no authority for his account of Paul Beneke's part in the "fearful retribution" inflicted on the English. His statement is pure supposition, as apparently are many other of the deeds he puts to the credit of his hero.

NOTE III.—"He sailed straight towards Holland," says Philip de Commynes, "and at that time the Easterlings were enemies both to the Englishmen and the French, and had many ships of war upon the sea, wherefore they were much feared of the Englishmen, and not without cause: for they were very good soldiers, and had done them great harme that yeere, and taken many prises. These Easterlings descryed afar off the ships wherein the King fled, and 7 or 8 of them began to make saile after him, but in vaine: for he was far before them, and fell upon the coast of

Holland or somewhat lower: for he arrived in Freezeland, by a little town called Alquemare, as neere the which as was possible his mariners cast anchor, for because it was ebbing water they could not enter the haven. The Easterlings came in like manner and anchored hard by them, minding to boord them the next tide. By chance the Lord of Gruteuse, the Duke of Burgundy's Lieutenant in Holland, was at that present in the place where King Edward arrived, who being advertised by certaine that the King sent to land, both of his arrival and of the danger he was in of the Easterlings, gave commandement foorthwith to the said Easterlings not to touch him: and went also himself (9th October) also into the King's ship to welcome him. And thus he landed."

NOTE IV.—There is a mistake here as to the "Graf von Vere." This nobleman was Henri de Borsele, admiral and "lord of Vere," but according to Philip de Commines, it was not he, but "the Lord of Gruteuse" who forbade the Hanseatics to attack the English fugitives.

NOTE V.—This seems to be a somewhat fictitious encounter. If we consult "*L'Histoire de la Marine Française*," by C. De la Ronçiere, probably the most careful and detailed record of mediæval naval warfare ever written, we find that the French admiral Coulon in the "Coulon"—evidently the "Colombe"—with 17 other ships, attacked six Hanseatic ships, including the "Mariendrache" and the "Jurgendrache," off Calais in June, 1472. They fled before him to seek refuge in Flanders. He was unable to catch them, but off Nieuport killed a great many of their crews. On the 19th July, when refitting off Welingue, the Prussians were surprised by an English squadron of 23 sail, which inflicted a signal defeat upon them. The "Mariendrache" and "Katerine" were burnt, the "Rodenbeke" was sunk, and the Dantzig Division, commanded by Berndt Pawest, was driven to take shelter under the guns of Sluys or the Zween. As De la Ronçiere quotes from the official records of the Hanseatic League, 9 Hanseresse, Vol. VI., p. 517 and pp. 522-524, we may fairly assume that his is an impartial account of the battle. The redoubtable Paul Beneke is not mentioned.



## MESOPOTAMIA.

By COLONEL SIR T. H. HOLDICH, K.C.M.G., K.C.I.E., C.B.

ONE often hears the question asked "Why did we meddle with Mesopotamia at all and send an expedition there of which the objective could in no way influence the final result of the present war?" It is a foolish question, which only illustrates the almost universal ignorance of the dominant influence which Mesopotamia has ever held on all that affects the great land highways between East and West. That position is even more important now than it was in the middle of the 17th century when England first established her predominance in the Persian Gulf by ousting the Portuguese from Hormuz before the Turk ever asserted his authority in Chaldæa. It is not necessary to recapitulate the oft-told tale of the political value of the command of the Gulf. So long as we are committed to India it is a political as well as a military necessity. But important as the possession of the right-of-way in the Gulf may be, the immediate objective of an expedition from India, amounting to a separate campaign, was not so much to keep the highway of the sea, as to protect our newly acquired interests in the Persian oil-fields, and to aim a blow at Germany's dream of an Eastern dominion, towards which a railway extending from Asia Minor to Basra would form the first and most important step. How much this dream of Eastern predominance affected the initiation of the present war it is impossible to say, but there are many authorities who regarded it as inevitably leading to rupture between Britain and Germany sooner or later; and the opportunity seemed good for impressing the Turk with Britain's determination to retain her command of what must prove to be a great commercial link between East and West. Nor were our interests in the Persian oil-fields to be disregarded, with all their possibilities of huge development in future. To surrender such a commercial asset to the Turk, or the Arab, without a blow would have been fatal to British prestige in Persia, which stands none too high as it is. The expedition was all right enough. The mistake made was the usual one of miscalculating the strength of the opposition. It was not long before the British force (represented by little more than a division) had defeated the Turks, captured Basra, and asserted themselves on the lower delta of the Tigris and Euphrates, after having occupied a defensive position near Ahwaz, covering the oil-fields. This in itself was a very creditable performance, and went a long way towards fulfilling the main objective of the expedition. Basra stands on the Shatt-el-Arab, which combines the waters of the Euphrates and the Tigris, some sixty miles from the head of the Gulf. Twenty miles below is Muhammerah, where the Shatt-el-Arab receives the waters of the Karun



River, flowing south-westward with many a twist and curve from Ahwaz, seventy miles distant in a direct line. On the right bank is the "jebel" (an Arab term which means an open waste rather than a typical desert, and has nothing whatever to do with a "hill") occupied by the Anifigah and Chab Arabs (friendly, so long as it is worth their while), who are guardians of that bank of the river against Turkish aggression.

The Turks, early in the campaign, were in force opposite Ahwaz and at Kurna, forty or fifty miles above Basra, and probably at Nasrie (on the Euphrates), eighty miles west of Kurna, and about a hundred and twenty from Basra, with a vast extent of low marshy swamp intervening on both sides of the Euphrates channel. The Turks threatened the position at Ahwaz, and had only to deal with the Arab population on the Karun River, and to cross that river, in order to cut the pipe-line. They threatened Basra from Kurna to the north and from Nasrie to the west, from which latter point they could spread southwards of the marshes and cut communications between Basra and the sea.

Thus did the expedition find itself committed to a far more extended area of operations than had been originally contemplated, when a comparatively weak force with a river flotilla (quite inadequate) was dispatched to conduct a campaign in a country of which the natural difficulties were never sufficiently appreciated. At the commencement of the war England and India stood in much the same position of unpreparedness. We had not then quite grasped the extent and the ability of German propaganda, nor did we appreciate its world-wide and subtle influence; but mischievous as it undoubtedly was in India, as elsewhere, the call to arms was a call which proved irresistible to the Indian soldier (as it always will), and it may very well be doubted whether the magnificent response of India to the call did not cause much more relief than embarrassment. There was, however, a sediment of the poison of unrest still remaining, and there was the certainty of trouble with our unruly frontier neighbours as soon as there appeared a chance of success owing to the depletion of our military force. That there was reason enough for grave anxiety should the demand for troops from India weaken the frontier, we know well enough now. Waziris, Mohmands, all tried to make the most of their opportunities, and all had to be dealt with effectually. The story of these frontier expeditions has yet to be told. But there were other reasons than that of domestic defence which interfered with the efficiency of the force sent to Mesopotamia in the first instance. The Indian Army has never yet been equipped for service abroad, and the Indian Sepoy himself has never seriously contemplated, nor has he been instructed in, the arts of war as experienced either in Europe or Mesopotamia. Could anything be more radically different than the skirmishing, hill climbing, strenuous warfare of the frontier and the trench-digging monotony, varied by the overwhelming storm of ear-splitting, nerve-racking artillery bombardment, of the European sphere of action? Although Mesopotamian configuration lends more analogy to India than does

Belgium or France, yet the conditions of service are so completely different when these services depend on river communication amidst broad spaces of flat waste, either submerged beneath undrinkable water or utterly waterless; sometimes frozen stiff, and sometimes scorched and withered under a brazen sky, that it need be no matter of surprise if an economical Government found itself absolutely unable to tackle adequately either the river traffic proposition, or the more serious one involved by the necessity of medical assistance vastly greater than the "peace time" equipment of normal India. On the whole, India was not more unready than England, and she started to muddle through the Mesopotamian expedition with, perhaps, greater prospect of speedy success than did England when she shipped off her first forces to France. In one respect India was specially fortunate. She found a magnificent fighting division and a strong general at the very outset. One by one were the preliminary actions fought and won (won with not much to spare), and from point to point were the Turks driven out of their defences, until Townshend and his division came to be regarded by the fatalist Turk as invincible. Nothing hereafter can ever detract from the splendour of that advance which began at Fao and ended at Ctesiphon, and, although Ctesiphon was the turning point, and the remnants of the Poona division (in face of a force which was too overwhelmingly superior) retreated practically unbeaten to Kut, it may be doubted whether that retreat was not the most brilliant performance of all. If we grant (as we surely must) that the command of the two rivers at Kut was a strategical necessity for the safeguarding of Basra and Ahwaz; for the control of the Arab tribes of lower Mesopotamia; and, incidentally, for the supplies of grain that were known to be collected there, there seems to have been no reason for any further advance, unless, indeed, there was strength enough to ensure the occupation of Bagdad. That, of course, was a political rather than a military objective of the very highest value. Shiahhs from Persia and Sunnis from all over the world are deeply concerned with the fate of Bagdad. To the Shiahhs it is a resting place on the last journey to the holy cemeteries of Kerbela, where the faithful dead surround the tombs of the murdered saints Hassan and Hosein. Enormous caravans of defunct Shiahhs pass across the desert from Bagdad to Kerbela. There are times when the Turkish river steam service from Basra to Bagdad is hardly adequate to the ghastly freight of the dead which piles the decks of its flat-bottomed and inadequate craft. To the Sunni, Bagdad is sacred as the ancient capital of the Caliphs, the seat of learning and of Eastern philosophy, the capital of Asiatic Turkey. The occupation of Bagdad would have stirred the whole Muhammadan world to its depths, and the chance of securing such an asset in the final settlement of peace terms was, perhaps, worth a risk. But the difference between the fighting qualifications of Turk and Afghan was not fully appreciated, nor the differences of armament and of leading. There seems, however, fair prospect of our retaining the command of the Tigris and Euphrates between Basra and Kut, and of thus dominating all lower Mesopotamia. What do we gain thereby? Setting aside

the question of relative areas (which is seldom a good criterion of relative values) between our acquisitions in Mesopotamia and elsewhere, it may be safely said that the deltas of the Euphrates, Tigris, and Karun Rivers open up a prospective field of Colonial importance which is not equalled by any of the recently acquired German territories in Africa or elsewhere.

The nature of these great deltas has been almost exhaustively examined by Sir William Willcocks, whose admirable scheme of drainage and irrigation, carried out in Turkish interests and with the assistance of Turkish engineers, has, I fully believe, had something to say to the openly-expressed regret of the Turkish commanders in Mesopotamia that they should be found fighting against the British at all. Stories of their good, and even gentlemanly, behaviour towards such of our people as have fallen into their hands are now freely circulated and are sufficiently well known. It cannot be doubted that many of the Turkish engineers employed by Willcocks are now concerned in fighting against us, and their regret at losing the more peaceful and better paid rôle of irrigation experts would be so natural that its existence is hardly to be denied. It is very safe to prophesy that once the war is over they would turn again with alacrity to their former pursuit hand in hand with British representatives. In short, there can be no doubt that the Turkish national feeling in Mesopotamia, which has always been favourable to us, has been further advanced by Sir William Willcocks and his work, whilst fear and dislike of the Germans has increased greatly. We may expect no difficulty (if we retain Mesopotamia) in completing a grand scheme of land reclamation in our own interests which was undertaken in the first instance for the benefit of the Turks. This scheme is based on the clever adaptation of the large existing basins in the general level of the Mesopotamian flats to the purposes of overflow and water storage, to the construction of huge weirs, or barrage, across the Euphrates and the Tigris at suitable points; to the maintenance of a vast scheme of drainage between the two great rivers, and the erection of banks, or bunds, to check the spread of swamp waters.

It is an enormous extension of any ancient system of irrigation which ever existed, so far as it deals chiefly with lower Mesopotamia, south of Babylon and Bagdad—a country which through all the ages has been most carefully avoided as a theatre for military action in the countless wars which have raged across upper Mesopotamia. We are, in fact, about the first people to undertake a campaign in this unpromising and difficult region.

Of the productiveness of the delta lands of lower Mesopotamia, when they are brought under a comprehensive scheme of irrigation, there can be no doubt. Three-fourths of the area lying between the rivers and extending east of the Tigris to the foot of the Persian hills is waste land (not desert in the strict sense of the term), and the remaining fourth is swamp. The swamp area increases enormously in flood seasons. Then there is a wide, bleak expanse of flood-ridden landscape, a desolation of grey, flat, inland sea, very much the same as may be seen at any time from the summit of the Birs Nimrud which

stands sentinel in the open wilderness near Babylon. The water is dark in colour, unfit to drink, useless for irrigation. In the dry months the swamp expanses shrivel and contract from the edges, and the bottoms of them consolidate into a floor of baked clay, cracked and seamed with the fierce heat of unclouded sun, maintaining here and there acres of dry and withered reed-beds, within which are often to be found the lairs of lurking Arab robbers. All this Sir William Willcocks proposes to turn into broad plains of wheat and cotton cultivation, with ample means of crop gathering and export. Once again will lower Mesopotamia touch the richness of the palmy days of the upper deltas when Opis and Ctesiphon were the great cities under Sassanian rule. This is no wild imagining. It is as certain as anything can be in this world of weary warfare. The value of such a possession to us mainly lies in the prospect that it affords for some scheme of Indian colonization which may meet the fierce demand of our expanding Indian population. Emigration difficulties have arisen already in India, and the results of them might have been acutely, if not disastrously, apparent amongst the Sikh population of the Punjab even now had not the war turned their eyes and aspirations into another channel. But the promise of new opportunity for the disposing of a few millions of extra people in a land of adoption, alluring as it may be, raises a vista of new troubles on a new frontier when we have by no means settled the old one.

There are the Arab tribes of Mesopotamia to be considered. At present they are under the heel of the Turk, and Turkish methods of maintaining order are not our methods, nor could we well apply them. Of the Arab of Mesopotamian deserts it is only possible here to write in very general terms, and to describe him as crafty, cruel, untrustworthy, and radically vicious all through. He has none of the gentlemanly instincts of the Ottoman Turk (who can himself be guilty of the most atrocious crimes "under order"), nor does he possess the superficial courtesy and graceful dignity of the Bedouin of Arabia. But he has the true Semitic appreciation for gain, and he will readily adapt himself to any circumstances which improve his financial prospects. If agriculture pays better than loot, then he is all for agriculture. If shopkeeping pays better than either he becomes quite a respectable citizen. Thus the Arab of the towns and of the fields is a far higher type of Semitic manhood than the desert adventurer, and the more the means of cultivation and of running a market are placed before him the more will he become reasonable and civilized and separate from the man of herds and flocks and provisional raids on his neighbour. As Sir William Willcocks says, every Arab family has its Jacob and its Esau, so that it is not a question of tribal proclivities at all, but simply one of personal opportunity.

With a reclaimed southern Mesopotamia we might expect a reclaimed Arab population, and community of faith and interests would doubtless go far to assist at least a superficial amalgamation of Muhammadan peoples. But we must not overlook the long line of frontier Persian hills, nor the fierce tribes of Baktiaris and Kurds who would become our frontier neighbours. It is true that the



Baktiaris show great civility to Englishmen at present, and have been positively helpful to the progress of surveys amongst their hills which have been lately completed. No dependence, however, could be placed on such amenities from either Kurds or Baktiaris so soon as, looking across the serried bands of the rugged hills, their eyes could see the fair prospect of cultivated open plains and growing towns. We should have a new frontier and one which would take all the looking after that the frontier of Baluchistan demands. I select the Baluch frontier rather than that of the Pathan tribes because the Baluch frontier gives infinitely less trouble than the northern marches, for a good and sufficient reason. That reason is the possession of the right of way on both flanks of the Baluch hills. We hold the back doors of those hills as well as the front, and the local tribespeople appreciate the fact and duly submit to it. Something of the same condition would govern the Persian frontier if we are to follow the present military advance of Russia to its legitimate conclusion. We, indeed, should not dominate that broken and almost impassable line of parallel ridges, but Russia would if she enlarges her political outlook over Northern Persia from a "sphere of influence" to its probable sequel in the course of frontier developments—the "protectorate."





## THE EMPEROR JULIAN AND THE EUPHRATES FLOTILLA.

### A STUDY OF MODERN GEOGRAPHY AND ANCIENT STRATEGY.

*Translated from an article in the "Revue des Deux Mondes," of  
April 1st, 1890, by the late*

ADMIRAL JURIEŒ DE LA GRAVIÈRE,

*whose daughter, in very kindly granting permission, writes as  
follows:—*

"Je suis très empressé à vous donner toute autorisation pour la publication de l'article de mon père, l'Amiral Jurien de la Gravière, article paru dans la *Revue des Deux Mondes*.

"Je sais que mon père, qui a toujours eu la sympathie la plus vive, la plus haute estime, pour la nation Anglaise, aurait été heureux de cette preuve de flatteuse appréciation de son œuvre, et je le suis en souvenir de lui. Il a combattu en Crimée avec la flotte Britannique et en avait rapporté des amitiés qui lui étaient restées très chères."

#### I.

WE have already in an earlier number seen something of Alexander on the Indus; perhaps it may be even more interesting to follow the voyage of the Emperor Julian on the Euphrates. I have often asked myself the question—What use do we make of our rivers? Our railways quickly become congested by the movements of troops, and it appears to me that our rivers may easily supplement them, to a certain extent, for the transport of the supplies of food and munitions. The great strategical lines are usually decided by the direction of the valleys watered by the larger rivers; the supplies of armies, loaded upon flotillas, should nearly always be able to keep in touch with the battalions to which they are to be distributed. A flotilla once organized, would not merely be employed as an auxiliary means of transport for a defensive war, for there is no estuary into which such supply boats—*onerariæ naves*—could not finally penetrate. We know the use which Alexander made of the Hydaspes and of the Indus; Julian in his turn followed the example of the conqueror whom he had taken as his model, and having used the Rhine and the Danube in other campaigns, he got together on the Euphrates a flotilla of eleven hundred boats, and thus crossed with ease the deserts where his army, deprived some months later of the help of this *chemin qui marche*, perished from starvation.

The Emperor Napoleon, ever ready to draw lessons from past history, had been greatly struck by the success attendant upon the

initial results of the expedition undertaken in the year 363 of our era. When he abandoned the idea of invading India via the Red Sea or by way of Khorassan, he gave his mind to the study of the Persian Gulf and the Euphrates Valley. It is known that Lamartine discovered the traces of this project in the mission given to one Lascaris,<sup>1</sup> a former knight of Malta. Colonel Chesney, the tireless explorer of the Euphrates, and the emissary of the British Government, seems to have taken seriously the idea, probably a very hazy one, of the Emperor Napoleon. He gravely assures us that the Emperor proposed to disembark an army at the mouth of the Orontes. Here a guide would be posted to await the arrival of the French troops and lead them thence to Marash—the ancient Germanica Casarea. Marash, surrounded by a huge forest, is situated 140 kilometres to the north-west of Aleppo; the forest was to provide the wood necessary for the construction of a flotilla. The troops thus easily embarked would descend the Euphrates as far as Busra. Once masters of this place it would be fortified, and would have been used as the base for future operations. "I have these details," adds Colonel Chesney, "from a man to whom they were officially communicated."

Let us accept this grandiose design of the Emperor, although several defects may be detected about it, and let us see whether the expedition of the Emperor Julian, carefully studied, will not throw some light on the nature of the difficulties which a modern army would have to surmount in the execution of a similar attempt. Above everything, it is necessary to get a clear idea of the country. History has few lessons of value except for those who seek them map in hand. Pentinger's map is here of little use, but happily there is no lack of modern travellers who have traversed these regions and have brought home intelligent accounts of them. One has really almost something like an *embarras de choix*.

There is one point well worthy of notice; the route which the Emperor proposed to follow in view of an invasion has, since some years past, been looked upon by the rulers of India as a line of defence. Two army corps, the one disembarked at the head of the Persian Gulf and the other in the Bay of Alexandretta, could co-ordinate their movements and rendezvous beneath the walls of Baghdad. There are certain circumstances under which such a concentration of the British forces might well become absolutely necessary. British India has no idea from what point of the horizon the invasion may come for which it has been accustomed to look out. An attack by sea is hardly to be feared by a Power the naval supremacy of which is fixed upon the surest foundations that the world has ever known, but the torrent which will rush down from the Caucasus and from Armenia should not encounter any obstacles but such as may

<sup>1</sup> M. de Lascaris was born in Piedmont. He accompanied General Bonaparte to Egypt, established himself at Aleppo, traversed the whole of Mesopotamia disguised as an Arab, and ended by dying at Cairo, a short time after the fall of Napoleon.

be offered by troops massed on the banks of the Euphrates and ready to make every use of that river.

To-day there are in Europe but two Asiatic Powers—Russia and England. Russia is admirably prepared for an aggressive rôle, and three roads lie open to her on the day that she proposes to threaten India—Turkestan, Persia, and Mesopotamia will each equally yield access to the coveted banks of the Indus. It is, indeed, not wholly impossible, when one remembers the huge forces of which the Muscovite Empire can dispose, that the advance may not be conducted by all three routes at one and the same time. It would be in the best interests of Russia to do so, were it only to deprive England of the assistance which, in default of this triple demonstration, she would receive by way of the Persian Gulf.

The British Empire can no longer be regarded as a military power, in view of the sudden development of standing armies in these days; but would not this Empire, so strong by virtue of its naval supremacy, of its wealth, be able to secure the assistance of allies in the event of a European conflict? It is not our place to ask of England why she should be more disquieted by the expansion of the Slav any more than of the German race. Every nation must look after its own interests from its own point of view. Our alliance was to be had at a price; it was, moreover, disinterested. England preferred another; that was her own affair. I would even add that she had the right of decision; but I would merely study the consequences of such a decision. Of these consequences one already appears to me to be inevitable, as already noted in the Book of Fate; the Euphrates Valley will become again before very long *latinae pacis iter*. That is to say, all the armies of the world will there concentrate under the pretext of keeping the peace of the world. The battle will open between the two *colossi*—by which I mean England and Russia, though Germany and the United States may also be thus described, and the campaign that follows will not necessarily be confined to Indian soil alone. It will concern the whole of Asia, each belligerent seeking in this great upheaval to gain certain compensations for the growth in power of its neighbour.

I know well enough that the world, if it did not follow its instincts, would remain peacefully inclined, despite these gloomy prognostications, but I despair of seeing this very natural desire carried into execution. The war of 1870 has left an open wound which refuses to heal, despite all that the statesmen have done for its cure.

Probably the first step to be taken by England as a defensive measure, would be the construction of a railway passing by Aleppo and connecting the mouth of the Orontes with that of the Euphrates. The river would supply the means of effecting the prolongation of the line of rail, first to Baghdad and then to Busra. Russia, for her part, would send her locomotives from Resht to Teheran, and from Astrabad to Herat. She has already placed Samarkand in communication with the shores of the Caspian. May these warlike preparations serve and profit only commerce! A nation's ambition, so often thoughtlessly acted upon, could never find a more happy solution

than this. Let us, then, make all kinds of vows of peace, and let us at the same time keep our eyes open.

## II.

The navigation of the Tigris is no less easy than that of the Euphrates. The army which can secure these two bases of operations will command Mesopotamia. Here the waterways assume the greater importance by reason of the intolerable heat which makes marches slow and trying; they are, indeed, from all points of view, almost murderous. In the month of July, 1841, a French traveller, the artist Flaudin, was travelling on the wide plains which descend towards, and finally reach, the Persian Gulf. He writes:—"A limitless horizon dances under the rays of a sun like fire. We rested by day, awaiting the setting of the sun, in order to resume our march in the darkness." Night marches may be made by caravans; they are too often forbidden to armies, but how else can one escape from the terrors of a climate justly dreaded by Europeans.

Campaigns *have*, however, been conducted in Chaldæa and in Mesopotamia, and they can be fought there again. It would, however, be only prudent to do as the Emperor Napoleon and the Emperor Julian proposed, and to collect large numbers of horses and mules, as well as of boats, to transport all manner of food supplies. It would also be advisable to induce the Arab tribes to join themselves to the army, and to prevent any military irregularities on their part by the issue of mild and effective orders.

An English writer has justly remarked that, "since these regions have not been affected by the impress of a powerful civilization, facility of movement and natural obstacles have remained as in old days. It has thus happened that the armies which have traversed the country have been forced to advance by the same routes and to fight on the ancient battle-fields." Thus the country, though to-day ruined by the Persians, by the Arabs, and by the Turks, who have ravaged and devastated it in every conceivable way, has not really changed in any way whatever since the days of Crassus, of Trajan, and of Julian. It is true that the wealthy cities have disappeared; but from the moment that these cities were left behind the desert lay before the eyes, and difficulties of supply were met with sufficiently overwhelming to account for the defeat of the first soldiers of the world.

It was in the year 190 before the Christian era that the Romans decided upon advancing into Asia, and from the very first it was proved beyond question that the Asiatic troops were quite unable to make head against them. Victory was delayed only by the difficulties of transport, such as French troops have encountered in Algeria and Mexico. From the year 120 to the year 63 before Christ, Mithridates played, between the Caspian Sea and the Euxine, the rôle of Abdel-Kadir. He found his Marshal Bugeaud in Lucullus in the year 74 B.C.; and eight or nine years later he discovered in Pompey his Duc d'Aumale.

In the year 59 Crassus was Governor of Syria; the Romans at that time were filled with confidence in themselves, it seemed that



nothing could stand in their path. Crassus formed the resolve to conduct his forces against the Parthians, and in so doing the Romans for the first time found themselves *aux prises* with the desert. Crassus passed the Euphrates and advanced into Mesopotamia with 40,000 men, including his auxiliaries. It is stated that Cassius, his second-in-command, urged him to make use of the Euphrates in order to draw his supplies from a flotilla, while he pursued his march upon what we now call Baghdad; but Crassus followed other counsels. He imagined he could bring the campaign to an end in the usual Roman manner, in a single day, by a battle *qui prendrait rang à côté des combats de Pydna et de Magnésie*, and in the pursuit of the Parthians he committed himself to a country wholly desert. The Parthians met his advance by retiring, so as to draw him into a country where all the advantage should be on their side. The son of Crassus, lately arrived from Gaul, provided the first sacrifice, for he was surrounded by the Parthians, who cut off his head and displayed the bleeding trophy before the eyes of his father. The Romans were never troubled by an excess of emotion, and such would here have been no better than weakness. Crassus was occupied by too many and too important duties to abandon himself to despair: "This disaster," said he truly, "concerns nobody except myself," but at the same time the soldiers can hardly have regarded it but as a bad omen for the future.

Crassus abandoned to a council of war the task of deciding upon a retreat from the banks of the Belik, where the battle had taken place, to Carrhae.

To remain here was to expose himself to the risk of siege, consequently Crassus left it by night almost as soon as he had occupied the place. Infantry cannot for any length of time conceal its march from an efficient cavalry fighting in a *terrain* suited to its capabilities. Crassus soon found himself lost in the midst of marshes across which he endeavoured to get back again to the ford of Thapsacus. He was guilty of the folly of entering into negotiations; a sudden tumult arose. Crassus was murdered, and the major portion of his army was destroyed—"30,000 Roman soldiers," says one historian, "were left upon the battle-field." We rather doubt, however, the accuracy of these figures. Crassus had crossed the Euphrates at the head of seven legions and of 4,000 cavalry; the Roman legion never exceeded the *actual*—not the *nominal*—strength of one of our divisions on a war footing, say 6,000 men roughly. Cassius—the Cassius whom fate reserved for the murder of Cæsar—succeeded in saving his column almost entirely. When one pulls oneself together after a disaster, one is surprised to find how many men there are who rejoin the ranks.

Popular imagination invariably exaggerates the consequences of a defeat. From the date of the defeat at Carrhae the Parthians were looked upon as the one enemy who was most inaccessible to the power of Rome, but they were not really dangerous unless they were sought out in their own country. The question of transport is the most vital of all in every war which has a desert for its theatre. It



was because they found means properly to organize their convoys of supplies that Marshal Bugeaud and General de la Moricière were able to overcome the Arabs.

Anthony, a general of a very different calibre to Crassus, nearly suffered, many years after the Battle of Pharsalia, the same fate as did Pompey's unlucky colleague. He only escaped by extraordinary energy. Checked in the mountains of Atropatene by the need for attacking a strong place without proper military appliances, he saw his baggage carried off by a surprise raid of cavalry, and raised the siege when he saw that his supplies were about to fail him. To raise a siege is a simple enough matter when the leader's line of retreat is assured. Anthony was forced, like Xenophon, to throw himself into the mountains in order to reach the plains of Tauris by way of the shores of the Lake of Urumia. Suliman the Great once passed along this road, and he never forgave his favourite, the grand vizier Ibrahim, for the dangers which he had run. This campaign against the Parthians was certainly the most trying in which Anthony had ever taken part, and in it he displayed military talents of a high order.

More than fifty years had gone by; Augustus had wisely drawn in the Imperial frontiers, and his successors were content with the possession of Syria and Armenia. Between the Romans and the Parthians there was no further occasion for quarrel. The discredit into which the central power at Rome had fallen had ended by something like recovery in the provinces. The Parthians were the first to violate the truce. Sextus Rufus, a writer of the fourth century of our era, tells us that during the reign of Nero the Parthians caused two Roman legions to pass under their yoke. The outrage was first avenged by Trajan, who took possession of Ctesiphon, the Parthian capital. "He penetrated," so Sextus Rufus tells us, "as far as the borders of India and made Armenia, Assyria, and Mesopotamia into provinces of the Roman Empire."

There were two reasons for the success of Trajan—the enfeeblement of the Parthians, who were torn by domestic rivalries, and the judicious preparations which the Emperor had made for war. The adopted son of Nerva, Emperor since the year 98 of our era, conqueror of the Dacians, of the Saracens, and of the Armenians, he marched to the attack of Ctesiphon, the chief objective of the Roman expedition, during the early days of the spring of 107, that is to say, in the ninth year of his reign. He needed a flotilla to pass from one bank of the Tigris to the other, and to carry his supplies, and this flotilla he caused to be built from wood carried on camels or on the backs of porters from Nisibis. If one may believe Dion Cassius, he did something very different. His flotilla made two land journeys—first from the Tigris to the Euphrates, and then from the Euphrates to the Tigris—to bring him at last under the walls of Ctesiphon, and it was thus that Trajan finally arrived on the shores of the Persian Gulf. Having returned to Ctesiphon he readily came to the conclusion that the conquests he had made were of no more than an ephemeral character. He placed the crown on the head of one of the princes

who was struggling for the upper hand, and who was, he knew, ready enough to receive it at the hands of a stranger, and then for a moment he had an idea of crossing Arabia to reach the sea once more. But he was less fortunate with the Saracens than against the Parthians, and the want of water and supplies and the excessive heat obliged him to retrace his steps. He then adopted the route by Cilicia and died at Selinonte.

Hadrian revived the policy of Augustus; he caused the frontiers to be drawn in and again abandoned Armenia, Assyria and Mesopotamia; the Euphrates was for the future to be the boundary between the Romans and the Parthians. But such restrictive methods are no more than a dream. Men like Marcus Aurelius and Verus felt themselves forced to return to Ctesiphon, which they desired to call Seleucia after its original founder. Septimus Severus also aimed at the subjugation of the Parthians, and this time Arabia barely escaped from being for all time converted into a Roman province. Caracallus, the son of Septimus, also in his turn invaded Mesopotamia, and carried fire and sword throughout the country before he fell back upon Edessa. There his triumphs ceased, and his grand projects vanished into the air, for he was assassinated in the year 217.

Another Severus, Alexander, also made war against the Parthians, then, in 233, regenerated by the revolution which had given all power over to the Persians, and which had placed the Sassanian dynasty on the throne. The founder of this dynasty boldly invaded Roman territory at the head of an army, but he played his enemy's game by confronting them with 1,800 chariots and 700 elephants. From the moment when he thus encumbered himself the Persian threw away his chief advantage; and valiant soldier though he showed himself to be, he was defeated by the legions against which he pitted himself. Five years later, in the year 238, Alexander Severus fell, like Caracallus, by the hand of an assassin; Mesopotamia and Syria were ravaged afresh by the Persians, and Antioch itself fell into their hands.

The successor of Alexander Severus, Gordian, again took the offensive, but while both Persians and Romans were equally well equipped for resisting invasion, both were equally feeble in attempting to effect it. Gordian, like Alexander Severus and Caracallus, was struck down at the height of his success, not by the hand of an enemy, but by his own troops.

A Roman emperor fell into the hands of Asiatics, an event which had never before occurred. Defeated in the year 260, near Edessa, the captivity of the Emperor Valerian has become celebrated. The Prince of Palmyra, Odenathus, at the head of his Arabs, avenged the capture of Valerian, but could not effect his release. Mesopotamia lends itself readily to sudden and lightning raids, but the difficulty is to hold it, for it is only by utilizing the rivers which traverse it that it becomes possible to consolidate an invasion.

Just for a moment it seemed probable that Rome would exert as great a power over the East as she already did over the West; this was on that day when Diocletian established the Empire on new foundations, substituting a wise tyranny for the military despotism

resting on the smallest caprice of the legions. On that day the Persians trembled despite a snatched victory over Galerius, but when Galerius again attacked, there was nothing for the King of Persia to do but to fly, leaving his queen and children in the hands of the lieutenant of Diocletian. In order that his family might be restored to him, the Persian King was forced to cede the provinces situated to the west of the Khabur river.

From that date the border war went on for ever. Under the Emperor Constantius in the year 250, the town of Nisibis, invested by Shapor, sustained a siege of four months, and was saved only by a diversion made by the Massagetae. The year 359 was memorable for an invasion which extended far beyond the limits to which the Persians had hitherto confined themselves. Shapor, ready to thread the mountain valleys of Armenia, now wished to trace the Euphrates to its source. The siege of Amida, unfortunately for him, delayed him for nearly two and a half months beneath its walls, and he was forced to retire and postpone the execution of his projects until the year following. In the year 360 he again appeared in Mesopotamia, a country which had by this been so completely devastated that no army could exist therein which did not carry its own supplies along with it. It was this which conferred so great an importance on the possession of the course of the Euphrates, so great an importance, also, to those fortresses which, like Singara, Nisibis and Tigranocerta, defended the approaches to the Tigris.

Master of Singara, the advance of Shapor became threatening. Constantius would certainly have moved against him, but for the fact that just at this time the army of Gaul proclaimed his nephew Julian as emperor, and thenceforth Julian became a greater danger for the son of Constantine than Shapor himself. Constantius now turned his back on the Persians and set out for Byzantium, impatient to recall the rebels to their allegiance. He died, however, *en route*, exactly as Trajan had died, in one of the towns of Cilicia. Thus fell to Julian, at the very commencement of his reign, the grave task of checking the ravages of the southern enemy and of ensuring the safety of the Roman possessions in Asia.

### III.

I have no intention of descending into the arena where philosophers and Christians have disputed with one another. I prefer to leave in peace the memory of the Great Apostate. A century earlier he would have been looked upon as a new Marcus Aurelius; so far as I am concerned I regard him as a new Alexander. Julian was indeed a second Alexander by reason of his valour, his generosity, by his interest in letters, by his affectionate nature; but unfortunately he was also an Alexander without elegance, and further, an Alexander who was a stranger in the time in which he lived. It is hard not to belong to, not to be of one's own era; Julian was born at the wrong time; he was an aerolite which had fallen into a torrent. This is certainly no reason for denying justice to his really great qualities, but it is a reason for regretting that he was not able to make a better use of them. To wish to bring

back the world to paganism in the year 361 is a madness even more impossible to account for than that of Diocletian; quite different, I grant, but the results of which might well be more fatal. And all this mingled with a blend of devotion, a devotion full of mystery with which it was physically impossible to associate a people who were great and yet hard, who had never regarded the Deity but as an expression. Heaven was kind to Julian in permitting him to meet a soldier's death; he was a brave soldier all through, and also, it may be added, a skilled leader.

Let us trace his steps from the very outset; we must trace them with care, and we shall see that he left but little to luck. The winter had been passed at Antioch, busy with preparations of great importance, and by March, 362, Julian was in a position to dispose of 83,000 men. In five days' time he had reached Hieropolis, a town which had been founded by Seleucus Nicator, and which under his descendants had become one of the great centres of Eastern trade. Constantine made it the capital of the new Euphrates province. Geographers have placed it at five days' journey from Antioch and at two and a half days' march from Berhœa (Aleppo). Did Julian cross the river by the bridge of boats which carried the direct road from Hieropolis to the Euphrates, or did he not, on the contrary, proceed 36 miles further to the north towards Apamea, where the Castle of Biredjick even to-day commands the eastern bank? The question may interest the student, it is of but limited interest to the military writer. Julian's plan of campaign was not shaped until the day when he came to cross the Euphrates.

The flotilla which Julian had caused to be built at the foot of the mountains whose forests Napoleon intended one day to exploit, was placed under the command of Lucian and of Constantius, and was concentrated at Samosata—or Samsat on the maps of to-day. The main body of the army, composed of 65,000 cavalry and infantry, gave as yet no indication of the route by which it was intended to move forward. Did Julian propose to lead this great force to the banks of the Tigris? Did he intend to follow in the footsteps of Alexander or of Trajan? Since the main thing was to keep the enemy uncertain of his plans he moved to Batne, in the district of Osrhoene, a place admirably suited for an encampment. "Here," writes Julian, "we made a delightful stay. I should prefer Batne to Ossa, to Pelion, to Olympus, to the most celebrated valleys of Thessaly, even to Delphi; the country is fertile, well wooded, and covered with clumps of flowering cypress." This description does not reveal to us where Batne was situated, but I do not think I shall be far out in placing the site of this camping ground rather below Samsat, possibly at the very spot where is to-day the Turkish village of Jallak. Here Julian was in easy communication with his flotilla.

During this time Procopius, kinsman and lieutenant of Julian, had been detached to the left with 18,000 men to ensure the fidelity of the King of Armenia, and prevent any Persian raids into the Roman province. From Batne Julian, on one occasion, made as though he intended an advance on the Tigris; he marched on Edessa, and thence on Carrhae, and for the time the enemy was wholly at a loss to penetrate his designs. The moment had now, however, arrived when he



must come to some definite decision, and Julian made a very wise one. He suddenly turned south, and following the road which once upon a time had saved the remnants of the army of Crassus, he marched along the shores of the Belik in order to reach the point where this stream joins the Euphrates. The campaign had now opened, and the far-sightedness of Julian provided in advance a guarantee of success. The flotilla, with which he was now in direct communication, counted 600 river boats, 500 rafts made of inflated skins, and a bridging equipment. The army was thus, thanks to this assistance, relieved of all baggage trouble, for since the flotilla carried the food supplies, the war engines and the munitions, the army moved forward swiftly and in light marching order.

The Khabur, one of the greatest of the affluents of the Euphrates, then formed the extreme boundary of the Empire, and here the army crossed by the bridge of boats by which it was accompanied, and which was speedily put together. It was now in a hostile country, its right flank covered by the river, its supply assured by its flotilla. Nothing remained but to protect its left by means of its numerous cavalry, and to reduce several fortresses *en route*. Julian at once marched, deployed for action, on Ctesiphon; 1,500 light troops formed his advance, while his rear was protected by a strong rear-guard.

The first resistance was met with on the fourth day, when the garrison of Amantho, a strong castle built on an island of the Euphrates, replied to his summons to surrender by a haughty refusal. Julian invested the place by night, and at daybreak it was given up.

To seamen accustomed to real storms, a storm which occurs on a river must seem like a tempest in a glass of water; but those who think thus have no knowledge of the storms of the Euphrates. The local wind when at its height is enough to sink a steamship, and one may imagine what damage it could cause to a flotilla composed of open boats and rafts supported on inflated skins. On April 7th, 363, the Roman expedition was put to the great test which has never, so far as I know, been avoided by any great expedition in which flotillas have played a part. The sun was about to set; a slight mist appeared, and in five minutes the whole sky was covered with a thick fog. Darkness reigned, flashes of lightning were accompanied by incessant peals of thunder; the wind roared through the camp, plucking up the tents and throwing down the soldiers, for no man could stand upright. The swollen river overflowed its banks and carried away the boats floating upon it; the whole flotilla was imperilled.

The storm passed away and stock was taken of what remained of the flotilla, when it was found that the damage occasioned was less than might have been expected, and that it amounted to no more than the loss of several boats laden with provisions. In war the main thing is to maintain a calm appearance and not to discover a bad omen in every accident.

On the morrow the flotilla and the army resumed their journey. Another fort was met with which had to be invested, but since operations of this character took much time, Julian ordered that it should not be attacked, holding that if Shapor were defeated the fort would fall of



itself. Consequently he refused to occupy himself with the siege of any forts, but he did not deny his troops the sack of the towns, and he made every effort to spare the supplies carried on the flotilla by making his troops live as far as possible on the country. Thanks to the presence of the flotilla, the army passed from one bank to the other with remarkable ease. On the right bank it captured Diacira and there found quantities of corn, while on the left bank the booty was no less rich, and at Zaragardia a rock may be seen which to this day the people call the throne of Julian.

The heart of the Persian power was now nearly reached, though access thereto was strongly guarded, while it was also cut up by canals and marshes. To arrive under the walls of Ctesiphon it was necessary to leave the Euphrates for the stream of the Tigris, a feat which had been an easy one enough in the days of Semiramis, Cyrus, and Alexander, when the canals which connected the two rivers had been carefully kept open. The Parthians and the Persians, however, had allowed them gradually to become filled up with mud and silt, but Julian not only reopened them to traffic, but did so in the face of the enemy. Under his impulse the Roman legions re-captured their former good qualities, those virile ones of courage and patient endurance. In Constantine we seem to recognize *en quelque sorte l'ancêtre moral de Charles-Quint*, in Constantius we see revealed Philip II., while Julian reminds us of the heroic Béarnais. Brought up in a college, captured later by the philosophers—and what philosophers!—inventors of mysteries—he taught himself to be a soldier, saved Gaul, and made ready to save the Empire. He was of the stuff of which great men are made, and by the grace of Providence he died, as often the greatest men die, young, idolised and full of great ideals. He died at the head of his troops, and his fading sight saw the enemy in flight; he never suspected that his political opponents would blast his memory by giving him the hideous name of Apostate.

Still he *was* an apostate, of his age, of the religion in which he had been brought up. What was lacking to him? Feeling for others. He never felt that the grandeur of Rome meant the enslavement of the world, that it was the crushing of the humble for the benefit of the patrician. No soul ever understood the spirit of Christianity less than did the soul of this inspired one. He was like a stone removed by Providence from the road, but let us at the same time be just and admit that in this stone we may find the hidden diamond. One hour, the last, was to come, when the precious stone would give forth all its hidden fires; it is only accorded to the few and the privileged to die a fine death.

Perisabor, the next largest town to Ctesiphon in Assyria, and defended by moats, bastions and a keep, was taken by the sword, and yielded up to the legions huge supplies of provisions, of arms and engines of war. The Persians, ceasing to have any longer faith in their walls, inundated their country against the enemy, causing great difficulties to the Romans, which they, however, overcame, combating the inundation as they had the walled places—and with the same energy and equal good luck.

No Asian campaign has ever been so continuously successful. Every occasion upon which the Persians had appeared they had been repulsed with loss; the ramparts behind which they sheltered themselves fell as though by enchantment; Ctesiphon and Seleucia were as open cities; it needed but one effort more and the seat of Persian power would be in the hands of the Romans. But one thing was a source of difficulty, and that was to succeed in bringing beneath the walls of these two cities engines strong enough to bring them down. Our field and siege artillery, our ammunition parks are anything but impedimenta when we compare them with the balistas, catapults and other war engines of the ancients. In order in those days to lay siege to a town, it might almost be said to be necessary to build another—an impossibility in a country where there were neither stones nor wood. Moreover, Julian had never thought of possessing himself by long protracted operations of such places where the enemy seemed resolved to make any determined resistance. It was well enough if he could capture them by surprise, by taking advantage of a panic induced by a series of defeats, but if the *coup de main* failed, he would at once retire fighting upon Antioch, there to make ready for a fresh campaign, having at least had the benefit of having explored the road.

Towns built of brick do not leave traces so easily recognizable as those which have been built of marble. But Colonel Chesney inclines to the belief that the ruins of Tell'Akhar, between the left bank of the Euphrates and the Nahr J'sa, might well answer to the description which has been handed down to us of Perisabor by Ammianus Marcellinus, the historian of the Roman expedition. In this case Firuz-Shapor, or Anbar, probably occupied the site of the great city raised by the Persians to serve as an outpost to their capital.

Let us now follow Julian as he marched along the southern bank of the Nahr J'sa. First he passed by a town which had been abandoned by the Jews who had lived in it; it was no strong place, and learned men have thought to discover traces of it in the Persian village known as Akar-Kuf. A little further and the forward movement of the army was again checked, this time before the double enceinte of Mahoz Malka, surrounded by a deep ditch, flanked by sixteen towns, and situated on the banks of the Nahr-Malka, one of the canals connecting the Euphrates with the Tigris. When engines were wanting for breaching the walls, mines were dug beneath the ground, and men sapped below the very foundations of the ramparts. Alexander had before used such methods in Gedrosia, the modern Makran. Julian employed them in Chaldaea. The walls began to fall, and while the Persian soldiery rushed to defend the breach, the Romans emerged from their subterranean passage in the very centre of the town; there then remained no further obstacle to the march on Seleucia.

M. Lejean, who visited these ruins in April, 1866, assures us that geographers are mistaken when they tell us that Ctesiphon and Seleucia were separated by the Tigris. Founded by Seleucus Nicator, Seleucia was astride the river, or, more exactly stated, on

either bank of the Nahr-Malka, the Royal Canal. Grégoire de Nazianze seems to have confused Carrhae and Seleucia, describing Carrhae, the ancient city mentioned by Arrian, as "a fortress separated from Ctesiphon by the Tigris. These two cities," he adds, "are equally important, they may, indeed, be looked as one city divided into two by the river."

According to M. Lejean, Seleucia itself can never have contained more than 30,000 souls, and no doubt the 500,000 or 600,000 inhabitants who are said by historians to have occupied it, lived in the suburbs. When the Parthian King Ardawan gave up all idea of raising up Seleucia from its ashes, after it had been burnt by the generals of Trajan and of Lucius Verus, and resolved to build a new city on the left bank of the Tigris, he wished to give the city he proposed raising as his capital under the name of Ctesiphon, a site on the ruins of the old capital of the Seleucians. Seleucia-Ctesiphon-Madain, "the cities," as the Khalifs later called it, was situated in the midst of the most fertile district of Chaldæa, in the centre of a grassy country, covered with vineyards and orchards, and soon gathered within its walls a population more numerous than that of Antioch, the great city of Syria. The Parthian kings always made it their winter residence, living during the summer at Ecbatana in Hyrcania.

Having mastered the two fortresses which hitherto had barred his passage, Julian, had he now proceeded to attack Seleucia, would have given himself the trouble of undertaking two sieges instead of one. The capture of Ctesiphon, in close communication with all the reserves of the Sassanian empire, would cause the fall of both cities at one and the same time; but Ctesiphon might easily survive the capture of Seleucia. It was therefore Ctesiphon to which he ought now to lay siege; the need of the operation was clear, and its conception needed the genius of no great military commander. The only thing was that the investment of Ctesiphon required first and foremost the transfer of the whole army to the left bank of the Tigris; therein lay a serious difficulty, for the Tigris at Baghdad is not one of those rivers which may be crossed by a ford. The Persian Army, ranged in order of battle, showed an imposing front, and to gain the bank by small parties was not to be thought of. But for his flotilla Julian would never have passed over so wide a stream. He had now formed the happy idea of making use of the Nahr-Malka for bringing his boats of all descriptions down to the Tigris. The canal, however, was almost filled up, but Julian caused it to be cleared out, and by means of a huge dam made the Euphrates leave its bed and follow this new channel. When the waters of the great river had filled what Ammianus Marcellinus calls the *flumen fossile*, or the artificial channel leading from the one river to the other, Julian gave the signal to his flotilla. The eleven hundred boats moved forward, and at the end of a few hours the terrified inhabitants of Ctesiphon saw them debouching into the Tigris before the very walls of their city.

What an enormous amount of work such an operation must have entailed, and how unwilling we should be to believe in its execution had not the Romans accustomed us to all kinds of miracles! It was

to rival such achievements that the Emperor Napoleon so ardently longed, and it was such that he so constantly displayed to his soldiers; but one must admit that to surpass them even the Grenadiers of the Old Guard would have had their work cut out for them. All the great historians—men like Ammianus Marcellinus, Eutrope, Rufus, Voltaire, Gibbon, Duruy, de Broglie, Lamé, Martha, and Maréchal—all give vent to a cry of admiration when they describe to us this episode in the great campaign of 363. "Julian," they cry with one accord, "showed himself then to be a really great captain!" A great captain! he was that, indeed, to the last, and the faults with which later on he was reproached were no faults, they were no more than the evil fortunes of that dreadful game which men call the game of force and chance.

He had, however, yet more to do than merely to throw his army on the bank of the river, he had also to deliver battle. For something like twelve hours the Persians fought well, they disputed the ground foot by foot, until, hurled back by the legions, they ended by retreating within the city. If the 18,000 men left in Upper Mesopotamia under the orders of Procopius had only arrived at this moment, Ctesiphon would probably have fallen, the campaign would have ended, and the power of the Persians would have for long been crushed. Procopius, however, came not. Was Julian really justified in reckoning on this reinforcement? All combinations which depend upon help from a distance are of a doubtful nature; conquerors have often suffered from these cruel miscalculations, but Julian was here misled rather by Fortune than by any error in calculation.

There was still, however, one thing left to him, and that was to carry the city by a *coup de main*, with the 40,000 men remaining to him, as Bonaparte wished to carry St. Jean d'Acre, as Alexander carried Tyre. He was, however, wise enough—and I, for one, approve of his decision—not to attempt the adventure. The failure of the assault would have exposed him to irretrievable disaster, far as he was from his base of operations, separated from Antioch, and even from Nisibis, by vast deserts. He was anxious to cover his retreat by inflicting a defeat upon Shapor's army, but in order to defeat Shapor, he must force that leader to accept battle, and this was not the way of the Parthians or Persians. This resolve once come to, Julian's flotilla became of no further use to him. Flotillas may descend streams but they cannot ascend them—or at least not when the power of propulsion which they possess is afforded by oars alone.

The order was then given to burn the boats, and all that was retained were twelve small boats, which were drawn on vehicles to serve at need as bridging material. Eleven hundred boats were together set on fire, and the army commenced its march—whither? It was marching under the guidance of a deserter, who had promised to place the army in front of that of Shapor. The country now undertook its own defence; the dams had been broken down, the harvest had all been burnt; if they passed through a village, it had been abandoned by its inhabitants. Everywhere there was an empty waste, only a few squadrons of the enemy's cavalry were seen in the dim



distance, distinguishable by the glitter of their body armour. These watched the Roman army, but did not allow themselves to be overtaken; pursuit was in vain, and the sufferings in these fiery plains become unbearable. The Legionaries began to murmur, and Julian resolved to incline his movement somewhat towards the north. From the date when retreat was decided upon, the Persians no longer kept aloof.

Every night there was an alarm; stragglers were cut off; the rear-guard was ever engaged. Thus five days passed, during which the army drew perceptibly nearer to the Tigris, and the light infantry performed marvels under critical conditions. The Persians now no longer dared to harass the retreat by means of flying squadrons, but they placed in line their heavy armoured cavalry and their elephants, the very smell of which terrified the horses of the Romans. These moved in mass at the rear of the Roman army, which closed up so as to offer a more compact resistance. Julian was everywhere, now in front, now with the main body, at another time with the rear-guard. He was adored by his men, to whom he set a fine example, and with whom he shared what food he had. Supplies now began to run short; those of the officers were thrown into the common stock, and the Emperor was the first to content himself with a bowl of papp. The greatest burden, under the terrible heat, was that of the breast-plate, and yet the hail of arrows constantly discharged by the Persians made this defensive armour very useful. At the earliest moment of relief, when the Persians had been thrown back some distance, the men hastened to throw off their heavy armour, and the army promised itself a little well-earned repose.

When to-day the traveller floats down the stream of the Tigris, when he has passed by, near Tell-Mandjour, this great mass of ruins wherein antiquarians have permitted themselves to recognize the ruins of Opis, a curious structure, something like a brick tower, formerly the watch-tower of the Mohammedan Khalifs, soon comes within view. The name of this edifice has hardly changed at all since the days of Alexander. It was then called Samara; to-day the Turks call it Soumera. The plain extends from the fertile borders of the stream to where the view is lost in the infinity of the desert; this is the for ever celebrated plain of Maranga, across which the exhausted Roman army dragged itself; on June 26th it here pitched its camp; it needed time to rest and take breath before the terrible attack it was about to experience.

The alarm was suddenly heard from the rear-guard. Julian resumed his arms, but did not buckle on his breast-plate, and rushed to where the danger appeared to be most imminent. His faithful light infantry men followed close upon his heels; the Persians recognized him, and it was not usual with them to wait upon his coming.

How often has Marshal Bugeaud been seen—Papa Bugeaud, as the soldiers of Africa called him—advancing thus at the head of his Zouaves!

At the sight of this gallant party the Persians fell back, but fell back only to return to the charge. The Emperor scorned everything,



the arrows which were loosed at him, the entreaties of his friends, and rushing into the midst of the *mêlée*, cried out: "They fly, they fly! Follow them up, press them closely, so that they will no longer dare to trouble our retreat." His soldiers, alarmed for his safety, seized the bridle of his horse, trying to force him to fall to the rear. The Emperor resisted their efforts, though the danger to which he was exposing himself was on his account the greatest danger which could menace his army. It is no longer the cold philosopher, always master of himself, who directs his legions with the calmness of a great captain; it is the warrior, drunk with battle, carried away by irresistible impulse. Alexander seems to be reborn—at the battle of the Granicus, in the fields of Issus and Arbela. Men speak of the faults of Julian; at this moment he committed the gravest, the most irreparable of faults, since by exposing himself he left the fate of his army to mere hazard. What wise saws I have heard uttered on this very matter by the illustrious captor of the Malakoff! The fatal blow was struck; a javelin, hurled at random, grazed the arm of the commander, pierced his side, and lodged in the liver. Julian put his hand to his side and tried to draw the weapon from the fatal wound, but the double-bladed head cut his fingers. He let go the javelin, uttered a loud cry, and fell senseless from his horse. He was quickly surrounded, lifted, and carried to a tent which had hurriedly been pitched. The army having heard the news, halted, and pitched camp for the night; every soldier's heart was filled with grief and consternation. But the Emperor did not for long disappear from the scene. No sooner had he recovered consciousness than he called for his charger and his weapons. What general has not made the same requests? From Epaminondas to MacMahon the one ambition of the leader stretched upon a bed of pain has always been to return to the head of his troops. In this case the troops could be safely left to themselves, for they had already avenged their Emperor.

The plain was now but a field of blood; this time at least the Persians had been well met; their initial success had cost them dear. Fifty satraps and innumerable soldiers had perished, while on the side of the Romans the right flank had given way. Anatolius led them back, but he was killed, and Sallustius, the prefect, seemed about to share the same fate, when his devoted comrades snatched him from the midst of the *mêlée*. Sophorus, less fortunate, did not escape. If the losses of the Persians were the greater, those of both sides were heavy, and, like Alexander, Julian was accorded bloody obsequies. The doctors did not attempt to conceal from the Emperor the gravity of his injuries; but even before they had spoken, the weakness and the sinking, following upon the great loss of blood which he had already suffered, had made the wounded hero realize that the time had come when he must pay the inevitable debt of nature. The Emperor, true to himself, prepared for death like the wise man he was, and the record which a faithful friend has handed down to us allows us to recognize that to die wisely is practically synonymous with dying like a Christian. All vain dogmas, all fantastic dreams pass easily away in the supreme hour of man's life: there is but the one way of making a good

death, and that is to die resigned. "It is, perhaps, somewhat early," said Julian, to the heart-broken friends by whom he was surrounded—he had then but 31 years, 8 months, and 20 days—"it is, perhaps, somewhat early, but I shall thus settle my debt more loyally. To die young is in some cases a favour accorded by the gods. My conscience tells me that I have borne with equal serenity what I remember of humiliation, of exile, of greatness, and of power. Philosophers have taught me the superiority of the soul over the body, and I have a firm conviction that I am only exchanging my present state for a better one. Why, then, should I mourn rather than rejoice?" One may be a poor politician and yet possess a great heart. Julian did not realize all that Heaven was doing for him. By striking him down on the field of battle, by checking him in his mad career, Heaven recognized the good that was in him. I find myself unable to share the opinion of Voltaire, who says: "If the career of Julian had longer endured, it is to be presumed that the Empire would not have tottered as it did after his death." One may easily see from this that Voltaire cared little for the poor and humble; to preserve the Empire, according to him, was to save it for the patricians. Christianity has done a greater work than this, and its well-doing is by no means yet at an end.

Up till the last moment Julian spoke with Maximus and Priscus, two philosophers like himself, of the soul and of its transcendency. His breathing then became laboured, he asked for a drink of water; he drank, and a few moments later Julian breathed his last.

Like Alexander, the nephew of the great Constantine had not nominated anybody to succeed him; the responsibility had seemed to him too great. The soldiers, however, charged themselves with this duty and elected a Christian Emperor—Jovian. During four days the battle raged, while the Romans struggled to burst through the circle by which the Persians tried hard to surround the army. At last the river bank was reached; on the further side lay safety, perhaps plenty of food, but unfortunately the flotilla was no longer there to facilitate the crossing. A few warriors from Gaul swam over the Tigris, while the bulk of the army laboured for two days to fashion a bridge from inflated skins, but this idea had to be abandoned for the water was too high and the current too rapid.

Still the enemy was always held in check, and had the provisions not given out, there would never have been any idea of entering into negotiations with him. But famine triumphed, and on July 7th the Romans first hearkened to the proposals of the enemy. The Persians demanded the surrender of Nisibis and of Singara, of the whole of their territory previously ceded to Diocletian. Nisibis and Singara were given up and peace, to endure for thirty years, was concluded, while the King of Armenia was abandoned to the vengeance of Shapor. Everything had to be given up in order to receive permission merely to live. The Persians, satisfied with the advantages they had secured, withdrew to a distance, and the army pursued its way along the banks of the river, seeking, not for a ford, but for a bend where the water was less troubled. They thought they had found such a bend in the neighbourhood of Tekrit. Here some of the soldiers made an attempt,

as some of their comrades from Gaul had done lower down, to swim across to the right bank of the Tigris, but most of these were either drowned or were massacred by the Arabs. The example served as a lesson for the others and curbed their impatience; rafts of osiers and inflated skins were now collected in sufficiently large numbers on the bank, and on a given signal a first contingent made the passage moving diagonally across the stream; other contingents followed. The boats carried on the vehicles in rear of the army arrived in the meantime, and these were launched hurriedly on the stream carrying many passengers. The Emperor was one of the last to embark; like the brave soldier that he was, he did his duty nobly to the last.

The river was passed, but the privations did not become any the less heavy. The country possessed no resources; and it became necessary to march as far as Ur, an enemy fortress now known by the name of Kal'ah Shevkat, to obtain some supplies by favour of the Persians. Finally, after marching for ten or twelve days, during which no grass was to be found upon which the horses could graze, Nisibis appeared in sight. Here Procopius was awaiting Julian, and he handed over to the new Emperor, Jovian, the supplies he possessed, and which, if earlier available, might have spared the Empire a humiliating peace.

From Nisibis, now about to cease any longer to remain a Roman possession, the Emperor would easily be able to reach Antioch, and thence, his troops fresh and rested, continue his march across Cilicia. At Antioch he had proclaimed the return of the Empire to the Christian religion, but he was not to have the satisfaction of repeating this ceremony in the city of the great Constantine. Having arrived at Dadastane, an obscure town in Bithynia, when men went to wake him in his tent, he was found lying dead upon his bed.

Thus ended the expedition of 363. The day is perhaps not so very distant—and this is the moral which I would draw from this story—when it will be remembered with sorrow that no one has ever dreamt of attempting to make war without a flotilla in a country which is covered with rivers.

## THE ENEMY CHARACTER OF MERCHANT SHIPS.

The ABOLITION of ARTICLE 57 of the DECLARATION OF LONDON.

By GIOVANNI ALESSANDRO ROSSO.

(Translated by permission from the *Rivista Marittima*,  
by Assistant Paymaster P. SMILES, R.N.)

THE laws of naval war, the general principles of which seemed to have been standardized at the last international conference, have been modified in many important particulars during the progress of the present struggle. Some such result was inevitable, owing to the exceptional and unforeseen character of the conflict, its extent and violence, and the employment of new arms and methods of war.

At the beginning of hostilities it seemed as though the conduct of the war would be governed by the Declaration of London, and such was the unanimous desire of the belligerents: but the necessities of the conflict were the cause of successive modifications, especially as regards such questions as lists of absolute and conditional contraband, presumed knowledge of a state of blockade, destination of neutral merchant vessels, etc., etc. Considering the complicated nature and wide extent of the operations of modern commercial warfare, the employment of submarines, and the importance of the pressure exercised by the blockade in obtaining a decision, it seems by no means strange that some such modifications should have been rendered necessary, and that besides the affirmation of principles new to International Law, doctrines (*e.g.*, the proclamation of parts of the open sea as "military areas"), long since considered out of date, should have been revived. Germany, to whose interests it was to maintain intact the principles embodied in the Declaration of London, was herself forced to make some modifications in them (*e.g.*, the declaration of wood as contraband of war), and Dernburg, one of her best-known public men, recently admitted that the belligerents were justified in their changed attitude towards laws formerly accepted as binding.

Without probing too deeply into the origins and consequences of this phenomenon, the main reason can be found in the fact that pressure on sea-borne traffic, which was formerly considered as subsidiary to purely military operations, has now become one of the primary weapons in the conflict. In former wars the capture of merchant shipping and the limitation of navigation and commerce were merely auxiliaries to the operations of larger scope entrusted to the armed forces, but under present circumstances the enforcement of a strict blockade and the annihilation of the enemy's mercantile marine are the only means at our disposal for bringing about a definite decision.

The whole system of laws, constructed with infinite care and labour to regulate the conduct of war at sea, has had to accommodate itself to this imperious necessity, and it will have again to yield if the supreme needs of the country call for further restrictions on national and individual liberty. The latest, in order of time, of the modifications referred to is the abrogation, announced by the British Government in the Order in Council of October 26th, 1915, of Article 57 of the Declaration of London, which reads as follows:—

“Subject to the provisions respecting transfer to another flag, the neutral or enemy character of a vessel is determined by the flag which she is entitled to fly.

“The case where a neutral vessel is engaged in a trade which is closed in time of peace remains outside the scope of, and is in no wise affected by this rule.”

This act of England's has passed almost unobserved, although it represents, beyond all doubt, the most important decision as regards International Maritime Law adopted during the present conflict: important, as will be seen, both in its actual significance and in its consequences.

The Declaration of Paris of 1856, with its well-known formula, “The flag covers the goods,” solved, theoretically, the greatest problem of the freedom of the seas, but in practice the determination of whether ships and goods were enemy or neutral was left to the arbitrary interpretation of the different States. The opinion held naturally varies according to whether it is the interests of belligerents or neutrals that are at stake. The latter obviously favour a narrow view of what constitutes an enemy, so as to be able to take over a large part of the trade of the warring States, while the former, on the contrary, press for a wider application of the term, which will permit them to stifle all the enemy's attempts at commercial activity under the protection of a neutral flag.

These tendencies had their birth in two fundamental theories, which bore the names of France and England respectively. In one point they agreed—viz., that ships flying an enemy flag were hostile and liable to capture—and the justification for such a rule is evident. The diversity between the two systems arose in their treatment of ships flying a neutral flag.

The French considered as neutral every ship which had a right to fly a neutral flag, independently of the nationality of the owners or of those who had claims upon the vessel. An exception was only made (Edict of July, 1878) in the case of ships which had been transferred to another flag after the outbreak of war.

The English doctrine did not accept the evidence of the flag as final: enquiry was always made into the nationality of the vessel's owners. An enemy was defined as any person domiciled in a hostile country, since, with sound common-sense, the British Courts considered the economic tie indicated by the domicile of an individual as of more importance than his nationality.

At the 1908 Naval Conference at London, the traditional British theory, shared by America, was held also by Japan; while the French



theory was supported by the continental powers—amongst others, Germany, Russia, Italy, and Holland. Great Britain, however, came to the Conference after a bitter experience in the Russo-Japanese War, when she was made to feel all the burdens of neutrality. She announced therefore that her theory and practice as regards maritime law had grown up during a period (second half of 18th century to second half of 19th) in which she was almost always at war, and had naturally served rather the interests of a belligerent than those of a neutral. When she found herself differently situated she had felt the disadvantages under which a commercial neutral laboured, and was willing to make concessions. In Sir Edward Grey's instructions to the British delegates to the Conference, this view is explicitly stated with reference to the enemy character of merchant vessels.

As their most powerful opponent had yielded, the views of the continental powers prevailed, and Article 57 of the Declaration of London was the result. This, without prejudice to the regulations as to the transfer of flag, laid down definitely that "the enemy or neutral character of a vessel is determined by the flag which she has a right to fly."

The full effect of this statement must be briefly examined. There could be no doubt that it constituted a victory for the neutrals, since it freed them from all fear of being compromised by the part ownership of enemy citizens, and from any uncertainty, which was all against their interests, as to when a ship might be considered hostile. The simple and explicit words of the Article eliminated the subordinate questions of the nationality or domicile of the owners, although subsequent enquiries might always be made as to whether the ship was legally authorized to fly a neutral flag.

The rule was based on the guarantee, expressed in the laws of all the larger States, that for a ship to have a right to the flag of a country she must be owned entirely or for the greater part by citizens of the country to which the flag belongs. The right to the flag was, therefore, as Renault affirmed in his explanatory speech to the Conference, the most certain proof that the ship is really a unit of the mercantile marine of a country, and, consequently, the best guide in determining whether she is neutral or hostile.

The essential value of Article 57 consequently lay in its limitation of the powers granted to belligerents; it tended to lessen the effects of hostile action by eliminating the possibility of direct pressure on neutral commerce.

Her experience in the present war has convinced Great Britain of the insufficiency of the guarantee on which Article 57 was based, and has shown that the principles which inspired it served rather as an incentive to fraud on behalf of the belligerents than as a protection to neutral interests.

Constant mention was made in the great English dailies of the various means by which Germany was evading the blockade. For example, attention was directed to the case of a certain Herr Jensen, living at Copenhagen, who had entered in the United States Maritime Register, under the name of Mr. Richard Wagner, eight ships, some

of which had been bought from Germans and all purchased with German money.

Jensen was imprisoned some time later by the Danish authorities for smuggling, but others after him continued the work. *The Times* announced that many such ships bound with cargo to Denmark were captured by the Germans, who, after having unloaded them, released them for the process to be repeated.

Some time later, on the occasion of the seizing by the British of the s.s. "Hocking," flying the American flag, the Washington correspondent of the *Morning Post* declared that he had been informed that that ship, and many others which had recently become the property of the American Transatlantic Company of New York, had been entered in the American Register with the sole idea of avoiding capture, and there was nothing American about them but the name, their real proprietor being a certain Hugo Stinnes, who lived at Mulheim.

It is certain, in any case, that the British Government was under no illusions as to the frequency with which the German blockade was violated, through the complacency shown by neutral States in allowing the entry in their registers of ships which were still foreign or, more precisely, German property. Great Britain has now, in the Order in Council of October 26th, 1915, abrogated Article 57 of the Declaration of London, and fallen back on the old Anglo-American rule, which, to put the matter shortly, applies to ships the same principles as the Declaration of London does to goods, *i.e.*, enquiry is made into the character of the owner, and any enemy goods are sold on behalf of the Crown or the neutral co-proprietors.

One of the earliest applications of this rule, as regards enemy shares in a vessel, was in the case of the "Vrouw Elizabeth" (1803), and, as regards enemy interests in mortgages or liens upon the ship, the cases of the "Tobago" (1804) and "Marianna" (1805).

The rule is closely bound up with another most important question, one which the Conference of London did not succeed in settling, or rather could only decide in part, that is, should nationality or domicile be the deciding factor in determining the neutral or enemy character of an owner, and under what circumstances is the transfer of flag valid?

The flying of a neutral flag merely constitutes a presumption in favour of a ship, and, if it can be shown, as an offset to this, that the proprietors of the vessel are enemy, Great Britain will be ruled by their place of domicile in determining their character. The continental theory, following the principle of nationality, considered only the case of those who were *de jure* enemies, owing to the fact that they belonged to a hostile State; the advocates of the Anglo-American theory, on the contrary, looking at the matter from the traditional "common-sense" point of view of their courts of justice, strove rather to ascertain whether an individual was an enemy *de facto*, that is, was he domiciled in hostile territory, and, if so, was there any economic bond between him and the enemy. As usual, one theory served the interests of the neutrals, while the other favoured the belligerents.

At London, as has been said, the rivalry between the continental system, to which, besides France, Italy, Russia, and, in most points,

Austria adhered, and the English, advocated also by Japan, Holland, and Spain, was shown in its full force when the question of the enemy or neutral character of goods was under consideration. Germany, through her representative, Kriege, proposed a compromise; the adoption, that is to say, of a decision according to the nationality of the person who bears the risk of any loss during the voyage. But since the acceptance of this principle would have led to great complexity of procedure and a most detailed examination of foreign laws, so as to ascertain who should in reality be considered the "porteur des risques," it was not adopted. There were sound reasons against making the consignee bear the risk, as this would be to confine the war on commerce exclusively to goods imported by an enemy direct, and open a loophole for frauds through neutral consignees; nor could the consignor justly bear it, as that rule would be open to similar objections, though in the opposite direction, nor finally could it be left to the discretion of the belligerent to adopt one system or the other, as opportunity would be given for an unlimited possibility of rulings harmful to neutrals. The Conference, therefore, decided to leave it to the discretion of each State whether she would adopt the standard of nationality or that of domicile in determining the enemy or neutral character of the owner of the goods; and, to-day, when Article 57 is no longer in force, the same latitude is allowed with regard to the ownership of vessels, one of the immediate consequences being that neutral commerce is exposed to increased risks.

It is not enough to say that the British Prize Courts adhere to the criterion of domicile in determining whether the owner's interests are coincident with those of the enemy. The Court possesses almost unlimited discretion in deciding what is to be considered the domicile. Luckily, however, a man can only have one domicile, though he can have a dual nationality, but how is his domicile to be ascertained?

English law has always regarded two points as fundamental—the object and the duration of the domicile in enemy territory. Above all, the intention of settlement is decisive in determining the domicile, but it is rarely possible to prove an intention in a case where it is to a person's interest to conceal it, so that the decision of the Court is necessarily based on presumption and internal evidence. If a neutral citizen resides in a foreign country for permanent commercial reasons, and his stay there is prolonged beyond a certain period, the presumption is evident that, even without his expressing a desire to that effect, that country must be considered as his domicile, because that bond of economic interest is created at which Great Britain, with sound common-sense, has always sought to strike. The English Courts thus arrogate to themselves very wide powers, subject to no definite rules, and only limited by the good faith and knowledge of the judges. Lord Stowell himself has drawn attention to the gradual process by which the fortuitous residence of a citizen in a foreign country grows little by little into presumptive evidence of his domicile; but, though making clear that no rule could *a priori* fix the duration of time necessary for the purpose of domicile, he lays stress on the wide discretionary powers entrusted to the Courts by English Prize Law.

These discretionary powers are yet more evident in the execution of duty which is laid upon the Court after determining the place of domicile—that of deciding whether it is really situated in enemy territory, since this must, of course, be considered in trying the case.

It is obvious that there can be no difficulty in settling the matter when the territory, properly so called, of an adversary is in question, but trouble inevitably arises in dealing with lands conquered or abandoned by the enemy. English law invariably adopts the standpoint of actual rather than legal community of interests, and makes a point of considering as friendly territory conquered from an enemy, while that which has fallen into an adversary's hands is judged to be hostile.

For the same reason a mere change of sovereignty is not considered sufficient, for example, where this is the result of a treaty and actual possession of the ceded territory has not been taken; *vice versâ*, the mere fact of enemy occupation of a State is sufficient to invest it with a hostile character, even if the occupation has never been legally sanctioned.

English law is less explicit with regard to countries which the enemy has temporarily occupied, without any intention of annexation, but solely for strategical reasons. Other difficulties arise in the case of States where insurrections have broken out, or which (like Cyprus and Egypt before the recent annexations) owe a nominal dependence to powers other than those which are in actual occupation. In such instances the ruling of the Court is based on the actual circumstances of each case, and investigation is made into whether the interests of such countries are in consonance with their legal status. In the same way, in places where Capitulations are in force, individuals are considered to bear the nationality of the foreign consul who protects their interests.

The British Courts do not, however, disregard the fact that nationality is a subsidiary proof, as it always constitutes a presumption favourable or the reverse to the individual. It acquires its full value in cases of change of domicile, where an individual, by breaking the economic bonds which unite him to the enemy, loses, *ipso facto*, the reason for his hostile character, and in this connection the bare intention of a change of residence is sufficient, whenever it may have been manifested.

The other point which is brought into prominence by the abrogation of Article 57 is that of the legitimacy of transfer of flag. This is especially the case in the present conflict, when Great Britain has every opportunity of attacking German interests in the steamers sold by that State in such large numbers to America. This difficult question was, as is well known, the theme of active diplomatic negotiations between England and the United States, before the issue of the Order in Council of October 26th. From the legal point of view, since it is only Article 57 that has been abrogated, and there has been no modification to the other articles which bear on the question of transfer of flag, it seems evident that Great Britain intends to adhere to the provisions of the articles which remain in force, instead of to her own



laws and practice in the matter; these, however, as we have seen, apply when the domicile is in question.

The English system seemed *primâ facie* more liberal than the continental, as the sale of ships after the outbreak of hostilities was not absolutely prohibited, although the *bonâ fides* of each case had to be proved. The transfer of ships in *transitu*, i.e., during the voyage, was forbidden. For this reason the bill of sale, complete and drawn up in proper legal form, and so worded as to eliminate the possibility of fraud, was always required to be carried on board, and it was necessary for the *bonâ fide* character of the sale to be confirmed by the service on which the ship was employed after the transfer had taken place. Under this system the examination of the Court extended over so many points that the liberal principle was transformed in practice into a rule more rigorous than the French, which, without more ado, refused to recognize any transfer which had taken place after the outbreak of war.

The principle adopted by the Declaration of London, after agreement had been reached by long argument between the representatives of the various powers, was based on a compromise between the English and continental systems. A transfer which takes place before the outbreak of hostilities is presumed to be valid, though the presumption may be negated by the showing of the captor that it was not made in good faith, but only with the object of avoiding the risks to which an enemy vessel is exposed. A transfer completed after the outbreak of war gives rise to the contrary presumption, which, in its turn, may be contested by a purchaser who can prove that he acted in good faith.

In the first case there is a presumption, if the bill of sale is not on board a vessel which lost her belligerent nationality less than 60 days before the outbreak of hostilities, that the transfer is void: when the transfer took place more than 30 days before the commencement of hostilities, there is a presumption that it is valid if it is unconditional, complete and in conformity with the laws of the countries concerned, and if its effect is such that neither the control of, nor the profits arising from the employment of, the vessel remain in the same hands as before the transfer.

In the second case the unfavourable assumption holds good if the transfer was effected in *transitu* or in a blockaded port, if there is any possibility of a re-sale, or if the requirements of the municipal law, governing the right to fly the flag under which the vessel is sailing, have not been fulfilled.

The English Courts ought therefore to be guided by these principles in conducting the enquiries assigned to them after the abrogation of Article 57, but the system bears hardly on the neutrals, and is likely to increase yet more the grave uncertainty caused by the wide discretionary powers, of which mention has been made above, exercised in determining the place of domicile.

There was no delay in applying the new regulations introduced by the Order in Council of October 26th, 1915. On October 30th and November 1st respectively, the s.s. "Hamborn" (Dutch) and s.s.



"Hocking" (American) were seized for suspected German ownership and taken to Halifax to await the decision of the Prize Court.

The adoption of this practice will evidently have material effect on the strictness of the blockade, and neutrals, as well as Germans, will be the losers. The right of capture has no longer any well-defined limits, and the safety of the goods also, for which a neutral flag is no longer an absolute guarantee, is often compromised.

However, the British Government cannot be condemned for its action. The old Anglo-American rule, confirmed by ancient legal practice, has an undeniable basis of equity, because it is considered quite legitimate to practise fraud upon the laws which a State has imposed in the lawful exercise of her powers as a belligerent. Errors may, however, arise, if this principle is carried to its extreme limits.

It must be remembered that this repudiation of rules, already accepted and embodied in an international agreement, has been brought about by a reaction of feeling and the exceptional features and necessities of the present war. For the first time in history the neutrals form but a small minority as opposed to the belligerent parties, and their interests are but trifling in comparison with those which the combatant powers have at stake. For the first time pressure on sea-borne commerce has become a primary operation in the waging of war, and no longer occupies a secondary place to the action of the armed forces of the country. For the first time there have appeared methods of warfare, ruses and fraudulent stratagems up to now unknown, and which could not have been foreseen, to combat which all our forces are needed.

It is not to be wondered at that some, relatively few indeed, of the elaborate regulations drawn up at the Hague and London, after peaceful theoretical discussion by men who could not contemplate the present state of affairs, should have proved unfitted to bear contact with such a difficult and novel situation.

It would not be right, however, to deduce that the laws of maritime war are too fragile to be of any value or utility except from a scientific point of view, instead, they will have to constitute the basis of discussion for the national representatives who, in the future, will frame a new code of laws, and will form a monument to the necessity of paying more attention to practical considerations and the exigencies of modern warfare, and less to humanitarian chimeras impossible of realization.

## NOTES ON SCOUTING.

By SECOND-LIEUTENANT D. CAMPBELL, Indian Army, R. of O.,  
*formerly attached 1/10th Gurkha Rifles.*

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### PREFACE.

These brief notes are a collection of data on the subject of scouting which I have collected from many sources, and together with which I have incorporated my own observations and deductions. Scouting being a subject which one must learn rather than be taught, these notes are more in the nature of an introduction to the subject than anything else.

In the ensuing pages I have made no attempt at literary effort, but merely confined myself to the pleasant task of jotting down my data in the order in which I considered they would be most easily assimilated.

In conclusion, I would add that the writing of this article has afforded me much pleasure, and that should the perusal of these pages prove of the slightest value to any one of my readers, I will feel amply recompensed for the labour incurred in the publication of the same.

September 1st, 1915.

### GENERAL REMARKS.

Success in scouting, as in everything else, depends to a greater extent on one's moral than physical qualities. The correct moral attitude of a scout should be that of a member of a "team" and not that of a man playing for himself only.

The actual battle depends a great deal on the value of your reconnaissance; it therefore behoves you to be most efficient if your side is to score.

Scouting is done on aeroplanes, on man-lifting kites, on captive balloons, on camels (in extensive desert country), on bicycles and on foot, and reconnaissance is generally carried out by scouting parties or individual men who have been specially selected for the purpose because of their proved ability.

The chief duty of a scout is to get information of the enemy and the country, and not to carry out an action of his own bat.

Before you go out be sure you understand the following:—

- (a) What you are expected to find out.
- (b) What direction and how far you are expected to go.
- (c) To what place you are to bring or send your information.

A good soldier must have a liberal supply of the four C's, i.e., courage, common-sense, cunning and cheerfulness. And a good

scout is usually a specially-picked soldier whose natural adaptability to scouting is guided along certain channels. (See Appendix i).

What are the qualifications of a good scout?

- (a) He is smart and of active habits.
- (b) He is trustworthy.
- (c) He is intelligent and shows it in many ways. For instance, if he thinks the enemy can see him and he is about to start scouting, he will move off in the opposite direction to which he really means to go, and when under cover will work round again; then, again, if he is carrying a despatch he will probably hide it in the bowl of a spare pipe, so that if he gets captured he will be able to burn it without arousing suspicion, or failing this he will swallow the despatch; and again, he will know when to mislead the enemy by making false tracks by walking backwards, etc. Again, if he is captured he will contrive to get rid of his bolt and the eye-piece of his field-glass. When a prisoner in the enemy's hands he will not give them any reliable information, and, *if possible*, will send out reports to his own side. It is policy to be friendly with your captors if they let you. The only information a prisoner is justified in giving the enemy is his name and rank.
- (d) He has good eye-sight and hearing; day and night should be alike to the good scout. A good scout will travel by night and reconnoitre at dawn.
- (e) He is healthy and sound and will carry a spare flannel shirt with him. This latter is a point worth noting.
- (f) He is willing and will turn his hand to anything, from cooking his own dinner (though this is not usually necessary) to washing his own shirt.
- (g) He can ride, cycle and swim.
- (h) He can semaphore and probably understands Morse signalling.<sup>1</sup>
- (i) He can read and write distinctly.

Having the above qualifications he will be taught:—

- (a) Reconnoitring and combat patrols.
- (b) Map reading.
- (c) Sketching and reporting.

Scouting must be learnt before actually proceeding on service, and the points to cultivate are:—

1. Pluck, self-reliance and discretion.
2. Finding your way in a strange country.
3. The proper use of your sense of vision, hearing and smell.
4. Taking cover.
5. Tracking.
6. Moving across country.
7. Self-preservation and care of your horse.
8. Sketching and reporting information.

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<sup>1</sup> Vide "Field Service Pocket Book" (1914), pages 67 to 69.

1. (a) *Pluck*.—Pluck must not be confused with rashness. "Some men are born brave, others require to have it thrust upon them."

Pluck can be cultivated—"if gifted with ordinary bodily development and health, it is largely the outcome of confidence in yourself, your leaders and your comrades."

How to develop confidence in yourself:—Learn to be expert with your rifle and to be able to hit moving objects in the field (plenty of shikaring will develop this); learn to judge distance accurately.

*Judging Distance*.—It has been found that distances are usually under-estimated. Under-estimation of distances usually occurs when an object is clearly visible, but, on the other hand, it is over-estimated usually when the object is indistinct. Distances are ascertained by range-finding instruments and maps, but estimated by certain recognized rules which have been found to work out fairly satisfactorily. Every soldier should *educate himself* in the estimation of distances in various types of country; the way to do this is to practise pacing known distances and getting to know the range of certain points within view of his daily rides and walks, and also by noting the appearance of men and horses at known ranges, the "aerial perspective method," and the "measurement of the visual angle by measured spaces on a card."

When you cannot see the enemy you must judge the distance by objects near which you know him to be.

*Remember when:—*

Looking up or down hill ...	...
There is a bright light on object ...	...
Looking across water and snow ...	...
Looking over deep chasms ...	...
The air is clear ...	...
Sun is at back of observer ...	...
The object is large ...	...
The colour of object differs from its background ...	...
Looking over level ground ...	...

Objects look much nearer than they actually are.

Misty or in failing light ...	...
Object in shadow ...	...
Looking across a valley ...	...
The colour of object blends with the colour of the background ...	...
Observer is kneeling or lying down ...	...
There is a heat haze on the ground ...	...
Object is at end of an avenue or long street ...	...
Only a portion of object can be seen ...	...
Intervening ground is broken ...	...
Looking over undulating ground ...	...

Objects look much further than they actually are.

Estimation of the height of aeroplanes and other aircraft.—Especially-constructed guns, which discharge red and black bombs, may be used for this purpose, the former during the night, when they leave a trail of red sparks illuminating the sky, and the latter, which are used during the day, emit a black cloud of smoke.

Should you use your rifle against an aeroplane (though as a rule it is not of much use unless the aviator is adventuresome and comes low down), don't forget your bullet has to come down again, and may terminate its career in one of your own men.

For further notes on judging distance see Appendix iii.

If an aeroplane suddenly appears keep perfectly still; if you have time and are alone stand under a tree, if with a large patrol get on to the side of a road and keep still. The third point in connection with the cultivation of pluck is to learn to be confident in your marching powers, to do so you should take the greatest care of your feet, the toe-nails especially.

(b) *Self-reliance* is ability to act "on your own hook." Use your common-sense and this will develop your "cunning."

(c) *Discretion* means sufficient cool-headedness to see how, by using your pluck and self-reliance, you can go into danger and come out of it safely. The value of discretion lies in that the scout is able to go to his point and get back with the information of what it is like.

2. *Finding your way in a strange Country.* (a) *Map reading.*—A scout must never lose his way by day or by night. Get a map and ride, cycle or walk over the district you reside in; a great thing is to look for changes or mistakes on a map, you will find them on most maps after some practice.

Learn to keep a mental picture of a map in your mind.

On service, if you discover any important omissions or errors in a map, details of them should be reported to headquarters immediately (through your C.O.).

(b) *Language.*—If you are not able to speak the language of the country you find yourself in, learn how to express the following questions before you begin reconnoitring:—


- What is the way to — ?
- Where does this road lead to?
- Have you seen any soldiers?
- How many hours is it to — ?
- Where is — ?
- What is the name of that place?

Be prepared to hear lies!! You, most probably, will be intentionally misled, especially in a hostile country.

(c) *Points of the Compass.*—1. Service compass; beware of iron-stone and the presence of metal fittings on your cap and your kit generally. The compass reading is not dependable within a distance of five or six paces from a gun. Get away from iron in any shape or form when using the compass. 2. Pole star (pointed to by Great



Bear). 3. Sun—rising E. (Pūrub); setting W. (Pachchham). 4. Watch—hold watch-face upwards and point hour-hand to the sun, bisect



the angle between the hour-hand and 12 o'clock. The line bisecting this angle will indicate the *South*.

As you go along in strange country note:—1. If moss on both sides of trees or only one. 2. Are the trees permanently bent in one direction. 3. The direction of the flow of streams. 4. In which direction is the breeze blowing; in some places at certain times of the day the wind blows in certain directions, a knowledge of this will assist you in finding your bearings.


If country is wide and open, there is a greater tendency to lose your way. Let the sun help you during the daytime; this habit should be sedulously practised.

*Landmarks.*—Distant hills, towers, pagodas, conspicuous trees, a withered tree, a strangely-shaped rock—*always look back to see what these look like from the other side, so that you will be able to recognize them on your return.*


In dense forest make your own "landmarks" by "blazing" or cutting off branches, and scratch a line across any path you did *not* follow. Blazing is useful both for night as well as day work.

If you have lost your way, don't lose your self-possession; light a smoke fire and hide yourself in a position from which you can see anyone approaching it, so that you will be able to see your man before he sees you. *Sit still* and cultivate an equable temperament till the return of light, both on the earth and on your scouting instincts. It is a curious fact that when a dog loses its way in a dense jungle it makes a little retreat for itself in a comparatively safe place and waits till it is tracked. On two different occasions I have observed this myself.

Useful marks and signs:—



= To good water.



= Letter hidden seven paces  
this way.



= Not this way.



= Not this way.

A line scratched across any path  
you did not follow

= Not this way.



= Go straight on, you are on  
the right track.



= Go straight on, you are on  
the right track.



= Go straight on, you are on  
the right track.



= Go straight on, you are on  
the right track.



= Turn to the left.



= Turn to the left.



= Turn to the left.



= Turn to the left.



= Turn to the right.



= Turn to the right.



= Turn to the right.



= Turn to the right.

3. *Using your Eyes and Ears.*—Cultivate quickness in seeing and hearing.

Savages are adepts at this.

Long gazing at one point accentuates the vision.

Your eyes should be trained to continually look in every direction, till eventually you will find that for all practical purposes you have eyes at the back of your head.

Look afar—for figures, dust rising, birds getting up, vultures, glitter of arms, or perhaps a thin wisp of smoke.

If you suddenly see anything bob under shelter, or if you think you have been seen by the enemy, pretend you have not seen them—they will probably think you have not. If you think an enemy is hiding near by and you are not quite sure he has seen you, it may pay you to act as if you do not suspect his presence and move away from the place, and then have a look at him from another direction, when you probably will be able to verify your suspicions. If you want to look over the edge of anything, gradually push a leafy branch of a tree or bush over the edge and hold it there, then equally slowly raise your glasses *just over* the level of the top and then, lastly, raise your head just high enough to see through the lenses; after you have done, gradually lower your head first, then the glasses, and finally the branch (the last named may be left where it is).

To a beginner, at a distance, cattle and horses, hedges and cavalry, carts and artillery are difficult to differentiate, therefore practise this in your spare time. The corollary to this is "do not jump to conclusions."

All dust clouds do not denote enemy on the march, they may be raised by the wind; and don't be deceived by the dust raised by a branch of a tree intentionally tied to the back of a country cart. In some countries locusts often give the impression of dust at a distance.

*Remember* a low dense cloud=infantry and vehicles; a high light cloud=cavalry; a thick high continuous cloud=motors rapidly moving.

Infantry at 1,500 yards look like "a black line," and cavalry at the same distance look like a black line with an uneven upper margin. When looking for a distant enemy, keep your eyes on likely crossing places, *i.e.*, bridges and fords. Having spotted the enemy, you must now ascertain how many there are. For each minute the following numbers would approximately go past any given point:—

Cavalry, in sections, at a walk	...	...	120
Cavalry, in sections, at a trot	...	...	240
Artillery, guns or wagons, at a walk	...	...	5
Artillery, guns or wagons, at a trot	...	...	10
Infantry, in fours	...	...	200

It is useful to remember that sound travels at about 380 yards per second. Four pulsations at the wrist reckoning as 1,000 yards is a fairly accurate calculation for judging the distance of a gun when you can see the flash. A "double report" means that the person who fired is somewhere in front of you.

Distant fires may be signals, this is done by covering and uncovering them with a blanket. When looking for distant enemy do not overlook the signs near you. (How this is done will be treated under the head of tracking.)

If you are looking for water, very often animal footprints and the birds will indicate its direction. Having found the water, dig a hole near the pool and drink the water that has percolated into the hole rather than the water in the pool itself; but avoid drinking any water except the best unless, of course, you must. If you can possibly help it do not drink any water except that passed by a medical officer.

If you discover any collection of ashes, note if it is :—

- (a) A small or large one.
- (b) Was it a signal fire or a bluff?
- (c) Amount of heat will tell how old it is.
- (d) Are there any remnants of food scattered near it (a good indication of the enemy's commissariat).

A megaphone is useful for listening with. At night put your ear to the ground, or apply it to a stick that is touching the ground, sounds can in this way be heard a long way off. It is worth remembering that if you carry a stick, which you will probably find most useful for feeling your way with at night, be sure it is not metal pointed, the iron makes too much noise when striking against stone. Cultivate your sense of smell; if you don't smoke too much, at night you will be able to tell the presence of horses and men (who have not bathed for some days). Occasionally smell a handful of earth, the presence of droppings will easily be recognized. To smell out a man who has not bathed for some days sniff the air till the ordinary scent of dew is interrupted, if he carries tobacco and you are a good scout and do not smoke too much yourself you will be able to smell him a long way off.

Anent the sense of smell, it will not be out of place to mention here that the services of dogs could with advantage be utilized by sentries under certain conditions. Certain species of dogs could be trained to accompany scouts when operating in dense jungle country, such as is found in East and West Africa. It is obvious that an untrained animal would be a source of danger, as it would probably give one away by an untimely bark. The Airedale is considered by some the most suitable for sentry and police work. The Germans are said to have trained 37,000 war dogs (June, 1915).

4. *Taking Cover*.—If in open country move from one cover to another rapidly, halting under cover while you look out. Move slowly while under cover. If you are one of a patrol in open country, keep together with one or two scouts to guard against surprise.

1. Select an object behind you that is the same colour as your kit (if in khaki go where there is khaki-coloured grass or rocks behind you). In short, try to blend with your surroundings.
2. Remain still (the human eye unaided is not powerful enough to differentiate any distant object that keeps absolutely still).



At night wear nothing that jingles, rattles or shines. Remember that a lighted match can be seen at a distance of 900 yards at night and a lighted cigarette at 300 yards. At night always keep down in low ditches and drains, the enemy are probably looking for you along the rocks and ridges, and, besides, you will get a better view of him against the stars.

Remember that men are very apt *not* to look up in trees for you, but be very careful to cover your footmarks. When on a tree or lying on a rock, keep close against the object, so that you may be mistaken for a part of it.

When selecting a look-out place *do not select the most prominent*, as the enemy will expect to find you there, but select some unlikely spot that affords

- (a) Concealment.
- (b) A good look-out.
- (c) And a "back door" (very important).

In making use of a hill do not get on the skyline, this is a common mistake. Your business is to keep yourself and your intentions as much concealed from the enemy as possible.

It is a good thing to imagine the enemy is some "big game," whose movements you are watching.

Use deep shadows of bushes, trees and banks as much as possible.

If in danger, lie close to the ground and use your ears as much as your eyes.

If mounted at night, ride your horse on bridoon only, the bit jingles too much. Be on the look-out for black-cotton ground.

5. *Tracking* ("Spoooring").—Tracking is the most important part of a scout's education, and it is said that "scouting without tracking is like bread and butter without bread." Tracking has been highly developed by some races, *e.g.*, the Australian aboriginal, who is said to be able to read the ground in the same way as we read books.

Its uses extend to many divisions of our scheme of life-sport, crime, and last, but not least, its military application.

From our point of view the first thing to learn is how to distinguish the pace at which a horse or man was moving when he made the track.

*Horse*.<sup>1</sup>—Pairs of foot-marks, each hind-foot coming close to the fore-foot=Walking.

Similar, each pair a greater distance from the next (about 4 ft. 4 ins. in horse, less in pony)=Trotting.

Two single footmarks and then a pair=canter.

If tracks are irregular=horse is tired.

Note 1. Freshness of droppings will tell you approximately when the animal was on that particular spot (make allowance for sun, rain and heavy dew).

2. It may be possible that the horse has reversed shoes—look carefully.

<sup>1</sup> For more advanced notes on horses' footprints see Appendix ii.

**Man.**—The whole flat foot on ground (equally) and the feet a little under one yard apart=walking.

Toes more deeply indented in the ground and feet much more than one yard apart=running.

Note 1. Observe if there is any indication of the number of horses and men that have passed.

2. The man whom you are tracking may have worn boots specially made with a reversed sole. It ought to be easy to recognize on yielding soil.

**Wheel Tracks:—**

(a) Gun	...	...	...	...	} And the direction they are taking.
(b) Carriage	...	...	...	...	
(c) Country cart	...	...	...	...	
(d) Bicycle (push and motor)	...	...	...	...	
(e) Motor car	...	...	...	...	

These must be learnt by careful observation by the scout himself, as it is difficult, or rather impossible, to teach this by means of a book or by lecturing on this particular section of scout-craft.

**Age of Tracks.**—The following make tracks look older than they actually are:—

- (a) Sun.
- (b) Rain.
- (c) Heavy dew.
- (d) Drying wind.

**Clues to Age of Tracks:—**

- (a) If it has rained—spots of water or droppings.
- (b) Dust and grass seeds blown on them.
- (c) Crossing of other tracks over them.
- (d) Where grass has been trodden, the extent to which it has dried and withered.

**Difficult Ground.**—If tracks apparently terminate in difficult ground note the direction of the last impression and then look well ahead in that line, say 20 or 30 yards. In grass you will see the blades bent or trodden, and on hard ground the stones displaced or possibly scratched, and so on—all these small signs one behind the other give you your direction.

If you have lost your tracks, leave a handkerchief or stick at your last "impression," and make a cast round in a wide circle up to 100 yards, examining the soft ground first. The patrol (if there is one) should halt while one or two men make the "cast"—"too many cooks may spoil the broth." In making the cast place yourself in the enemy's position, and think what direction he was likely to have taken. Having gone into the details of meanings of the signs—it is presumed we can read the alphabet on the ground—so we have now got to put together what they tell us.

*The information to look for is:—*

1. Do all the tracks run in one direction?
2. Is there any indication of the number of men and horses that have formed the tracks?
3. What is the age of the track?
4. Were the whole party moving at a uniform rate?
5. Is there any indication of wheeled transport and guns?
6. Do any side tracks leave the main route?
7. Are there any signs of oxen?
8. Are there any signs of halting places?
9. Are there any signs of camps (stray sheep grazing about, etc.)?
10. Are there any signs of food, tins, etc.?

6. *Moving across Country.*—You must learn to get across country rapidly and with the least possible delay. If possible try to get a view of the surrounding country and pick a good covered approach. Note the surrounding country, for the reason that it may not be wise to return by the same way you went for fear of ambush. Fords in big rivers are usually risky, as they are generally zig-zag. To find a ford, look for a path leading to and coming from a river on the far side, the line joining the two points will give you your direction. (Note—it may be zig-zag, hence the urgent necessity of every scout knowing how to swim.) If the ford is deep and the water rapid and there is another scout with you, hold one another's hands while crossing. When in the water keep your eye on the spot where you want to come out, otherwise the current will move you off the ford.

Note—An ordinary corn sack or kit bag stuffed with straw makes a good float, three or four of these with four poles or a charpoy make an efficient raft. In jungle country two or three logs tied together make useful rafts, and have the advantage of being both safe and easily obtained.

Look out for other fording places, in case you have to beat a hasty retreat and the one you crossed over is guarded by the enemy.

If scouting on horseback remember that a horse

walks	4	miles an hour.
trots	9	do.
canters	10	do.
gallops	15	do.

The usual marching pace—walking and trotting—is 6 miles an hour.

7. *Self-preservation.*—Successful self-preservation implies a knowledge of first aid.

You may have to be away from the main body for several days. Always take an extra flannel shirt, food and water (cold tea for preference) with you when scouting. You never know how long you may have to be away. Sleep whenever you can get the chance in safety, but do not be caught napping; a patrol should either scatter when sleeping or some should sleep while one or two take it by turns to watch the approaches.

Have your revolver fastened to you by a lanyard and let it lie between your knees, this is a better place than under the head. When sleeping, slacken your boot-laces but do not take off your boots.

If you have used a fire for cooking during the day (it is not probable) move away from it when you want to sleep, the smoke may have given you away.

If you are attacked by overwhelming odds, the patrol should scatter so that at least one should escape to bring information to the C.O. as to what they have been able to find out; but, on the other hand, if you can capture one or more of the enemy so much the better. Send him in with the next despatch, but do not forget the scout's chief duty is to get information and not to fight.

It is sound to know how to carry a wounded comrade, you never know when the emergency may arise.

8. *Sketching and Reporting.*—Sketching is outside the scope of these notes; but, nevertheless, a good scout ought to be able to make a fair rough sketch quickly, being careful not to omit any of the salient features of the country he is reporting on.

*Reporting.*—"A little information brought in quickly is worth volumes of writing sent in too late."

Write your report briefly and get it up to the C.O. without delay.

When writing your report remember the following points:—

1. Keep to the points you have been ordered to report on; but this should not prevent you reporting any special things that you may have noticed, which your C.O. would desire to know. Very often a negative report is useful.
2. Write clearly, as it may have to be read with the aid of a very defective light.
3. Word it just as you would if you were a poor man sending a telegram, but do not leave out any information that applies to what you have been told to reconnoitre.
4. Write as if you are reporting to an officer who has not seen the country you are working on.
5. Only report facts, not fancies, and do not use vague phrases, such as "a large body of men," "a large river," etc.
6. Always give the hour of sending off your message as well as the date.
7. In the case of cipher messages, after you have enciphered or deciphered them, very thoroughly destroy all slips of paper, and remember never to keep the key-word in writing.
8. When conveying verbal reports be careful not to lose your self-possession.
9. It may be noted that for obvious reasons it is not expedient for a scout to keep a private diary of his movements, etc.

## APPENDIX I.

## REGIMENTAL ORGANIZATION OF SCOUTS.

All soldiers should have a knowledge of scouting. Scouts are classified annually: the battalion scouts as 1st class, and the remainder as 2nd class scouts. The battalion scouts are selected from among the best of the company scouts, and the places of the latter are filled by suitable men from the battalion.

Per battalion of infantry:—

1	Officer	...	...	...	(Scout Officer).
1	N.C.O.	...	...	...	(Sergeant Scout).
16	Battalion scouts	...	...	...	(1st class scouts).
	Remainder	...	...	...	(2nd class scouts).

Every second-lieutenant should qualify as a 1st class scout.

## APPENDIX II.

To be able to read a horse's footprints quickly and efficiently the following table could be memorized with advantage.

The first step is to learn to differentiate between the impressions of the fore and hind feet. It will be noticed that those of the hind feet are longer and narrower than those of the fore feet:—

Distance from toe of one fore foot to heel of other fore foot.	Pace.	Remarks.
2 feet 8 inches ... ..	Walking ...	{ Pairs of footprints, each hind foot coming close to the fore foot.
4 feet 4 inches ... ..	Trotting ...	{ Similar arrangement of footprints, but distance greater and toes more deeply indented.
7 feet 4 inches ... ..	Cantering	{ Two single footprints and then a pair; the impressions are not so deeply marked if cantering uncollected.
8 feet 6 inches ... ..	Slow Gallop	{ A succession of single footprints, the impressions of which are deeper than when walking and cantering.
10 feet 6 inches ... ..	Full Gallop	{ Same as preceding, but impressions still deeper.

Note—(a) When a horse is reined or tired the impressions are irregular.

(b) The tracks of a led animal incline towards each other.

(c) The tracks of different animals vary.

(d) The measurements given above are those for a horse, those for ponies are less.



## APPENDIX III.

Some of the other methods of judging distance are:—

- (a) The "measurement of the visual angle by means of measured spaces on a blank visiting card." These should be held at a definite distance from the eye, *i.e.*, either 18 inches away or to the full extent of the arm. Every man ought to be able to make a useful "card" for himself.
- (b) The "rule of thumb method." Hold the hand steady to the full extent of the arm in front of you with the thumb pointing upwards. Close the left eye and sight along the left edge of the thumb, do the same with the right eye closed. The thumb will appear to have moved, estimate the distance moved in yards and multiply by 10, the resultant figure is the distance in yards.
- (c) Estimate a point half way and then mentally divide this half into 100 yard intervals, add up these sums and multiply by two.
- (d) When you see the flash of a field gun or a rifle at night, begin to count at the rate of 11 beats in 3 seconds, and stop as soon as you hear the report. The number of beats will give you the distance in hundreds of yards. This method needs much practice to be of any practical value.

## APPENDIX IV.

JUDGING DISTANCE TABLE.

Distance in yards.	When utilising the "Aerial perspective method."	When looking at mounted man through rifle-barrel (with the bolt previously removed).	When looking at man standing, through rifle-barrel.	When judging distance laterally 100 yards is covered.	"French Method."
50	Mouth and orbits clearly distinguished.	—	—	—	—
100	Orbits appear as dots.	—	—	—	—
200	Buttons and uniforms can be distinguished.	—	—	—	—
210	—	A little over half diameter occupied by horse (withers to feet).	—	—	—

APPENDIX IV.—JUDGING DISTANCE TABLE—*contd.*

Distance in yards.	When utilising the "Aerial perspective method."	When looking at mounted man through rifle-barrel (with the bolt previously removed).	When looking at man standing, through rifle-barrel.	When judging distance laterally 100 yards is covered.	"French Method."
under 300	—	—	He occupies more than half the diameter.	—	—
300	Faces can be seen.	—	He occupies exactly the diameter.	—	—
350	—	Full diameter of rifle occupied by horse and man exactly.	—	—	—
400	Shoulders appear square and movements of legs can be seen.	—	—	—	—
440	—	—	—	—	Telegraph posts can be seen.
500	Shoulders appear bottle-shaped and colours of uniforms can be distinguished.	—	—	By 6-7 fingers.	—
550 over	—	—	He occupies one half the diameter.	—	—
600	The head appears as a cricket ball.	—	—	—	—
650	—	Half diameter occupied by horse and man.	—	—	—
700	*Difficult to distinguish the head and the upper half of the body appears V-shaped.	—	—	—	—
800	A man appears to be like a post.	—	He occupies one third the diameter.	—	—

APPENDIX IV.—JUDGING DISTANCE TABLE—*contd.*

Distance in yards.	When utilising the "Aerial perspective method."	When looking at mounted man through rifle-barrel (with the bolt previously removed).	When looking at man standing, through rifle-barrel.	When judging distance laterally 100 yards is covered.	"French Method."
850 & 900	—	One third diameter occupied by horse and man.	—	—	—
1,000	—	—	—	By 3-3½ fingers.	—
1,200	—	—	—	—	The following can be differentiated, files of infantry, cavalry mounted or dismounted and guns from the teams.
1,500	—	—	—	By 2 fingers.	Infantry appear as a black line, cavalry as a black line with an uneven upper margin.
550 ft 1,760	—	—	—	—	Trunks of large trees can be seen.
2,000	—	—	—	By 1 thumb.	—
2½ miles	—	—	—	—	Chimneys and windows can be differentiated.
6 miles	—	—	—	—	Windmills, big houses and towers can be recognised.
9 miles	—	—	—	—	An average church steeple can be seen.
Notes.	Because of the difference in the power of vision, every man should make a Table of his own on the above lines.	Difficult to see a mounted man (through barrel) when 650 yards distant unless the light is very good.	Difficult to see a man (through barrel) when 550 yards distant unless the light is very good.	The hand in this method must be held to the full extent of the arm.	—

## JOURNAL OF THE SIEGE OF GIBRALTAR, 1727.

(From a Manuscript in the Royal United Service Institution.)

IN December the Spanish Troops encamped between Alguzaries and St. Rocque.

On January 20th removed their camp to the plains of St. Rocque and raised a battery against the shipping. Lieut.-Governor Kane from this appearance thought necessary to begin some preparations for defence. Admiral Hobson with a considerable fleet was at this time in the Bay: which might have rendered considerable service by stopping their water communications in the passage of their stores, artillery, etc., but no orders or information to this purpose was received from home.

Upon further batteries being advanced the Lieut.-Governor sent his secretary to the Spanish General to desist in his approaches, but the Spanish General declared he had orders to possess all the ground between St. Rocque and Gibraltar. The Lieut.-Governor did not yet molest or commence any kind of hostility against the enemy only that of the communication by land.

FEB. 3RD.—Governor Clayton arrived, a council of war of land and sea officers was immediately held. The troops from the fleet were landed to assist in the works, but no act of hostilities was agreed on. The Spaniards were constantly landing facines, etc., about a mile and a half from the garrison, but did not appear to intend any attack from their side till their works were compleat.

FEB. 10TH.—In a general council of war it was determined to now oppose the farther approach of the Spaniards. The Governor sent this resolution to the Count Las Torres, and withdrew the advance guard, consisting of some Genoese, from the Round Tower, where the enemy first began to break ground.

FEB. 11TH.—The Governor, accompanied by the principal land and sea officers, went to the Old Mole and ordered Lord Forbes to Willis's battery, and Captain Holman to fire the first gun over them, which was done from the Mole head, and our firing continued from this time.

About 10 at night 5,000 of the enemy marched by the Devil's Tower and advanced under the lines, and began a work extending across Lord Portmore's Walk in front of the Prince's lines, and were then under the fire of our guns. The powder was reduced to one-half, but our guns were fired with two shot each.

FEB. 12TH.—The enemy fired on the nearest ships which returned some shot. Sir Charles Wager hoisted the red flag, and two ships of war were sent to the back of the rock, our bomb ketches threw shells from behind, one of which, falling in Landport

ditch, and another in the victualling office yard, at first caused some consternation to us that the enemy had a mortar battery behind the rock.

FEB. 14TH.—Enemy still continue their approaches, our shot and shells do much apparent execution.

FEB. 15TH.—The enemy encamped about a league from the garrison, are said to be 20,000 men; we apprehend a storm and are very vigilant.

FEB. 16TH.—A deserter says they have lost 500 men.

FEB. 17TH.—Three deserters mention a mine under Willis's, our engineers discover it is in a cave which was (formerly) in the first siege a magazine.

FEB. 18TH.—Enemy finished a battery at the mill of 17 guns, but none yet mounted. They threaten the garrison much.

FEB. 19TH.—Enemy's artillery landed for their mill battery, it was said they designed a storm this night. Landport ditch cleaned, the guns loaded with grape shot, and the regiment ordered to be in readiness.

FEB. 20TH.—A deserter reports their artillery is landed, they mean to open on the 25th, we keep a constant fire on their new batteries.

FEB. 21ST.—Guns brought into their trenches, we keep a constant fire, but before morning they had all their cannon mounted.

FEB. 22ND.—The enemy opened 17 pieces of cannon and some small mortars, they fired all day and only killed one man at Willis's.

FEB. 23RD.—One man killed in the Prince's lines. No intelligence of Admiral Wager and Hobson who sailed on the 17th.

FEB. 24TH.—Enemy continue a hot fire but to no purpose, only have had two men as yet killed. The enemy endeavour to secure their approaches for the safety of their men, a considerable number of which must be lost.

FEB. 26TH.—The Horse are kept near the windmill to prevent desertion, the enemy daily advance near.

FEB. 27TH.—The "Royal Oak" brought in a prize loaded with rye and brandy, value £30,000. The two companies of Col. Hays' regiment that were separated from the fleet arrived.

MARCH 1ST.—A flag of truce from the enemy with insolent demands, the Governor tore the letter, and ordered all the batteries to fire. A settée of ours drove on shore and the men made prisoners. Five deserters came in.

MARCH 2ND.—Ten guns burst at Willis's battery, killed two men and wounded one.

MARCH 3RD.—Enemy opened a battery of 20 guns on the town but we received no damage.

MARCH 4TH.—One man killed. Enemy finished their batteries on the Strand.

MARCH 5TH.—We lost a captain of the train, and one man his leg shot off, and one killed at Landport.



MARCH 7TH.—Enemy busy in mounting their guns.

MARCH 8TH.—They opened their new batteries on the Old Mole, but with small success. An 18-pounder burst on the Queen's Battery and killed one man.

MARCH 9TH.—Hot fire from the enemy but little or no success. Our own guns in bursting have been more destructive than the enemy's fire.

MARCH 10TH.—A gun burst and killed two men.

MARCH 11TH.—A house blown up by a shell.

MARCH 12TH.—A deserter says they have lost 3,000 men.

MARCH 13TH.—A gun burst, being in want of guns for the Grand Battery, are brought from on board a ship.

MARCH 14TH.—A gun burst and killed a mattrass, and ten men were killed by a shell.

MARCH 15TH.—A Spanish man-of-war brought in by the "Royal Oak" with 549 people. A deserter came in.

MARCH 16TH AND 17TH.—Two men wounded.

MARCH 18TH.—A flag of truce was received at the New Mole with articles for the prisoners, but the Governor made the people with the flag prisoners.

MARCH 23RD.—Two men killed by a shell.

MARCH 26TH.—Colonels Middleton and Hays arrived with some store ships.

MARCH 28TH.—Lost 10 men. Cols. Middleton and Hays' regiments landed; also some gunners.

MARCH 29TH.—A mortar split and five men wounded.

MARCH 30TH.—A gun burst and five men wounded.

MARCH 31ST.—Six men slightly wounded, a deserter came in says they are reduced from twenty to 15,000 men, and are very sickly.

APRIL 2ND.—Old Gibraltar or Alguzaries being a great support to the enemy, our fleet got under way to burn it together with their settees, etc., but the wind not answering the fleet came again to an anchor.

APRIL 3RD.—A deserter reported that the enemy's grenadiers are preparing to storm.

APRIL 4TH AND 5TH.—Deserters come in, a deserter from us taken in the attempt.

APRIL 6TH.—Exchanged 20 of our prisoners taken in the settee by giving three for one.

A serjeant came in who reports 60 men and an officer being killed from Prince's lines.

APRIL 8TH.—The enemy undermining Willis's with 24 men who work four at a time.

APRIL 10TH.—500 men arrive from Minorca.

APRIL 16TH.—A serjeant and 20 men sent out in the night to alarm their trenches, so that upon their being reinforced from their

- camp all the batteries might open at once upon them, but this design was frustrated by one of our gunners beginning too soon. The gunner was sent to England a prisoner for this neglect.
- APRIL 18TH.—Three men killed by a shell and one mattrass killed, and six wounded by some powder blowing up.
- APRIL 19TH.—Six men wounded.
- APRIL 21ST.—Lord Portmore, the Governor, with the First Battalion of Guards and Col. Clayton's regiment and some gunners arrived.
- APRIL 22ND.—One man drown'd.
- APRIL 24TH.—Four men killed and five wounded.
- APRIL 25TH.—One man swam to the enemy.
- APRIL 26TH.—New batteries opened by the enemy, and directed against the Old Mole head, which sustains the fire of about 60 guns besides mortars, five men killed this day and several wounded.
- MAY 3RD, 4TH AND 5TH.—Three men deserted and twelve men came in, they report the enemy design to storm this night; orders for each regiment to have 5 men per company ready to reinforce the picquet.
- MAY 6TH.—One of ours deserted, and one of theirs to us: four men killed and six wounded.
- MAY 7TH.—One ensign of ours shot himself, and a man deserted.
- MAY 8TH.—Three men killed and 2 wounded.
- MAY 9TH.—Deserted to the enemy one serjeant.
- MAY 10TH.—One man deserted, and 4 men killed and 6 wounded.
- MAY 11TH.—Three deserters, who inform the enemy have compleated their mine under Willis's, and loaded it with powder.
- MAY 12TH.—Two deserters came in.
- MAY 13TH.—One deserter came in.
- MAY 14TH.—Two men wounded.
- MAY 15TH.—A soldier who deserted from us was taken and hanged near the New Mole. One man killed, and one deserted to us.
- MAY 16TH.—Three deserters came in, who give an account that the enemy have lost upwards of 1,500 men on the mainland. One man killed.
- MAY 18TH.—One man killed.
- MAY 19TH.—Four deserters from the enemy.
- MAY 20TH.—Came in 4 deserters. An accident happened under Willis's by a shell, which fell in the midst of a guard, consisting of one corporal and ten men; three were killed and the rest mortally wounded.
- MAY 21ST.—One deserted to us.
- MAY 23RD.—Six deserted to us.
- MAY 24TH.—Seven deserted to us, and one of Col. Anstruther's shot going from Middle Hill.
- MAY 25TH.—One deserted to us. One of our guns burst, and one man swam to the enemy.
- MAY 26TH.—Three men killed and two wounded.

MAY 28TH.—It being King George's birthday, at 4 o'clock in the afternoon we gave the enemy three vollies for the honour of the day, 4 men wounded and 3 deserted to us.

MAY 29TH.—One serjeant killed on the Prince's line and four men wounded.

MAY 30TH.—Three men wounded and three deserted to us.

MAY 31ST.—One man killed and one wounded.

JUNE 1ST.—One man killed on Prince's line.

JUNE 3RD.—Two deserters came in.

JUNE 4TH.—Went on board 3 men of a regiment. One deserter came in.

JUNE 5TH.—Three deserters came in.

JUNE 6TH.—A corporal from Middle Hill deserted to the enemy.

JUNE 7TH.—A deserter came in, who informs us that the enemy have loaded their mines.

JUNE 9TH.—One man killed on the land battery, and one killed himself.

JUNE 10TH.—One man wounded.

JUNE 11TH.—One deserter came in, six men wounded.

JUNE 12TH.—Six men wounded. Col. Fitzgerald came and hailed our sentrys, but was forbid to advance by our firing, the enemy having ceased firing and beat a parley. The Col. of the lines reported it to the Governor, who first took every precaution of loading the guns with grape shot, in case of treachery, he then received Col. Fitzgerald, by whose information a cessation of arms was agreed on for nine months, and on this day June 12th, 1727, the siege ended.

#### LIST OF THE COLONELS, LIEUT.-COLONELS AND MAJORS PRESENT.

Date of Commissions.		
Colonels (8).	Lieut.-Colonels (20).	Majors (8).
Disney ... .. 1710	Bream ... .. 1708	Sample ... .. 1718
Egerton ... .. 11	Townshend ... .. 9	Fleming ... .. 18
Hardgrove ... .. 11	Merrick ... .. 13	Solemy ... .. 18
Middleton ... .. 17	Duncombs ... .. 13	Brandrift ... .. 18
Anstruther ... .. 21	Hastings ... .. 16	Lafery ... .. 20
Cosby ... .. 17	Kennedy ... .. 17	Monoy ... .. 21
Hays ... .. 24	Ferguson ... .. 18	Harrison ... .. 21
Guisse ... .. 24	Montague ... .. 18	Leighton ... .. 22
	Parsons ... .. 18	
	Pettesworth ... .. 18	
	Inwood ... .. 18	
	Williamson ... .. 20	
	Devisher ... .. 21	
	Battrow ... .. 22	
	Ebrington ... .. 22	
	Slaughter ... .. 22	
	Brown ... .. 23	
	Pearce ... .. 23	
	Anslow ... .. 24	
	Cornwallis ... .. 25	

## GUARDS IN THE SIEGE.

	Colonels.	Majors.	Captains.	Subalterns.	Serjeants.	Corporals.	Drummers.	Privates.
Governor's Guard ... ..	—	—	—	—	1	1	—	15
Rock Guard ... ..	—	—	—	1	1	2	1	24
Middle Hill Guard ... ..	—	—	—	1	1	2	1	24
Willis's Battery ... ..	—	—	1	1	2	2	1	40
Signal House ... ..	—	—	—	1	1	2	1	20
South Port ... ..	—	—	—	1	1	2	1	20
Castle Gate ... ..	—	—	—	—	1	1	—	15
Main Guard ... ..	—	—	1	2	3	3	2	60
Water Port Lane ... ..	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	6
Water Port ... ..	—	—	1	2	3	3	2	60
Land Port ... ..	1	—	2	3	3	3	2	100
Shade at Night ... ..	—	—	—	1	1	1	1	20
King's Line ... ..	—	—	1	2	4	4	2	100
Prince's Line ... ..	1	1	2	4	7	6	2	100
New Mole.. ... ..	—	—	—	1	1	2	1	20
Europa ... ..	—	—	—	1	1	2	1	36
Quarter Guard ... ..	—	—	—	—	1	1	—	12
Europa Advance ... ..	—	—	—	1	1	2	1	36
Orderly ... ..	—	—	—	—	6	—	—	—
Total ... ..	2	1	8	22	39	40	19	708

Guns when mounted and fit for service on the North batteries ... 94

Mortars, ditto ... .. 69

## CASUALTIES DURING THE SIEGE.

	Officers.		Men.					
	Killed.	Died.	Killed.	Wounded.	Died of Wounds.	Died of Sickness.	Deserters.	
One Battalion of Guards ... ..	—	—	2	19	2	4	1	28
General Pearce's ... ..	—	—	4	9	—	—	—	13
Lord Mark Kerr's ... ..	—	—	1	26	3	4	3	43
Brigadier Clayton's ... ..	—	—	1	13	5	9	—	34
Colonel Egerton's ... ..	2	—	8	12	8	3	3	36
Colonel Middleton's ... ..	—	—	3	14	—	2	3	22
Colonel Anstruther's ... ..	—	—	6	29	3	6	2	46
Colonel Disney's ... ..	—	1	2	12	—	2	2	19
Brigadier Birsett's ... ..	—	—	8	15	4	4	—	31
Colonel Hays' ... ..	—	—	2	16	2	8	2	30
Colonel Newton's ... ..	1	1	6	4	4	2	—	18
Colonel Cosby's Detacht. ... ..	—	—	6	17	1	1	1	26
The Train ... ..	1	—	8	16	2	1	—	28
Total ... ..	4	2	69	202	34	46	17	374

## GUNS AND MORTARS ON THE N. BATTERIES, 28TH MAY, 1727.

	Pounders.									Mortars.					
	32	24	18	16	12	6	4	3	Total.	13	8	8	Royal.	Coehorn.	Total.
Willis's ...	—	—	2	—	2	3	2	—	9	1	—	—	6	17	24
Near Willis's ...	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	—	—	6	8
Centinel Box ...	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	2	—	—	—	—	—	—
Square Tower ...	—	—	—	—	1	2	—	—	3	—	—	—	—	—	—
Prince's Lines ...	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	10	10
Behind Willis's ...	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	—	—	—	—	2
North Bastion ...	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	—	—	2
Behind N. Bastion ...	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	3	—	—	3
In the Castle ...	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	2	—	—	—	4
Old Mole ..	4	4	8	4	—	—	—	—	20	—	—	—	3	7	10
New Battery ...	—	—	—	—	—	2	—	—	2	—	—	—	—	—	—
By the Castle ...	—	—	—	—	—	2	—	—	2	—	—	—	—	—	—
Grand Battery ...	2	2	6	8	2	—	—	—	20	—	—	—	—	—	—
Forbes Battery ...	—	—	—	—	—	2	—	1	3	—	—	—	—	—	—
Covered Way ...	—	—	—	—	—	2	—	—	2	—	—	—	—	—	—
	6	6	16	12	5	13	2	3	63	5	4	5	9	40	63

SHOTS EXPENDED.		SHELLS EXPENDED.		
32-pounders ...	1,907	13 Mortars ...	791	Mortars broke ... 29 Guns broke ... 71
24 " ...	998	10 " ...	1,009	
18 " ...	6,587	8 " ...	598	Barrels. Cannon Powder ... 2,240 Fine ... 700
16 " ...	7,000	Houboyts ...	100	
12 " ...	1,986	Royals ...	1,100	Barrels of powder { 2,940 expended
6 " ...	57	Coehorns ...	13,197	
5 " ...	780			
4 " ...	270			
3 " ...	195			
Shot, expended ...	19,780	Shells expended	16,798	

Orders that were given in the Spanish camp the 22nd of February, 1727, the day they opened their batteries for the disposition of the works and batteries:—

“ Marquis Espinola General of the day, Rodrigo Peralta, and the picket, Don Francisco Carillo at Knight of Noe Cusebio Estorgo, and Juan Dias by day, is to be put in execution for the opening of our works and batteries against the garrison from the Devil's Tower (now named St. Peters) through the middle of the sands to the West Strand; the parade of arms is to be established on the East Strand near the Genoese's Cave, which are to communicate with each other as far as the first battery towards them, and the rest from the entring



of the trenches to lay on the main trenches as a safeguard, the troops that are to mount in the trenches are the battalions as follow, viz.:—The 1st Battalion of Spanish Guards, the first Walloon Guards, the 1st Battalion of Marquis Espinola, Rodrigo Peralta, and Marquis de Torri Majors, and the said battalions are to stand to their arms without beat of drum, exactly at 4 o'clock in the afternoon and to meet at the front of the Spanish brigade, and from there to march to their respective guards when they shall be detached for, and to observe the orders that shall be given them on their march under the foot of the hill, and to leave none in their camp, but a quarter guard to take care of the tents, the grenadier companies are to be formed in the front of the detachments for a cover. Twelve hundred workmen to be warned to parade at the same hour in the park of artillery, and they are to receive shovels, 50 houghs, fascines, with 3 pickets to each fascine; the Lieut.-General to be with the said workmen and 1,000 horse for the same effect, and to take up the ground from the said parade of arms to the Tower of St. Peters, where is to remain a reserve. The Major-General is to take up the second parade of arms to the East Strand to the Genoese Tower, and to detach the officers with 30 soldiers each to take up the ground from thence to the Genoese Cave to defend the corner of the rock in case of a sally from the garrison, according to the number of men that mount the trenches are to be detached 200 men to communicate with the Lieut.-General and to St. Peters Tower, the Brigadier to run his trench to the Genoese Cave till he joins the situation of the battery. One Colonel with 300 armed men to follow them from St. Peters Tower to the battery, in the front of them is to march a Lieut.-Colonel with 100 armed men into the line, the company of grenadiers of Victoria's Regiment, 50 French dragoons, and 40 horse to remain on the West Strand, leaving open the Tower between the two battalions, to observe the motion of any attack that may be made or alarm, to defend the Strand in case of a sally from the garrison. Each of the battalions above mentioned are to detach 50 men with three officers to form a picket at their front, who are to work according to the directions of the Lieut.-General, the bloody hospital to be at the rear of the communication. Twelve hundred workmen to be warned; Colonel Pedro Charloe and Lieut.-Colonel Diego Charloe to command the said workmen. The following battalions are to give men for work, viz.:—The 3 battalions of Spanish Guards give 120 men, the 3 battalions of Walloon Guards 120 men, of Brigadier Badagos 120, the 2 battalions of Hibernia 120, the Regiment of Mons 120 men, of Corcega 120, the Regiment of Valladolid 120 men, the Regiment of Voltonio 120 men, the Regiment of Gornerias 120 men, of Sicilia 120 men. Each battalion to send them workmen with one captain, 4 subs and 8 serjeants. The picket of Voltonio's Regiment to mount at night."

Before the trenches was relieved, there happened a false alarm by a difference between the men in the trenches near the garrison, who left their trenches to quarrel; the guard in the far trench thinking it was a sally fired on them, the others thinking there might be some disembarkment returned their fire, and so continued till some of the



## ACCOUNT OF THE BATTLE OF MEANEE.<sup>1</sup>

By MAJOR CHARLES WADDINGTON,  
Commanding Engineer, Scinde and Beloochistan.

(From a manuscript in the Royal United Service Institution.)

IN the afternoon of February 16th, 1843, after a fatiguing march of twenty-one miles from Halla, the British force about 3,000 strong, under Major-General Sir C. T. Napier, K.C.B., encamped near the village of Muttara, seventeen miles north of Hyderabad.<sup>2</sup>

Muttara lies within a mile or two of the Indus, and Major Outram, who had been ineffectually negotiating with the Scinde Ameers, now landed here from the "Planet" steamer, accompanied by his escort, the Light Company of Her Majesty's 22nd Regiment.<sup>3</sup> He confirmed the report, already received by the General at Halla, of his having been attacked on the preceding morning at Hyderabad. It appeared that the Residency, which lies on the left bank of the Indus, three miles S.W. of the city, had been surrounded by a large body of cavalry and infantry headed by one of the Ameers, Meer Shadad Khan. A gallant defence had been made by his escort during four hours, when, ammunition failing, they had been compelled to retreat to the river. Here they were received on board the two steamers "Planet" and "Satellite," which conveyed them to Muttara, as above stated.

Major Outram brought with him the intelligence that the Belooches had assembled in great force and posted themselves in the shikargahs which intervene between Muttara and Hyderabad.<sup>4</sup> It was thought that by setting fire to these woods the enemy would be driven to the plain: and a party of 200 Sipahes was embarked the same evening with Major Outram and other officers on the two steamers to co-operate with the sailors in carrying this scheme into effect. The design, however, failed, for, though the woods were partially fired, the scene of action on the 17th was too far distant to be affected by this stratagem. The Belooches, it was said, had shifted their ground during the night, but it is more probable that we were mistaken as to the position of the shikargahs which they occupied.

<sup>1</sup> Meanee is the name of the district between the Indus and Fooilailee Rivers.

<sup>2</sup> This force was about 3,000 strong, comprising 1,100 cavalry and 12 field pieces, viz., 9th Regiment Bengal Light Cavalry, detachment Poona Irregular Horse, Scinde Irregular Horse, Bombay Camel Battery (9-pounders), Bombay Horse and Mule Battery (6-pounders), detachment Madras Sappers, Her Majesty's 22nd Regiment of Foot, 1st Grenadiers Bombay N.I., 12th Bombay N.I., 25th Bombay N.I.

<sup>3</sup> Commanded by Captain Conolly.

<sup>4</sup> The shikargahs are forests enclosed for the preservation of game.

At 4 o'clock on the following morning, February 17th, the troops again marched, the Scinde Horse, under Captain Jacob, leading. They were followed by the sappers under Captain Henderson, with a working party of one hundred Sipahs to prepare passage for the guns. The numerous canals which intersect the country had made the arrangements for crossing them a nightly work of great labour, and much impeded the progress of the artillery. We usually cut down the banks of the canals, and threw the earth into the middle: but as camels cannot pull up hill, it was necessary to make the ascent very gentle. On this morning a delay of more than an hour occurred in forming the road over two large canals not far from Muttara. Beyond these, however, it was found that the Ameers had anticipated our labour, the roads being already prepared for the passage of their own artillery.

A march of seven miles brought the advanced guard to the Foolailee, which is a small branch of the Indus, filled during the inundations of that river, but at this time of the year dry. Along its eastern bank the road continued for a couple of miles, passing in quick succession several small villages interspersed with groves of trees. Near the second of these the silence of the march was first broken by the sound of a distant cannon. Sir Charles instantly formed up the infantry of his advanced guard behind a small canal, disposing the Scinde Horse in the bed of the Foolailee and unlimbering the two 9-pounders which accompanied him. Shortly afterwards a squadron of the Scinde Horse was despatched across the Foolailee to skirt round a shikargah on the opposite bank, while the remainder was sent to the front to reconnoitre. It was soon ascertained that the enemy was certainly in the latter direction, and the General again moved on, till he arrived at a village where the road to Hyderabad leaves the bank of the river.<sup>1</sup>

Close on the General's right at this time was the dry bed of the Foolailee, having its course nearly south: and as far as the sight could reach in that direction, its further bank was enclosed by a mud wall which bounded a dense shikargah. Directly to his front rose the last of the string of small villages before mentioned, Zahir Bahirchy Ka Gote. Half a mile again beyond that another vast enclosed shikargah extended at a right angle, from the near bank of the Foolailee about a mile, and overlapped his left flank, though somewhat reaching from it.

Two squadrons of the Scinde Horse, under Captain Jacob and Lieutenant Russell, meanwhile continued their advance, turning off obliquely to the left, till they found themselves within half a mile or less of the enemy's guns. Here they drew up in line and were afterwards joined by the squadron which had been detached to examine the shikargah, on the other bank of the Foolailee. In this position the whole of this gallant corps remained, observing the enemy's movements and exposed to his fire till the final advance of the British line.

<sup>1</sup> These roads are merely beaten tracks, and the bed of the river is as much used as any other.

The General again moved forward for a thousand yards or so along a beaten track which appeared to lead round the left skirt of the shikargah in his front. Here, finding himself in sight of the enemy and within long range of his artillery, he decided on waiting for the main column of his force. This column was far behind, as the guns had been much impeded in their progress by accidents arising from the badness of the road.<sup>1</sup> The delay thus caused was considerable, and gave time to examine attentively the enemy's position.

Immediately in our front the top of the shikargah's wall was thickly studded with matchlock men, more particularly at its eastern or receding end. Extending from this to the enemy's right was seen a dense mass of infantry surrounding two conspicuous flags and supported by large bodies of horse in its rear, while in front of it were posted numerous pieces of cannon. Some of these, more advanced than the rest, had been firing on the Scinde Horse, and now directed their shots,<sup>2</sup> though from a great distance, on the General and his advanced guard. The right of the enemy's infantry rested on groves of trees, which concealed a village, and the whole of this chosen ground was occupied in great strength.

Such was the formidable position taken up by our yet untried adversary, and which the slow approach of the British column allowed ample time to observe and discuss. It was generally thought that about 8,000 infantry and 3,000 cavalry were at this time visible from the General's station, as yet distant nearly a mile from the eventual scene of action. But the full strength of the Belooches was not manifest from this place of observation, for it could neither be seen from thence that he held on his right a village strongly protected by trees and canals and walled enclosures, nor that along and behind the whole of his line ran the bed of the Foolailee River, at right angles to its former course.

At length the arrival of the main column enabled the General to advance. The same order of march was preserved, and, following the direction of the beaten road which edged off to the left, the column was not halted till within three hundred yards of the shikargah wall. This wall, as before mentioned, had been studded with Belooches, but was deserted on our approach after some distant discharges of matchlocks; and as it was eight feet high without loopholes or banquette, it afforded, in fact, no advantage of offence to the enemy, though it secured him from our fire.

The head of the column which arrived left in front was directed on the first distant tree standing to that flank, nearly at right angles with the road; and as soon as it had taken up sufficient ground the column was again halted and wheeled to the right into line. The whole of the guns under Major Lloyd: four 9- and two 6-pounders, two 24- and two 12-pounder howitzers, with the sappers, were placed

<sup>1</sup> The store carts of both batteries had had pintle-eyes broken this morning, and a waggon of the Camel Battery had been upset.

<sup>2</sup> These balls were of beaten iron and weighed five or six pounds each. The Ameer's artillery was under the direction of an Englishman.



on the right of the infantry, towards the shikargah. Behind the right the 9th Bengal Cavalry, 350 strong, was in reserve. The Scinde Horse, about 500 sabres, were in the position which they had occupied for the last hour, 300 yards in advance of the left of the infantry line. They now formed column near the shallow green bed of a dry watercourse, bordered by scattered trees, and leading directly forward to the village of *Synd Soottam Shah Ki Wustee* or *Katree*<sup>1</sup> which flanked the enemy's right. From right to left the order of the infantry regiments was as follows: first Her Majesty's 22nd Regiment, next the 25th and 12th Regiments N.I., and last the 1st Grenadiers N.I., mustering altogether, when joined by their details from the advanced guards, 1,350 bayonets. The Poona Horse under Captain Tait, with 200 of the Grenadiers and two 6-pounders, had been left as a rear-guard and did not come into action.

Before the British line there now lay a narrow plain, dotted with two sandy hillocks and camel bushes, and extending in front to the *Foolailee*, a distance of 1,100 yards. Bounded on the east by the shallow green *Nullah*, the trees and the village before described, and beyond these by an impassable canal<sup>2</sup>: it was shut in on the west by a continuation of the shikargah wall, which, taking an abrupt line from its N.E. corner, ran thence for a distance of 600 yards to the *Foolailee*, in a S. by E. direction. The front of this contracted space measured, in a straight line, only 700 yards from the shikargah wall to the village, and this was to be the field of battle. The enemy had selected it with judgment, for, while the abrupt banks of the *Foolailee* afforded him a strong entrenchment, the British cavalry and artillery were greatly embarrassed by want of room, as will appear in the sequel of this account.

As soon as our line had been carefully dressed, and skirmishers thrown out, the guns moved forwards 200 yards, and our first fire (of round shot) opened on the enemy's batteries at a little before eleven o'clock. Her Majesty's 22nd formed upon the left of the artillery, and the remaining regiments were placed in echelon to the rear at twenty paces distance. Our guns, being found too distant to silence the enemy's batteries, were again advanced about 250 yards, and the enemy's fire, which, though briskly kept up, had not been very destructive, now evidently slackened under the rapid and well-directed discharges of the British artillery. At this time an opening was seen in the shikargah wall close to our right flank, and the Grenadier Company of the 22nd Regiment under Captain Tew was detached to clear the wall. This was done by entering the shikargah, the jungle for some distance from the wall being thin and open. Captain Tew was almost immediately shot dead and the company otherwise suffered, but the skirt of the shikargah was cleared for the time by these brave men.

A third halt was made at 300 yards from the *Foolailee*, and while some of the British cannon swept the outside of the shikargah wall

<sup>1</sup> *Katree* is more properly the name of the district.

<sup>2</sup> This canal was dry: but the sides had been recently scarped, probably in the progress of clearing it.

with grape shot, and others kept down the enemy's fire and at last silenced it, the infantry line, still formed in close echelon of regiments, was dressed in preparation for its final advance.

The word to advance was given. Her Majesty's 22nd, our only European regiment, led the echelon, and, as the bugles sounded, moved on in the most perfect order. A galling fire from numerous matchlocks was received with firmness, and in due time returned, though at first without much effect. Sheltered by the steep bank of the Foolailee the Belooches rested their matchlocks and took deliberate aim. In its turn the 25th Regiment N.I. became engaged, and then the 12th and Grenadiers. On this flank the enemy was even more strongly posted than on our right, for the water-cuts and walls of the village protected him. His guns meanwhile had been abandoned when the British troops advanced, and were most of them already in our possession. But as the distance lessened the more daring of the Belooches, fresh and impatient for the fight, put aside their matchlocks. With sword and shield in hand they rose from their hiding-places, and, in more than one impetuous onset, shook and forced back the British line.<sup>1</sup> Twice or three times were the 12th N.I. beaten back, and as often were they nobly rallied by their officers. Brevet Major Jackson of that regiment, dismounting from his horse, thus sacrificed his life. Advancing to the front, followed by only two havildars, this lamented officer, after a short combat, fell beneath the sabres of the enemy. The 1st Grenadier Regiment,<sup>2</sup> driven back with the 12th, fell into some confusion, and appears to have taken but little share in the action. Major Teasdale, commanding the 25th, was killed while animating his Sipahes, who gave ground in an alarming manner before their fierce opponents.<sup>3</sup> Lieut.-Colonel Pennefather, commanding Her Majesty's 22nd, was shot through the body, and Major Poole succeeded to that command. Even his stout Europeans could not keep their ranks unmoved under the furious attacks of the Belooches. Defending themselves more skilfully with their bayonets than the Sipahes, they yet swerved back from the sharp sabres of their desperate foes, many of whom were excited with bhang,<sup>4</sup> or opium. Lieutenant McMurdo, Assistant Quartermaster-General, his horse having been shot under him, killed a Belooch chief, hand to hand, and made prize of his gold-handled sword. Still our brave officers and soldiers continued to fall,<sup>5</sup> and now Sir Charles Napier,

<sup>1</sup> Commanded by Major Reid

<sup>2</sup> The 1st Grenadier Regiment mustered less than 200 bayonets with its Colours.

<sup>3</sup> Captain Jackson, brother of Major Jackson of the 12th, took command of the 25th on Major Teasdale's death.

<sup>4</sup> Bhang is a decoction of hemp seed.

<sup>5</sup> Killed: Captain Keade, 12th N.I., Lieutenant Wood, 12th N.I. Wounded: Major Wythie, Assistant Adjutant-General, Captain Conway, H.M. 22nd, Lieutenant Hardinge, H.M. 22nd, Ensign Pennefather, H.M. 22nd, Ensign Bowden, H.M. 22nd, Ensign Holbron, 12th N.I., Lieutenant Phayre, 25th N.I., Quartermaster, Lieutenant Bourdillon, 25th N.I.

seeing the obstinacy of the fight, and doubtful of its issue, pushed his horse through the ranks of Her Majesty's 22nd, and, waving his cap, cheered on that gallant regiment. In the same manner, regardless himself of danger, he encouraged the 25th N.I. to advance. At this time it was no doubt the General's wish to drive the enemy from the bed of the river by a vigorous charge, but his intention was not carried into effect. The bayonet was but little used except in defence, and it shortly became evident that the fire of the matchlocks and the glancing of the keen sabres were less and less frequent, while the continued and destructive roll of musketry, delivered from the edge nearly of the river bank, levelled every living being before it.<sup>1</sup> For upwards of an hour did this mortal struggle endure, and when at last the British line descended into the river, it was but over crowded heaps of dead and dying. The pouches and cotton clothes of nearly all these men had taken fire, probably from their lighted matches, and their scorched and writhing bodies presented a shocking spectacle. Many Belooch corpses, too, lay on the bank above mingled with those of their enemies, mute witnesses of their desperate valour. Quarter was not asked or given. The wounded were shot or bayoneted by our exasperated soldiers, disdaining to yield and striking at our men with their sabres to the last.

Meanwhile neither artillery nor cavalry were idle, nor was their aid unimportant in deciding the fate of the day. So contracted was the last position of the guns that only four of them could be brought into action.<sup>2</sup> One of Captain Hutt's guns, with the assistance of the sappers, who also broke down part of the wall, was brought round to bear on the shikargah, and did great execution there, while the remaining three swept the Foolailee to the right and front with a continued deadly discharge of grape shot and spherical case.

During the heat of the fight orders were sent to the cavalry to force the enemy's right. The 9th Bengal Cavalry had been previously crossed in support of the left of our line and formed immediately in rear of the 1st Grenadiers. By some misconception of an order the men of the latter regiment faced to the right about and retreated some distance before their officers could rally them. The Belooches showed themselves at the same time in numbers from the village enclosures and ravines. Lieut.-Colonel Pattle, of the 9th Cavalry, second in command, had not yet received the General's order to advance, but seeing the necessity of checking the enemy's movements, and partly, as I am informed, on the urgent representation of Captain Tucker, he after some hesitation permitted the cavalry to act. The moment certainly appears to have been critical, when the 3rd squadron of the 9th Cavalry, led by that gallant officer, advanced at a

<sup>1</sup> The bed of the Foolailee is an excavation produced by the current of a river in an alluvial soil, the bank here spoken of being simply the edge of that excavation. The elevated bank alluded to in the official despatch was confined to a small portion of our front. Below the edge of the bank was a double step or ledge which was heaped with the bodies of the slain.

<sup>2</sup> Captains Whittie and Hutt commanded the Camel and Horse Batteries.

trot, passing between the infantry and the village and driving the enemy into and along the bed of the Foolailee. A body of Belooches, drawn up in rear of the village, made a stout resistance from which this brave squadron suffered severely. Captain Tucker received six shots and fell,<sup>1</sup> but Captain Bagett succeeding him completed the dispersion of the enemy in that direction. The 3rd squadron, followed by the 2nd under Captain Garrett, which supported Lieut.-Colonel Pattle in an attack on the village, while the 1st, under Captain Wemyss, filing between the Grenadiers and 12th Native Infantry, crossed the Foolailee, dispersing the enemy on the opposite bank. Brevet Captain Cookson, the Adjutant, was at this time killed, and three other officers were wounded.<sup>2</sup> Lieut.-Colonel Pattle, with a few men of the 3rd squadron, had gallantly attacked the enclosures of the village, and, being afterwards supported by the 2nd squadron, succeeded in partially clearing them. It was the fire from these and the neighbouring canals and gardens which caused the heavy loss of the 9th Cavalry. The Scinde Horse, after an ineffectual attempt to get round the outside of the village, in which they were stopped by a deep canal occupied by the enemy, also descended into the river between our infantry and the village and rode direct to the enemy's camp.

The Ameers had already abandoned it and fled to Hyderabad, but many brave men were still found there who defended themselves obstinately, and were not cut down without loss to their pursuers. Captain Jacob had his horse killed under him and deputed Lieutenant Fitzgerald to continue the pursuit, which he did for some distance, till, coming on a large body of horse which had not been engaged, that officer was obliged to retire. The Scinde Horse were about the same time recalled to defend our baggage, and a detachment of the Bengal Cavalry held possession of the camp, which was afterwards burnt and evacuated by order of the General.<sup>3</sup>

When the British troops crossed the river, about half-past one p.m., the battle may be said to have ended, but firing did not altogether cease, and multitudes of the enemy still hovered about; nor was it till our guns had been crossed and opened both up the Foolailee and on the village and neighbouring enclosures that the insurgents gradually dispersed. The General formed his camp on the field of battle with the baggage in the centre of a hollow square, and the troops slept on their arms.

Thus closed the eventful day. Seldom, perhaps, has the determined valour of the Belooches on that occasion been surpassed. The Europeans behaved steadily and bravely, and were no doubt much inspired by Sir Charles's brilliant example. The Sipahes were sustained and rallied by their officers, whose conduct was marked by a noble self-devotion: without them they could hardly have recovered

<sup>1</sup> It is gratifying to record that this gallant officer recovered from his wounds.

<sup>2</sup> Wounded: Brevet Captain Smith, 9th Bengal Cavalry, Lieutenant Plowden, 9th Bengal Cavalry, Ensign Frith, Quartermaster, 9th Bengal Cavalry.

<sup>3</sup> 30,000 or 40,000 rupees were found in the camp: the Ameers were said to have brought some lacs of rupees with them.

themselves as they did, after being more than once driven back. The artillery and cavalry did their duty well, but their actions were in a great degree paralysed by the confined field to which they were chiefly restricted. It must be admitted, however, that the advance of our cavalry on the enemy's right had probably an important effect in deciding the battle.

Our loss in the engagement was severe, considering the small number of our troops engaged, 62 killed and 194 wounded, of whom 19 were officers (6 killed and 13 wounded).<sup>1</sup> The enemy left upwards of 400 dead in the bed of the Foolailee, and there were probably as many more in different parts of the field and the shikargah killed by the artillery and cavalry. As quarter,<sup>2</sup> with a few exceptions, was not given, it may be doubted whether the number of wounded who escaped much exceeded the number of the killed. The statements of the Belooches make their loss much greater, but are probably exaggerated. At the lowest computation, however, the loss of the Belooches must have been six times that of the British, a surprising disproportion when we consider their advantage of position, and a plain proof of the superiority gained by discipline, and especially by one of its results, a rapid and well-sustained fire.

The whole of the enemy's guns, ten in number, the standards, ammunition, baggage, tents and some treasure fell into our hands, and the immediate results of this battle were most important. On the two following mornings six of the Ameer's surrendered themselves prisoners, and shortly afterwards Hyderabad<sup>3</sup> was taken possession of, and Lower Scinde declared a province of the British Empire.

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<sup>1</sup> The number of horses killed on both sides was considerable. The enemy's cavalry was not much engaged, but many of the Belooches dismounted to fight, picketing their horses in the bed of the river.

<sup>2</sup> It must be noted that the Belooches, not expecting quarter, defended themselves to the last, making it nearly impossible to spare them.

<sup>3</sup> Hyderabad was not taken possession of till the 21st, after Major Outram's departure. It was said that there were two millions sterling of public treasure in the fort. If so a great part of it must have been removed during this delay. The prize money found was about one quarter of that sum.



## THE SECOND CAPTURE OF PONDICHERRY, IN 1778.

(From a Manuscript in the Royal United Service Institution.)

AFTER Pondicherry was taken by Coote in 1761, the fortifications of that handsome and flourishing city were destroyed: but when the peace of 1763 restored that place, together with many others of their captured possessions, to the French, they soon began to rebuild their demolished defences. War was once more declared against France in February, 1778, but the notification did not reach India till July. It was then determined to attack the French possessions without delay. With this object, a considerable force was assembled near Madras, under the command of Major-General Hector Munro, the hero of Buxar. Chandernagore and other minor settlements had in the meantime been captured without resistance, by a detachment from the garrison of Calcutta. Munro's force consisted of a small party of cavalry: all the available strength of the Madras Artillery from the Mount and from Trichinopoly: the Madras European Infantry, then organized as two regiments of two battalions each: eleven battalions of Madras Sepoys, four of which were afterwards called regiments: six battalions of Grenadier Sepoys, four of which were formed from the grenadier companies of the "Carnatic" battalions, and two from the grenadier companies of the eight "Circar" battalions which had been raised for service in the Northern Circars. There were two grenadier companies to each battalion in those days.

Marching in a southerly direction, from the vicinity of Madras, Munro arrived, with his little army, on August 8th, at the Red Hills, four miles from Pondicherry: but his force was not strong enough to lay siege to that city till the 20th. Commodore Vernon had sailed from Madras, on July 29th, with a squadron of five ships, to blockade Pondicherry, where he arrived on August 8th. A French squadron, of the same number, appearing, Vernon immediately gave chase, but was unable to get near them till the 10th, when, in the morning, he saw them bearing towards him. After a smart action in which Vernon's ships had their rigging greatly damaged, while the French were more seriously injured in their hulls, the latter got into Pondicherry Roads, and remained there till the 21st. Vernon, retarded by adverse winds and currents, and crippled by the damage to his rigging, did not get there till that day. The French declined another action, and, sailing away at night, left Pondicherry to its fate. On the same day Munro took possession of the "bound-hedge" so often mentioned in accounts of operations near Pondicherry, cutting off all communication with the country, while Vernon effectually blockaded the place from the sea.

After a reconnaissance on the last day in August, the plan of the siege of operations was settled, and attacks were begun both from the north and south. Here it may be well to mention that the coast line at Pondicherry runs nearly due north and south. The first battery was finished on September 4th: it was directed against the Dauphin bastion on the south. The fort of Ariancopang, in attacking which Boscawen lost much time and many men, in his unsuccessful siege in 1748, and the suburb near it, were utilized in the attack from the south. The first parallel was begun during the night of the 6th, and on the 8th the approaches were advanced beyond the Ariancopang river, and a parallel was made at 400 yards. Till the 18th, the besiegers were fully occupied in constructing batteries and completing the parallels. On that day, a heavy fire was opened from 28 guns and 25 mortars: and, towards evening, gained a superiority over that of the town. As M. Bellecombe, the French governor, was a very skilful officer, as well as a brave and resolute man, the advances were made with due caution, and they were greatly retarded by very heavy rain. A magazine in one of our batteries accidentally blew up on the 24th, but it does not appear to have caused much damage or loss.

Day by day the approaches were steadily pushed on till October 6th, by which lodgments had been made between the inner and outer ditches on the south front: and at the north attack a lodgment had been made on the crest of the glacis. Progress was impeded not only by the rain, but also by the defective supply of guns and stores: and Munro complained that "the powder was shamefully bad, and had been condemned four years ago." Some further advances were made on the 7th and 8th: and, soon after, extensive breaches were made in both the fronts attacked. The storming was to have taken place on the 15th just before daybreak, with a simultaneous attack on the sea front: but, on the 14th, the ditch at the south side was filled to such an extent by the heavy rains that the gallery leading down to it was destroyed, and the boats intended to form the bridge were damaged. It became necessary, therefore, to postpone the assault till the 17th. But on the 16th, the Governor, convinced that he could not defer the capture much longer, proposed a capitulation. His offer, after some discussion, was accepted the next day, very liberal terms being granted, in consideration of the gallant and honourably conducted defence. The garrison marched out with all the honours of war, and then surrendered, the Regiment of Pondicherry being, as a special favour, allowed to retain its Colours. The Frenchmen were sent to their own country, and the native soldiers were dismissed.

I have not seen any statement of the numbers of Munro's forces, but they may be fairly estimated at 13,000, exclusive of 260 sailors and marines, who were landed to take part in the assault. The casualties were 8 officers, 2 native officers, and 211 men killed: and 27 officers, 16 native officers, and 643 men wounded. Of these, the native regiments lost 19 officers, 16 native officers, and 612 men, in killed and wounded. The garrison of Pondicherry was nearly 3,000, and of these 200 were killed, and 480 wounded. The besiegers'

casualties may appear few, for so arduous and protracted a siege: but it must be considered that there were none caused by mistakes or misconduct, and that they were spared the heavy losses that must have resulted from storming a place so stoutly defended.

Major-General Munro was made a Knight of the Bath, and a baronetcy was conferred on Mr. T. Rumbold, the Governor of Madras. Honours were given sparingly in those days, even for eminent services.

I have not succeeded in tracing any existing batteries of the Royal Artillery as the successors of the artillery engaged at Pondicherry. The Madras European Infantry, after undergoing many "re-organizations" and some changes of title, became in 1861 the 102nd Royal Madras Fusiliers, a designation indicative of their history and services: and that famous corps is now to be found bearing the title of the 1st Battalion Royal Dublin Fusiliers. Of the 17 Sepoy battalions, the 2nd, 8th, 9th, 10th, 12th, 13th, and 16th are represented by the Madras Native Regiments bearing those numbers: the 17th Battalion was incorporated with the present 1st Regiment in 1806, and the 18th with the 8th Regiment in 1796: and the 21st subsequently became the 20th. The "Carnatic" Grenadiers rejoined their respective battalions, and the "Circar" Grenadiers were disbanded with their battalions.

On April 12th, 1841, "Pondicherry" was granted (with nine other names commencing with "Arcot" and "Plassey") to the Madras European Regiment, in recognition of its services at the sieges of that place in 1761, 1778 and 1793: but to none of the Sepoy regiments was that distinction given. How well they earned it in 1778, the narratives of that siege and their lists of casualties plainly show.

The fortifications of Pondicherry, soon after its capture in 1778, were again demolished: to be again rebuilt, when the place was restored to France in 1783. Pondicherry was captured by the British, a third time, in August, 1793, and again restored on the peace of 1802.



## THE CAPTURE OF MANILLA, IN 1762.

(From a Manuscript in the Royal United Service Institution.)

IN the records of the victories gained in 1762, over the French and Spaniards, the capture of Manilla occupies a prominent place. The inception of this enterprise was due to accident rather than design. Colonel (afterwards Sir William) Draper was obliged to leave India soon after the successful defence of Fort St. George, Madras, in which he bore a conspicuous part, as his health broke down from the strain of hard work in a trying climate. He sailed to Canton, where he remained for some time. During his stay, he made himself acquainted, by careful inquiries, with the extent and condition of the Spanish settlements in the Philippine Islands. He learned that the Spaniards were not apprehensive of an attack in the event of war with England, which was then imminent. Trusting to their situation, remote from the ordinary routes of British trade, and beyond the range of probable hostilities, they had taken no defensive precautions: their fortifications were neglected, and their discipline was relaxed. The chief of this numerous group of islands, Manilla, or Luconia, or Luzon, as it has been variously called, is about 300 miles long, and varies in breadth from 200 miles to 80. Manilla, the capital, lies in a large bay of the same name, on the east side of the island. The town is of irregular figure, but it may be roughly described as a triangle, of which the longest side faced the sea. At the northern extremity, in an acute angle formed by the sea and the Rio de Pasig, the citadel was built. The wall that bounded the town had eleven bastions of various forms and at irregular distances. The lower storeys of the houses were mostly built of stone, but the upper storeys were of wood: a mode of construction found to be the least dangerous in the earthquakes with which the island was occasionally visited.

On his return to England, Colonel Draper laid before the Government a clear and forcible statement of the information he had acquired: and when, in January, 1762, war was declared against Spain, he obtained their concurrence in his design of attacking Manilla before the news of the outbreak of war could reach that distant settlement, and, consequently, before any adequate preparations for resistance could be made. The great advantage of secrecy would be lost, if an expedition were prepared in England: so Draper returned to India in 1762, fully authorized and instructed. On his arrival at Madras, he encountered much opposition: and when, on June 28th, he laid his designs before the Council, Major-General Lawrence, Mr. Bouchier, and Major Call the chief engineer, dissented, and considered the projected expedition inexpedient and rash. The orders and instructions that Draper brought out were, however, so explicit and

unequivocal, that the Madras authorities reluctantly acquiesced, and the requisite preparations were commenced.

The force ordered for embarkation consisted of 450 of the 79th, Draper's Regiment; 60 of the Royal Artillery, and 30 of the Madras Artillery; 200 deserters of different nationalities but chiefly French; a company of Coffrees and one of Topasses, each 80 strong; 60 European Pioneers; 650 Madras Sepoys; and, lastly, some 60 Europeans in the service of the Nawab of the Carnatic; altogether 1,670 of all arms and ranks. Colonel Draper was commissioned to command, with the rank of Brigadier-General; Colonel Monson<sup>1</sup> of the 79th was either second in command or Quartermaster-General; Major Scott of the 89th Highlanders (Munro's) was Adjutant-General; the artillery, both King's and Company's, were placed under Major (afterwards Sir Robert) Barker, an officer often honourably mentioned in the records of Indian campaigns; and the other staff and departmental appointments were suitably filled. When the preparations were nearly complete, a frigate was sent to the China seas to stop all vessels bound for Manilla, and so to prevent any warning from reaching the place of the intended attack. The naval part of the expedition, consisting of eight ships of the line and three frigates, was under Vice-Admiral Cornish, an able and experienced officer.

The squadron, accompanied by some transports, sailed from Madras in two divisions, the first on August 1st, and the second soon after. It arrived at Malacca on the 19th, and, after a voyage of moderate duration for those days, anchored in the bay of Manilla on September 23rd. The next day a Spanish officer came off to ask what it all meant. He was not left long in ignorance, for a landing was effected in the evening, under the fire of the frigates, about two miles south of the town, without loss of life, though the surf was heavy and many boats were destroyed. In addition to the land forces, 12 naval officers and 667 sailors, 19 officers and 319 men of the Marines were also landed from the fleet. On the 25th a small fort called the *Polverista*, and the *Hermita*, a large and commodious church, half a mile from the walls, were occupied. These buildings were found very useful as safe places for stores, and as giving cover from the rains which had deluged the country and rendered encamping impracticable. The surf was still dangerous, and when landing some Madras Sepoys, Lieutenant Hardwick of the Company's Service and a few men were drowned. On the 26th, 200 Spaniards, with two guns, advanced from the town and attacked the right of the besiegers' position, but they were soon repulsed, leaving one of their guns behind them.

The south face was selected as the part to be attacked, because, though at first it appeared the strongest part, further observations showed its defects. Its two bastions had orillons and retired flanks, it had a ravelin covering the "royal gate," a wet ditch, covered-way, and glacis: but the ravelin was not armed, the covered-way was out

<sup>1</sup> The same Colonel Monson who was afterwards appointed a Member of Warren Hastings' Council.



of repair, the glacis was far too low, and the ditch was not carried round the capital of the bastion nearest the sea. From the smallness of the besieging force, *only a fourth the number of the garrison*, anything like an investment could not be attempted, and supplies and reinforcements could be brought into the town at any time. Yet with these almost unexampled disadvantages, the siege works progressed fairly and with little interruption. On the 28th Lieutenant Fryer, the General's secretary, was sent to escort into the town the Governor's nephew, who had lately been taken prisoner in the bay. When Fryer approached the walls, some Spaniards and Indians, who were attempting a sortie, drew near. The Indians rushed at the unfortunate officer, disregarding, or not understanding his flag of truce, and murdered him, mangling his body shockingly, and mortally wounding the young Spaniard who had vainly attempted to save him.

Ground was broken on the 29th, and breaching batteries were begun. A heavy gale, on the night of October 1st, drove a store ship on shore, but this proved an advantage, for the ship was not damaged, and the stores were easily landed. Neither the gale nor the torrents of rain stopped the working parties, who completed an eight-gun battery during the night. On the 3rd, a breaching battery opened fire against the St. Diego bastion (that next the sea) with such effect that the enemy's guns were silenced in two hours, and the bastion was rendered untenable. About 3 a.m. on the 4th, a thousand Indians suddenly attacked the part of the lines occupied by the sailors, and killed and wounded several before they were repulsed. Shortly after, another body of Indians, with part of the Spanish garrison, attacked the Sepoys with great impetuosity, and drove them back. Some of the 79th, however, came to support them, and the assailants were defeated with the loss of 70 Spaniards killed: of the loss of the Indians, no account is given. On our side, Lieutenant Porter, R.N., and Captain Strachan of the 79th were killed, and about 40 others were killed or wounded. In both these attacks, the Indians fought with extreme ferocity, rushing up to the muzzles of the muskets, and, in many cases, according to Draper, "died like wild beasts, gnawing the bayonets." Discouraged by their heavy losses, and by the failure of their desperate attacks, most of the Indians returned to their homes, leaving only 1,800 of the 10,000 who had come to aid the garrison. The breach was reported practicable on the 5th, and all the enemy's guns bearing on it were silenced: so Draper determined to storm the place before day-break the next morning.

At 4 a.m. on the 6th, the several parties detailed for the assault began to file out quietly from their several quarters, and soon assembled near St. Jago's Church. At day-break, a heavy fire was opened from guns and mortars, which dispersed a body of Spaniards in the left bastion. Under cover of the dense smoke of this cannonade, which was blown towards the town, the stormers advanced quickly but silently. First some 60 volunteers from different corps, led by Lieutenant Russell of the 79th; next the 79th Grenadiers; then the pioneers to clear the breach, and to make lodgments, if required; the rest of the 79th, the sailors and the Sepoys followed. The breach was

quickly reached and passed, without much opposition: but some guard-houses and other buildings were obstinately defended. These places were stormed in succession, and as their occupants would not surrender, they were killed. Our loss in the storming was:—Major Moore of the 79th, killed by an arrow, and about 33 officers and men killed or wounded. The Governor, who was also the Archbishop, and the principal officers retired into the citadel, but they surrendered about 8 a.m. As the place had been taken by storm, without a capitulation, it was impossible to prevent excesses on the part of some of the captors, but order was soon restored. Our total loss in the siege was:—Four officers and 28 men killed, an officer and six men drowned, and five officers and 106 men wounded. The Spaniards had three officers and 82 men killed, but the number of wounded is not stated. The savage Indians are said to have had 300 killed and 400 wounded.

A capitulation was signed, on the day of the capture, conceding the sovereignty of the Philippine Islands to Great Britain, and granting to the city of Manilla and its inhabitants, immunity from plunder, in consideration of a ransom of four million dollars. The town was saved, but the ransom was never paid.

The English remained in possession till the end of March, 1764, when news of the treaty arrived, and we lost by the pen what we had gained by the sword.

(The chief authorities for the above narrative are:—General Draper's journal, as given in Beatson's "Memoirs"; Colonel Wilson's carefully written "History of the Madras Army"; Colonel Vibart's "History of the Madras Engineers"; and Campbell's "Lives of the Admirals." The accounts given in many other works are evidently erroneous.)



## THE WAR.

### ITS NAVAL SIDE.

#### WORK OF THE FLEETS.

The principal naval events of the war during the first four months of 1916 are, so far as they have been officially revealed, recorded here. In the arrangement of the narrative, the same method has been used as that adopted in earlier issues of the JOURNAL, with the exception that the divisions are now reduced in number. This is owing to the termination of the conjoint undertaking in the Gallipoli Peninsula, with the evacuation of Helles on January 8th. The naval work which has since been carried out at the Dardanelles, that in connection with the operations in Egypt, Syria, and Salonika, and generally those in the waters beyond Malta, are now included in one section under the heading Eastern Mediterranean. As also the movements in the Baltic and Adriatic required less space, opportunity has been taken to deal at greater length with interesting exploits of the Russian squadrons and flotillas in the Black Sea.

In the House of Commons on March 7th, on the motion to go into committee on the Navy Estimates, Mr. Balfour made a statement upon Admiralty policy. In the course of his speech, the First Lord stated that the Board had pursued to the utmost of their ability the broad general lines marked out for them by their predecessors. Speaking of the work performed by the naval service, he said that about four million combatants had been transported under the eye of the British Fleet, with one million horses and other animals, two and a half million tons of stores, and twenty-two million gallons of oil. Referring to the expansion of the Navy, he said that the personnel had, broadly speaking, doubled since the war began. In the Navy Estimates for 1914-15, about 140,000 men, without reserves, were required; now, excluding the Royal Naval Division, they had about 300,000 men, and had taken power to increase the total to 350,000, including the Royal Naval Division. In regard to the material of the Navy, the tonnage, including auxiliary cruisers and all ships used as ships of war, had increased by well over a million tons.

"There never had been a time when so many ships had been turned out, or when the speed of turning them out had been equalled. With one exception, the Navy was far stronger than it was before the war broke out. That exception was in armoured cruisers; we had lost some and not replaced them; but in these vessels our superiority was enormous and uncontested. In every other type of ship—Dreadnoughts, light cruisers, flotilla leaders, destroyers, submarines, sloops, and all the other classes of boats—there had been a most notable augmentation, and that augmentation was suffering no check. The number of naval guns had greatly grown, and the ammunition for those guns had increased both absolutely and relatively."

Colonel Churchill, the ex-First Lord, who returned on leave from the front, also spoke in the Estimates debate. He referred to the possibilities of output of the German shipyards, and to the new naval developments which were to be expected. He urged the utmost energy in completing programmes already in hand, and the beginning of fresh ones. There should be no limit of labour, he said, where the British Navy is concerned. Colonel Churchill also referred to the possibility of novel dangers, requiring novel expedients. It was necessary to be

always seeking to penetrate the enemy's intentions, and he mentioned the menace of submarine attack on merchantmen, which he thought might present itself in new and more difficult forms. He warned the Admiralty to be ready with new devices before the enemy was ready with his, and he deplored what he called the attitude of pure passivity with which he asserted the Board had been content.

On the following day, Mr. Balfour repeated in the most explicit manner that there had been no breach of continuity between his and the preceding Board. There had been no slackness in pressing on the construction of ships for naval purposes, he said, and the real limitation to building was due to the difficulty of obtaining labour. In connection with the readiness and efficiency of the Fleet, he said: "It is stronger in the face of any overt attack which it is likely to meet, far stronger than it was at the beginning of the war, and, in his belief, stronger than it had ever been in its history."

During the early part of the year, the depletion of mercantile carrying capacity, owing to various causes, came into prominence and was the subject of some discussion and of action on the part of the Government. A serious rise in freights which had taken place was due to the scarcity of ships, and this again was mainly due to naval and military requirements, arising chiefly from the many oversea expeditions undertaken during 1915. These Government demands upon shipping rose from one-fifth of the whole British mercantile tonnage in January, 1915, to two-fifths in the autumn of the year, or just double. In addition, losses caused by the action of enemy submarines and by mines amounted to about 5 per cent. The problems arising out of this question, which concerned the provision of carriage for food and other necessities to Great Britain and thus affected the very existence of the people, did not pass unnoticed in Germany, and may have been the originating cause of the renewed attack upon merchant ships which began on March 1st. It was significant that in this new attack neutral ships suffered to a much larger extent than before. From the beginning of the war to March 23rd, 1916, the neutral losses were in the proportion of 32 per cent. of the Allied losses, but from March 23rd to April 12th they increased to 51 per cent. The purpose indicated was to reduce the amount of shipping, of whatever nationality, plying to and from Great Britain, with a two-fold object, first to induce the neutral shipowners to employ their vessels in trade with other countries, and so accentuate the shortage of carrying tonnage to England; secondly, to reduce the volume of shipping generally so that after the war the Germans might have a superiority in their mercantile marine. Among the steps taken to remedy the state of affairs were the appointment of a committee to consider what ships could be released from Government employ, and a committee to consider how mercantile construction might be accelerated without interfering with the needs of the Navy and of warship building.

In the last issue of the JOURNAL, the appointment was recorded of Admiral M. J. L. Lacaze as French Minister of Marine. The Admiral has made certain changes in commands, mainly in the direction of replacing older officers by younger ones. Vice-Admirals Le Bris and Chocheprat, having relinquished commands of divisions of the "Armée Navale," were appointed to the Superior Council of the French Navy. Vice-Admiral Le Cannellier became Director of the "Services Militaires de la Flotte." Vice-Admiral Tracou was appointed in command at Cherbourg, and Vice-Admiral C. E. Favereau, formerly commanding in the Channel, became "Chef d'Escadre" under Admiral d'Artige du Fournet, the Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean. Vice-Admiral de Bon, it was officially announced on March 4th, was appointed Chief of the French Naval Staff, a position corresponding to that of the British First Sea Lord, in succession to Vice-Admiral de Jonquières, who was appointed a member of the Council of the Order of the Legion of Honour. The Secretary to the Minister of Marine is Rear-Admiral

Schwerer. Rear-Admiral Salaun was reported to have taken command of the Naval Division of the French Eastern Expeditionary Corps; and among other changes Captain Count de Saint Seine was relieved as Naval Attaché in London by Captain Baron Mercier de Lostende, who was attached to the Embassy four or five years earlier, and Captain de Saint Seine was appointed in command of the battleship "Democratie."

#### NORTH SEA.

**BELGIAN COAST.**—On January 16th, the German official *communiqué* announced that "an enemy monitor unsuccessfully bombarded the region of Westende." Again on January 27th, the German *communiqué* said that Westende had been "subjected to a fruitless fire by monitors." These were apparently the only official references to fleet operations off the Belgian coast during the three months ended March 31st.

**BRITISH SUBMARINE STRANDED.**—On January 21st, the Admiralty announced that a British submarine had grounded off the Dutch coast. Part of her officers and crew were taken off by a British destroyer, and the remainder were rescued by a Dutch warship and taken to Holland. There was no loss of life. On February 21st, it was reported from Holland that a British submarine, presumably the one mentioned above, had been refloated that day after many fruitless attempts. She was taken next day to Terschelling, before being towed to Nieuwdiep.

**GERMAN SUBMARINE STRANDED.**—On February 17th, a German submarine, reported to be "U.6," went ashore on the island of Schiermonnikoog, and was not refloated for some days. This made the fourth submarine which had been reported aground in Dutch waters during the winter, "U.8" having stranded on November 4th; and the British boat "E.17" on January 6th.

**AIR RAIDS.**—On January 23rd, the first German air raids over England in 1916 took place, when seaplanes visited Dover and Hougham, a village two miles and a half away. One raid took place in the bright moonlight at 1 a.m., and another shortly after noon, and the three machines engaged got away safely. No naval or military damage was caused. These two visits were followed by others, undertaken no doubt chiefly for purposes of reconnaissance. On March 2nd, a seaplane passed over a portion of the south-east coast of England between 6.15 and 6.25 p.m., and next morning it was picked up at 10 a.m. three miles north of the Middelkerke Bank, having come down the night before in its return flight. One of the occupants was drowned, and the other made prisoner.

**AIR DUEL OFF KENT.**—On March 19th, four German seaplanes flew over East Kent, dropping bombs on Dover, Deal, Ramsgate, and Margate. Westgate was also visited, but not attacked, several aeroplanes going up here in pursuit. Flight-Commander R. J. Bone, in a single-seater aeroplane, pursued one of the German seaplanes thirty miles out to sea, where after an action lasting a quarter of an hour he forced it to descend. The German machine was hit many times and the observer killed.

**ZEPPELIN RAIDS.**—The first visit of the German naval Zeppelins to England in 1916, took place on January 31st, when the Midland counties were raided and 67 people killed and 117 injured. Over 300 bombs were dropped by the six or seven airships which made the attack. On February 2nd, Skipper W. Martin, of the trawler "King Stephen," of Grimsby, observed Zeppelin "L.19" in the North Sea, with her gondolas and part of her envelope submerged. He saw from seventeen to twenty men on the top of the envelope, and they asked to be taken off. They outnumbered the trawler's crew, however, and as the huge gasbag



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
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seemed in no immediate danger of sinking the skipper left to report the circumstances to the proper authorities. Two naval vessels were sent out from Grimsby, but found no trace of the airship, which evidently sunk in the gale which sprang up after the "King Stephen" left her. On February 4th, the German Admiralty confirmed the loss of this Zeppelin.

**COASTING SHIP SUNK.**—One of the very few ships which have been reported sunk by aerial attack was destroyed on February 1st. This was the "Franz Fischer," a captured enemy vessel employed as a coasting collier. She left Hartlepool on January 31st on a voyage south, and when at anchor off the Kentish Knock on the following evening a Zeppelin appeared right over the vessel and dropped an explosive bomb, which struck the ship amidships. She sank within two minutes, the captain and twelve others being drowned. It is possible that the Zeppelin was "L.19," the one found floating in the sea next morning.

**"CAROLINE" REPORT.**—On February 7th, the Admiralty referred to the announcement in the German wireless of that day to the effect that on the occasion of the recent air raid to England the light cruiser "Caroline" was struck by a bomb in the Humber and sunk with great loss of life. The destroyers "Eden" and "Nith" were also reported bombed. "Neither the 'Caroline,'" said the Admiralty, "nor any other of His Majesty's ships, nor any merchant ship, large or small, was struck by a bomb in the Humber or in any other port."

**EIGHT COUNTIES RAIDED.**—On March 5th, a Zeppelin raid over eight of the Eastern Counties took place, three airships taking part. They appear to have been uncertain as to their whereabouts owing to the snowy and rough weather, and although ninety bombs were dropped no military damage of any description was caused. The German account spoke of the "naval base of Hull" having been heavily bombarded with good results.

**A WEEK'S RAIDING.**—On March 31st, the Zeppelins made a raid which proved to be the first of five within a week. During this period, sixteen Zeppelins were officially announced to have crossed the coast of Great Britain. The counter-measures, both in regard to anti-aircraft artillery and aeroplanes, proved more effective, and while one Zeppelin was brought down the others were prevented from making attacks on munition factories or similar objects of military importance.

**"L.15" SUNK.**—On March 31st, when five Zeppelins came, one was observed during the night to descend off the Thames Estuary. She was hit by gun-fire while over the eastern counties, and finally came down into the sea off the Kentish coast. On the approach of patrol vessels, she surrendered, and was taken in tow, but broke up and sank. She was the "L.15," Lieutenant-Commander Karl Breithaupt, and her crew consisted of two officers and sixteen men, but one of the latter was drowned when the airship fell into the sea. To representatives of neutral papers who were granted permission to interview them at Chatham barracks, the men said that on nearing the British coast they were spotted at once, and before they could throw any bombs they were fired at and struck three times. In the raids on dark nights, they declared they could see absolutely nothing; they could only distinguish land from water, although they did not know what the officers might see through their glasses. The officers were not very communicative. Lieutenant-Commander Breithaupt had commanded a destroyer before the war, and had gained the Iron Cross and Order of Merit for service as commander of a Zeppelin. He denied that their object was to kill non-combatants, women and children, but it was to serve high military purposes, and refused to believe that the Zeppelins had never been able to destroy in Great Britain anything of military importance, although he could not give any specific information in support of this view. The second-in-command of "L.15" was



Lieutenant Kuhne, who said that before the war he had been in England, and who spoke English well.

**VISIT TO SCOTLAND.**—On April 1st, two airships approached the north-east coast, but only one crossed the coast, the other having turned back. Eight dwelling houses were demolished and a serious fire was caused in a French-polishing shop. On April 2nd, six Zeppelins took part in a raid, three visiting the south-east counties of Scotland, one the north-east coast of England, and the other two the eastern counties of England. There were ten killed and eleven injured in Scotland, but none in England. On this night also, a Zeppelin dropped eight bombs on Dunkirk, causing small material damage. On April 3rd, one Zeppelin came over to the East Anglian coast, but did not cross the coast until between 2 and 3 a.m. on the morning of the 4th. No damage was caused. On April 5th, three Zeppelins raided the north-eastern counties, and one was understood to have been struck by gun-fire. No military damage took place, and the casualties were one killed and eight injured.

**BOARDING SHIP FIRE.**—On February 7th, fire broke out on board the "Peel Castle," one of the naval boarding steamers in the Downs. Tugs from Dover, and other small craft, assisted in suppressing the fire, and there was no loss of life. The "Peel Castle" was reported to be considerably damaged amidships. She was built in 1894, a vessel of 1,474 tons, and before the war belonged to the Isle of Man Steamship Company.

**"ARABIS" SUNK.**—On the night of February 10th, a division of four new British mine-sweeping sloops were engaged off the Dogger Bank by a German torpedo flotilla of new and heavily armed destroyers, which had made an advance into the North Sea. The British vessels were surprised, according to the German account, and they retreated, being opposed by superior force. The "Arabis," however, was sunk, and three officers and 21 men of her crew were rescued and made prisoners by the Germans, who claimed to have hit a second vessel. The German wireless referred to the "Arabis" class as entirely new ships, constructed for the mining and air defence services. They were mistakenly styled "cruisers," and the *Lokalanzeiger* gave their displacement as 3,800 tons. Of the captured British seamen, the doctor of the "Arabis," Surgeon-Probationer John Hughes, R.N.V.R., died from the exposure in the sea, and was buried with military honours in the Naval Garrison Cemetery at Wilhelmshaven on February 23rd.

**"ARETHUSA" MINED.**—On February 14th, the Admiralty announced that the light cruiser "Arethusa," Commodore R. Y. Tyrwhitt, had struck a mine off the East Coast, and it was feared she would become a total wreck. About ten men lost their lives. The "Arethusa" was one of the ships of the Navy best known to the public, being the prototype of a new class of light armoured cruiser, burning oil fuel only, which was introduced in 1912-13. She was not completed when war began, but went straight from the dockyard into action in the Heligoland Bight on August 28th, 1914, when she sustained heavy fire from several German ships. She also took part in the air raid on Cuxhaven on Christmas Day, 1914, and in the battle off the Dogger Bank on January 24th, 1915.

**"MALOJA" MINED.**—Among shipping losses caused by mines during February was that of the P. and O. steamer "Maloja," under the command of Commander C. E. Irving, R.N.R., which foundered between Dover and Folkestone on February 27th. The British tank steamer "Empress," of Fort William, was sunk about the same time, fortunately without loss of life. In the "Maloja," about 155 people were missing, of whom 49 were passengers. According to statements in the American Press, after the arrival in the United States of the Cunard liner

"Pannonia," the "Maloja" was lost through disobedience of Admiralty instructions. The "Maloja" and "Pannonia" left London on February 26th, and when stopped in the Downs to change pilots a naval vessel came alongside and they were advised to remain in the Downs until further orders. No reason was given, and the "Maloja," it was stated, proceeded on her course and struck a drifting mine. After the "Pannonia" had waited several hours, another naval officer came alongside and said to her captain: "Obey these orders implicitly. The P. and O. liner which went out ahead of you didn't and is gone." The "Pannonia" was anchored in the Downs for two days before word was received that she could safely proceed.

"MECKLENBURG" MINED.—Several ships fell victims to mines in the North Sea at this time, lending colour to the reports that Germany was resorting to the use on a larger scale of mine-laying submarines. The Zealand mail steamer "Mecklenburg," of 2,885 tons, was sunk while on passage from England to Flushing on February 27th, near the Galloper Lightship, but the passengers and crew were landed at Deal next day. The French steamer "Trignact," of 3,300 tons, from Nantes to Newcastle, was also mined and sunk in the same week in the North Sea, with a loss of twenty-one lives.

NAVAL AIRMAN'S FEAT.—The Admiralty on the night of February 20th revealed a success gained by one of the naval airmen attached to the left wing of the Allied Army in Flanders. On that day, Flight Sub-Lieutenant Simms, R.N.A.S., attacked and shot down a hostile aeroplane, which fell in flames a short distance in front of the Belgian lines. The combat and result took place in full view of the Belgian soldiers in the trenches.

GERMAN RAIDER SUNK.—On February 29th, an armed German raider attempting to break out of the North Sea was caught and sunk by the British armed merchant cruiser "Alcantara," Captain T. E. Wardle, assisted by other ships. The German vessel was known as the "Greif," and was disguised as a Norwegian merchant ship. In the engagement with the "Alcantara," the "Greif" was seriously damaged, but before she could be sunk the British vessel, after, it is reported, having her steering gear struck by a shell, which interfered with her handling, was sunk apparently by a torpedo. The "Andes," another converted liner, appeared and took up the fight, making it impossible for the German ship to escape. A third British vessel attracted by the firing was a light cruiser which joined in the action at a great distance, her gunners quickly finding the range. But soon afterwards the "Greif" blew up, probably by the mines in her being fired. Five German officers and 115 men were picked up and taken prisoners out of a total complement of over 300. The British losses amounted to five officers and 69 men. The "Greif" was reported to be armed with two 7.4-in., and six 4-in. guns, and three torpedo tubes. The German account stated that after reducing a large English cruiser of about 15,000 tons to a sinking condition by means of a torpedo, the "Greif" blew herself up, but as the Germans also complained that their seamen who were captured had been "shut off from all communication with the outside world by the English," it was difficult to know how they obtained this information.

NEW SUBMARINE CAMPAIGN.—On March 1st, there was to be inaugurated a new campaign against merchant ships by the German "U"-boats. The first direct reference to this appeared in the *Cologne Gazette* on February 7th, which stated that Germany had been preparing a further submarine surprise for England's benefit, and the effects of it would be experienced within a few days. "If anything could give us," said this journal, "the certainty of the importance of submarine war, it has been the exertions of England to wrest the weapon from our hands.

Everything America does, and for which English diplomats work day and night, arises from strivings to make submarine war impossible for Germany."

**ARMED MERCHANTMEN.**—The Germans sought to justify their threats by pleading the alleged illegal practice of the British in arming merchant vessels against submarine attack. On January 18th, the American Secretary of State addressed a Note to the European belligerent Powers on this subject, suggesting the adoption by them of a formula which would render unnecessary the arming of merchantmen, about which the State Department was reported to hold that there were grave legal doubts. The object of this Note was stated to be to reconcile the conflicting principles of equity in the maritime warfare raised by the introduction of the submarine as a commerce raider.

**AMERICAN FORMULA.**—Mr. Lansing's formula was set forth under five heads:—(1) That a non-combatant has the right to traverse the high seas in a merchant ship flying a belligerent flag, and to rely on the rules of international law and humanity for its protection. (2) That a merchant ship of any nationality is not subject to attack without warning. (3) That a belligerent-owned merchant ship should promptly obey an order to stop. (4) That a merchant vessel should not be fired upon unless it tries to resist, and even then the attack must cease as soon as flight and resistance cease. (5) That only if it is impossible to supply a prize crew, or to convoy the merchant ship, is sinking justified, and that in that case the passengers and crew must be removed to a place of safety.

**GERMAN DECLARATION.**—On February 10th, without waiting for the other belligerent Powers to reply to the American suggestion, Germany handed to the diplomatic representatives of neutral Powers at Berlin a memorandum concerning the treatment which she intended to apply to armed merchant ships as from March 1st. She announced her intention to treat all such vessels as men-of-war, and therefore liable to be sunk on sight. The German Government held, said the memorandum, that merchant ships, by being equipped with guns, acquired a war-like character, whether the guns serve for defence only or also for attack. Reference was also made to alleged secret instructions issued by the British Admiralty, which "regulate in detail the rules for artillery attack by British merchantmen on German submarines."

**ARMED MERCHANTMEN RULES.**—On March 2nd, the Admiralty published in full the instructions in force governing the conduct of merchant ships armed with guns for defensive purposes. These instructions were dated October 20th, 1915, and remained in force. They were divided into three sections, the first dealing with the status of armed merchant ships, the second with rules to be observed in the exercise of the right of self-defence, and the third with circumstances under which the armament should be employed.

**MERCHANT SHIP ACTIONS.**—In appendix No. 4 to the German Memorandum there was published a list of cases in which armed merchantmen had fired upon German or Austro-Hungarian submarines. This appendix was transmitted by wireless from the German stations to the German Embassy at Washington on February 26th. The cases numbered eighteen, and extended from April 11th, 1915, and January 17th, 1916. In all but three of them, the merchant ships escaped from the attack of the submarines. The three cases in which the defence was unsuccessful were those of the French steamer "Amiral Hamelin," sunk in the Central Mediterranean on October 7th, 1915; the British steamer "Woodfield," sunk in the Western Mediterranean on November 3rd, 1915; and the British steamer "Lumina," sunk in the Eastern Mediterranean on November 6th, 1915.

**UNARMED VESSELS TORPEDOED.**—The Admiralty published a list of forty British and fourteen neutral ships, all unarmed, which were torpedoed by enemy

submarines without warning during 1915. The British ships were all sunk, but as regards the neutral ships some were only damaged. The effect of these tables was to show that in the past the German submarines had treated any ship, whether able to protect herself or not, in precisely the manner which it was threatened on and from March 1st they would treat merchant ships carrying guns.

**CASE OF THE "ARTEMIS."**—On February 2nd, the Dutch tank steamer "Artemis," of 3,803 tons, was stopped shortly after midnight by four German torpedo boats four miles off the North Hinder lightship. The commander of the torpedo boats ordered the master of the steamer to proceed at full speed for one hour in a direction south by east and then drop anchor. Arriving there, the "Artemis" was again stopped by two torpedo boats, which ordered her to Zeebrugge, but the master asked for a pilot, which was refused. The master was then told he had disobeyed orders, that his ship would be torpedoed, and five minutes allowed to lower boats. Before the boats had been lowered, a torpedo was fired, and the ship listed heavily. The torpedo boats disappeared. The crew of the steamer remained in their boats until daylight, when they boarded the "Artemis." At two the same afternoon she was able to go to Rotterdam under her own steam.

**TORPEDO CRAFT SUNK.**—On March 10th, the Admiralty announced that the destroyer "Coquette" (Lieutenant Vere Seymour, R.N.R., in command), and torpedo boat No. 11 (Lieutenant John A. P. Legh, R.N.) had struck mines off the east coast and sunk. The casualties in the "Coquette" included one officer and twenty-one men, and in torpedo boat No. 11 three officers and twenty men. Lieutenant Seymour was lost from the "Coquette," but from the torpedo boat Lieutenant Legh was saved.

**"FAUVETTE" SUNK.**—On March 12th, the Admiralty stated that the mercantile fleet auxiliary "Fauvette" (Lieutenant-Commander Henry J. T. Wilson, R.N.R.) had struck a mine off the east coast and sunk, with a loss of two officers and twelve men. The "Fauvette," of 2,644 tons, was a steel screw steamer built at Middlesbrough in 1912 for the General Steam Navigation Company.

**NEUTRALS ATTACKED.**—During the first fortnight of March, there were little or no signs of a special effort on the part of the enemy submarines, and the new campaign appeared to be suspended. In the latter part of the month, however, victims of the "U"-boats increased, and among them were several neutrals. On the 10th, the Norwegian barque "Silius" was torpedoed off Havre. On the 16th, the Dutch liner "Tubantia," of 13,911 tons, was torpedoed off the North Hinder. The British Admiralty stated that no British submarines were in this vicinity at the time of the sinking of the "Tubantia." On the 20th, the Dutch liner "Palembang," of 6,674 tons, was torpedoed off the Galloper lightship. Several smaller ships of the Allies, as well as neutrals, were also attacked, and a number were sunk by mines also. On March 24th, the French cross-Channel steamer "Sussex" was torpedoed by a submarine, and although she was towed into Boulogne the explosion, and the disorder caused by it, resulted in about 100 lives being lost. There were 380 passengers on board at the time.

**MARCH SHIPPING LOSSES.**—During the month of March, reports were received at the Board of Trade of the loss of 46 British steamships, with a net tonnage of 75,005. These included 19 steamships of 44,609 tons, sunk by enemy warships; ten of 13,927 tons sunk by mines; and one of 2,131 tons sunk by an enemy ship or mine. There were 43 lives reported lost in steamers sunk by enemy craft, and 81 in steamers sunk by mines. In the same period, 24 sailing ships of 3,764 tons were lost, including eight of 1,865 tons sunk by enemy warships.

**ALLIED AIR RAID.**—In the early hours of March 20th, a combined force of approximately fifty British, French, and Belgian aeroplanes and seaplanes, accom-



panied by fifteen fighting machines, left and attacked the German seaplane station at Zeebrugge, and the aerodrome at Houttave, near Zeebrugge. Considerable damage was reported to have been done. The machines on an average carried 200 lbs. of bombs, and all returned safely—the British machines taking part were all naval. The French machines numbered nineteen. A Belgian soldier was reported seriously wounded. This was the largest air raid officially stated to have occurred in the war. In February, 1915, the machines used to raid the Bruges—Ostend—Zeebrugge district did not exceed forty-eight in number.

**DESTROYER ACTION.**—Later in the day on March 20th, an action took place between four British destroyers and three German destroyers, the latter having apparently been driven out to sea from Zeebrugge by the aerial bombardment. They were not far from the Belgian coast when sighted by the British division, and they at once turned and ran for Zeebrugge. The British pursued, and shots were exchanged during the short running fight. Two of the German boats were observed to be hit, but were able to make good their escape into port. The British casualties amounted to four men wounded. This was the first destroyer affair reported officially since that in which two French destroyers sank a German boat off Ostend on August 22nd, 1915.

**AIR RAID NEAR SYLT.**—On March 25th, an attack by British seaplanes was delivered upon the German airship sheds at Tondern, in Schleswig-Holstein, east of the island of Sylt. The seaplanes were convoyed to their rendezvous close to the German coast by an escorting force of light cruisers and destroyers under Commodore Tyrwhitt. Three of the seaplanes which took part in the attack were missing, and the Germans reported they had brought them down and taken their five occupants prisoners. All the warships employed in the operations returned safely, with the exception of the destroyer "Medusa." This boat came into collision with the destroyer "Laverock," and it was reported that in the stormy weather which was experienced she foundered. Her crew were all taken off by the destroyer "Lassoo," Lieutenant-Commander V. S. Butler, without any casualty, and the Admiralty referred to this achievement in such bad weather as "a fine piece of seamanship." The British destroyers sunk two German armed patrol vessels, the "Otto Rudolf" and "Braunschweig," and rescued four men from the former and sixteen from the latter. While engaged with the enemy patrol vessels, the destroyers were themselves attacked by German aircraft, but received no damage of any kind. On the night of the 25th, a division of German destroyers was encountered by the British light cruisers, and one of these destroyers was rammed and sunk by the "Cleopatra," none of the crew being saved. In their announcement on March 26th, the Admiralty said that no detailed report had yet been received, but it would seem from Danish Press messages that this operation within the enemy's waters achieved its object.

**CUTTER MISHAP.**—On the evening of March 28th, during the blizzard which swept over the country, a cutter belonging to the light cruiser "Conquest," which was taking forty liberty men off to the ship, was lost with all hands. The cutter was being towed out by a steam launch, and was caught in the storm. The hawser broke, and the boat was swept away, nothing more being seen or heard of her until next morning, when she was found cast up on shore many miles away.

**WORK OF THE "MÖWE."**—Early in January, a German armed merchant cruiser named the "Möwe" was found to be at work in the Atlantic as a commerce raider. It appeared from later information that she escaped from the North Sea during a snowsquall in the latter part of December. She made her first captures off Madeira. Altogether, she sunk or captured fifteen ships—twelve British steamers and one sailing vessel, one French steamer, and one Belgian steamer, of 57,835



aggregate tons, and of a value of about two millions sterling. On March 5th, the German Admiralty reported her safe return to Germany.

**SHIP'S IDENTITY.**—It was generally believed that the "Möwe" was originally built as a fruit trader in 1914. Two such ships were being built at Geestemünde in that year for the ownership of F. Laeisz, of Hamburg, named the "Pungo" and "Ponga." Prisoners taken on board the raider stated that she had certain plates named "Ponga" on board her, and that some of the German seamen had the name on their caps. It was also seen on papers in the commander's cabin. If the "Möwe" was this trading vessel transformed, she would be of 4,500 tons, with a length of 385 feet, beam of 49 feet, and depth of 32½ feet. Her best speed was said to be 17 knots.

**THE "APPAM."**—One of the early victims of the raider was the Elder Dempster liner "Appam," of 7,781 tons, homeward bound from West Africa. She left Dakar on January 11th, and was due at Plymouth on January 20th. Deep anxiety was caused by her non-arrival and by the lack of news concerning her possible fate, and this feeling was reflected at Lloyd's by the extreme quotation of 90 guineas per cent. for reinsurance. Over 300 passengers and crew were on board, including Sir Edward and Lady Merewether, who were on their way from Sierra Leone to the Leeward Islands, of which Sir Edward had been recently appointed Governor.

**ARRIVAL IN AMERICA.**—On February 1st, the "Appam" arrived at Norfolk, Virginia, under the control of a German prize crew and flying the German flag. She had been captured off the Canaries on January 16th by the "Möwe." When the raider approached, it was a bright and clear day, said Captain H. G. Harrison, of the "Appam," and the German ship had the appearance of an ordinary tramp steamer. As no attack was expected, there were no preparations in the liner to resist. Suddenly the tramp fired across her bows, and the "Appam" at once hove to. Simultaneously, the tramp's false forecandle head and bulwarks fell away, revealing a battery of 7-inch and 4-inch guns.

**PRIZE CREW.**—There were in the "Appam" twenty German prisoners who were on their way to England from the Cameroons. These were liberated and helped to form the prize crew which was placed in charge of the "Appam." The prize-master was Lieutenant Berg, whom the German wireless on February 9th said had joined the German Navy as an A.B. at the beginning of the war, having formerly been master of a merchantman which had often visited Norfolk. He was a native of Apenrade, in the north of Schleswig-Holstein, and was thirty-nine years of age. Six months earlier, said the message, he was promoted to be a lieutenant. When he was about to leave home, he told his wife that she would hear nothing from him for a long time, but that she need have no fear.

**OTHER CAPTIVES.**—The "Möwe" had, previous to capturing the "Appam," held up five other British steamers, of which four had been sunk. On January 10th, the "Farringford" was sunk, and the "Corbridge," with a cargo of coal, was stopped and a prize crew put on board. On January 13th, the "Dromonby" was sunk, and also the "Author" and "Trader." On January 15th, the "Ariadne," with a cargo of wheat, was also sent to the bottom. The crews of the sunk steamers were transferred to the "Appam," and for twenty-four hours the "Möwe," "Appam," and "Corbridge" remained in company. Captain David Barton, of the "Corbridge," who was for a time confined in the German raider, said she carried six guns, four mounted forward, masked by a collapsible steel forecandle, and two aft, one being on the poop, and both so placed that they could not readily be observed.

**THE "CLAN MAC TAVISH."**—On the day after the "Appam" was captured, the Clan Line steamer "Clan MacTavish," an Australian freighter carrying

10,000 tons of general cargo, was sighted, and overhauled after a long chase. She was asked, "What ship?" and somewhat mistrustingly replied, "Who are you?" being answered, "German cruiser, stop immediately." The liner bluffed that she had stopped, but continued to steam at full speed. A shot was then fired across her bows, and having on board a 6-pounder gun for protection against submarines, she replied with this weapon as vigorously as possible. A running fight ensued, which was witnessed by the passengers and seamen through the portholes of the "Appam." Sir Edward Merewether said on arriving in America, "The fight with the 'Clan MacTavish' was fine, if it was one-sided, lasting fully half an hour. The little gun continued to bark long after the German shells had set the 'Clan MacTavish' on fire in half a dozen places." Seeing that further resistance was useless, the captain of the liner ceased fire, and the Germans boarded his ship, and ordered the crew into the boats, of which two were sent to the "Appam" and two—those in charge of the captain and chief officer—to the "Möwe." The "Clan MacTavish" was then sunk by two bombs with time fuses, and a torpedo. Admiral Sir John Jellicoe, on the receipt of the first news of the action, sent the following telegram to the owners of the ship:—"The magnificent fight shown by the 'Clan MacTavish' fills us in the Grand Fleet with admiration. We sympathise deeply with those who have lost relatives as a result of the action."

**ATTEMPTED ESCAPES.**—Simultaneously with the news that the "Möwe" was engaged in commerce raiding, reports came to hand of the attempted escape of certain German vessels interned in neutral ports. On February 13th, it was announced that the German steamers "Bahrenfeld" and "Turpin" had made good their departure from Buenos Ayres and Punta Arenas respectively. The "Bahrenfeld" was of 3,648 tons, registered in Hamburg; the "Turpin" of 5,152 tons, registered at Bremen. In the same week, the German steamer "Asuncion," detained in the harbour of Belem, having asked permission to shift her position nearer the shore for the purpose of watering, took advantage of a fog to make an attempt to put to sea. She was, however, detected by the cruiser "Republica" and the despatch boat "Teffé," which opened fire after warning signals had been disregarded, and the steamer then returned to port.

**FURTHER HAUL.**—On February 22nd, the British steamer "Westburn," which left Liverpool on January 31st for Buenos Ayres, put into Santa Cruz, Teneriffe, flying the German flag and having on board a prize crew of an officer and seven men from the "Möwe." She had also on board 206 prisoners taken from other captured vessels, which had been sunk. The new victims brought her total captures up to thirteen to date. Under the command of Commander Badewitz, the "Westburn," having landed the captured seamen, left within twenty-four hours, and was blown up by the Germans within the territorial limit. Having scuttled the ship, the Germans made for the shore in boats, but all were arrested by the Spanish naval authorities and interned.

**"MÖWE'S" RETURN.**—On March 4th, the German Admiralty announced that the "Möwe," under the command of Captain the Burgrave Count von und zu Dohna-Schlodien, after a successful cruise lasting several months, had arrived that day at a certain home port, with four British officers, 29 British marines and sailors, and 166 men, crews of enemy steamers, among them 103 Indians, as prisoners, and a million marks (£50,000) in gold bars. The "Möwe" was stated to have held up fifteen British and Allied steamers, whose names were given, the two which were revealed for the first time being the British steamer "Saxon Prince" and the French steamer "Maroni." Two men from the "Saxon Prince," Danish seamen, who returned to Copenhagen later in the month said their vessel was sunk off the south coast of Ireland on February 26th. The

"Möwe" hoisted the Swedish flag, her funnels were painted yellow, and all the regular indications of Swedish nationality were painted on the hull. The ship steamed north of Iceland, and then hugged the Norwegian and Danish coasts, proceeding at full speed within Scandinavian territorial waters until she finally reached Wilhelmshaven.

**MINES ON BOARD.**—The German statement of the "Möwe's" return concluded by the assertion:—"At several points of the enemy coast the "Möwe" also laid out mines, to which, among others, the battleship 'King Edward VII.' fell a victim." There was nothing to show how far this claim was justified, but the admission of minelaying showed that the "Möwe" was equipped like the "Berlin" and the "Meteor," whose earlier attempts to get out of the North Sea were unsuccessful. An officer of the "Clan MacTavish" who was taken on board the "Möwe" said: "The vessel was nothing but a huge floating bomb. She had huge stores of torpedoes and shells, and mines and bombs were lashed everywhere. They were fastened on her decks and in all the rooms, and we were told she could be blown up at a moment's notice. . . . If we had only had a bigger gun and could have got some shells home she would have gone up." On April 3rd, the Admiralty announced that Acting Lieutenant A. E. B. Lamble, R.N., and Mr. H. G. Cambridge, artificer engineer, with twenty-seven petty officers and men, were reported to have been taken to Germany as prisoners of war in the "Möwe."

**NEW FRENCH COMMAND.**—At the end of March, it was announced that the French Ministry of Marine had decided to appoint a naval commander-in-chief for the northern zone of the Army. This command, it was reported, would include the direction of the new defence flotillas, and would ensure a closer co-operation between the naval and military forces operating in Flanders. Vice-Admiral Pierre Ronarc'h, formerly Commandant of the Marine Brigade in Belgium, was selected for the new post. He was understood to have succeeded at the same time Vice-Admiral C. E. Favereau, formerly Commander-in-Chief in the Channel, who was appointed "Chef d'Escadre" under Vice-Admiral Dartige du Fournet, the Commander-in-Chief, in the Mediterranean.

### BALTIC.

**PATROL BOAT LOST.**—On January 16th, it was reported that the German patrol boat "Ander" had been lost off Kongshøj, on Aerøe Island, in the Little Belt. The ship foundered only about a hundred yards from land, and apparently struck a mine. All her crew were said to have perished. The "Ander" was one of a patrol flotilla stationed in the waters south of Langeland.

**NEW MINEFIELD.**—In the middle of February, the Germans began to lay a minefield along the Falsterbo reef. A message received from Malmö on February 19th stated that the Falsterbo route would, after this minefield had been completed, be practically shut off from the sea, and sailing craft outside the minefield, if there was an easterly wind, would be unable to take shelter either at Falsterbo or Skanör. It was also asserted, by a Swedish paper, that the new field had "no military value, because if a submarine slips through the Sound the vessel's subsequent course was not laid along the coast, and especially not towards Falsterbo." A protest was made by Sweden against Germany's action in laying this minefield south of Falsterbo. It was contended that Swedish territory reaches out four miles from the shore here, and yet, nevertheless, the German mines had been laid at a distance of three miles from the coast. The Gothenburg steamer "Knippla" was sunk by striking one of the new mines

on February 28th, and another Swedish vessel, the "Martha," likewise fell a victim on March 9th.

**FURTHER MINING.**—On March 15th, it was announced in the *Nachrichten für Seefahrer* that a minefield would shortly be laid down south-west of the Drogdens lightship, at the south end of the Sound, from the three-mile limit of the Danish territorial waters outward. There would be a passage for ships marked by two signal vessels.

**THE RUSSIAN NAVY.**—In the course of an interview with the *Novoe Vremya* (quoted in *The Times* Russian Supplement on March 25th), Vice-Admiral Kanin, Commander-in-Chief in the Baltic, said that the fundamental strategic picture was amply clear. "The Russian Fleet," he said, "is a continuation of the extreme flank of the Army; the task of the Fleet is as far as possible to support the movements of the Army, protecting it against envelopment by the German Fleet. . . . One English specialist has said that in the present war there have been two turning points, neither of them particularly brilliant or vivid, but extraordinarily important—the Marne and Riga Gulf. Paris was saved on the Marne, while in the Riga Gulf the struggle for the approaches to Petrograd terminated in our favour. It is impossible to deny this. What would be the situation of the Army if the Germans now occupied Riga and the entire Gulf of Riga?" The Admiral remarked on the great help afforded by the British submarines, and on the bearing and coolness of their officers.

**SUBMARINE'S PRIZE.**—Winter conditions in the Baltic of course prevented the submarines continuing their operations against the German mineral traffic. On March 19th, however, the Norwegian steamer "Kong Inge" arrived at Friederikshavn, Zutland, with a British prize crew on board. The steamer was on her way to Lubeck from a Norwegian harbour when she was stopped by a British submarine off Falkenberg (Sweden). Her papers were examined, and a prize crew was placed on board with orders to take the vessel to Leith, but as the steamer had not sufficient coal she put into Friederikshaven to fill her bunkers, and arrived at Leith on March 22nd. This was believed to be the first reported case of a submarine supplying a prize crew to a merchant vessel.

**ADMIRAL JELICOE'S MESSAGE.**—To a party of Russian journalists who visited the Grand Fleet in February, 1916, Admiral Sir John Jellicoe, after referring to the great work of the Russian Army, said that the Russian Navy had won their admiration by its progress and efficiency. "Nothing could give us greater pleasure," he said, "than to be able to fight side by side with the Russian sailors against our common foe. It would be difficult for us to go to the Baltic, but I will not say impossible. I hope the day may come when our ships will engage the enemy together."

#### ADRIATIC.

**OUTPOST SKIRMISHES.**—On February 6th, a British cruiser and French torpedo boat, engaged in covering the retirement of the Serbian Army, met four enemy destroyers. As soon as they were fired upon, the latter fled towards Cattaro. On the same day, the Italians reported that one of their destroyers, escorting an Allied cruiser, sighted an enemy aeroplane and a destroyer. The latter was pursued and fired upon, being driven under the Cattaro forts. The Italians also reported submarine attacks upon their vessels on February 6th and 8th, without result. On February 7th, the British cruiser and French torpedo boat already mentioned were attacked by submarine off Durazzo, but the torpedo missed its mark.

**DURAZZO CAPTURED.**—The Austrian troops took possession of Durazzo on February 27th. In announcing the capture of this place a Vienna *communiqué* said that the troops, advancing across the southern isthmus, were at first hindered in their advance by the fire of the enemy ships, but towards evening several detachments succeeded in reaching the bridge east of Durazzo, either by swimming or crossing the water on rafts. It had been announced from Rome on the 26th that the withdrawal of the Serbian, Montenegrin, and Albanian troops from Albania had been completed, and that the Italian brigade at Durazzo had also embarked, the Albanian Government having left the place. The Italian Fleet, after covering the embarkation of the Italian troops, continued to bombard the roads leading to Durazzo, preventing the enemy entering the town in force, and setting the port in flames. The fact that, in spite of the bad weather which prevailed at the time in the lower Adriatic, the Italian ships reduced the enemy's batteries and kept the coast roads under fire until all the Italian troops which had been sent to Durazzo to cover the evacuation of the Serbians, etc., were embarked without mishap and taken to Valona, was a tribute to the efficiency of the Italian seamen. Not a single Italian gun was left behind at Durazzo, but all the old Turkish guns were abandoned and destroyed.

**ITALIAN REPORT.**—On February 24th, an official note issued at Rome said that since the middle of December, there had been transported between the western and eastern shores of the lower Adriatic, under the escort of units of the Italian Fleet and Allied ships attached to it, 260,000 men, and a remarkable number of animals, 250 steamers having been employed in this work. During the same time, 300,000 cwt. of materials were transported on 100 steamers, most of which were of small tonnage, in order that they might be able to put in on the opposite shore of the Adriatic. Under the escort of Italian and Allied ships during the same period, sovereigns and princes of foreign Royal houses six times accomplished the same crossing, and foreign ministers and political, civil, and military authorities still more frequently.

**ALLIES' SUCCESSSES.**—"The enemy attempted to impede this extensive and complex movement," continued the report, "by continual activity in the air, by mining certain sea areas, and often by attempting to bring into action squadrons of torpedo boat destroyers, supported by scouts or cruisers, and, lastly, by nineteen submarine attacks. In spite of all these attempts, and the fact that the operations had to be carried on within a restricted area of water and along routes and towards points of anchorage which were necessarily obligatory, the ships were escorted so well that, apart from trifling incidents mentioned in previous *communiqués*, the sinking of only three small steamers has to be recorded, of which two struck mines, and the third was torpedoed after the unloading operations had been completed. Not a single Serbian soldier was lost at sea. Our ships and those of the Allies, whenever circumstances would allow, counter-attacked the enemy with decision and effect. In the early part of January, an Austrian submarine was sunk, while two more in all probability were lost during the same period, and an enemy seaplane was captured near Valona."

**AUSTRIAN SUBMARINE LIFE.**—On March 21st, the United Press correspondent at Messina telegraphed to New York the statement of the master of the Greek steamer "Atromitos," concerning an interview with an Austrian submarine commander. The "U"-boat stopped the Greek vessel, and the commander boarded the "Atromitos." He was said to be yellow from the poisonous fumes of gasoline, and declared he had been in the submarine six months, having only been on shore for a few hours at Trieste in all that time. He described the life as terrible, with an awful death staring them in the face night and day,



and said their nerves did not stand the strain, so that they could not help quarrelling among themselves on the smallest provocation. Owing to storms, the commander declared that submarines had been unable to live on the surface of the Mediterranean throughout most of last winter. When a storm arose, it was the practice to drop down to forty feet, and remain until the sea had subsided, but the main difficulty was to tell when the storm was over.

**"RENAUDIN" SUNK.**—On March 18th, the French destroyer "Renaudin" was sunk by an enemy submarine in the Adriatic, with the loss of over half her crew. Another French destroyer cruising in the neighbourhood came to the rescue, but was only able to pick up two officers and 34 men; and three officers, including the commander and second-in-command, and 44 men were missing. The enemy report said that it was an Austrian submarine which sunk the boat, off Durazzo. The survivors were taken to Brindisi.

**TRANSPORT SUNK.**—On April 8th, it was announced from Paris that a French submarine had sunk an Austrian transport in the Adriatic.

#### EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN.

**ALLIED COMMANDS.**—In reply to a question on February 23rd, Mr. Balfour stated in Parliament that it would be inadvisable to describe in detail the organization of the Allied naval commands in the Mediterranean; but the general command was in the hands of the French Commander-in-Chief—at present Admiral d'Artige du Fournet. The command of the Adriatic and its approaches was in the hands of the Italian Commander-in-Chief—his Royal Highness the Duke of the Abruzzi; and other local commands were assigned to British officers. "The best general indication," said Mr. Balfour, "of the work performed by the Allied fleets in the Mediterranean is the successful transport of large military forces to Salonika, Valona, and Egypt; the successful evacuation of the Allied expedition from the Dardanelles; and last, but not least, the transportation of the Serbian Army from Albania—a result chiefly due to the ability and energy displayed by the Italian Fleet."

**ACTION IN SOLLUM BAY.**—On December 27th, the French Ministry of Marine reported that in the course of an exploration of the Bay of Sollum, a French cruiser bombarded and destroyed a Turkish battery. The *communiqué* added that the trawler "Parisii" opened fire off the Ottoman coast on two large enemy submarines, which remained a great distance off, and took to flight after being fired at for two hours.

**SEARCHING FOR SUBMARINE BASES.**—During January, Franco-British naval forces carried out a search of various localities along the Greek coasts and among the islands with the object of discovering and destroying bases for the German and Austrian submarines. The Entente Powers had in the previous month made representations to the Greek Government in this matter, claiming the right of policing Greek territorial waters in view of the presence of lurking enemy submarines. Search parties were reported to have been landed at Corfu, Santi Quaranta, Zante Island, the Piræus, Phaleron, Sayada, and Corinth.

**CASTELLORIZO LANDING.**—On December 30th, the Greek Government was informed that detachments of French troops had landed in the island of Castellorizo, in order to facilitate Allied action against Adalia. The force put ashore was reported to consist only of 500 men, and they landed on the 29th. The French Government assured Greece that the occupation of Castellorizo was a necessity of war, and only provisional. The position of the island made it most suitable as a base.

**CORFU LANDING.**—On January 11th, French troops landed at Corfu, not for the occupation of the place in a military sense, but to prepare for the arrival of Serbian soldiers. The Legations of the Entente Powers published a statement to the effect that their Governments deemed it an obligation of humanity to transfer to Corfu that portion of the Serbian Army which was then in Albania. The task of revictualling these troops would thus be simplified. The Powers took this step in the belief that Greece would not feel compelled to oppose a measure that would redound to the benefit of her Ally, and would in any case be of brief duration. It had already been reported from Athens on January 2nd that the British authorities had informed the Greek Government of the intention to occupy the Kaiser's villa, the Achilleion, in Corfu, and to use it for wounded Serbian troops.

**SUCCESSFUL ORGANIZATION.**—An official French *communiqué* on January 15th stated that the landing in Corfu was carried out with order and rapidity, and reflected the greatest credit upon those who executed it. The French squadron arrived at 2 a.m., the landing began an hour later, and the whole operation was over by 11 a.m. By evening, the French soldiers had been installed in the barracks and the new forts. The first detachment landed immediately occupied the telegraph office and arrested two individuals reported by the French Consul, one of whom was president of the German espionage organization. According to an account of the landing telegraphed to the *Daily Chronicle* by Mr. M. H. Donohoe, no transports were used, every man, gun, mule, and horse, every round of ammunition, every pound of food and forage, were embarked on board of four French cruisers, which, escorted by destroyers, stole silently into Corfu harbour without lights and had begun to discharge before the sleeping town realized what was happening. Describing the landing of the horses, Mr. Donohoe stated that they were slung overboard into ordinary ships' boats, from which the seats had been removed, and the bottom of the boats were covered with straw and powdered charcoal to prevent the animals slipping. Landing-stages in the shape of inclined planes for the passage of the horses from the boats to the shore had been constructed on board the cruisers during the voyage from the embarkation point.

**DARDANELLES BOMBARDMENTS.**—After the evacuation of the Gallipoli Peninsula, Turkish *communiqués* showed that certain Allied warships remained off the coast, and bombarded enemy positions whenever desired. On January 18th, a monitor and an ironclad, with three torpedo boats and seven mine-sweepers were stated to have entered the Gulf of Saros, and to have opened fire on the land batteries, the fall of the shells being spotted by aircraft. The Turks claimed to have hit the ironclad and caused it to withdraw. About the same time, a cruiser and monitor were said to have fired some shells in the neighbourhood of Tekke Burnu and Seddul Bahr. On the 19th, these vessels were reported to have fired some thirty shells in the district of Alteshi Tepe and Tekke Burnu. On January 28th, a cruiser was stated to have fired twenty shells in the neighbourhood of Seddel-Bahr. On February 15th, an Allied submarine was reported unofficially to have passed through the Dardanelles and reached the Bosphorus, where, under the windows of the Sultan's palace, she torpedoed the tug "Rhône," formerly a French vessel, and six transports loaded with munitions. On March 7th, the Turks claimed that demonstrations by warships, assisted by aeroplanes, against the Dardanelles coasts were rendered ineffective by artillery fire, two cruisers being hit. The Turks also claimed that the activity of their airmen "had prevented the enemy from effecting reconnaissances in the Dardanelles."

**DEDEAGATCH BOMBARDED.**—On January 18th, five Allied warships, including the Italian cruiser "Piemonte," bombarded Dedegatch and Porto Lagos. A detachment was stated to have been landed at the latter place, which carried

out a reconnaissance. After ascertaining that there were no Bulgarian troops on the spot, the detachment re-embarked. An official *communiqué* issued in Sofia said that an enemy squadron of twenty-four units at 8 a.m. appeared off Dedeagatch, and at 9.42 a.m. opened fire on the town and surrounding heights. The bombardment ceased at noon, when the ships left. No lives were lost, but four horses were killed. On the same day, continued the *communiqué*, sixteen enemy ships cruised from 8 a.m. in the Bay of Porto Lagos. At 1.5 p.m. they began a bombardment of the heights surrounding Porto Lagos. The attack ceased at 5.30 p.m., when the vessels steamed away in the direction of the Isle of Thasos, and there were no casualties. A newspaper report said that three submarines had been sent to Xanthi in sections, to be used for operations in the Aegean, with Porto Lagos as a base. The prevention of this plan may have been one of the objects of the bombardment on the 18th. A Sofia Press message on February 2nd said that Franco-British warships daily bombarded Porto Lagos, Makri, and Dedeagatch, their fire being answered by the Bulgarian coast batteries.

"E.20" LOSSES.—On January 20th, the Admiralty published the names of twenty-one men who lost their lives when submarine "E.20" was sunk in the Sea of Marmora early in November, 1915. Three of the four officers of the vessel, and six men of the crew, were officially reported prisoners of war in Turkey. "E.20," under the command of Lieutenant-Commander Clifford H. Warren, which was on detached service in the Sea of Marmora, did not communicate after October 30th. The Turks reported that "thanks to the new measures of protection of our Fleet, the English submarine 'E.20' was sunk in the Dardanelles. . . . The 'E.20' was one of the more modern English submarines, 61 metres long, and with a displacement of 800 tons. Its speed above water was 19 miles, under water 14 miles. It possessed eight torpedo discharge tubes, two quick-firing cannon, and a crew of 30 men."

SALONIKA FORTS OCCUPIED.—On January 31st, it was announced that the forts of Kara Burnu and Kum Kale, on either side of the entrance to the Bay of Salonika, had been occupied by British and French troops, and British, French, Italian, and Russian naval detachments. The Greek troops evacuated the forts, and the occupation was effected without incident. This action was necessitated by the operations of hostile submarines in the roadstead of Salonika, one of which had a few days before torpedoed a mule transport, which had to be beached. The occupation of the forts by the Allies enabled a stricter guard to be kept upon the waters forming the approaches to Salonika. In the early morning of February 1st, apparently by way of reprisal, a German airship carried out a raid on Salonika. Sixteen bombs fell on the town and harbour, killing three Greek, one French, and two British soldiers, and four Greek civilians, and wounding about twenty Greek and Jewish civilians. Several houses and shops were destroyed, but no military damage was done.

SUBMARINE METHODS.—On February 4th, the Press Bureau announced that the master of the Harrison Line steamer "Commodore," which was sunk by an enemy submarine in the Mediterranean on December 2nd, 1915, had been interviewed by the naval authorities. He stated that his ship was fired on without any colours being shown by the submarine, and the ship was abandoned. The submarine approached the boat with two flags rolled up at the flagstaff, inquired if the ship were British; and, on being answered in the affirmative, unrolled one of the flags, which proved to be a German ensign. From this account, it appears likely that the submarine kept the German and Austrian flags bent on ready to fly either of them according to the nationality of the ship to be attacked.

"AMIRAL CHARNIER" SUNK.—On February 8th, at 7 a.m., the French cruiser "Amiral Charnier" was struck by a mine or torpedo off the coast of Syria and

sank within a few minutes. A German telegram claimed that she had been torpedoed by a German submarine, but later reports stated that it was a floating mine from the Dardanelles which caused her destruction. As, however, there was but one survivor considerable doubt existed. A raft was found bearing fifteen seamen from the cruiser, but only one man was alive.

**JAPAN AND THE MEDITERRANEAN.**—On February 22nd, German newspapers quoted the Italian journals for the statement that the Japanese Fleet "safely arrived in the Mediterranean, having with them a great number of aircraft." On January 4th, it had been stated by the *Jiji Shimpō* that a squadron composed of the cruisers "Kasuga," "Tokiwa," and "Chitose" would leave Japan for the Suez Canal, presumably to protect Japanese shipping, which had suffered two or three losses from enemy submarines in the Mediterranean. No further information was published concerning this squadron, nor was its presence in the Mediterranean confirmed. The report was untrue.

**FRENCH TRANSPORT SUNK.**—On February 26th, the French auxiliary cruiser "Provence II," which was temporarily engaged in the transport of troops and military equipment to Salonika, was torpedoed in mid-Mediterranean. Of the 1,800 men on board, 296 were landed at Malta, and 489 at Milo, by French and British patrol steamers, trawlers, and destroyers which responded to the wireless appeal for assistance. The lives lost numbered about 1,000. According to an officer of the Headquarter Staff of the Army in the Orient who was on board, no periscope was seen, either before or after the mishap, nor the track of a torpedo. There was no spurt of water at the moment of the explosion. The watch on board had been very strenuous and thorough. The crew and gunners remained at their post up to the last possible moment. The vessel foundered within fifteen minutes. She was armed with five 5.5-inch and six other guns.

**"PRIMULA" SUNK.**—On March 1st, while in the Eastern Mediterranean, the "Primula," a mine-sweeper carrying out patrol duties, was torpedoed and sunk. The official announcement of the loss stated that the whole of the officers and crew, with the exception of three men, were saved and landed at Port Said. The "Primula" was reported to belong to the class of minelaying sloops, one of which, the "Arabis," had been sunk in the North Sea a few days earlier.

**"TARA'S" CREW RESCUED.**—On March 20th, the Admiralty announced that ninety-one prisoners from the British armed boarding steamer "Tara," who were captured on November 5th, 1915, had been recaptured. After the action on March 14th, when the force under Major-General Peyton reoccupied Sollum, the Eastern Egyptian frontier post that was evacuated in December, aeroplane reconnaissance discovered the Senussi camp where the British seamen were held prisoners. A motor force under the Duke of Westminster, consisting of nine armoured cruisers, 26 other cars, and ten motor ambulances left Sollum on a rescue expedition on March 17th at 3 a.m., being guided by Captain Royle, of the Egyptian Coastguard Service, and two natives. The prisoners were said to be at Bir Hakim, 70 miles from Sollum, but the actual distance travelled was about 121 miles. At the approach of the cars the guards fled, but were pursued and killed, and all the cars returned safely, bringing back the prisoners. Two prisoners remained in the enemy's hands, but there was some hope that they might be rescued. The saved included Captain R. S. Gwatkin Williams and eight other officers. A member of the crew stated in an interview that the armoured cars came just in time, as in another week the seamen would have died of starvation. The "Tara" was torpedoed, he said, and sunk in seven minutes. The crew afterwards saw the submarine commander on shore at Port Suleiman. The prisoners were taken on an eleven-days' march and finally brought to the place from which they were rescued. Both they and their guards suffered



extreme hunger, owing to the shortage of food due to the British sea and land blockade, and there were no medicines and hardly any soap. Four men died of neglect, and the captain recited the burial service over them from memory. From the list of names issued by the Admiralty on March 23rd, it appeared that these men were Engineer-Lieutenant R. S. Williams, R.N.R., and three seamen of the mercantile crew.

**SMYRNA BOMBARDED.**—On March 31st, Forts St. George and Sandjak, with other coastal defences of Smyrna, were reported to have been reduced in a three-hours' bombardment by a British warship, the Turks making no reply to the fire. Sandjak fort was the work on the Yeni Kale Spit which commanded the entrance to the harbour of Smyrna on the southern shore of the Gulf. St. George was situated two or three miles to the south-east. The adjacent coast was also stated to have been shelled. On April 9th, a Constantinople *communiqué* said that north-west of Urla an enemy monitor fired twenty-five shells unsuccessfully in the vicinity of Kar Tatsh Burnu, and was replied to and hit, having to be taken in tow.

**CRETE BLOCKADED.**—On March 27th, two British cruisers were reported to have arrived at Suda Bay, Crete, where some of the officers landed and called on the British Consul at Canea. Ten other Allied ships were said to have been sighted off Crete. Their visit was understood to have arisen out of the arrest of an agent of the British Consular Service on the denunciation of the German Consul. They demanded his release, but the prefect, after communicating with his Government, refused this, whereupon the ships established a blockade of Canea and Candia. Passenger traffic was not restricted, and the export of goods was also reported to be free, but no goods were allowed to enter, and fishing was also prohibited. On April 1st, it was announced from Athens that the Greek authorities at Candia had released the British official, whereupon the Allied blockade of the Cretan coast was raised.

**CEPHALONIA OCCUPIED.**—On April 9th, the British and French Ministers at Athens informed the Greek Premier of the intention of their Governments to land forces in Cephalonia, especially at the harbour of Argostoli, and to create naval bases at certain points in the Ionian Islands, and in the *Ægean*, including perhaps Crete. They declared that this measure, which was dictated by urgent necessity, would in no wise infringe the sovereign rights or the territorial integrity of Greece. Imperious needs impelled their Governments to close the harbour of Argostoli, off which place an Allied squadron was reported to have arrived, on April 7th.

**"COQUET'S" FATE.**—On March 30th, the authorities issued to the Press the narrative of Captain A. C. B. Groom, late of the steamship "Coquet," as told by him to the Imperial Merchant Service Guild. The "Coquet" was torpedoed and sunk in the Mediterranean on January 4th, when bound from Torre Vieja to Port Said. The submarine commander, in spite of the captain's representation that it was nothing short of murder to send thirty-one men away in leaky boats, so far from land, in the middle of winter, left the crew to their fate. The two boats separated in the rough weather, and six days elapsed before that under the charge of Captain Groom reached the African coast. There its occupants were attacked by Beduin Arabs, who killed two men and a boy, wounded others, and took ten prisoners. It was due to the fact that Captain Groom and a seaman named Lord, both of whom were wounded, had been left for dead that they were rescued by an Italian steamer. Captain Groom stated that the submarine had no mark or number on her, but he concluded she was Austrian, as the officers in her had the Austrian crown on the badges of their caps.



**SUBMARINE VICTIMS.**—The Mediterranean claimed a large share of the victims of the submarine war, both before and after the inauguration of the new campaign on March 1st. On April 8th, the British India steamship "Chantala" was sunk without warning, the fourth engineer and eight lascars being killed by the explosion. On the same day, it was reported that eleven lascar firemen were killed by the explosion which sunk the British liner "Simla," of the P. and O. Company, which was sunk on April 4th. The "Clan Campbell," another victim, was torpedoed in the same week, but all those on board were landed at Tunis. On March 27th, the Atlantic Transport Company's "Minneapolis" was sunk with the loss of eleven lives, off Malta. On April 10th, another victim off Malta was the "Yonne." The merchant shipping of the Allies and neutrals suffered alike.

#### BLACK SEA.

**OPERATIONS OFF VARNA.**—Later information concerning the operations by the Russians off Varna on December 20th shows that only a demonstration in force was intended. There was no landing of troops. About forty vessels are said to have taken part. They anchored during the afternoon of the 19th off Cape Kaliakra, and next morning proceeded south in the direction of Varna. Sixteen of the ships were assumed to be transports, hence the reports of an intended landing of troops, but the vessels were more probably mine-sweepers. Fire was opened from the big guns of the Fleet, and the result was declared unofficially to be much more effective than in the earlier bombardments. A Bulgarian torpedo boat was sunk by the Russian shells, and in the town itself numerous casualties and fires were observed. The King's palace was reported to have been hit and some unimportant damage caused, but the harbour works and similar objects of military value received the chief attention. It was stated that important German forces, coming from Serbia, were concentrated at Varna at the time of the bombardment. Although the shore batteries replied to the Fleet, and submarines were sent out to attack it, no loss or damage to the ships was reported. The action ceased some time before noon, apparently owing to the prevalence of fog. Simultaneously with this bombardment, two Russian gunboats shelled the Bulgarian frontier near Ekrene.

**BRITISH NAVAL MISSION.**—The fact was recorded in the last issue of the JOURNAL that Rear-Admiral R. F. Phillimore was present on board the Russian flagship at the bombardment of Varna on October 27th. On December 22nd, he was stated to have arrived at Petrograd, and after consulting the authorities there he left in company with other British officers for Sebastopol and Nikolaieff to make an inspection of these and other Black Sea Ports and anchorages. With Major-General Callwell and Captain Wigram, he returned to Petrograd on January 20th, and on the 22nd the members of the Mission left to visit the Imperial headquarters.

**TWO TURKISH GUNBOATS DESTROYED.**—A fight between three Russian torpedo boats and two Turkish gunboats, one of the "Doruk Reis" type, and the other of the "Malatia" type, took place on December 10th, and was referred to last quarter. The following semi-official statement has since been issued at Petrograd:—"Our torpedo boats in the Black Sea, while patrolling the Turkish shore, passed the spot where they caused two enemy gunboats, which they fired upon in a previous fight, to run ashore. One of them was without funnel or masts and almost entirely submerged. Her prow alone showed above water. The other, which had evidently sustained less damage, was upright, with her flag flying from the mainmast. As her position indicated that the Turks were endeavouring to refloat her, one of our torpedo boats was ordered to destroy her completely. Hardly



had our vessel drawn near, however, when several explosions occurred in succession on board the enemy gunboat, after which she sank as far as her deck. Evidently the Turks, fearing that we would capture their gunboat, had made every preparation to blow her up, which they did on seeing our torpedo boat approach."

**TURKISH SUBMARINE DESTROYED.**—Arising out of the destruction of these gunboats, the Turks also lost a submarine, which was destroyed near the mouth of the Melen on January 10th. The incident was briefly referred to in the Sea of Marmora notes last quarter. It was learnt from Turkish prisoners that the object of the despatch of the gunboats of the "Doruk Reis" and "Malatia" type was to bring off a Turkish submarine which had grounded near the shore. But the gunboats never reached her, being intercepted and disabled by the Russian torpedo boats under the command of Captain Prince Trubetzkoj on December 10th. Exactly a month later, however, the Russians, acting on information obtained from their prisoners, discovered the submarine stranded off the Melen, and the torpedo boats destroyed it with their guns.

**RUSSIAN TORPEDO FLOTILLA.**—On January 10th, or the same day as the hostile submarine was accounted for, the Russian torpedo boats sank two Turkish sailing ships with cargoes of oil and coal. Five men of the crews of these ships were made prisoners. The ubiquity and remarkable activity of the Russian torpedo flotilla has been one of the predominant features of the Black Sea operations. It has been through these small craft that the Russians have exercised the command in those waters. On January 17th, it was officially announced that the torpedo boats made a raid towards the eastern coast of Anatolia, destroyed 163 sailing craft, 73 being laden with provisions, and captured 71 prisoners. On the 21st, another official *communiqué* said that 40 more sailing ships had been destroyed.

**KING GEORGE'S INTEREST.**—On January 6th, 1916, it was announced that King George had awarded eleven orders and thirteen medals to seamen of the Russian Black Sea Fleet, in recognition of their meritorious service in the war. This was stated to be the second instance of the very gracious attention paid by His Majesty to the operations of the Russian Navy in the Black Sea, but the circumstances of the first award, if one was referred to, and details of the second, were not disclosed.

**SAMSOON BOMBARDED.**—A Petrograd *communiqué* on January 23rd reviewed in greater detail the work of the torpedo boats. In the reconnaissance on January 17th, the vessels did not limit themselves to the destruction of 163 enemy ships, but also bombarded the town of Samsoon, south-east of Sinope. Here the torpedo boats were able to destroy several storehouses, the barracks, and the Customs house. Further to the east, they bombarded the ports of Unieh and Fatsa, at each place destroying numerous buildings. In the second reconnaissance on January 21st, along the south-eastern coast of Anatolia, the torpedo boats sunk thirty-three Turkish sailing vessels and destroyed seven others in harbour. They also bombarded with success three wharves. As regards the places mentioned, Samsoon, in the vilayet of Trebizond, is the chief Black Sea port for the interior of Asia Minor. Unieh, fifty miles to the east, is also an important commercial centre, with considerable trade with Constantinople and the Crimea in peace time. Fatsa, sixty-five miles east-south-east of Samsoon, is an ancient seaport, surrounded by the ruins of what used to be Phadisana.

**"GOEBEN" LOSSES.**—A Petrograd message on January 27th said that it was learned there, on reliable authority, that after the engagement on January 8th, between a Russian ship of the line and the "Goeben," or the "Sultan Yawus

Selim," as she is known to the Turks, the latter ship returned to Constantinople damaged, and with 33 killed and 80 wounded on board. It was significant that the "Goeben" was not reported to have put to sea again up to the end of March.

**TORPEDO AND AIRCRAFT FIGHTING.**—On February 8th, the Russian official *communiqués* announced that Russian ships had bombarded with effect the Turkish positions on the Anatolian coast. According to the Turks, this took place on the 6th. The Russian torpedo boats also fought an action with a Turkish coast battery, which did them no damage. They were attacked as well by a Turkish submarine, but without success. The submarine fired a torpedo at the auxiliary cruiser "Ssuya," which missed, and the cruiser and torpedo boats gave chase to it, firing rapidly, but the boat submerged while the shells were bursting all around it. A squadron of Russian seaplanes, it was also announced, attacked with bombs a large steamer anchored at the jetty at the large coaling port of Zunguldak. They also damaged considerably the coal wharves, lighters, and a number of small craft sheltering behind the mole protecting the port. In spite of a sharp fire, no damage was done to the aircraft. One account stated that a Russian seaplane pilot, descending to the water, picked up a mine laid by a Turkish submarine, but he was unable to retain his hold upon it.

**VITZE BOMBARDED.**—On February 9th and 10th, some vessels of the Russian Fleet kept up a heavy bombardment of the Turkish positions near Vitze. This place, north of the Lazistan chain of mountains, between Cape Loros and Cape Nironit, is about half way between Rizeh (east of Trebizond) and Batum. The operation was manifestly connected with the movements of the Russian troops. The Fleet successfully engaged the Turkish coast batteries, reducing some of them to silence. On the same day, a Turkish sailing vessel, bound west, with twenty-five Turks on board, was captured.

**SUPPORTING THE ARMY.**—On February 11th, a Russian squadron, officially stated to be supporting an offensive movement by the troops, destroyed two stone bridges, one of which was a three-arched one, and also four wooden bridges. In the course of a close search of the coast, the ships also sank eight Turkish sailing vessels. The locality of these occurrences was not revealed. On February 21st, it was officially announced that thirteen more sailing ships had been destroyed by Russian torpedo boats on the coast of Anatolia. On February 24th, near the Bosphorus, a Russian submarine was twice attacked by two hostile aeroplanes, but without result. The submarine destroyed a sailing vessel laden with coal.

**TROOPS LANDED AT ATINA.**—On the night of March 4th, Russian troops, under cover of a very heavy fire from the Fleet, landed and occupied the town of Atina, on the Black Sea coast, sixty miles east of Trebizond, in the region where the enemy's left wing was falling back on that port. After taking 202 prisoners, and capturing two guns and a quantity of ammunition, the troops advanced half-way between Atina and Rizeh. A demonstration was also made by Russian torpedo boats at Trebizond, where several vessels in the harbour were destroyed. On March 6th, the Fleet opened a fierce bombardment of the enemy positions at Maprava, to which place the Turkish troops had retired, and after artillery preparation, the Russians stormed the positions, and the enemy fled to Rizeh. The Petrograd correspondent of *The Times* wrote on March 7th that "the able co-ordination of the naval and military operations, in which the Fleet turned the Turkish flank, conferred on the Russians a big advantage, resulting in the enemy's discomfiture."

**SUBMARINE AND SEAPLANE RAIDS.**—With the new landing by the Russians on the Asiatic coast, the enemy showed increased activity in the direction of raids



by submarines and aircraft. It was reported at this time that a number of the mines in the Dardanelles had been taken up and some of the nets raised to facilitate the entry of new submarines from Germany or Austria. One statement said that five enemy submarines, of 1,000 tons displacement, had passed through the Straits into the Black Sea. The first official intimation that they were at work was issued from Petrograd on March 12th, to the effect that on the 9th two Russian torpedo boats, reconnoitring the coast near Varna, were attacked by submarines. One torpedo boat, the "Lieutenant Pustchin," was blown up, part of her crew being rescued by the other boat. According to a German *communiqué*, on the same day a Russian squadron, consisting of a ship of the line, five destroyers, and several transports, was attacked with bombs by German seaplanes to the north-east of Varna. Hits were observed on some of the destroyers, said the report, and in spite of a heavy bombardment all the seaplanes returned safely.

VARNA REPORT.—From neutral sources, it was stated that on March 11th a further bombardment of Varna was made by the Russians. Several Russian ships were sighted off Balchik steaming in the direction of Varna, and sounds of firing were afterwards heard for some time. Seven or eight Turkish ships on their way from Constanza to Constantinople were reported to have been destroyed.

AMPHIBIOUS FIGHTING.—With the Russian Army fighting close to the Black Sea shore, additional work was demanded of the Fleet, but the call in this direction was fully met. A neutral writer on March 22nd said that, divided into several squadrons and flotillas, the Fleet scoured the Black Sea in all directions, examining the Turkish, Bulgarian, and Roumanian coasts daily. Valuable reconnaissance work was also performed by the submarines, which had penetrated into the ports of Varna and Burgas, torpedoing enemy ships. A Turkish *communiqué* on March 29th said that the fire of the coast artillery prevented an attack by Russian submarines on the harbour of Zunguldak. As to the support of the Army, a Petrograd *communiqué* on March 20th said that "on the Black Sea coast front the Turks tried to advance at various points, but their attempts were stopped by our fire, both from land and sea." In the same week, the steamer "Esperanza," of 7,000 tons, with a cargo of flour and other foodstuffs from Constanza for Constantinople, was sunk by the Russians off Bouliarca, on the Roumanian coast, the crew being rescued and made prisoners.

HOSPITAL SHIP TORPEDOED.—At 8.30 a.m. on March 30th, the Russian hospital ship "Portugal" was sunk by an enemy submarine with two torpedoes at a range of about sixty yards. The "Portugal" had been sent for to take on board some 200 wounded from a place near Rizeh, recently occupied by the Russians. She was about to anchor, in order that the lighters which she was towing for use in bringing off the wounded might be baled out. The second torpedo struck the engine-room, and the vessel split in two and foundered in about a minute. Boats from small craft near rescued 11 of the 26 sisters of charity on board, and in all 158 were saved of 273 persons on board, the lost including Count Tatistcheff, Red Cross delegate, Baroness Meyendorff, who had been a sister of mercy in the last war, 50 men of the Russian Naval Medical Service, and 29 of the French crew. The "Portugal," of 9,805 tons, belonged to the Messageries Maritimes, and had been placed at the disposal of the Russian Government. She had all the official marks of a hospital ship painted on the hull, and flew the Red Cross flag.

SUBMARINES' CLAIMS.—An official *communiqué* from Constantinople on April 3rd stated that on March 30th their submarines sank to the north-east of Batum a Russian transport ship of about 1,200 tons, full of soldiers and war materials.



On March 31st, the submarines sank another ship of 1,500 tons. There was no confirmation of these losses from the Russian side. However, the destruction of the "Lieutenant Pustchin" on March 9th, and of the "Portugal" on March 30th, were the first successes, according to official information, achieved by enemy submarines in the Black Sea, although several attempts were made by them during the sixteen months of war in that theatre. Although Turkey had no efficient sea-going submarines when war broke out, German workmen reconstructed some which had been sent to Constantinople in parts, and in May, 1915, the first of a series of boats, which made the journey by sea from Wilhelmshaven, arrived. In the following October, six or more boats were sent overland to Varna when Bulgaria entered the war.

"BRESLAU" IN ACTION.—On April 3rd, the cruiser "Breslau" supported an attack by the Turkish troops on the Russian right flank, but the attack was repulsed. The Turks claimed that on the same night the "Breslau" sank a large enemy sailing vessel, laden with war and other material, and took the crew prisoners. They also asserted that the "Breslau" was met on the morning of the 4th by a Russian squadron, consisting of a battleship of the "Imperatritsa Maria" class, a cruiser, and three torpedo boats, "which contented themselves with firing at the 'Breslau' from a distance without effect."

## THE WAR.

### MILITARY NOTES by J. D. F.

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## SECTION II. (add).

## Dates of Declaration of War.

France against Bulgaria : October 5th, 1915.

Italy against Turkey : August 21st, 1915.

## SECTION XXX.

## The Campaign in Serbia from October 1st to December 12th, 1915.

OCT. 1ST.—During the last half of September, 1915, the Germans, Austrians and Bulgarians decided to invade Serbia.

The objects of this invasion were :—

1st : The punishment and occupation of Serbia.

2nd : The maintenance of a through railway route from Berlin, through Vienna, Nish (Serbia) to Constantinople.

The Allies also had the question of Serbia under consideration and decided :—

1st : To help Serbia.

2nd : To prevent the enemy using the Berlin—Constantinople railway.

The general positions were :—

*Austro-Germans-Bulgarians :—*

Gradiska—Ram : one division (German).

Ram—Semendria : three divisions (German).

Belgrade : one division (German).

Reserve north-west of Gradiska : one army corps (German).

Obrenovatz—Jarak—Mitrovitza—Zabrej : three divisions (Austrian).

East of Bielina on River Drina : one division (Austrian).

Pancsovoe ; in reserve : one army corps (Austrian).

Orsova—Strumnitza (mobilizing) : three army corps (Bulgarian).

*Serbian Army :—*

The Serbians were occupying the lines of the River Danube and River Drina from Orsova to the Montenegrin frontier.

*Austro-German-Bulgarian plan :—*

The objects to be attained were :—

1st : To cross the river and gain a footing for the Austrian and German forces.

2nd : To hold the positions thus gained until the Bulgarian forces were ready.

3rd : To then advance and completely occupy Serbia.

*Allies' plan :—*

The general idea was to land troops at Salonika (Greece), advance north up the Vardar Valley, join hands with any Serbian troops and drive the enemy forces out of the country.

OCT. 2ND.—The Austro-German forces commenced the passage of the rivers—heavy fighting all along the line.

OCT. 4TH.—The French sent an ultimatum to Bulgaria.

OCT. 5TH.—The Allied forces (French) commenced landing at Salonika : General Sarrail in command. The force was the 1st Division of the French Expeditionary Force, from the Dardanelles.

OCT. 6TH TO 8TH.—The Germans occupied Ram, Gradiska, Kulitch and Semendria ; an advance being made to Pojarevat. After heavy fighting they took

Belgrade, the Serbians retiring to the heights south-west of the town. The Austrians succeeded in crossing at Jarak and Mitrovitz, but failed at Zabrej. About Bielina the Austrians crossed the River Drina and gained the right bank of the river towards Lechnitz.

OCT. 10TH.—The Bulgarian Army had now nearly completed its mobilization. The Allies (French) now commenced to move north from Salonika towards Gievgeli.

*Allies' plan of attack.—*

The plan was to move up towards Uskub, join hands with the Serbians and drive the enemy out of the country.

*Austro-German-Bulgarian plan of attack:—*

The arrangements were as follows:—

Von Kowriss (Austrian): four army corps, 130,000 men, to move on Milanovatz.

Von Gallwitz (German): three army corps, 100,000 men, to move on Krajoujevatz.

(?) (Austrian): one division, 40,000 men, to move up the valley of the River Timok and join hands with the Bulgarians.

Todoroff (Bulgarian): two divisions, 90,000 men, to move on Negobin, and join up with the Austrians.

Bojadieff (Bulgarian): three divisions, 130,000 men, to move on the Uskub—Nish line.

Tenieff (Bulgarian): three divisions, 130,000 men, to move on Veles—Valandovo line and protect the left flank of Bojadieff's army from the Allies.

OCT. 14TH.—The Serbians now began to retreat to the south and west, chiefly on account of the threatening attacks on their right flank, developed by the Bulgarians. The Bulgarians commenced to cross the Serbian frontier all along the line.

OCT. 15TH.—The Allies (French) advanced troops reached Gievgeli on the Greco-Serbian frontier.

OCT. 16TH.—The Allies (French) drove back the Bulgarian troops about Valandovo.

OCT. 17TH.—Bojadieff occupied Vrania after considerable fighting, while his southern troops arrived before Kumanovo. The Allies (French) made a demonstration against the railway station at Demie-Kapou.

OCT. 18TH.—Tenieff arrived before Veles and Krivolak.

OCT. 20TH.—The Bulgarians had now advanced considerably, and the general Austro-German-Bulgarian line was now Valievo—Alexandrovatz—Kontchevo—Negotin—Kinajevatz—Piro—Vrania—Kumanovo—Veles—Krivolak—west of Strumnitza. The general Austro-German-Bulgarian attack now commenced.

OCT. 21ST.—The Allies (French) reached the Serbio-Greek frontier.

OCT. 22ND.—The Serbians re-took Veles.

OCT. 24TH.—Bojadieff occupied Kumanovo and commenced his advance on Uskub.

OCT. 26TH.—The Allies (French) were at Demie-Kapou. The Bulgarians occupied Uskub, and sent brigades towards Katchanik and Tetevo to open the route to Monastir.

OCT. 27TH.—The general Austro-German line was Rogacitsa—south of Valievo—north of Krajoujevatz. The Bulgarians held Palanka—Zayetchar—north-east of Nish—Piro, and to the south as before.

The Allies (French) reach Dubrara.

OCT. 29TH.—The Bulgarians again captured Veles, and prepared to march on Monastir.

OCT. 30TH.—The Austrians reached Grand Milanovatz; the Germans were south of Sivilianatz.

The Allies (French) were opposite Krivolah and were in connection with the Serbians about Rozoman. An attack by Bulgarians beaten off.

OCT. 31ST.—The Serbians evacuated Krajoujevatz. Bojadieff moved from Uskub up the railway line towards Katchanik; the troops from Vrania arrived at Gilan.

NOV. 1ST.—The general positions were :—

*Austro-German-Bulgarian forces :—*

Lubovitz—Grand Milanovatz—Krajoujevatz—south of Sivilaivatz—Jagonbitza, and as on October 27th, 1915.

*Allied Forces (French) :—*

The head of the French forces was at Demie-Kapou, and the stations Gradee, Valandovo, Mirovtsa, Pordovitz were also held by them.

*Allies' plan.* This had the following objects : to :—

1st : Act against the Bulgarian flank, through the valley of the River Vardar, and prevent the movements against Uskub and to the north.

2nd : Protect southern Serbia in the regions of Prilep and Monastir.

NOV. 3RD.—The Bulgarians were now in force at Veles, had occupied Katchanik and Tetovo, and were holding the Mount Archangel east of the Baborna pass with a division in order to prevent the French joining hands with the Serbians.

NOV. 4TH, 5TH, AND 6TH.—There was heavy fighting about the east of the Baborna pass. The Bulgarians were eventually driven back towards Veles; but the Serbians in the meantime retreated towards Monastir as they could not reach the French. Nish was occupied by the Bulgarians.

NOV. 10TH.—The general battle line was : Vishegrad—Alexinats—Nish—east of Katchanik—Izbor—Gradeska—Krivolak—to the Greco-Bulgarian frontier.

NOV. 20TH.—The general battle line was : Moystir—Novi-Bazar—Maden—west of Katchanik—Izbor—Krivolak.

NOV. 23RD.—The Serbian Government left Mitrovitz for Prizend, from which they retired on November 26th, 1915.

NOV. 24TH.—Von Korvass reached Mitrovitz.

NOV. 25TH.—Von Gallwitz occupied Prishtina.

NOV. 27TH.—The Allies (French) being unable to assist the Serbians, decided to retire.

NOV. 28TH.—The German Government issued a proclamation stating that its object had been obtained as soon as connection with Bulgaria and the Turkish Army had been opened up.

NOV. 29TH.—The Bulgarians occupied Prizend. The British force which had landed at Salonika began to move north towards the position River Vardar—Lake Doiran.

NOV. 30TH.—The Serbian Government arrived at Scutari.

DEC. 1ST.—The Austrians under Von Korvass crossed the Montenegrin frontier.

DEC. 3RD.—The Allies (French) withdrew from Krivolak, towards the south, so as to be in line with the British force which had taken up a position as above.

DEC. 4TH.—The Bulgarians occupied Dibra.

DEC. 5TH.—The Austro-German-Bulgarian forces occupied Monastir. The Allies' position was : French (River Cerna to Krivolak); British (Babrovo to Lake

Doiran). The British were very heavily attacked by the Bulgarians but held their positions.

DEC. 6TH.—British again attacked by the Bulgarians; eventually they retired to their second position. The French were moving south to get the British alignment.

DEC. 7TH.—The Austro-German-Bulgarian forces occupied Djakova and Ipek.

DEC. 8TH.—British forces about Lake Doiran again attacked by the Bulgarians. As the French were now in line, the British retired to a third position.

DEC. 10TH.—The French reached a line a little to the south of Mirovitza.

DEC. 11TH.—The French retired without fighting and reached the British alignment.

DEC. 12TH.—The general positions were now:—

Austro-German-Bulgarian forces: in possession of Serbia, as far as the Greek frontier.

The Serbians: retiring on Albania.

The Allies: retiring on Salonika; the French by the valley of the Vardar, the British by Killindir.

### SECTION XXXI.

**The Campaign in German South-West Africa from August 4th, 1914, to July 9th, 1915.**

AUG. 4TH.—On war against Germany being declared the Government of South Africa informed the Home Government that the Union was prepared to employ its own troops for the defence of South Africa, and to release the Imperial troops for use elsewhere.

AUG. 5TH.—The Home Government acknowledged with thanks the proposals of the Government of South Africa.

AUG. 7TH.—The Home Government suggested that the Union troops might, in addition to any of the usual defence duties, seize such parts of German South-West Africa as might give them the command of Swakopmund, Luderitzbucht, and the wireless stations there or in the interior.

AUG. 10TH.—The Government of South Africa decided to send an expedition to German South-West Africa to carry out the work suggested by the Home Government on August 7th, 1914.

On the outbreak of war some of the Boers and others in the northern territories, viz., the Transvaal and Orange Free State, objected to the Government of South Africa taking part in any expedition against German South-West Africa, and broke out into rebellion. This very much delayed the Union Government's plans, and prevented any operations taking place till February 7th, 1915.

#### A.—THE REBELLION.

The principal leaders of this were: General Beyers, Commandant-General of the Active Citizen Force of the Union; Lieut.-Colonel Maritz, Commandant North-West District of the Cape Province (borders of German South-West Africa); Major Kemp, District Staff Officer No. 7 Military District; General De la Rey and General De Wet.

The "Report on the Outbreak of the Rebellion, etc.," published as a Parliamentary paper, by the Union of South Africa, gives a general account of the rebellion and the policy of the Government regarding its suppression. The general rebel plan of operations was as follows:—

General De Wet to organize a revolution in the Free State.



Lieut.-Colonel Maritz, who had all along been in communication with the Germans, was to raise a revolt in his district south of the German border.

Major Kemp was to organize the revolt at Potchefstroom, where he was in charge of the training camp.

Other leaders were to raise such forces as they could. A new Republic was to be proclaimed, the President of the Provisional Government thus formed to be General Beyers, while General De la Rey was to be the Commandant-General of its forces. Potchefstroom was to be seized and the Republican flag raised there; Beyers was to march with the Defence Force on Krugersdorp, while Kemp and De la Rey were to seize Lichtenberg and mobilize the forces at that place. The various commands were then to reassemble at Krugersdorp, proceed to Pretoria, overthrow the Government, hoist the Vierkleur, and release the German prisoners of war.

The Union Government made numerous attempts to prevent the rebellion breaking out, but the rebels refused to listen, and finally set their forces in motion.

SEPT. 28TH.—General De la Rey was accidentally shot while trying to pass through the police cordon round Johannesburg.

OCT. 2ND.—Lieut.-Colonel Maritz deserted with all his force from the camp at Upington, and moved towards the German border.

OCT. 22ND.—The rebellion definitely broke out, both in the Transvaal and Orange Free State.

OCT. 27TH.—General Botha arrived at Rustenberg and defeated some rebels in that neighbourhood.

NOV. 2ND.—Bands of rebels about Britz were dispersed.

NOV. 5TH.—Rebels at Bronkhurst Spruit dispersed.

NOV. 11TH.—Botha arrived in the Free State about Theunissen; country very much disturbed.

NOV. 15TH.—De Wet defeated at Mushroom Valley.

NOV. 18TH.—Beyers was now about Upington, trying to get in touch with the Germans.

NOV. 28TH.—Some fighting north of Upington. Kemp succeeded in escaping to the German border.

NOV. 31ST.—The rebels proclaimed the new Republic at Reitz and Bethlehem.

DEC. 8TH.—Wessels with his forces, about 1,200 strong, surrendered near Reitz.

DEC. 16TH.—A large party of rebels under Major Fourie were defeated at Nooitgedacht. Fourie was eventually shot.

JAN. 24TH.—Maritz and Kemp defeated by Van der Venter near Upington.

At this date the rebellion, practically speaking, came to an end. Maritz had escaped into German territory; Beyers was drowned when trying to escape; De la Rey was accidentally shot; De Wet was captured and sentenced to six years' imprisonment with a fine of £2,000 (imprisonment remitted later); and Fourie was shot.

FEB. 3RD.—Kemp with his forces, about 500 strong, surrendered at Upington.

#### B.—THE CAMPAIGN IN SOUTH-WEST AFRICA.

AUG. 4TH.—*German Forces* :—

At this time the German forces in South-West Africa were commanded by Colonel Von Frank, and were about 8,000 strong, only 6,000 being Germans, the remainder natives.

*Union Forces :—*

These were commanded by General Botha, who also commanded the Northern Army. They were organized as follows :—

*Northern Army—General Botha :—*

Transvaal Scottish, 1st Rhodesians, Cape Town Highlanders, Kimberley Regiment, Rand Regiment, Rand Light Infantry, South African Irish, Northern Mounted Rifles, some Transvaal Horse Artillery and South African Railway Engineers. There were also some Burgher commandos.

*Southern Army—General Smuts :—*

No. 1 Column—Brigadier-General Sir D. Mackenzie : 1st Natal Carabineers, 2nd Natal Carabineers, Natal Mounted Rifles Brigade, Border Mounted Rifles, Umvoti Mounted Rifles, Zululand Mounted Rifles, Northern Districts Mounted Rifles, Transvaal Scottish (part), Pretoria Regiment, Natal Light Horse.

No. 2 Column—Colonel Van der Venter : 1st South African Mounted Rifles, 2nd South African Mounted Rifles, 3rd South African Mounted Rifles, 5th South African Mounted Rifles (part), the Witwatersrand Rifles, Transvaal Horse Artillery (part).

No. 3 Column—Colonel Berrange : 4th South African Mounted Rifles, 5th South African Mounted Rifles (part), 1st Durban Light Infantry, 2nd Durban Light Infantry, 1st Kaffrarian Rifles, 2nd Kaffrarian Rifles, Queenstown Rifles, 1st City Rifles, Bechuanaland Rifles, Imperial Light Horse, Brand's Horse, Enslin's Horse, Hartigan's Horse, Diamond Field Horse, with part of South African Railway Engineers and South African Motor Corps.

The total strength of the Union forces was about 50,000 men at its highest.

*The German plan of operations :—*

The small number of men at the disposal of the German Commander-in-Chief prevented any offensive movement taking place. Probably it was intended to help the rebels in the Transvaal and Free States, had an opportunity arisen.

*The Union plan of operations :—*

This was arranged as follows :—

Northern Army : to land at Swakopmund and advance on Windhoek by the railway line and the Swakop river.

Southern Army : to concentrate at Koetmansdorp and then move on Windhoek.

No. 1 Column : to land at Luderitz Bay.

No. 2 Column : to cross the frontier at Raman's Drift.

No. 3 Column : to march from Kimberley, via Kuruman, to Rietfontein.

The capital (Windhoek) having been captured, the German forces were to be pursued and forced to surrender.

SEPT. 2.—Luderitz Bay was occupied by No. 1 Column, preparations made for reconnoitring the route towards Aus.

DEC. 25TH.—Walfisch Bay occupied by advanced troops of Northern Army.

JAN. 12TH.—Raman's Drift occupied by advanced troops of No. 2 Column.

JAN. 14TH.—Swakopmund occupied.

FEB. 8TH.—General Botha arrived Luderitz Bay and inspected No. 1 Column.

FEB. 9TH.—General Botha reached Swakopmund and began to arrange for the advance.

FEB. 22ND.—The Northern Army's advance from Swakopmund commenced; after a little fighting Goanikontes, Haigamkhab and Husab were taken.

MARCH ?—No. 2 Column occupied Ukamas, and drove the enemy out of Platbeen, capturing stores, etc.

MARCH 3RD.—No. 3 Column occupied Hasuar.

MARCH 19TH.—The Northern Army advanced from Husab towards the German position on the line Pforte—Jakalswater—Riet.

MARCH 20TH.—The Northern Army attacked the Germans at Riet and late in the evening the enemy evacuated the whole position and retired to the north-east. Supply depôts started at Riet and Salem.

MARCH 22ND.—No. 1 Column occupied Garub.

MARCH 31ST.—No. 1 Column occupied Aus.

APRIL 1ST.—No. 3 Column captured Hasuar.

APRIL 3RD.—No. 2 Column occupied Warmbad.

APRIL 5TH.—No. 2 Column occupied Kalkfontein. From thence the advance continued in two parties, moving east and west of the Karas Mountains.

APRIL 13TH.—No. 1 Column occupied Bethany.

APRIL 18TH.—No. 2 Column (west party) reached Seeheim, as did No. 1 Column's advanced guards.

APRIL 20TH.—No. 2 Column (east party) met No. 3 Column at Koetmanshoop.

APRIL 24TH.—No. 1 Column reached Aritetis.

APRIL 28TH.—No. 1 and No. 2 Columns attacked the enemy and occupied Gibeon.

MAY 1ST.—The general position was: Northern Army about Kubas; Southern Army in possession of all the country south of Gibeon.

MAY 5TH.—Northern Army occupied Karibib.

MAY 12TH.—Windhoek, the capital of the country, surrendered; the Germans having withdrawn to a new capital at Grootfontein in the north of the country. The important wireless station was found undamaged.

MAY 14TH.—Orders were issued for all the Germans at Windhoek to be interned. The Union forces now rested for a while and were reorganized for further operations.

JUNE 15TH.—It was now decided to move on Grootfontein, and a force for that purpose was organized at Karibib, the first objective being Otavi, to which place the Germans had retired.

Western Column (Brigadier-General Britz): two mounted brigades.

Central Column (General Botha) ?

Eastern Column (Brigadier-General Myburgh): two mounted brigades.

The Central Column was to move along the railway, the flanking columns to clear the country to the east and west of the line.

JUNE 21ST.—The Central Column occupied Omaruru.

JUNE 26TH.—The Central Column occupied Objiwarango. The flanking columns were now ordered to advance as follows:—

Western Column: via Otigo to Namutoni.

Eastern Column: via east side of railway to Tsumeb.

JULY 1ST.—The Germans evacuated Otavi after some fighting and moved towards a position at 500 kilometres, between Otavi and Korab. The Central Column occupied Otavi.

JULY 6TH.—Western Column occupied Namutoni.

JULY 7TH.—Eastern Column occupied Tsumeb.

JULY 9TH.—The German forces surrendered.

The total number of German prisoners taken between June 18th and July 9th, 1915, was 4,740. The total Union casualties during the whole campaign were:—

Killed in action ... ..	88
Died of wounds ... ..	25
Wounded in action ... ..	268
Wounded taken prisoners ... ..	48
Unwounded prisoners in the hands of the enemy ...	612
Died of disease ... ..	97
Died through accidents ... ..	56

Total ... .. 1,194

### SECTION XXXII.

The Campaign in Mesopotamia from November 3rd, 1914, to September 29th, 1915.

The general objects of the British Government in this campaign were: to

1st.—Safeguard our interests in the Persian Gulf.

2nd.—Maintain the authority of our flag in the East.

3rd.—Protect the recently acquired oilfields on the River Karun.

4th.—Secure the neutrality of the Arab population.

The British Forces, at the commencement of the campaign, were organized as follows:—

Indian Expeditionary Force "D."

In command: Lieut.-General Sir A. Barrett.

6th Division of the Indian Army.

16th Brigade.	{	2/ Dorsets.
Brigadier-General Delamain		20th Infantry.
(Poona).		104th Rifles.
		117th Mahrattas.
17th Brigade.	{	1/ Oxford Light Infantry.
Brigadier-General Hoghton		22nd Punjaubis.
(Jhelum).		103rd Mahrattas.
		119th Infantry.
18th Brigade.	{	2/ Norfolks.
Major-General C. Fry		110th Mahratta Light Infantry.
(Belgaum).		120th Rajputana Infantry.
		7th Rajputs.

Other troops arrived from time to time later on.

The Turkish Forces.—Very little was known as to the number, strength, etc., of the Turkish troops; a good many local Arabs appeared to have joined in with them from time to time.

Nov. 3RD.—The advanced troops of the Indian Expeditionary Force (Poona Brigade) reached the mouth of the Shatt-el-Arab at the head of the Persian Gulf.

Nov. 6TH.—After a preliminary bombardment, a landing party from the Poona Brigade captured the fort at Fao.

Nov. 7TH.—The Poona Brigade landed at Fao, and occupied the oil refinery station at Abadan Island.

Nov. 8TH.—A reconnaissance was made of the River Tigris; Saniyeh was selected as a suitable camping ground.

Nov. 10TH.—The brigade landed at Saniyeh. A Turkish attack was beaten off.

Nov. 14TH.—The remainder of the 6th Division now began to land. General Sir A. Barrett arrived and assumed command of the operations. A hostile force having been reported at Sahil and Zain, with its main body at Baljaniyeh, Brigadier-General Delamain was ordered to reconnoitre, but not to undertake a serious offensive.

Nov. 15TH.—Reconnaissance against the Sahil position duly carried out. The position extended from an old fort on the river, through Hassanain, to Zain.

Nov. 17TH.—The attack on the Sahil position commenced, the general idea being to attack the enemy's left flank, and drive him on to the river, so that the "Odin" and "Espiegle" could co-operate in the movement. At 10 a.m. the troops were put in motion, and it soon became clear that the old fort was the key of the position. Arrangements were therefore made for a frontal attack by the 18th Brigade, and a turning movement by the 16th Brigade against the old fort. The plan was successfully carried out, and by 1.15 p.m. the enemy were in full retreat. The troops occupied Sahil by dusk.

Nov. 18TH, 19TH, AND 20TH.—Stores, etc., were landed, and the enemy's position at Balaniyeh reconnoitred.

Nov. 21ST.—Information was received that the enemy had retired from Basra, and that the town was in danger of being looted by the Arabs. A detachment marched at 8 p.m. for Basra, and a party was sent up by river to occupy the town and prevent its destruction.

Nov. 22ND.—The river party arrived in the early morning, the detachment at 9 a.m., and the town was duly patrolled.

Nov. 23RD.—The rest of the force arrived at Basra and occupied the town.

Nov. 30TH.—From the information now received it appeared that a Turkish force of about 3,500 infantry, 1,000 Arabs, with four quick-firing guns and eight mounted guns, was assembled at Kurna. It was decided to attack this force as soon as possible.

Dec. 3RD.—A detachment, consisting of 104th Rifles, 110th Mahrattas, with two guns Royal Field Artillery, under Colonel Fraser, was ordered to reconnoitre Kurna and clear the enemy from the left bank of the river.

Dec. 4TH.—Colonel Fraser's column carried out the orders given, but found no further progress could be made. The Turks re-occupied Muzaira'ah and entrenched.

Dec. 6TH.—A column under Major-General Fry arrived at Colonel Fraser's camp at 5 a.m., and a fresh reconnaissance of the enemy's position was now made. The enemy was now found to have about 1,200 men and six guns at Muzaira'ah, and 800 men with four guns at Kurna itself.

Dec. 7TH.—It was decided to attack Muzaira'ah, as its possession was essential to any further advance. The attack commenced at 11 a.m., and by 12.50 the village was captured. A vigorous pursuit was maintained till dusk and the British force finally camped near Muzaira'ah. The enemy had about 200 killed and 300 wounded.

Dec. 8TH.—The attack on Kurna now developed. The general plan was:—

- (1) The 110th Mahrattas to cross the river by a flying bridge to be constructed by the sappers and miners, and move on Kurna.
- (2) The 2/ Norfolks to cover the crossing of the river.
- (3) 104th Rifles to reconnoitre and cover the operations from the north.
- (4) 120th Infantry and 7th Rajputs to demonstrate against Kurna.
- (5) The Royal Navy to ascend the river and co-operate generally.



The programme was carried out, but the 104th Rifles found a river crossing about a mile and a half up stream, and formed up on the right of the 110th Mahrattas. By evening the positions were: 104th and 110th near the flying bridge, 2/ Norfolks on the left bank, rest of the troops about Muzaira'ah.

DEC. 9TH.—Kurna surrendered, and the British forces occupied the town.

JAN. 20TH.—A Turkish force of 5,000 men and six guns was reported to be in a position about one mile south of the Rotah canal. It was decided to send a column to act against this force, the object being to impress upon the enemy that it was not the intention to maintain a passive defence on the prepared position Kurna—Muzaira'ah. The operation was duly carried out, and part of the enemy was driven back, but the weakness of the column and the unfavourable ground prevented a serious advance, and the troops returned to camp.

MARCH 3RD.—A force of some 12,000 Turks moved against Ahwaz (the headquarters of the oil pipe line), and, after a good deal of fighting, was defeated.

MARCH 11TH.—The British cavalry made a reconnaissance towards Nakaila, which was found to be occupied by about 1,800 Turks.

APRIL 1ST.—The Turks had now assembled in some force, and were reported to be preparing for an attack on Kurna, Shaiba, and Ahwaz.

APRIL 9TH.—Lieut.-General Sir A. Barrett had to give up the command owing to ill-health. He was succeeded by General Sir John Nixon.

APRIL 11TH.—Important operations now commenced about Shaiba. The British position extended all round the west and to the south of Basra, Shaiba Fort being about its centre.

The Shaiba garrison at this time consisted of Major-General Fry in command; 16th Brigade (Delamain); 18th Brigade (Fry); Cavalry Brigade—S Battery, R.H.A., 7th Lancers, 16th Cavalry, 33rd Cavalry (Brigadier-General Kennedy).

The enemy's forces were said to consist of 12,000 regulars, 12 field guns, and 10,000 tribesmen.

The plan of attack was:—

- (1) Regulars, from the west, direct on Fort Shaiba.
- (2) Various tribesmen, on the north of the British position.
- (3) Various tribesmen from Zubais on the south of Shaiba.

Major-General Melliss was ordered to assume the command at Shaiba; his brigade, the 30th, was to accompany him.

APRIL 12TH.—The Turkish attack on Shaiba position began at 5 a.m. There was a serious advance at 6.10 a.m., which was repulsed between 7 and 8 a.m. A further attack commenced at 2.15 p.m., which, after a very effective counter-attack by the cavalry, died away about 3 p.m. At 6 p.m. another attack was repulsed, and intermittent firing went on all night.

Major-General Melliss arrived with 24th Punjaubis, the rest of the 30th Brigade being unable to come up, owing to the flooded condition of the country. Kurna was on this day bombarded ineffectively, as was also Ahwaz.

APRIL 13TH.—Major-General Melliss took over the command 4.30 a.m. Between 7 a.m. and 7.45 a.m. a successful cavalry reconnaissance operated towards the north-west, with the view of ascertaining the enemy's position. At 8.30 a.m. the 16th Brigade attacked the North Mound, and by 11 a.m. had captured it. This brigade, assisted by the cavalry on its outer flank, now wheeled half left, and began to clear the enemy out of the ground to the west and south-west of the camp, and drove the Turks off by 2.30 p.m. As it was too late to undertake a further advance, the troops fell back on the Shaiba position, still, however, holding the North Mound, which they had gained. The enemy's losses were about 1,000 killed and wounded, and 400 prisoners.

APRIL 14TH.—At dawn large bodies of the enemy were seen about South Mound (2½ miles south-west of Shaiba) and the Barjisiyeh Woods; but the exact position occupied by him could not be located.

It was decided that the British should attack with all available forces.

The general plan of attack was:—

- (1) 16th Brigade on a point 300 yards west of South Mound.
- (2) 18th Brigade on the left of the 16th Brigade.

The troops moved at 9.30 a.m., and after some fighting the South Mound was occupied at 10.30 a.m. It was now evident that the main position was Barjisiyeh Woods, but the Turkish flanks could not as yet be located. A further advance was therefore decided on, and by 11.30 a.m. the whole line was engaged; cavalry on the extreme right, 18th Brigade on the right, and 16th Brigade on the left. At this time the enemy's position was found to be about three miles in length, with its left on the north end of the Barjisiyeh Woods. At 4.15 p.m. a vigorous attack was made, and by 5 p.m. the enemy had abandoned his front line trenches all along the line. As it was not possible to make a further advance, the whole force retired to the Shaiba position, unmolested, by 8.30 p.m.

APRIL 17TH.—Nakaila occupied by the British.

MAY 31ST.—There was some fighting north of Kurna, the Turks being driven back to north.

JUNE 1ST.—The British advance from Kurna was continued, the forces camping north of Eszra Tomb.

JUNE 3RD.—The British captured Amara, driving out the enemy with considerable loss. The Turks retired on Kut-el-Amara.

JULY.—At commencement of July it was decided to send an expedition, under command of Major-General Gorringe, to occupy Nasiryeh, at the south end of the Shatt-el-Hai.

JULY 24TH.—Major-General Gorringe's force, after encountering great difficulties and hardships, drove the enemy back on their position in front of Nasiryeh. By 11 a.m. the Turks were retreating up the Shatt-el-Hai.

JULY 25TH.—Major-General Gorringe captured Nasiryeh, and took 700 prisoners; the Turkish losses were very heavy.

AUG.—At the beginning of the month it was decided to advance up the River Tigris and occupy Kut-el-Amara, and Major-General Townshend's Division was selected for this work. The Turks were reported to be some seven miles south of Kut-el-Amara, in a strongly-fortified position astride the river.

SEPT. 25TH.—A reconnaissance of the Turkish position showed that it had a front of about 6½ miles. The right wing was on the right bank of the river, the centre and left on the left bank. The whole position was strongly entrenched, and the garrison was estimated to be about 10,000 regular troops, with a large following of tribesmen.

SEPT. 27TH.—The general plan of the British attack was as follows:—

- (1) Belgaum Brigade and artillery to entrench opposite the Turkish centre and keep it employed.
- (2) Poona Brigade to make a feint against the Turkish right during September 26th, so as to give the enemy the idea that the main attack was to be made against his right.
- (3) Poona and Jhelum Brigades to cross the River Tigris on the night of September 27th-28th, 1915, and early in the morning of the latter day carry out two surprise flanking attacks; Jhelum Brigade right round the extreme left of the enemy's position, Poona Brigade against the Turkish left.

SEPT. 28TH.—The attack commenced at daybreak. The Belgaum Brigade kept the Turkish centre well employed all the morning, while by 1.30 p.m. the Poona Brigade had driven back the left. The Jhelum Brigade had succeeded in getting completely round the left flank, and by 2 p.m. the whole of the Turkish left was in retreat. About 5 p.m. Turkish reinforcements came up, but these were vigorously attacked by the Poona Brigade and driven back.

SEPT. 29TH.—During the night of September 28th-29th the Turks began to retreat, and when the British force advanced early on September 29th the position was found to be evacuated. The whole force now pushed on to Kut-el-Amara, which surrendered at once. The Turkish prisoners numbered about 2,000.

[Note on March 31st, 1916.—Very little further information is available as regards this campaign. In October it was decided to advance on Baghdad, and on November 29th, 1915, Major-General Townshend encountered a large Turkish force at Ctesiphon, about 18 miles south of Baghdad. The Turks were defeated with considerable loss, but, owing to the want of water, the British Commander decided to retire on Kut-el-Amara, which place he reached on December 3rd, 1915. Kut-el-Amara was heavily attacked by the Turks on December 8th-10th, and a force sent up under Major-General Aylmer, V.C., to relieve it. Major-General Aylmer's troops defeated the Turks at Shaik Saad, 25 miles east of Kut-el-Amara, on January 7th, 1916, but, owing to the flooded condition of the country, were unable to make any further progress. On March 8th Major-General Aylmer attacked the enemy at Es Sinn, eight miles east of Kut-el-Amara, but was unable to carry the Turkish trenches, and consequently retired to his former position.]

### SECTION XXXIII.

#### The Operations in the Cameroons from August 2nd, 1914, to January 27th, 1915.

AUG. 2ND.—On the outbreak of war, the Allies decided to attack the German colony of the Cameroons. The British, French and Belgian forces were to act in concert.

*Allies' plan.*—The general idea was to surround the German colony, British from the sea and Nigeria, Belgians from the Belgian Congo, the French completing the encirclement from the French Congo and the Tchad territory. Convergent attacks by specially equipped columns were then to be made on certain selected points, and the German forces driven into a suitable area, where they could be compelled to surrender.

The columns were as follows:—

*Northern (French):* from Fort Lamy, on Mora, Marona, and Garona.

*Nigerian (British):* from Kano on Tepe, from Ikom, on Nsanakong, and from Calabar, on Archibong.

*de la Lobage Column (French):* from Magoumba, up the river on Carnot.

*Sangha Column (French):* from Bonga on Nola and Carnot.

*Dobell-Mayer Column (British and French):* to attack Dualla from the sea, and occupy it as principal base of operations.

*Southern Column (French):* from Mitzi on Oyem, and from Mvadi to the north.

*Miquelard Column (French):* from the sea, to occupy Cocobeach.

*German plan.*—As the total German forces only amounted to some 3,000 men, very little could be done in the way of defence. There were some forty fortified posts scattered all over the country, and the general idea was to hold these as long as possible and then escape into Spanish territory. (Spanish Guinea.)

AUG. 6TH.—The Northern Column advanced against Kousseri, but had to return to Fort Lamy.

- AUG. 8TH.—The Kano force moved on Tepe.  
 AUG. 21ST.—The Germans captured Behagle.  
 AUG. 25TH.—The Kano force crossed frontier and occupied Tepe.  
 AUG. 26TH.—The Northern Column retook Behagle.  
 AUG. 27TH.—The Northern Column defeated the Sultan of Logone's troops, who were acting under German orders.  
 AUG. 29TH.—The Kano force captured one of the forts of Garua. The column from Calabar occupied Archibong.  
 AUG. 30TH.—The Kano force had to retire from Garua and returned to Nigeria. The force from Ikom reached Nsanakanga.  
 SEPT. 6TH.—The Germans recaptured Nsanakanga, the British retiring on Nigeria.  
 SEPT. 21ST.—The Northern Column, after some fighting, occupied Kousseri.  
 OCT. 4TH.—The Dobell-Mayer Column commenced to advance from Dualla on Edea. The advance met with many difficulties, owing to the unfavourable ground. The Northern Column left Kousseri, and moved through the Mandara district on Mora.  
 OCT. 14TH.—The Northern Column captured Pedikona, an outlying position of Mora.  
 OCT. 24TH.—The Northern Column captured Gagadima.  
 OCT. 26TH.—The Dobell-Mayer Column occupied Edea.  
 OCT. 30TH.—The Northern Column captured Debaskoum, close to Mora, and leaving a part of the force to maintain a blockade of the town, moved to Marona. There was a good deal of fighting round Mora, but it was not possible to dislodge the Germans.  
 DEC. 1ST.—The Germans attacked Edea, but were beaten off.  
 DEC. 12TH.—After some fighting the Northern Column captured Marona. The Germans evacuated the place and fell back on Garona.  
 DEC. 25TH.—A detachment of the Northern Column moved from Colombè, via Figuil, on Leré. A detachment from Dualla captured Baré.  
 DEC. 30TH.—The detachment occupied Leré and re-established French authority there.  
 JAN. 2ND.—The Leré detachment rejoined the Northern Column. This column commenced its march on Garona.  
 JAN. 8TH.—The Northern Column reached Nassarao, about four miles from Garona.  
 JAN. 10TH.—A Nigerian force under Major Webb-Bowen joined the Northern Column. This force consisted of eight companies (one mounted), a naval 75 cm. gun, three mountain artillery guns and fifteen machine guns.  
 JAN. 27TH—28TH.—The Dobell-Mayer Column had some fighting about Yaunde and seized Bersona, and a detachment occupied the bridge over River Kele, and Ngua.

## SECTION XXXIV.

The Italian Campaign from May 23rd to June 30th, 1915.

MAY 23RD.—On this date the strengths of the contending forces were approximately :—

*Italians :—*

In command : H.M. King Victor Emanuel.

Chief of the General Staff : General Count Luigi Cadorna.

First Army : General Brusati—northern front.

Second Army : General Frugoni—eastern front.

Third Army : General Duke of Aosta—eastern front.

Fourth Army : General Nava—northern front.

Independent Command : General Lequio—Carnic Alps.

*Austrians :—*

Very little is known regarding the strength of these forces; it was reported that some twenty-five divisions were available for use against Italy.

*Italian plans :—*

The general idea of the operations was to hold the Austrians on the north and north-east, and move against Trieste, via Gorizia, on the east. At the same time every effort was to be made to advance into Austrian territory, and more particularly to prevent the eastern movement being outflanked from the north-east.

*Austrian plans :—*

As the forces available were not sufficient to carry out an invasion of Italy, it was settled to act on the defensive all round the Italian frontier. The mountainous districts forming the border land of Austria were strongly entrenched and everything was done to prevent an Italian advance.

MAY 24TH.—The Italians occupied Caporetto, Cormons, Versa, Cervignano and Terso on the eastern front; Monte Pasubio on the Trentino side, and the Val d'Inferno in the Carnic Alps.

The Austrians destroyed two frontier bridges in the valley of the Adige.

MAY 25TH.—The Italians commenced to advance against Tolmino (eastern front) and occupied Sella Provala (Carnic front).

MAY 26TH.—Monte Altissimo (Trentino front) captured, and Italian troops pushed north both sides of the Lake Garda. Other detachments moved north of Fort Rocca d'Auton and towards the Tonale Pass.

MAY 27TH.—An Italian advance up the River Brenta commenced, and reached a point a little to north of Borgo, and Ala, with Coni Lugua to the north-east, was occupied. The River Isonzo now began to come down in heavy floods, operations being very much delayed.

MAY 30TH.—The Italians captured Cortina, in the Val d'Ampezza, on the northern front.

JUNE 1ST.—The general positions were :—

*Isonzo front.*—Caporetto—Cormons—Terso Italian left wing was moving against Tolmino and the Monte Nero heights; the centre was advancing to attack Gorizia, on the south to Trieste; and the right wing was aiming at Monfalcone and the Carso Plateau.

*Carnic Alps front.*—The battle line was the crest of hills. Advances were being made by the Italians through the Fella Pass and the Predil Pass against Plezzo.

*Dolomite front.*—Battle line on crest of the hills. Italians advancing towards Toblach and Innichen via the Falzarego and Sexten Passes.

*Trentino front.*—Italians had gained the passes, and were moving via Adige Valley on Rovereto, and by Val Sugana and Val Giudicaria against Trent.

JUNE 2ND.—Trentino front. Italians occupied Storo, near Andino in the Val Giudicaria. On the Carnic front an advance against Monte Nero was made.

JUNE 3RD.—Some fighting to the north of Ala in the Trentino, as also on the Carnic front about Monte Croce. On the Isonzo front there was heavy fighting west of Tolmino.

JUNE 4TH.—Austrian reinforcements came up, chiefly about Frioul. General Dankl nominated commander-in-chief of the troops in that region. The Italians made some progress about Monte Nero and Tolmino.



JUNE 5TH.—Minor fighting along the whole front.

JUNE 6TH.—Rovereto occupied by the Italians, the Austrians having withdrawn their forces.

JUNE 7TH.—Isonzo front. A general advance was made all along the line. Much fighting on the southern slopes of Monte Nero; bridging operations against Gorizia commenced, as the floods had now subsided a little.

JUNE 8TH.—Isonzo front. Monfalcone occupied by the Italians: heavy fighting along the whole front.

JUNE 9TH.—Heavy fighting south of Monte Nero and along the Isonzo front.

JUNE 10TH.—In the Trentino, Podestagno (north of Cortino) occupied by the Italians. Very severe fighting on the Isonzo front, about Gradisca, Sagrado and Tolmino, but the Austrians held their positions.

JUNE 11TH.—Austrian attacks on the south slopes of Monte Nero failed. Gradisca occupied by the Italians.

JUNE 12TH.—On Isonzo front the Italians crossed the river near Plava.

JUNE 13TH.—The Austrians attacked at various points along the Trentino frontier, from the Tonale to Carnia, but without success. The Italians occupied Volaja and Valentina defiles in Carnia. Malborghetto was heavily bombarded by the Italians and the latter generally consolidated their positions on the Isonzo front.

JUNE 14TH.—The Austrians were repulsed towards Piazza.

JUNE 15TH.—Austrian attacks about Monte Croce repulsed. On the Isonzo front, the Italians attacked Podgora.

JUNE 16TH.—Minor fighting and reconnaissance on the Trentino front and about Monte Croce. Heavy fighting on the Isonzo front, about Podgora and Gradisca, while the Italians had some success south of Monte Nero.

JUNE 17TH.—In the Trentino, some fighting about Rovereto. Heavy fighting about Plava, the railway line being cut by the Italians.

JUNE 18TH.—Heavy fighting along the Isonzo front, especially about Monte Nero and Plava, which latter place was captured by the Italians who occupied the heights on the east bank of the river.

JUNE 19TH.—Fighting all along the battle line, especially about Malborghetto and east of Plava.

JUNE 20TH—23RD.—Heavy fighting about Plava. The operations south of Sagrado held up owing to the breaking of the Monfalcone Canal dam by the Austrians.

JUNE 24TH.—The Italians made some progress south of Monte Nero, and occupied Globna, north of Plava.

JUNE 25TH.—The Italians commenced an advance between Sagrado and Monfalcone. Weather very stormy and operations much impeded. The inundation caused by the breaking of the dam on June 23rd was partially stopped.

JUNE 26TH—29TH.—Weather very bad; the Italians forced the bridge-head at Castelnuovo on June 28th. On the same day, the presence of German troops was reported in the Tyrol.

JUNE 30TH.—The general position of affairs was:—

*Trentino, north and north-east fronts.*—The Italians had made some progress all along the line and had occupied Austrian territory, especially in the Trentino, about Rovereto.

*Isonzo front.*—The Italian left wing was held about Tolmino; the centre was opposite Gorizia, while the right was between Sagrado and Monfalcone.

Unsuccessful attacks were made by the Austrians against Castelnuovo and Sagrado.

## SECTION XXXV.

## The Italian Campaign from July 1st to August 3rd, 1915.

JULY 1ST.—Speaking generally, a state of trench warfare existed all along the line. The Italians were, on the whole, pushing slowly forward, especially on the Isonzo front, but no decisive advance had been made up to this date.

## THE ISONZO FRONT.

JULY 2ND.—The general battle line was west of Tolmino—west of Plava—Sabotina—Podgora Castelnuovo and the lower slopes of Montes San Michele and Sei Busi.

A severe battle commenced on a front extending from Plava to Monfalcone. The Italian left was to move from Plava towards Ternova and attack Gorizia from the north; the centre was to move directly east from Podgora against the town; while the right was to advance via Doberdo, and cut the railway line between Gorizia and Trieste.

JULY 3RD.—The centre attacked Podgora and the right advanced a little about San Michele and Sei Busi. Heavy fighting about Plava and Monte Nero.

JULY 4TH.—The Italians had made some progress about Sei Busi.

JULY 5TH.—Very heavy fighting about Podgora, San Michele, and Sei Busi.

JULY 6TH TO 18TH.—Severe fighting all along the line. About July 15th, 1915, considerable Austrian reinforcements were brought up, as it was evident that the Italians were advancing. There was severe fighting about Plava, the Italians making some progress to the north.

JULY 18TH.—The Italians commenced a new attack all along the line, but more especially towards Doberdo. The fighting was very severe, and some progress was made.

JULY 19TH.—The Italian centre captured part of the Podgora heights.

JULY 21ST.—The Austrians made an unsuccessful attack on Sagrado.

JULY 22ND.—The Austrians made a vigorous counter-attack, against the Italian right wing, with little success, the latter making some progress about Monte San Michele.

JULY 25TH.—A fresh Austrian attack commenced against Monte Sei Busi. An Italian detachment occupied the south slope of Monte San Michele, but had eventually to retire.

JULY 26TH TO AUG. 3RD.—Heavy fighting on the right of the Italian position. The general battle line was much as before, except on the right, where the Italians had advanced close to the top of Monte San Michele, had reached the saddle of San Michele del Carso, and had captured Sei Busi.

## TRENTINO FRONT.

JULY 1ST.—The Italian position was now south of the Val D'Aone, about Palone, Ala, towards Zugna Torta, towards Brenta, about Fiera di Primiero, and Cortina d'Ampezzo. During the month there was considerable fighting all along the line, the Italians pushing slowly forward.

## CADORE FRONT.

JULY.—The Italians occupied the whole district of Ampezzo, and obtained a strong footing on the Col dei Bois, on the summit of Falverego, and on the mountain ranges which descend from the Col di Lana towards Agai and Pieve di Livinallongo.

## CARINA FRONT.

**JULY.**—At the beginning of the month the Italians were in possession of the most important mountain passes, in the high valleys of Degano, Chiarzo, Raccolana, and Dogna.

There was some fighting about High Degano, the Austrians having vigorously attacked the position. The Italians bombarded the Austrian fortifications at Marlborghetto, Predil, and Plezzo with considerable success.

[Note on March 31st, 1916.—The fighting all along the line during the latter half of 1915 and the first quarter of 1916 was, generally speaking, of a minor character, except on the Isonzo front, where heavy fighting took place from time to time, especially round about Gorizia and to the south. At the end of December, 1915, the general battle line was: Tonale Pass—south of Riva—Mori—Zugna Torta—south of Laverengo—north of the River Astica for a few miles—Brenta—Borgo—Monte Serola—north of Fiera di Primiero—along the old frontier to Marmolado—Monte Cristallo—south of Sexten, along the old frontier to Pontafel—Montasio—Cergnata—Plezzo—west of Monte Nero—west of Tolmino—Roncina—Ajba—Globna—Plava—Belavia—Podgora—Petreano—west of Monte San Michele—east of Monfalcone—to the Adriatic.

Since then the general battle line has been more or less stationary.]

## SECTION XXXVI.

**The Combined Military and Naval Operations in the Dardanelles from July 1st to October 16th, 1915.**

**JULY 1ST.**—The Commander-in-Chief decided on a fresh plan of action. The following schemes of action were considered :—

- (a) To throw every available man of the force on the southern sector of the peninsula and force a way forward to the Narrows.

This was condemned chiefly on account of the difficulty in employing the troops in such a limited space.

- (b) To disembark on the Asiatic side, and march on Chanak.

This was rejected, because the forces available were not strong enough to act on two fronts.

- (c) To land at Enos or Ebrije and seize the neck of the Gallipoli Peninsula at Bulair.

This was also rejected, owing to the danger caused by submarines, which had at that time become active.

- (d) To reinforce the Anzac position strongly, make a vigorous attack on Khoja Chemen (Hill 971), and then push on to a point where the waist of the peninsula could be gripped. At the same time to make a fresh landing at Suvla Bay, and secure it as a winter base for Anzac and all the troops operating in the northern theatre.

This was finally decided upon, as being the most practical scheme.

The next point for consideration was the number of men likely to be available. After communication with the Home Government it was decided that three regular divisions and the infantry of two territorial divisions were to be sent out, and it was arranged that the advance guard of this new force should reach Mudros on July 10th, 1915, the whole to be concentrated ready for action by August 10th, 1915. The second week in August was fixed upon as the most suitable time for the new offensive.

## PRELIMINARY OPERATIONS.

During July and part of August certain preliminary operations took place. The objects of these were to

- 1st, gain ground;
- 2nd, maintain the moral ascendancy of the British troops, which had by this time been established;
- 3rd, induce the enemy to believe that the main attack would come from Cape Helles rather than from Anzac.

**JULY 12TH—13TH.**—By the action of June 28th the Turkish right had been driven back on its main system of defence just south of Krithia. The centre and left, however, still held its forward position. The object of the attack on this date was, therefore, to seize this latter position (from the mouth of the Kereves Dere to the main Sedd-el-Bahr—Krithia road).

The general plan of operations was :—

*Right.*—The French Expeditionary Force (frontal attack).

*Right Centre.*—52nd Lowland Division (frontal attack, right in the morning left in the afternoon).

*Left.*—29th Division (diversions).

*Anzac.*—Australians (diversions).

At 7.35 a.m. the British attack commenced, and the Right and Right Centre captured two lines of enemy's trenches at once. The 1st French Division also took the trenches skirting the lower part of the Kereves Dere, while the 2nd French Division and the British 155th Brigade held the trenches they had already gained. After this the fighting became much confused, but the second line of captured trenches was well held. It was now decided to send on the left of the 52nd Division as previously arranged, and the 157th Brigade carried the trenches in front of them with a rush. At this part of the line the total advance was about 400 yards, while the 155th Brigade and 2nd French Division had moved forward from 200 to 300 yards. At 6 p.m. the 52nd Division was ordered to make good its position and entrench. There was a good deal of fighting during the night, and at 7.30 a.m. on July 13th the enemy broke in on the right of the 157th Brigade. To remedy this a fresh attack was ordered on such portions of the original objectives as remained in the enemy's hand. This attack was successful; the general result being that on the British right and French left two lines were captured, while in other places the Allies had reached good positions.

**JULY 17TH.**—Lieutenant-General Hunter Weston was invalided, and Lieutenant-General the Hon. Sir F. Stopford succeeded him.

**JULY 31ST.**—A very successful attack against a Turkish trench threatening the flank of the "Tasmania Post" was carried out by the 11th Australian Infantry Battalion.

## PREPARATIONS FOR THE GREAT ATTACK.

**AUG. 1ST.**—As the bulk of the new reinforcements had now arrived it was settled to make the attack on August 6th, 2 a.m. being the hour of moon rise on August 7th. The general arrangements were as follows :—

- (1) Cape Helles Force : on 1,200 yards of Turkish trenches opposite Allied right and right centre.
- (2) Anzac Force : on Lone Pine trenches and Khoja Chemen.
- (3) Suvla Bay Force : on the Anafarta Hills.
- (4) Saros Force : on Saros.

The main attack was from Anzac ; the advance from Cape Helles was a strong offensive; the Saros attack was a feint; while the object of the landing at Suvla was to gain a winter base for Anzac and the troops in the northern territory. It was hoped that the Turks would assume (1) to be the real attack, and that they would send the bulk of their reinforcements to Krithia; thus enabling the real attack from Anzac to make good, and eventually gain the crest of the hills commanding the Turkish line of communications with Achi Baba and Krithia.

Elaborate arrangements were made for the supply of water, and the whole system of collecting and carrying the water carefully arranged for.

The Commander-in-Chief fixed his headquarters at Imbros.

#### *A.—Cape Helles Force.*

AUG. 6TH.—The arrangements for this attack were as follows :—

- (a) 88th Brigade of 29th Division to assault the 1,200 yards of trench above mentioned.
- (b) 42nd Division to capture at the same time some small trenches likely to enfilade the 88th Brigade.

The 42nd Division was on the right, the 29th Division on the left, of the British line. At 3.50 p.m. the infantry (after a preliminary bombardment) advanced, and some progress was made on the left, but the right and right centre encountered serious resistance. The 42nd Division made two vigorous assaults, but very little ground was gained. Officers' patrols sent out in the evening discovered that the enemy had been reinforced by two divisions, and that he had been on the point of attacking at the hour the British advance commenced.

AUG. 7TH.—Early in the morning the Turks attacked the British left, but were driven back. At 9.40 a.m. the 124th Brigade (right) and 129th Brigade (left) attacked a double line of trenches between the Mal Tepe Dere and the western branch of the Kanli Dere. There was heavy fighting, some ground was gained on the right, but little on the left. The heaviest fighting, however, was in and around a vineyard west of the Krithia road. This had been captured by the 42nd Division, but it was constantly attacked by the Turks. The British, however, held this vineyard and the Turks suffered very severely.

AUG. 8TH.—The Turks made two strong attacks against the vineyard at 4.40 a.m. and 8.40 p.m.; both of these were repulsed; there was heavy fighting during the night.

AUG. 9TH—12TH.—There was not much fighting, and it was possible to relieve some of the British troops.

AUG. 12TH—13TH.—During the night the Turks captured the vineyard, but later on the British troops regained it.

The general results of this attack were :—

First—Some ground was gained, more or less all along the British front.

Second—Considerable enemy reinforcements were drawn to this front, and consequently could not be used in more important areas.

#### *B.—Anzac Force.*

This was under the command of Lieut.-General Birdwood, and had a strength of 37,000 rifles and 72 guns, with naval support from two cruisers, four monitors, and two destroyers. It was divided into two main portions :—

- (a) The Australian Division, with 1st and 3rd Brigades of Light Horse, and two battalions of 40th Brigade. This force was to hold the then existing Anzac position and to make frontal assaults as required.



- (b) The New Zealand and Australian Division (less the 1st and 3rd Light Horse Brigades); the 13th Division (less five battalions); the 29th Indian Infantry Brigade and the Indian Mountain Artillery. In addition, the 29th Brigade of 10th Division (less one battalion) and 38th Brigade formed a reserve. This force was to assault the Chunuk Bair Ridge.

(a) *The Australian Division.*

AUG. 4TH, 5TH AND 6TH.—During these days the Turkish positions were heavily bombarded, while at 4.30 p.m. on August 6th, 1915, the British made a vigorous attack on the Lone Pine position. The works at this point were exceptionally strong; the frontage was only 220 yards, while the approaches were open to heavy enfilade fire.

At 4.30 p.m. a heavy bombardment from all available guns and by the Navy commenced. At 5.30 p.m. the 1st Australian Brigade advanced to the attack, and moving in a most vigorous manner, succeeded in carrying the enemy's works by 5.47 p.m. The reserve then came up, and the position was completely in the Australians' hands by 6.20 p.m. At 7 p.m. the Turks made a heavy attack to try and regain their works; but were driven back with heavy loss. There was also some heavy fighting on the right of the British line, but the results were inconclusive.

AUG. 7TH.—From 1.20 a.m. to 8.20 a.m. the enemy made numerous attacks on the Lone Pine position, but all were driven off. Fresh attacks, however, commenced at 1.30 p.m. and lasted till 5 p.m., further assaults continuing during the night of August 7th—8th. Part of a trench was lost during these operations, but it was eventually recaptured. A vigorous assault was also made against the centre of the British line and some ground was lost after very heavy fighting.

AUG. 8TH.—The British line was generally improved and strengthened.

AUG. 9TH.—The Turks made a fresh attack at 5 a.m., but were driven off by 7.45 a.m.

AUG. 10TH—12TH.—There was a good deal of fighting all along the line, but the position was well held by the British.

The results obtained from the fighting described above were satisfactory, as some ground was gained, and the enemy's reserves were prevented from helping the far more important attack on Chunuk Dere.

(b) *The Australian and New Zealand Division.*

The arrangements for this attack were as follows:—

Right Covering Column (Brigadier-General Russell): New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade, Otago Mounted Rifles Regiment, Maori Contingent, and New Zealand Field Troop. To seize Table Top and all other enemy positions between Chailak Dere and Sazli Beit Dere ravines. Object: to prepare the way for the assaulting column.

Left Covering Column (Brigadier-General Travers): Headquarters' 40th Brigade, half 72nd Field Company, 4th South Wales Borderers, 5th Wiltshire Regiment. To march north along the beach and seize Damakjelik Bair, about 1,400 yards north of Table Top. Object: to protect left flank of the Left Assaulting Column, and make connection with IXth Corps, landing south of Nibrunesi Point.

Right Assaulting Column (Brigadier-General Johnston): New Zealand Infantry Brigade, Indian Mountain Battery (less one section), one company New Zealand Engineers. To move up the Chailak Dere and Sazli Beit Dere ravines, and storm the Chunuk Bair ridge.

Left Assaulting Column (Brigadier-General Cox): 29th Indian Infantry Brigade, 4th Australian Infantry Brigade, Indian Mountain Battery (less one section), one company New Zealand Engineers. To move up the Aghyl Dere, and storm Khoja Chemen Tepe (Hill 971; sometimes called 305). Reserve: 6th South Lancashires, 8th Welsh, at Chailak Dere; 39th Infantry Brigade and half 72nd Field Company, Aghyl Dere.

AUG. 6TH.—At 9.30 p.m., the Right Covering Force commenced its advance and by 11 p.m. had captured old No. 3 Post. The attack on Bauchop's Hill and the "E" entrance of the Chailak Dere then commenced, the former position being captured late in the night, the latter was taken after very severe fighting about the same hour. The Table Top position was occupied by 12 midnight, the attack having commenced at the same hour—9.30 p.m.

The Right Assaulting Column got into the Sazli Beit Dere and Chailak Dere ravines by midnight.

The Left Covering Force, after marching along the beach, commenced to move up the Aghyl Dere under a heavy fire, but after much fighting, it was able to vigorously attack Damakjelik Hill, and by midnight was well up the slopes.

AUG. 7TH.—The Right Covering Force captured the whole of Bauchop's Hill by 1 a.m. The Right Assaulting Column captured the Lower Rhododendron Spur by 1.30 a.m. after severe fighting. The Left Covering Force finally seized the whole of Damakjelik Hill by 1.30 a.m.

The Left Assaulting Column followed close behind the Left Covering Column, and early in the morning commenced its attack. The 4th Australian Brigade advanced up the north fork of the Aghyl Dere on Khoja Chemen Tepe, while the 29th Indian Brigade moved up the south fork of the Aghyl Dere on Q Hill, a ridge of the Sari Bair.

At dawn the 4th Australian Infantry Brigade was on the line of the Asma Dere, and the 29th Indian Infantry Brigade held the ridge west of the farm below Chunuk Bair.

The Right Assaulting Column now advanced up the Sazli Beit Dere, and the Chailak Dere, meeting with considerable opposition, but by 5.45 a.m. the whole force had reached the lower slopes of Rhododendron Spur. A further advance was then made, and eventually a position on the top of the Spur, within a quarter of a mile of Chunuk Bair, was gained. At 7 a.m. a part of the Left Assaulting Column was near the main ridge north-east of Chunuk Bair, and had gained touch with the 4th Australian Brigade on the south side of the Asma Dere. Orders were now issued for the 4th Australian Brigade and 14th Sikhs to assault Khoja Chemen Tepe, which they did, but by 9 a.m. little progress was made. At 9.30 a.m. fresh attacks were tried, but the results were not very favourable. By the afternoon the positions were as follows:—

- (a) Right Covering Force: Table Top, old No. 3 Post, and Bauchop's Hill.
- (b) Left Covering Force: Damakjelik Bair.
- (c) The forces which had attacked from the original Anzac line were mostly back in their old trenches.

During the afternoon, reconnaissances were carried out, and arrangements made for a new attack next morning.

AUG. 8TH.—The plans for this day's attack were as follows:—

Left Column (Major-General Cox): 21st Indian Mountain Battery (less one section), 4th Australian Brigade, 39th Infantry Brigade (less one battalion), 6th S. Lancashire Battalion, and 29th Infantry Brigade. To attack the prolongation of the ridge north-east to Khoja Chemen Tepe, the highest peak of Chunuk Bair.

Right Column (Brigadier-General Johnston): 26th Indian Mountain Battery (less one section), Auckland Mounted Rifles, New Zealand Infantry Brigade, two battalions 13th Division (7th Gloucesters and 8th Welsh), and the Maori Contingent. To climb the Chunuk Bair ridge.

Hour of attack, 4.15 a.m.

The Right Column made a most vigorous attack and seized the south-west slopes and crest of the main knoll. The losses were exceedingly heavy, but the ground was maintained.

The Left Column moved in two detachments, the left, consisting of 39th Infantry Brigade and 29th Indian Brigade, advancing towards the farm on Chunuk Bair and the spurs to the north-east of the farm. The fire was extremely heavy, and only a little progress was made.

The right detachment, consisting of the 4th Australian Brigade, advanced from the Asma Dere against the lower slopes of Abdul Rahman Bair, with the intention of wheeling to the right and moving up the spur. The Turkish fire was, however, too strong, and no progress could be made.

At 12 noon, as the position was now a good one, it was decided to hold on, and prepare for a grand attack on the following day.

In the evening the positions were:—

- (a) New Zealand Brigade, two regiments of New Zealand Mounted Rifles and the Maoris. Rhododendron Spur and south-west slopes of the main knoll of Chunuk Bair.
- (b) Columns of Generals Cox and Monash, prolonged the front line.
- (c) 38th Brigade in reserve in rear of New Zealanders.
- (d) Two battalions 40th Brigade in rear of General Monash.
- (e) 29th Brigade as general reserve.

AUG. 9TH.—The general arrangements for the attack were:—

No. 1 Column (Brigadier-General Johnston): 26th Indian Mountain Battery (less one section), Auckland and Wellington Mounted Rifles regiments, New Zealand Infantry Brigade, and two battalions 13th Division. To hold the ground gained on the 6th inst., and to co-operate with the other columns in gaining the whole of Chunuk Bair and extending to the south-east.

No. 2 Column (Major-General Cox): 21st Indian Mountain Battery (less one section), 4th Australian Brigade, 39th Brigade (less 7th Gloucesters), 6th S. Lancashires and Indian Infantry Brigade. To attack Q Hill.

No. 3 Column (Brigadier-General Baldwin): two battalions 38th Brigade, two battalions 39th Brigade, and one battalion 40th Brigade. This was the main attack. To move from Chailak Dere on Q Hill.

Attack to commence at 4.30 a.m.

A very heavy bombardment commenced at 4.30 a.m. and lasted till 5.16 a.m.

At that hour No. 3 Column advanced towards a position in rear of No. 1 Column, the intention being to make the attack through the position of the latter. Owing to the darkness and the difficult country No. 3 Column did not arrive till 5.15 a.m. By this time part of No. 2 Column had crowned the heights between Chunuk Bair and Hill Q, and commenced to move down the east slopes. The Turks now made a vigorous counter-attack, and No. 2 Column was forced back to its original position. Fortunately No. 3 Column had now come up, and the British attack was renewed against a very large force of enemy which appeared at this moment on the crest of the hill. The Turks continued their attacks for a long time, but the British held their positions successfully.

In the evening the general battle line ran, along Rhododendron Spur to the crest of Chunuk Bair, down to Chunuk Bair farm, due north to the Asma Dere S watershed, and then west to sea near Asmak Kuyu.

The fighting throughout the day had been very severe, and the trying weather added much to the many difficulties experienced by the troops. At night some of the troops were relieved, and the line generally consolidated.

AUG. 10TH.—At daybreak the Turks made a violent attack against the Chunuk Bair position, from Chunuk Bair—Hill Q. After a heavy bombardment the infantry attack commenced at 5.30 a.m., a full division with three extra battalions being employed. The British lost some ground, but eventually the Turks were driven back by very heavy fire from the warships and the land artillery, their losses being very great.

The British losses were considerable, about 12,000 in General Birdwood's force, but the main battle line was held and the Turks gained little by their attacks.

AUG. 21ST.—To assist the Suvla Bay attack (see Section C below August 21st, 1915), it was arranged for a force under General Cox to attack the left of the Turkish position in that section.

The force was divided as follows :—

- (1) Left, to establish a permanent hold on the junction between the left of the Anzac and the right of the Suvla Bay force.
- (2) Centre to seize the wells at Kabuk Kuyu.
- (3) Right to capture the Turkish positions on north-east side of the Kaijajik Aghala.

The troops were : 29th Indian Brigade, two battalions 29th Irish Brigade, 4th South Wales Borderers, two battalions New Zealand Mounted Rifles.

The left detachment succeeded in carrying out its task, while the centre detachment captured the Kabuk Kuyu wells. The right detachment effected a lodgment on Kaijajik Aghala by 4.30 p.m., and connected up with the 4th Australian Brigade on their right.

AUG. 22ND.—The right detachment, reinforced by the 18th Australian Battalion, made considerable progress at first, but had eventually, owing to the very heavy fire, to retire.

At 10 a.m. a Turkish counter-attack was repelled, and eventually the new line from Kaijajik Aghala to Susak Kuyu was joined on to the right of the IXth Corps.

AUG. 27TH.—Major-General Cox made an attack on Hill 60, overlooking the Biyuk Anafarta Valley, at 5 p.m. There was very hard fighting, and at 9.30 p.m. it was reported that nine-tenths of the hill had been gained. A little later the north Turkish communication trenches were carried, but at midnight they had to retire.

AUG. 28TH—29TH.—Heavy fighting continued through the day and night, but at 1 a.m. on August 29th the position was carried and successfully held. This hill was of considerable importance, as it gave an outlook over the Anafarta Sagir Valley and safer lateral communication between the Anzac and Suvla Bay sections.

#### *C.—The Suvla Bay Force.*

The General Officer Commanding this force was Lieut.-General Hon. Sir F. Stopford. The troops were :—

10th (Irish) Division (less one brigade)	} 9th Army Corps.
11th (Northern) Division	
53rd Division	} Territorials.
54th Division	

END OF JULY.—The reports from the Intelligence Department showed that the Turkish force, in the Anafarta section of the defence, had a strength of about 4,000, exclusive of the general reserves in rear of Sari Bair. The Turks, apparently, did not expect an attack in this direction, and few defensive works had been constructed. There were a few trenches on Lala Baba, some more on Hill 10 and on the hills forming the north arm of Suvla Bay, but there was no wire, and only a few guns on Chocolate Hill, and on Ismail Oglu Tepe.

At this time the British troops were at Imbros. The plan of operations was : to

- (a) Land the force secretly by night, at selected points in and around Suvla Bay.
- (b) Seize certain selected positions.
- (c) From these positions operate against the Anafarta Hills and attack the Sari Bair position from the north, and thus dominate the waist of the Gallipoli peninsular. (See Commander-in-Chief's plan of operations, July 1st, 1915).

The chief difficulty in connection with the landing was the want of water ; all water had to be carried by the troops, or conveyed to them by special water trains, and the non-success of the operations was chiefly due to the want of water.

AUG. 6TH.—In the evening the 11th Division was transported to Suvla Bay, and, favoured by good weather, carried out the landing, as previously arranged : 32nd Brigade at B beach, 33rd Brigade at C beach, and 34th Brigade at A beach.

The Turks were completely surprised. The brigades at B and C beaches landed without any difficulty, but the 34th Brigade had a certain amount of opposition to contend with, which was, however, put a stop to when the 32nd Brigade rushed Lala Baba Hill.

AUG. 7TH.—At dawn, the positions were :—

- 34th Brigade : left driving the enemy north towards Kiretch Tepe Sirt ; remainder fighting about Hill 10.
- 32nd Brigade : supporting the 34th Brigade.
- 33rd Brigade : holding Lala Baba Hill.

At daybreak, three batteries of artillery were landed at B beach, and the 34th Brigade had driven the enemy from Hill 10. Six battalions of 10th Division arrived from Mitylene.

The General Officer Commanding had intended landing these six battalions at A beach to assist the left of the 34th Brigade, but the naval authorities were unable to manage this, and they were consequently landed at C beach, subsequently marching along the coast to Hill 10 and coming into action about that position. Three more battalions of the 10th Division arrived somewhat later and were landed at Ghazi Baba.

The general position now was :—

- (a) The enemy was retreating towards Sulajik and Kuchuk Anafarta.
- (b) 34th and 32nd Brigades of 11th Division were following up the enemy ; one battalion was attacking Kiretch Tepe Sirt.
- (c) 31st Brigade of 10th Division was advancing between Hill 10 and the Salt Lake. (The Commander's intention was that this Brigade should have advanced on the extreme left of the 11th Division.)
- (d) 33rd Brigade was moving on Chocolate Hill.

By the evening, the general battle line was Chocolate Hill—west of Kuchuk Anafarta—and north end of the Karakol Dag.

Owing to the great heat, the want of water, and the exhausted state of the men, no further advance was made.

AUG. 8TH.—The Commander-in-Chief arrived at Suvla Bay at 5 p.m. and proceeded to examine the position.



The General Officer Commanding had prepared a plan of operations for the following day, which was to be carried out by 13 battalions, but the Commander-in-Chief considered it desirable to send forward one brigade at once, so as to prevent the Turkish reinforcements digging themselves in on the heights to the east. (The 32nd Brigade was selected for this work.)

AUG. 9TH.—The 32nd Brigade commenced its advance at 4 a.m. and made some progress : it was, however, heavily attacked, and fell back to a line north and south of Sulajik.

At dawn the grand attack commenced, but as the Turks had now realized the object of the Suvla Bay movement, an advance became difficult. The 33rd Brigade made some progress about Ismail Oglu Tepe, but had eventually to retire to Chocolate Hill. At this time the centre of the line fell back somewhat, the fires on Hill 70 considerably hampering the troops.

During the course of the afternoon the general battle line was (left to right) :—

34th Brigade, with two battalions of 159th Brigade of 53rd Division : about Kiretch Tepe Sirt.

32nd Brigade : on a line north and south through Sulajik.

33rd Brigade : about Chocolate Hill.

AUG. 10TH.—A fresh attack was made on the Anafarta ridge, but little progress was made, as the enemy now numbered about 12,000 men.

In the evening orders were issued by the Commander-in-Chief that the IXth Corps should take up and entrench a line across the whole front from near Azmak Dere, through knoll east of Chocolate Hill, to the ground held by the 10th Division about Kiretch Tepe Sirt. At the same time the divisions were re-organized to suit the new conditions.

AUG. 11TH.—The 54th Division (infantry only) was placed in reserve.

AUG. 12TH.—During the afternoon the 163rd Brigade, after much fighting, captured Kuchuk Anafarta Ova.

AUG. 13TH—15TH.—Arrangements were made for generally strengthening and consolidating the position.

An attack was made by the 10th Division to gain possession of the crest of the Kiretch Tepe Sirt, the 54th Division co-operating. The 30th and 31st Brigades were to attack frontally, the 162nd Brigade working on their right ; the land artillery and the guns of H.M.S. "Grampus" and "Foxhound" also assisting. After some hours of indecisive fighting the ridge was captured, but the losses were very heavy and part of the position had to be given up. The strength of the Turkish forces was now reported to be about 20,000 men.

In the evening General Stopford handed over the command of the IXth Corps. Major-General de Lisle took over the temporary command and was directed to get the whole corps into fighting trim. His force consisted of 10th Division (less one brigade), 11th Division, 53rd and 54th Divisions, the whole having a strength of about 30,000 rifles.

On this date the strength of the various forces was as follows :—

*Allies :—*

Anzac : 25,000 rifles.

Helles :

British : 23,000 } rifles

French : 17,000 }

Suvla Bay : 30,000 rifles.

95,000 rifles.

*Turks :—*

Southern Line : 35,000 rifles

Anzac : 75,000 rifles

110,000 rifles.

AUG. 16TH.—The Commander-in-Chief applied for reinforcements from home, but it was not possible to send them.

The 29th Division was therefore sent to Suvla Bay and a part of 2nd Mounted Division brought from Egypt to assist Major-General de Lisle.

AUG. 21ST.—The Commander-in-Chief decided to make a vigorous attack against Ismail Oglu Tepe.

The general arrangements were :

- (1) 53rd and 54th Divisions to hold the enemy from Sulajik to Kiretch Tepe.
- (2) 29th and 11th Divisions to storm Ismail Oglu Tepe.
- (3) Two brigades, 10th Division, and 2nd Mounted Division formed the reserve.

The weather was very misty and the artillery were much impeded in their work. The bombardment lasted from 2.30 p.m. to 3 p.m., and at the latter hour the infantry attack commenced. The 34th Brigade gained the trenches between Hetman Chair and Aire Kavak with little loss, but the 32nd Brigade had many difficulties to contend with and made little progress. The 33rd Brigade also was unable to gain much ground, but the 29th Division was more successful. The 87th Brigade on the left carried Scimitar Hill about 3.30 p.m., but the 86th Brigade on the right was checked by forest fires in their immediate front. The 29th Division had eventually to fall back on the south-west slopes of Scimitar Hill and entrench.

About 5 p.m. the 2nd Mounted Division advanced from Lala Baba (as infantry in extended order) some two miles over ground without a particle of cover, and though their losses were considerable, they succeeded in reaching the ground just in rear of the 87th Brigade. As darkness fell this division attacked Ismail Oglu Tepe, and succeeded in gaining the lower slopes. Unfortunately the enemy were too strong, and during the night the force had to retire on its old position.

AUG. 24TH.—Lieut.-General Hon. J. Byng assumed command of the IXth Corps.

#### SUBSEQUENT MATTERS.

AUG. 24TH TO OCT. 11TH.—There was minor fighting on all the fronts.

On October 11th, 1915, the Home Government asked the Commander-in-Chief for an estimate of losses which would be involved in an evacuation of the peninsula.

OCT. 12TH.—The Commander-in-Chief cabled to Home Government in terms showing that such a step was to him unthinkable.

OCT. 16TH.—The Home Government recalled the Commander-in-Chief to London, as H.M. Government desired a fresh, unbiased opinion from a responsible Commander, upon the question of early evacuation.

#### SECTION XXXVII.

**The Combined Military and Naval Operations in the Dardanelles from October 28th, 1915, to January 9th, 1916.**

OCT. 28TH.—General Sir C. C. Monro was appointed to command the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force. He was directed to examine the state of affairs at Gallipoli and report to the Home Government on the following points :—

- (a) The military situation on the Gallipoli Peninsula.
- (b) Express an opinion whether, on purely military grounds, the Peninsula should be evacuated, or another attempt made to carry it.
- (c) Ascertain the number of troops that would be required (1) to carry the Peninsula, (2) to keep the Straits open, and (3) to take Constantinople.

The general organization of the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force was now fixed as follows :—

In Chief Command : General Sir C. C. Monro—headquarters at Mudros.

To command the Dardanelles forces : Lieut.-General Sir W. Birdwood—headquarters at Imbros.

To command the Salonika forces : Lieut.-General Sir B. Mahon—headquarters at Salonika.

After carefully examining the positions at Gallipoli the Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force summarized his impressions as follows :—

- (a) The British forces held only a mere fringe of the Peninsula.
- (b) The landing beaches, piers, etc., were completely exposed to artillery fire.
- (c) The British entrenchments were almost entirely dominated by the Turks.
- (d) Possible artillery positions were bad.
- (e) It was impossible to conceal and deploy fresh troops without the Turks having full knowledge of such operations.
- (f) The Turkish positions were very strongly fortified.
- (g) The British troops were much enervated from diseases endemic to the country.
- (h) There was a great dearth of officers.
- (i) Owing to want of cover it was not possible to rest the troops from time to time as was done in France.

Under these circumstances the Commander-in-Chief recommended the evacuation of the Peninsula because :—

- (a) It was obvious that the Turks could hold the British force in front with a small force and prosecute their designs on Baghdad or Egypt, or both.
- (b) An advance from the British positions was not a reasonable military operation.
- (c) Even had it been possible to advance, the state of affairs would not have been much improved, and an advance on Constantinople was out of the question.
- (d) It was clearly advisable, under the circumstances, to prevent the troops being locked up in Gallipoli, as they could certainly be used for a better purpose in other theatres of war.

NOVEMBER.—In the beginning of the month the high rate of sickness among the troops began to decrease considerably. Much successful minor fighting took place. It was noticed that the Turkish artillery fire increased a good deal. On November 21st the Peninsula was visited by a tremendous storm, accompanied by twenty-four hours of torrential rain. This was followed by a hard frost and a severe blizzard. The whole force suffered very much from the weather, especially the IXth Corps : 200 men were reported to have died from exposure and over 10,000 sick had to be evacuated. Very considerable damage was done to the landing piers, etc., and the light shipping which it was necessary to employ for landing the troops suffered severely.

At the end of November the Commander-in-Chief gave instructions for schemes to be prepared for the evacuation of the Peninsula, based upon the following idea :—

- (a) The evacuation to be carried out in three stages.
- (b) 1st stage : all troops, animals and supplies not required for a long campaign to be withdrawn.
- (c) 2nd stage : all men, guns, animals and stores, not required for defence during a period when the conditions of weather might retard the evacuation, or in fact seriously alter the programme contemplated.

- (d) 3rd stage : the remaining troops on shore to be embarked with all possible speed, leaving behind the guns, animals and stores needed for military reasons at this period.

#### WITHDRAWAL FROM SUVLA AND ANZAC.

DEC. 8TH.—The Commander of the Dardanelles Army was directed to commence the retirement from these two positions as early as possible. That officer decided to carry out the operations between December 10th and 19th, 1916.

DEC. 10TH—19TH.—The work of evacuation progressed steadily during this period according to the programme, and on the morning of December 18th, 1916, everything was ready for the last stage, and this was duly carried out on the night of December 19th. At Suvla the front line trenches were held lightly till the last moment, while supporting positions were constructed as follows :—

Northern : Kara Kol Dagħ—Hill 10—Salt Lake.

Southern : Salt Lake—Lala Baba—the sea.

These latter positions were only to be used in case of emergency. The troops retired to a common embarking area under the orders of the G.O.C. IXth Corps.

At Anzac the arrangements were similar, but as the trenches were so close to the beach supporting positions were unnecessary. Soon after dark the transports were in position and the withdrawal commenced.

DEC. 20TH.—At 1.30 a.m. the rear parties (rear guard) began their retirement. The detachments on the right of Anzac remained in position until 2 a.m., and by 5.30 a.m. the whole force had left the Suvla and Anzac positions.

At Anzac, a few guns and stores were left behind, but at Suvla everything was safely removed.

#### WITHDRAWAL FROM CAPE HELLES.

EARLY DECEMBER.—It was decided to withdraw the French troops and replace them by British troops. On December 12th the Royal Naval Division took over part of the French lines, and by December 21st there were only 4,000 French troops left. Eventually it was arranged for the 52nd, 11th, and 13th Divisions to hold Helles, with the 42nd Division and Royal Naval Division in reserve on adjacent islands.

DEC. 28TH.—The Home Government ordered the evacuation of Helles. The Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean Expeditionary Force issued orders to the Commander of the Dardanelles Force to carry out this work on the following principles :—

- (1) Evacuation to be carried out as quickly as possible.
- (2) Guns to be saved, but personnel not to be exposed to undue risk.
- (3) Final evacuation to be carried out in one night; troops to be withdrawn from the trenches direct to the beaches.

DEC. 29TH.—The 52nd Division captured a number of Turkish trenches.

DEC. 30TH.—General Sir C. C. Monro proceeded in H.M.S. "Cornwallis" to Alexandria to hand over his command to Lieut.-General Sir A. Murray. The retirement from Helles proceeded on much the same lines as that at Suvla Bay.

JAN. 1ST—2ND.—The last of the French infantry re-embarked on board the French transports. A general line of defence was organized running from the sea north of Sedd-el-Bahr to X Beach inclusive, and at Gully Beach.

JAN. 7TH.—There was a good deal of fighting all along the line; the naval artillery fire was very effective. The Turkish bombardment was the heaviest experienced since April, 1915.

JAN. 8TH.—The first trip of the retirement got off satisfactorily at 8 p.m., and although the weather was bad, the second trip also moved off well up to time at 11.30 p.m.

JAN. 9TH.—At 1.50 a.m. the embarkation at Gully Beach was completed, but at 2.10 a.m. one of the lighters grounded and could not be re-floated. The men on this lighter were landed and embarked at W Beach. At 2.40 a.m. the sea was very rough, but by 3.30 a.m. the evacuation was completed.

Two magazines were blown up at 4 a.m. by the last parties left on shore, and these conflagrations seem to have been the first intimation that the Turks had of the British withdrawal. The Turks bombarded the trenches until about 6.30 a.m., when all operations ceased.

## APPENDIX XII.

*Despatch from General Officer late Commanding the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force, dated March 10th, 1916.*

War Office, 24th March, 1916.

The following supplementary dispatch has been received by the Secretary of State for War from General Sir Ian Hamilton, G.C.B. (The references are to the pages of the Supplement to the *London Gazette* dated January 6th, 1916, Number 29429):—

1, Hyde Park Gardens, W., March 10th, 1916.

My Lord,—I have the honour to submit herewith a supplement to my despatch of December 11th, 1915. Your Lordship may remember that I was unable to set seriously to work upon this despatch until after my return home at the end of October, 1915, and that, when I did so, I was hampered by my separation from my late General Headquarters.

My main difficulty lay in the lack of properly authenticated facts relating to the actions and identities of some of the units which had borne the brunt of the fighting. In the Suvla Bay area especially so many senior commanders had gone under in one way or another that it seemed as if the story must be left half told.

But now, since my despatch has been studied by many who were themselves engaged, fresh light has been thrown upon several episodes hitherto obscure. I have sifted the evidence, and have satisfied myself that full justice has not been done to certain individuals and units. I hope, therefore, these corrigenda and addenda may be permitted to appear.

Page 289. Substitute "127th" for "129th" in line 10 from end of page.

Page 292. Substitute the words "First New Zealand Battery under Major McGilp" for the words "Second New Zealand Battery under Major Sykes."

Page 296. Substitute the words "6th Royal Irish Rifles" for the words "10th Hampshire Regiment."

Page 300. Brigadier-General Hill's 31st Brigade consisted of the 5th Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers, the 6th Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers, the 5th Royal Irish Fusiliers, and the 6th Royal Irish Fusiliers, plus the 6th Royal Dublin Fusiliers and the 7th Royal Dublin Fusiliers, which were temporarily attached thereto. Of these battalions the 5th Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers joined General Mahon and were, therefore, not present during the fighting at Chocolate Hill. In addition to units already singled out for commendation, the 5th Royal Irish Fusiliers and the 7th Royal Dublin Fusiliers deserve special mention for the energy and boldness which characterised their attack.

Page 302. In the attack on Hill 70, on August 9th, the 6th Royal Irish Fusiliers and the 6th Royal Dublin Fusiliers of the 31st Brigade (both attached to the 32nd Brigade for this day's operations) rendered distinguished service.



Page 306. The 9th Battalion Sherwood Foresters had constantly maintained stout hearts and a soldierly spirit in despite of the heavy losses they had suffered when carrying out their costly duty of closing the big gap between the left of the Anzac troops and Chocolate Hill from August 8th to 14th. On August 21st this same battalion, together with the 6th Battalion Border Regiment, displayed a vigorous initiative combined with very steady discipline during the attack on Ismail Oglu Tepe.

Since the publication of my despatch of December 11th the late Commanders of the 11th Division and IXth Corps have drawn my attention to the good work done by the following officers :—

Brigadier-General R. P. Maxwell, commanding the 33rd Brigade. He evinced coolness as well as energy throughout the heavy fighting of August, and stuck to his duty afterwards until, through sickness, he was literally unable to stand.

Brigadier-General H. Haggard, commanding the 32nd Brigade. He was severely wounded on August 7th, but not before he had had time to give sure proof of leadership and daring.

The following mentions of officers of the staff of the 29th Brigade and of the 6th Royal Irish Rifles and 10th Hampshire Regiment have only lately come to hand. The original documents seem to have gone entirely astray, owing to successive casualties amongst the senior officers to whom they were addressed :—

#### 29TH BRIGADE.

Staff :—

Captain A. H. McCleverty, 2nd Rajput Light Infantry, Brigade Major.

10th (Service) Battalion, Hampshire Regiment :—

Major (temporary Lieut.-Colonel) W. D. Bewsher.

Temporary Captain F. M. Hicks.

No. 4410 Sergeant-Major J. Smith.

No. 4291 Company Sergeant-Major W. T. Groves (killed).

6th (Service) Battalion, Royal Irish Rifles :—

Lieut.-Colonel E. C. Bradford.

Captain (temporary Major) W. Eastwood (killed).

Captain (temporary Major) A. L. Wilford, 5th Light Infantry, Indian Army (attached).

Regimental Serjeant-Major P. Mulholland.

#### 11TH DIVISION.

Staff :—

Captain J. F. S. D. Coleridge, 8th Gurkha Rifles.

#### 32ND BRIGADE.

Staff :—

Captain B. W. Shuttleworth, 45th Rattray's Sikhs.

6th (Service) Battalion, York and Lancaster Regiment :—

Temporary Captain W. H. Toohey.

Temporary Captain W. P. Baldock (Lieutenant, Reserve of Officers) (killed).

No. 4324 Sergeant A. Ollernshaw.

## 33RD BRIGADE.

Staff :—

Temporary Captain A. Hoade.

6th (Service) Battalion, Lincolnshire Regiment :—

Major A. E. Norton, West India Regiment (attached).

9th (Service) Battalion, Sherwood Foresters (Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire Regiment) :—

Temporary Major A. S. Murray (Captain, Reserve of Officers).

Captain F. F. Loyd.

I have the honour to be,

Your Lordship's most obedient servant,

IAN HAMILTON,

General.

Late Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean  
Expeditionary Force.

## APPENDIX XIII.

*Despatch by the General Officer Commanding Indian Expeditionary Force "D,"  
(Mesopotamia)*

General Headquarters, I.E.F. "D," January 1st, 1916.

*From General Sir John Nixon, K.C.B., A.D.C., General, Commanding Indian  
Expeditionary Force "D," to the Chief of the General Staff, Army  
Headquarters, India.*

Sir,—I have the honour to forward a report on the operations of the forces under my command for the period from the middle of April, 1915, up to the end of September, 1915.

1. The floods of last season, which are said to have been the highest for 30 years, formed an inland sea of water and reeds varying from two to six feet deep, which extended for 40 miles north of Qurnah, down to Basrah, and stretching from Nasiriyah in the west to Hawizeh (50 miles north-east of Qurnah) in the east. Consequently, until the subsidence of the floods at the end of July, operations in this area were of an amphibious nature.

2. During the month of April a brigade at Ahwaz, first under Major-General Davison, and subsequently under Brigadier-General Lean, had been containing a hostile force consisting of some eight battalions of Turks with eight guns and about 10,000 Arab auxiliaries, which had advanced from Amara via Bisaitin and Khafajiyah (on the Kharkeh River) into Persian Arabistan.

At this time another British detachment was at Qurnah, where it had been opposed since January by a Turkish force of some six battalions with 10 guns and the usual following of Arab tribesmen, which had descended the Tigris from Amara.

By the defeat of the Turks at Barjisiyah (20 miles south-west of Basrah) on April 14th the hostile forces in the vicinity of Basrah had been dispersed and driven to Nasiriyah, enabling me to take active measures against the enemy detachments on the Karun and on the Tigris.

I decided to deal first with the former and placed Major-General Gorringe in command of the operation.

3. Directly the Turks had been defeated at Barjisiyah the concentration of the 12th Division up the Karun was commenced. The Turkish force near Ahwaz

retreated across the Kharkeh River on hearing of the defeat of their army at Barjisiyah.

General Gorringe followed in pursuit. By May 7th the 12th Division and the Cavalry Brigade had reached Illah on the Kharkeh. This river was 250 yards wide with a rapid and deep stream, which presented a formidable obstacle to the passage of troops.

4. General Gorringe overcame the difficulties of passage and skilfully crossed his troops and guns to the other bank. The Turks continued their retreat towards Amara on discovering that our column had crossed the river.

General Gorringe now found himself under the necessity of dealing with a recalcitrant and pugnacious branch of the Beni Taruf Arabs, who had identified themselves very strongly with the Turkish cause.

He advanced down the Kharkeh River, operating on both banks.

Major-General Melliss commanded the column on the right bank, and Brigadier-General Lean that on the left bank.

The occasion of the successful attack on the Arab stronghold, Kharajiyah, in extremely hot weather, when the temperature in tents was 120 degrees, was a display of dogged gallantry and devotion on the part of the troops engaged.

Among other intrepid deeds was the exploit of Subadar Major Ajab Khan and 20 men of the 76th Punjabis, who swam the river under heavy fire, and brought back a boat in which troops were ferried across until sufficient were collected to assault a stout mud fort which was strongly held.

5. After the defeat and dispersion of the hostile tribesmen who had molested his advance, General Gorringe, in accordance with my instructions, made a series of demonstrations with a portion of his force from Bisaitin against the Turkish force which lay between him and Amara. This action was in co-operation with the impending advance of our detachment from Qurnah (commanded by Major-General Townshend) on Amara. It had the desired result of preventing reinforcements from joining the Turkish forces on the Tigris in time to oppose General Townshend's advance. It was largely due to these demonstrations that the enemy's retreat up the Tigris, after their defeat on May 31st, was so precipitate, and that General Townshend was enabled to enter Amara practically unopposed. The Turkish force opposing General Gorringe was so delayed in its march to Amara that when it eventually reached there it was surprised by General Townshend, who was already in occupation of the town. A part of the advance guard was captured and the remainder had to seek safety in dispersion with the loss of two guns.

6. General Gorringe's operations extended over a period of seven weeks. As a result, Persian Arabistan had been cleared of the enemy, and the Arab tribes forced to submit, thus enabling the pipe line to be repaired and normal conditions to be resumed at the oil fields, and most effective assistance had been given to General Townshend's advance from Qurnah.

7. I consider that General Gorringe showed marked ability and determination in conducting these operations. The successful result is due to his able leadership and to the zeal and energy displayed by all ranks under his command.

The troops were compelled to undergo severe exertions, and overcame many obstacles during very hot and trying weather with undiminished resolution and zeal that was admirable.

8. While the 12th Division was advancing by the Karun and Kharkeh Rivers, preparations were in progress for an advance up the Tigris by the 6th Division under command of Major-General Townshend. Owing to the limited amount of river transport available at that time the movement and collection of troops was a slow and difficult process, and the flooded country around Qurnah presented

many problems which required careful attention before operations could be commenced.

9. "Bellums"—long, narrow boats of the country—were collected and armoured with iron plates, to be used for carrying infantry to the assault of the enemy's positions; troops were trained in punting and boat work; various types of guns mounted on rafts, barges, tugs, and paddlers; floating hospitals had to be improvised, and many other details of construction and equipment had to be thought out and provided for.

By the end of May preparations for the advance were complete.

10. The Turkish force was entrenched north of Qurnah on islands formed where high ground stood out from the inundation which covered all lower lying country.

These fortified localities were in two groups, the most southerly group forming an advanced position some two miles from the British lines; the main position being some three miles further to the north.

The flooded state of the country rendered it a position of some strength, necessitating a carefully organized attack in successive phases by combined naval and military operations.

General Townshend's plan was to capture the advanced position by a frontal attack combined with a turning attack against the enemy's left flank, supported by the naval flotilla and the artillery afloat, and that on land within the Qurnah entrenchments.

11. In the early morning of May 31st, after a heavy preparatory bombardment, the infantry advanced to the attack in the flotilla of improvised war "bellums," supported by admirably directed gunfire.

The 17th Infantry Brigade, commanded by Lieut.-Colonel Climo, 24th Punjabis, made the frontal attack. The 22nd Punjabis and the Sirmur Sappers and Miners, under Lieut.-Colonel Blois Johnson, 22nd Punjabis, captured One Tree Hill, on the enemy's left flank, and enfiladed Norfolk Hill, the first objective of the 17th Infantry Brigade, which was carried at the point of the bayonet by the 1st Battalion, Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry, after poling their boats for over a mile through thick reeds and landing waist deep in water.

12. The bold action of the mine-sweepers, which preceded the naval sloops and armed tugs, enabled the latter to keep pace with the troops, and their fire, combined with that of the Royal Artillery ashore and afloat, ensured the capture of the whole of the enemy's advanced position by noon.

It was entirely due to careful preparation and organization of artillery fire of all kinds that our casualties were very few.

These operations form a good example of the co-operation of the Royal Navy with infantry and artillery.

13. An aeroplane reconnaissance on the morning of June 1st discovered that the enemy had evacuated his main position, and was in full retreat up the Tigris.

The Naval Flotilla, led by H.M.S. "Espiegle" (Captain Nunn, R.N.), pushed in pursuit, followed by the shipping with troops.

On the morning of June 2nd, when some ten miles below Qalat Salih, the deeper-draught vessels could proceed no further owing to shoal water, and the pursuit was continued by the naval armed tugs. Up to this time the "Espiegle" had engaged and sunk the Turkish gunboat "Marmaris," and had captured two steamers and a number of lighters laden with munitions and stores.

14. Qalat Salih was reached on the afternoon of June 2nd, and after some hostile troops outside the town had been dispersed the pursuit was continued.

H.M.S. "Comet" (Captain Nunn, R.N.), with General Townshend on board, and three armed tugs, occupied Amara in the afternoon of June 3rd, capturing

there some 700 troops and 40 officers. This is a most excellent instance of courage and pertinacity in pursuit, and very creditable to all who took part in it.

The leading infantry (2nd Battalion, Norfolk Regiment) of the 6th Division arrived at Amara at 6.30 a.m. on June 4th, not a moment too soon, as the inhabitants were beginning to realize the size of the force which had cowed them into submission on the previous day.

15. The captures resulting from the action at Qurnah, the pursuit and the occupation of Amara, included 17 guns, 2,718 rifles, 1,773 prisoners, four river steamers (exclusive of the gunboat "Marmaris" and another steamer, which was sunk), a number of lighters and boats, besides quantities of ammunition and stores.

The weather throughout these operations was intensely hot—a sweltering sun all day, followed by still and sultry nights; but in spite of this the spirit and energy of all ranks was excellent.

16. I consider that General Townshend carried out these operations in a highly creditable manner. His prompt and vigorous pursuit is worthy of high praise, and it was largely due to his dash and enterprise that Amara was entered unopposed.

The part played by General Goringe's force to help General Townshend's operations has been described in an earlier part of this despatch.

17. Immediately after the capture of Amara, preparations were taken in hand for the capture of Nasiriyah, on the Euphrates, the dominant place on this flank. Its importance lies in the facts that it is the base from which a hostile force threatening Basrah must start; it is the centre from which influence can be exercised among the powerful Arab tribes which lie along the Euphrates; standing at one end of the Shatt-el-Hai, it closes communication between the Tigris and Euphrates, and is thus of strategic value; and, lastly, it was the headquarters of the civil administration of a large part of the Basrah Province.

18. To General Goringe and his troops was allotted this objective. The route from Qurnah to Nasiriyah is by water, through the low-lying valley of the Old Euphrates Channel for 30 miles to Chahbaish; across the Hammar Lake for 15 miles to its western side, thence by the Haqiqah—a tortuous channel, some 50 yards wide and 15 miles long—until the main channel of the Euphrates is reached some 25 miles below Nasiriyah. From Qurnah to Chahbaish, deep-draught vessels can go up the old Euphrates; beyond this, at the time the operations commenced, on June 27th, the Hammar Lake was passable by all river steamers drawing less than five feet, as far as the entrance to the Haqiqah Channel. By the middle of July the channel across the lake held little more than three feet of water, and only the smallest steamers could cross. In many cases steamers were aground for days at a time, and the small tugs fitted as gunboats could only be taken across by removing guns, ammunition, armour plating, fuel and water, and using light-draught sternwheelers to tow them. Later, troops and stores could only be transported in "bellums," which for some distances had to be dragged over mud and water by men.

The Haqiqah Channel was blocked by a solidly constructed "Bund" half a mile from its entrance to the Lake, which had to be removed before the passage could be used by shipping.

19. Above its junction with the Haqiqah the Euphrates has an average width of 200 yards. Along its banks are numerous gardens, patches of cultivation, and several small villages within walled enclosures. On the left bank, belts of date palms, with an occasional fringe of willow trees, are the prevailing features. On the right bank the country is more open. During July, except for a belt of dry ground along the river banks a few hundred yards wide, on either side the



country was completely under water. Numerous irrigation channels intersect this belt of dry land at right angles to the river, presenting a series of obstacles to an advance. Such was the nature of the country where the Turks offered their main opposition to our advance on Nasiriyah.

20. On June 26th General Gorrings's force was concentrated at Qurnah, and proceeded on June 27th across the Hammar Lake, preceded by gunboats under command of Captain Nunn, R.N. Hostile armed launches above the Haqiqah bund were driven back. The bund was occupied, and the work of demolition commenced.

During the 28th a channel 150 feet wide and four feet deep was made. The rush of water through the opening created a strong rapid, almost a cataract, up which parties of men were successful in hauling up the naval craft on the 29th.

It was not until July 4th that all vessels and troops were passed over the Haqiqah obstruction, and established about two and a half miles from the junction with the Euphrates. Covering this entrance, reconnaissances proved that the enemy had established themselves with guns on the right bank of the Euphrates commanding both banks of the Haqiqah, and the mine field which they had prepared about a mile down it.

21. At 4.45 a.m. on July 5th the 30th Infantry Brigade, commanded by Major-General Melliss, advanced to attack the enemy; on the left bank, the 76th Punjabis and the 24th Punjabis, the latter moving in bellums through the inundation accompanied by the 30th Mountain Battery. The 2/7th Gurkhas supported by the 1/4th Hants moved up the right bank. Considerable opposition was encountered, especially on the left bank, and it was not until 1.20 p.m. that our troops forced the enemy on the right bank of the Euphrates to hoist the white flag.

The 24th Punjabis had to carry their bellums across some sixty yards of dry land before they could cross the Euphrates to take possession of the enemy's position and battery. After the right bank had been cleared our naval craft were able to sweep for mines, an operation rendered easier for us as a captured Turkish officer assisted to indicate their position.

By 9 p.m. the channel was clear. The ships came up and the troops embarked.

22. The detachment of the enemy which had opposed our advance consisted of 1,000 regular Turkish troops, 2,000 Arabs, four guns and two Thorneycroft launches armed with pom-poms. Four guns and 130 prisoners fell into our hands at a cost to us of 26 killed and 85 wounded.

The second phase of these operations was commenced on the morning of July 6th by the occupation of Suk-Esh-Sheyukh by Captain Nunn, with two gunboats, and afterwards the whole flotilla moved up the Euphrates.

23. The Turks had taken up a series of positions astride the river about five miles below Nasiriyah, with both flanks resting on marshes. In front of their trenches were broad deep channels difficult to turn or assault.

The ground on the right bank was devoid of cover; that on the left bank fringed by a narrow belt of palms.

24. General Gorrings established his force some two miles below the enemy's advanced positions and occupied entrenchments on both banks. Up to July 13th continual reconnaissances were made and our entrenchments gradually extended nearer to the enemy.

25. On the night of 13th-14th an attack was made by our troops on both banks. On the right bank we secured an entrenched position within 400 yards of the Turkish trenches. A gallant attempt by the 24th Punjabis under Lieut.-Colonel Climo, supported by four guns of the 30th Mountain Battery under

Captain E. J. Nixon, to capture some sandhills behind the enemy's right flank met with unexpectedly strong opposition, and they were attacked in rear by Arab tribesmen and had to withdraw.

The mountain guns covering the withdrawal rendered invaluable support.

26. Until the 23rd, General Gorringe was perfecting arrangements for his decisive attack. Gun positions were moved forward, infantry trenches extended and communications improved. The working parties were subjected to a continual fire, but our snipers established ascendancy over those of the enemy. The heat night and day throughout was intense.

27. At 5 a.m. on July 24th the attack was launched. By 7.30 a.m. the 12th Infantry Brigade operating on the left bank of the river had occupied the enemy's advanced trenches at Miyadiyah. The 30th Infantry Brigade then pushed its attack up the right bank, covered by well-directed artillery fire, and by 9.30 a.m. had captured the advanced trenches after forcing the passage of the Mejinineh Channel. During this operation the gunboat "Sumana," carrying bridging material, fought her way up to the entrance of the creek under a very heavy fire, and, supported by the fire from the gunboats, the 17th Company Sappers and Miners threw a bridge across.

28. The attack was continued by both banks. The main position was captured by noon, in spite of a stubborn resistance. The enemy clung to their trenches where some 500 were killed. After reorganizing, the troops pushed forward to the Sadanawiyah position—the enemy's final line of defence, which was also captured. During the attack at Sadanawiyah, Captain Nunn, in the "Shushan," a small sternwheeler, laid his ship alongside hostile trenches on the river bank and engaged them at close range.

29. By 6.30 p.m. the enemy was in full retreat across the marshes, and our troops bivouacked on the position they had won.

Severe losses had been inflicted on the enemy, while our casualties were not heavy considering the nature of the fighting, the total number of our killed and wounded being under 600.

Our captures included over 1,000 prisoners, 17 guns, five machine guns, 1,586 rifles, and quantities of ammunition and stores.

Nasiriyah was occupied on the 25th without further opposition.

30. General Gorringe conducted the task assigned to him with skill and determination, and his troops responded to the strenuous calls that were made upon them in a gallant and devoted manner.

Seldom, if ever, have our troops been called upon to campaign in more trying heat than they have experienced this summer in the marshy plains of Mesopotamia.

But the spirit of the troops never flagged, and in the assault of the entrenchments which the Turks thought impregnable, British and Indian soldiers displayed a gallantry and devotion to duty worthy of the highest traditions of the Service.

31. I have to place on record the excellence of the work performed by the officers and men of the Royal Flying Corps, whose valuable reconnaissances materially assisted in clearing up the situation before the battle of July 24th.

32. And I have to express my deep appreciation of the valuable and whole-hearted co-operation of the officers and men of the Royal Navy under the command of Captain Nunn, D.S.O., Senior Naval Officer. It was in a great measure due to the excellent work performed by the Royal Navy that these amphibious operations, like those at Qurnah, at the end of May, were brought to so successful a conclusion.

33. The capture of Nasiriyah had established British control on the western side of the Basrah Vilayet, but the district lying north of the line Amara-Nasiriyah still remained outside our control, and strong Turkish forces under Nur-Ed-Din Bey were reported to be concentrating at Kut-el-Amara, at the junction of the

Shatt-el-Hai with the Tigris, the possession of which strategic centre is necessary for the effective control of the northern part of the Basrah Vilayet. Nur-Ed-Din has attempted to cause a diversion by pushing strong detachments to within thirty miles of Amara, while my principal attention was concentrated on the Euphrates.

The defeat of Nur-Ed-Din and the occupation of Kut-el-Amara became my next objective as soon as Nasiriyah was secured, and I commenced the transfer of troops towards Amara on the following day.

34. After the month of June the Shatt-el-Hai ceases to be navigable for some six months, and the only line of advance by water on Kut-el-Amara is by the River Tigris.

On August 1st a detachment from the 6th Division, accompanied by a naval flotilla, occupied Ali-al-Gharbi. Covered by this detachment, the concentration of the 6th Division under General Townshend for the advance on Kut-el-Amara was carried out.

35. The transfer of troops from the Euphrates to the Tigris was a slow process, owing to the difficulties in crossing the shallow Hammar Lake during the low-water season.

By September 12th the force was concentrated at Ali-al-Gharbi. Thence the advance was continued by route march along the river bank, accompanied by a naval flotilla and shipping, until Sannaiyat (some eight miles below the enemy's position covering Kut-el-Amara) was reached on September 15th. Intense heat prevailed during the period of this march, with temperatures ranging from 110 degrees to 116 degrees in the shade. The column remained halted at Sannaiyat until September 25th, receiving reinforcements during this period.

36. A few skirmishes had taken place between our cavalry and that of the enemy, and constant naval and air reconnaissances were made. Accurate information was gained regarding the dispositions of the enemy.

The work performed by the Royal Flying Corps during this period was invaluable.

37. Nur-Ed-Din Bey's army lay astride the river some seven miles north-east of Kut and eight miles from General Townshend's force at Sannaiyat. It occupied a line naturally favourable for defence, which, during three or four months of preparation, had been converted into a formidable position.

On the right bank the defences extended for five miles southwards along some mounds which commanded an extensive field of fire. The river was blocked by a boom composed of barges and wire cables commanded at close range by guns and fire trenches. On the left bank the entrenchments extended for seven miles, linking up the gaps between the river and three marshes which stretched away to the north. The defences were well designed and concealed, commanding flat and open approaches. They were elaborately constructed with a thoroughness that missed no detail. In front of the trenches were barbed wire entanglements, military pits, and land mines. Behind were miles of communication trenches connecting the various works and providing covered outlets to the river, where ramps and landing-stages had been made to facilitate the transfer of troops to or from ships, while pumping engines and water channels carried water from the river to the trenches.

38. Nur-Ed-Din's Army held this position: one division being on each bank, with some Army troops in reserve on the left bank, near a bridge above the main position. A force of Arab horsemen was posted on the Turkish left flank; most of the Turkish regular cavalry were absent during the battle on a raid against our communications at Shaikh Saad.

39. On September 26th General Townshend advanced to within four miles of the Turkish position. His plan was to make a decisive attack on the left bank

by enveloping the Turkish left with his main force, but in order to deceive the enemy as to the direction of the real attack, preliminary dispositions and preparatory attacks were made with the object of inducing the Turks to expect the principal attack on the right bank.

40. On the morning of the 27th our troops advanced by both banks. The principal force, on the right bank, made a feint attack on the trenches south of the river, while the left bank detachment entrenched itself within 3,000 yards of the enemy. Meanwhile a bridge had been constructed, and under cover of night the main force crossed from the right bank and deployed opposite the enemy's left flank.

41. On the morning of September 28th a general attack was made against the enemy on the left bank. The 18th Infantry Brigade, under Major-General Fry, with its left on the line of the river, made a pinning attack, while Brigadier-General Delamain, commanding the 16th and 17th Infantry Brigades, advanced in two columns against the enemy's left, one column being directed frontally against the flank entrenchments, while the other moved wide round the flank and attacked in rear. General Delamain's right flank was protected by the Cavalry Brigade.

42. The first troops to enter the enemy trenches were the 1st Battalion Dorsetshire Regiment, 117th Maharattas, and 22nd Company Sappers and Miners, who made a brilliant assault, well supported by the artillery, and soon after 10 a.m. captured a redoubt and trenches on the enemy's extreme left, inflicting heavy losses and taking 135 prisoners.

43. A combined attack by the 16th and 17th Infantry Brigades was then made, and, after hard fighting, during which the enemy made several unsuccessful counter-attacks, the whole of the northern part of the enemy's position was in our hands by 2 p.m.

44. General Delamain reorganized his troops on the captured position and gave them a much-needed rest, as they were exhausted by the great heat, the long march, and hard fighting. After a brief rest General Delamain moved his column southwards to assist the 18th Infantry Brigade by attacking the enemy opposed to it in rear. Before this attack could develop strong hostile reserves appeared from the south-west, in the direction of the bridge. General Delamain immediately changed his objective and attacked the new troops, supported by his guns, firing at a range of 1,700 yards.

45. The sight of the approaching enemy and the prospect of getting at him in the open with the bayonet put new life into our infantry, who were suffering from weariness and exhaustion after their long and trying exertions under the tropical sun. For the time thirst and fatigue were forgotten.

The attack was made in a most gallant manner with great dash. The enemy were routed with one magnificent rush, which captured four guns and inflicted heavy losses on the Turks. The enemy fought stubbornly, and were saved from complete destruction by the approach of night.

46. General Delamain's troops bivouacked for the night on the scene of their victory about two miles from the river, both men and horses suffering severely from want of water, as the brackish water of the marshes is undrinkable. In the morning the column reached the river, and the horses got their first water for forty hours.

47. Throughout the battle the Naval Flotilla co-operated with the land attack from positions on the river. Late in the evening of 28th, led by the "Comet" (Lieut.-Commander E. C. Cookson, R.N., Acting Senior Naval Officer), the flotilla advanced upstream and endeavoured to force a passage through the boom obstruction. The ships came under a terrific fire from both banks at close range. The "Comet" rammed the boom, but it withstood the shock.



Lieut.-Commander Cookson was shot dead while most gallantly attempting to cut a wire cable securing the barges.

48. The Turks evacuated their remaining trenches during the night and escaped along the bank of the Tigris. On the morning of the 29th a pursuit was organized, troops moving in ships preceded by cavalry on land.

The cavalry, consisting of four weak squadrons, overtook the enemy on October 1st, but had to wait for the support of the river column, as the Turks were making an orderly retreat, covered by a strong rearguard with infantry and guns.

49. The progress of the river column was so delayed by the difficulties of navigation, due to the constantly shifting shallows in the river, that it was unable to overtake the retreating enemy.

When the ships reached Aziziyah on October 5th, the enemy had reached their prepared defensive position at Ctesiphon, covering the road to Baghdad, where they were reinforced.

50. The Turks lost some 4,000 men in casualties, of whom 1,153 were prisoners captured by us. In addition we took 14 guns and a quantity of rifles, ammunition, and stores. Considering the severity of the fighting our casualties were comparatively small. They amounted to 1,233, including a large proportion of men only slightly wounded.

51. The defeat of Nur-Ed-Din Bey completed the expulsion of Turkish troops from the Basrah Vilayet. Apart from material gains won at Kut-el-Amara, our troops once again proved their irresistible gallantry in attack, and added another victory to British arms in Mesopotamia.

52. I am glad to place on record my appreciation of the ability and generalship displayed by Major-General C. V. F. Townshend, C.B., D.S.O., throughout these operations. His plan for turning the Turkish left was the manoeuvre whereby the position could best be captured without incurring very heavy losses.

53. Brigadier-General Delamain, who commanded the main attack, showed himself to be a resolute and resourceful commander. His leadership during the battle was admirable.

54. The troops under the command of Major-General Townshend displayed high soldierly qualities, and upheld the reputation they have earned during this arduous campaign.

55. The conduct of the infantry in the attack was particularly noteworthy. They were set a task involving prolonged exertion and endurance, and performed it with an alacrity and resolution which must have been most disconcerting to the enemy.

56. The artillery has established a high reputation for good shooting. The infantry rely on their accuracy and skill; during the attack they welcome the close support of the guns, and press forward with the narrowest margin dividing them from the curtain of bursting shells, in a manner that is a tribute to their comrades in the artillery.

57. The services of the Royal Flying Corps, not only during the battle but also in the frequent reconnaissances which preceded the fighting, also call for notice.

The flying officers displayed courage and devotion in the performance of their duties, which were often carried out under a heavy fire. The accurate information obtained during air reconnaissances was of the utmost value in planning the defeat of the enemy, and the remarkable skill and powers of observation displayed by Flight-Commander Major H. L. Reilly, Royal Flying Corps, contributed in no small degree to the success of the operations.



58. The work of the Royal Navy fully maintained the high standard they have established in these rivers. I much regret the loss of Lieut.-Commander E. C. Cookson, whose gallant act has already been referred to.

59. Acknowledgments are due to the excellent work done by the commanders and personnel of the river steamers for their unremitting work in connection with operations on the rivers of Mesopotamia.

60. Accompanying this despatch is a list of officers and men whose names I wish to bring to notice in connection with the operations undertaken during the period under report.

I have, etc.,

(Signed) JOHN NIXON, General,  
Commanding I.E.F. "D."

#### APPENDIX XIV.

*Despatch by the General Officer Commanding the Mediterranean Forces.*

Headquarters, 1st Army, France, 6th March, 1916.

My Lord,—I have the honour to submit herewith a brief account of the operations in the Eastern Mediterranean from October 28th, 1915, on which date I assumed command of the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force, until January 9th, 1916, when, in compliance with your directions, I handed over charge at Cairo to Lieut.-General Sir Archibald Murray, K.C.B., C.V.O., D.S.O.

On October 20th, in London, I received your Lordship's instructions to proceed as soon as possible to the near East and take over the command of the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force.

My duty on arrival was in broad outline :—

- (a) To report on the military situation on the Gallipoli Peninsula.
- (b) To express an opinion whether on purely military grounds the Peninsula should be evacuated, or another attempt made to carry it.
- (c) The number of troops that would be required,
  - (1) to carry the Peninsula,
  - (2) to keep the Straits open, and
  - (3) to take Constantinople.

Two days after my arrival at Imbros, where the headquarters of the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force was established, I proceeded to the Peninsula to investigate the military situation. The impressions I gathered are summarised very shortly as follows :—

The positions occupied by our troops presented a military situation unique in history. The mere fringe of the coast line had been secured. The beaches and piers upon which they depended for all requirements in personnel and material were exposed to registered and observed artillery fire. Our entrenchments were dominated almost throughout by the Turks. The possible artillery positions were insufficient and defective. The force, in short, held a line possessing every possible military defect. The position was without depth, the communications were insecure and dependent on the weather. No means existed for the concealment and deployment of fresh troops destined for the offensive—whilst the Turks enjoyed full powers of observation, abundant artillery positions, and they had been given the time to supplement the natural advantages which the position presented by all the devices at the disposal of the field engineer.

Another material factor came prominently before me. The troops on the Peninsula had suffered much from various causes.

- (a) It was not in the first place possible to withdraw them from the shell-swept area, as is done when necessary in France, for every corner on the Peninsula is exposed to hostile fire.
- (b) They were much enervated from the diseases which are endemic in that part of Europe in the summer.
- (c) In consequence of the losses which they had suffered in earlier battles, there was a very grave dearth of officers competent to take command of men.
- (d) In order to maintain the numbers needed to hold the front, the Territorial divisions had been augmented by the attachment of Yeomanry and mounted brigades. Makeshifts of this nature very obviously did not tend to create efficiency.

Other arguments, irrefutable in their conclusions, convinced me that a complete evacuation was the only wise course to pursue

- (a) It was obvious that the Turks could hold us in front with a small force and prosecute their designs on Baghdad or Egypt, or both.
- (b) An advance from the positions we held could not be regarded as a reasonable military operation to expect.
- (c) Even had we been able to make an advance in the Peninsula, our position would not have been ameliorated to any marked degree, and an advance on Constantinople was quite out of the question.
- (d) Since we could not hope to achieve any purpose by remaining on the Peninsula, the appalling cost to the nation involved in consequence of embarking on an overseas expedition with no base available for the rapid transit of stores, supplies, and personnel, made it urgent that we should divert the troops locked up on the Peninsula to a more useful theatre.

Since, therefore, I could see no military advantage in our continued occupation of positions on the Peninsula, I telegraphed to your Lordship that, in my opinion, the evacuation of the Peninsula should be taken in hand.

Subsequently I proceeded to Egypt to confer with Colonel Sir H. McMahon, the High Commissioner, and Lieut.-General Sir J. Maxwell, Commanding the Forces in Egypt, over the situation which might be created in Egypt and the Arab world by the evacuation of the Peninsula.

Whilst in Egypt I was ordered by a telegram from the War Office to take command of the troops at Salonika. The purport of this telegram was subsequently cancelled by your Lordship on your arrival at Mudros, and I was then ordered to assume command of the forces in the Mediterranean, east of Malta, and exclusive of Egypt.

Consequent on these instructions, I received approval that the two forces in the Mediterranean should be designated as follows:—

- (a) The original Mediterranean Expeditionary Force, which comprised the forces operating on the Gallipoli Peninsula and those employed at Mudros and Imbros as the "Dardanelles Army," under Lieut.-General Sir W. Birdwood, K.C.B., etc., with headquarters at Imbros.
- (b) The troops destined for Salonika as the "Salonika Army," under Lieut.-General Sir B. Mahon, K.C.B., with headquarters at Salonika.

The staff of the original Mediterranean Expeditionary Force was left in part to form the Dardanelles Army, and the remainder were taken to make a General Headquarter Staff for the increased responsibilities now assumed. Other officers

doing duty in this theatre with the necessary qualifications were selected, and, with no difficulty or demands on home resources, a thoroughly efficient and adequate staff was created.

Mudros was selected as being the most suitable site for the establishment of headquarters, as affording an opportunity, in addition to other advantages, of daily consultation with the Inspector-General, Line of Communications. The working of the services of the line of communications presented difficulties of an unique character, mainly owing to:—

- (a) The absence of pier and wharfage accommodation at Mudros and the necessity of transferring all ordnance and engineer stores from one ship to another.
- (b) The submarine danger.
- (c) The delay caused by rough weather.

Close association with General Altham was therefore most imperative, and by this means many important changes were made which conduced to greater efficiency and more prompt response to the demands of fighting units.

A narrative of the events which occurred in each of the two Armies is now recorded separately for facility of perusal and reference.

#### SALONIKA ARMY.

Early in October the 10th Division, under Lieut.-General Sir B. Mahon, K.C.B., was transferred from Suvla to Salonika, and fully concentrated there. The dislocation of units caused by the landing on the Peninsula and the subsequent heavy fighting which occurred prevented this division being despatched intact. The organization of the infantry and the Royal Engineers was not disturbed, but the other services had to be improvised from other divisions as found most accessible.

The arrival of the 10th Division had been preceded by two French divisions under General Sarraill, whose force was subsequently augmented by another division. These three divisions were then moved into Serbia under the understanding arranged between the Allies' Governments, which was to the effect that the French forces were to protect the railway between Krivolak and Veles, and to ensure communication with the Serbian Army, whilst the British were to maintain the position from Salonika to Krivolak, and to support the French right. If communication with the Serbian Army could not be opened and maintained, the Allied forces were to be withdrawn.

With this object, two battalions of the 10th Division were moved from Salonika on October 27th, and took over the French front from Kosturino to Lake Doiran. The remainder of the division was sent to Serbia on November 12th and following days, and took over the French front eastwards from Kosturino.

The task of moving troops into Serbia and maintaining them there presented many difficulties. No road exists from Salonika to Doiran, a few miles of road then obtains, which is followed within a few miles by a track only suitable for pack transport. Sir B. Mahon had therefore to readjust his transport to a pack scale, and was dependent on a railway of uncertain carrying power to convey back his guns and all wheeled traffic in case of a withdrawal, and to supply his troops whilst in Serbia.

Very soon afterwards reinforcements commenced to arrive. The disembarkation of these new divisions was an operation which taxed the powers of organization and resources of the staff at Salonika to the highest degree possible, and it speaks highly for their capacity that they were able to shelter and feed the troops as they arrived.

During November and the early part of December the 10th Division was holding its position in Serbia, and the disembarkation of other divisions was proceeding with difficulty.

In order to gain time for the landing of the troops, and their deployment on the positions selected, I represented to General Sarraill and Sir B. Mahon the urgent need of the divisions withdrawing from Serbia being utilized as a covering force, and retaining their ground as such until the forces disembarking were thoroughly in a position to hold their front.

It had been evident for some time that the power of resistance of the Serbian Armies was broken, and that the Allied forces could afford them no material assistance. It was also clear from all information received that the position of our troops was becoming daily more precarious owing to a large German-Bulgarian concentration in the Strumniza Valley. I, therefore, again pressed General Sarraill to proceed with his withdrawal from the positions he was holding. The British division operating as it was, as the pivot upon which the withdrawal was effected, was compelled to hold its ground until the French left was brought back.

Before our withdrawal was completed the 10th Division was heavily attacked on December 6th, 7th, and 8th, by superior Bulgarian forces. The troops had suffered considerably from the cold in the Highlands of Macedonia, and in the circumstances conducted themselves very creditably in being able to extricate themselves from a difficult position with no great losses. The account of this action was reported by wire to you by General Mahon on December 11th: no further reference is therefore necessary to this incident.

As soon as I was informed that the 10th Division was being heavily pressed, I directed Sir B. Mahon to send a Brigade up the railway line in support, and to hold another Brigade ready to proceed at short notice. The withdrawal was, however, conducted into Greek territory without further opposition from the Bulgarians.

Meanwhile, the operation of disembarkation at Salonika was being carried out with all possible speed, and the Greek authorities, through their representative from Athens, Colonel Pallis, were informed by me that we intended to proceed to the defensive line selected. This intimation was received in good part by the Greek generals. They commenced to withdraw their troops further to the east where they did not hamper our plans, and they showed a disposition to meet our demands in a reasonable and friendly spirit.

Whilst dealing with the events above enumerated, I desire to give special prominence to the difficulties to which General Sir B. Mahon was exposed from the time of his landing at Salonika, and the ability which he displayed in overcoming them. The subjoined instances, selected from many which could be given, will illustrate my contention, and the high standard of administrative capacity displayed by the General Officer Commanding and his staff:—

- (a) From the date on which the 10th Division first proceeded into Serbia until the date of its withdrawal across the Greek frontier, personnel, guns, supplies and material of all kinds had to be sent up by rail to Doiran, and onwards by march, motor lorries, limbered waggons and pack animals. This railway, moreover, was merely a single track, and had to serve the demands of the local population as well as our needs. The evacuation of the wounded and sick had to be arranged on similar lines, yet the requirements of the troops were fully satisfied.
- (b) The majority of the divisions were sent without trains to Salonika, most units without first line transport; in spite of this, part of the force was converted into a mobile condition with very little delay.

- (c) The complications presented by the distribution and checking of stores, supplies, ammunition, etc., discharged from ships on to quays, with insufficient accommodation or storehouses, and with crude means of ingress and egress therefrom, and served by a single road which was divided between the French and ourselves, constituted a problem which could only be solved by officers of high administrative powers. I trust, therefore, that full recognition may be given to my recommendation of the officers who rendered such fine services under such arduous conditions.

#### THE DARDANELLES ARMY.

On my arrival in the Mediterranean theatre a gratifying decline in the high rate of sickness which had prevailed in the force during the summer months had become apparent. The wastage due to this cause still, however, remained very high.

The corps commanders were urged to take all advantage of the improved weather conditions to strengthen their positions by all available means, and to reduce to the last degree possible all animals not actually required for the maintenance of the troops, in order to relieve the strain imposed on the Naval Transport Service.

During the month of November, beyond the execution of very clever and successful minor enterprises carried out by corps commanders with a view to maintaining an offensive spirit in their commands, there remains little to record—except that an increased activity of the Turkish artillery against our front became a noticeable factor.

On November 21st the Peninsula was visited by a storm said to be nearly unprecedented for the time of the year. The storm was accompanied by torrential rain, which lasted for twenty-four hours. This was followed by hard frost and a heavy blizzard. In the areas of the VIIIth Corps and the Anzac Corps the effects were not felt to a very marked degree owing to the protection offered by the surrounding hills. The IXth Corps were less favourably situated, the watercourses in this area became converted into surging rivers, which carried all before them. The water rose in many places to the height of the parapets and all means of communication were prevented. The men, drenched as they were by the rain, suffered from the subsequent blizzard most severely. Large numbers collapsed from exposure and exhaustion, and in spite of untiring efforts that were made to mitigate the suffering, I regret to announce that there were 200 deaths from exposure and over 10,000 sick evacuated during the first few days of December.

From reports given by deserters it is probable that the Turks suffered even to a greater degree.

In this period our flimsy piers, breakwaters and light shipping became damaged by the storm to a degree which might have involved most serious consequences, and was a very potent indication of the dangers attached to the maintenance and supply of an army operating on a coast line with no harbour, and devoid of all the accessories such as wharves, piers, cranes and derricks for the discharge and distribution of stores, etc.

Towards the latter end of the month, having in view the possibility of an evacuation of the Peninsula being ordered, I directed Lieut.-General Sir W. Birdwood, Commanding the Dardanelles Army, to prepare a scheme to this end, in order that all details should be ready in case of sanction being given to this operation.

I had in broad outline contemplated soon after my arrival on the Peninsula that an evacuation could best be conducted by a sub-division into three stages.



The first during which all troops, animals and supplies not required for a long campaign should be withdrawn.

The second to comprise the evacuation of all men, guns, animals and stores not required for defence during a period when the conditions of weather might retard the evacuation, or in fact seriously alter the programme contemplated.

The third or final stage, in which the troops on shore should be embarked with all possible speed, leaving behind such guns, animals and stores needed for military reasons at this period.

This problem with which we were confronted was the withdrawal of an army of a considerable size from positions in no cases more than 300 yards from the enemy's trenches, and its embarkation on open beaches, every part of which was within effective range of Turkish guns, and from which in winds from the south or south-west, the withdrawal of troops was not possible.

The attitude which we should adopt from a naval and military point of view in case of withdrawal from the Peninsula being ordered, had given me much anxious thought. According to text-book principles and the lessons to be gathered from history it seemed essential that this operation of evacuation should be immediately preceded by a combined naval and military feint in the vicinity of the Peninsula, with a view to distracting the attention of the Turks from our intention. When endeavouring to work out into concrete fact how such principles could be applied to the situation of our forces, I came to the conclusion that our chances of success were infinitely more probable if we made no departure of any kind from the normal life which we were following both on sea and on land. A feint which did not fully fulfil its purpose would have been worse than useless, and there was the obvious danger that the suspicion of the Turks would be aroused by our adoption of a course, the real purport of which could not have been long disguised.

On December 8th, consequent on your Lordship's orders, I directed the General Officer Commanding Dardanelles Army to proceed with the evacuation of Suvla and Anzac at once.

Rapidity of action was imperative, having in view the unsettled weather which might be expected in the *Ægean*. The success of our operations was entirely dependent on weather conditions. Even a mild wind from the south or south-west was found to raise such a ground swell as to greatly impede communication with the beaches, while anything in the nature of a gale from this direction could not fail to break up the piers, wreck the small craft, and thus definitely prevent any steps being taken towards withdrawal.

We had, moreover, during the gale of November 21st, learnt how entirely we were at the mercy of the elements with the slender and inadequate means at our disposal by which we had endeavoured to improvise harbours and piers. On that day the harbour at *Kephalos* was completely wrecked, one of the ships which had been sunk to form a breakwater was broken up, and the whole of the small craft sheltered inside the breakwater were washed ashore. Similar damage was done to our piers, lighters, and small craft at Suvla and Anzac.

Lieut.-General Birdwood proceeded, on receipt of his orders, with the skill and promptitude which is characteristic of all that he undertakes, and, after consultation with Rear-Admiral Wemyss, it was decided, provided the weather was propitious, to complete the evacuation on the night of December 19th-20th.

Throughout the period December 10th to 18th the withdrawal proceeded under the most auspicious conditions, and the morning of December 18th found the positions both at Anzac and Suvla reduced to the numbers determined, while the evacuation of guns, animals, stores, and supplies had continued most satisfactorily.

The arrangements for the final withdrawal made by Corps Commanders were as follows :—

It was imperative, of course, that the front line trenches should be held, however lightly, until the very last moment, and that the withdrawal from these trenches should be simultaneous throughout the line. To ensure this being done, Lieut.-General Sir W. Birdwood arranged that the withdrawal of the inner flanks of corps should be conducted to a common embarking area under the orders of the General Officer Commanding IXth Corps.

In the rear of the front line trenches at Suvla the General Officer Commanding IXth Corps broke up his area into two sections, divided roughly by the Salt Lake. In the southern section a defensive line had been prepared from the Salt Lake to the sea, and Lala Baba had been prepared for defence, on the left the second line ran from Kara Kol Dagh through Hill 10 to the Salt Lake. These lines were only to be held in case of emergency—the principle governing the withdrawal being that the troops should proceed direct from the trenches to the distributing centres near the beach, and that no intermediate positions should be occupied except in case of necessity.

At Anzac, owing to the proximity of the trenches to the beach, no second position was prepared except at Anzac Cove, where a small keep was arranged to cover the withdrawal of the rearmost parties in case of necessity.

The good fortune which had attended the evacuation continued during the night of the 19th-20th. The night was perfectly calm, with a slight haze over the moon, an additional stroke of good luck, as there was a full moon on that night.

Soon after dark the covering ships were all in position, and the final withdrawal began. At 1.30 a.m. the withdrawal of the rear parties commenced from the front trenches at Suvla and the left of Anzac. Those on the right of Anzac who were nearer the beach remained in position until 2 a.m. By 5.30 a.m. the last man had quitted the trenches.

At Anzac, four 18-pounder guns, two 5-inch howitzers, one 4.7 naval gun, one anti-aircraft, and two 3-pounder Hotchkiss guns were left, but they were destroyed before the troops finally embarked. In addition, 56 mules, a certain number of carts, mostly stripped of their wheels, and some supplies which were set on fire, were also abandoned.

At Suvla every gun, vehicle, and animal was embarked, and all that remained was a small stock of supplies, which were burnt.

Early in December orders had been issued for the withdrawal of the French troops on Helles, other than their artillery, and a portion of the line held by French Creoles had already been taken over by the Royal Naval Division on December 12th. On December 21st, having strengthened the VIIIth Corps with the 86th Brigade, the number of the French garrison doing duty on the Peninsula was reduced to 4,000 men. These it was hoped to relieve early in January, but before doing so it was necessary to give some respite from trench work to the 42nd Division, which was badly in need of a rest. My intention, therefore, was first to relieve the 42nd Division by the 88th Brigade, then to bring up the 13th Division, which was resting at Imbros since the evacuation of Suvla, in place of the 29th Division, and, finally, to bring up the 11th Division in relief of the French. Helles would then be held by the 52nd, 11th, and 13th Divisions, with the Royal Naval Division and the 42nd Division in reserve on adjacent islands.

On December 24th, General Sir W. Birdwood was directed to make all preliminary preparations for immediate evacuation, in the event of orders to this effect being received.

On December 28th your Lordship's telegram ordering the evacuation of Helles was received, whereupon, in view of the possibility of bad weather intervening, I instructed the General Officer Commanding Dardanelles Army to complete the

operation as rapidly as possible. He was reminded that every effort conditional on not exposing the personnel to undue risk should be made to save all 60-pounder and 18-pounder guns, 6-inch and 4.5 howitzers, with their ammunition and other accessories, such as mules and army transport carts, limbered waggons, etc. In addition, I expressed my wish that the final evacuation should be completed in one night, and that the troops should withdraw direct from the front trenches to the beaches, and not occupy any intermediate position unless seriously molested. At a meeting which was attended by the Vice-Admiral and the General Officer Commanding Dardanelles Army, I explained the course which I thought we should adopt to again deceive the Turks as to our intentions. The situation on the Peninsula had not materially changed owing to our withdrawal from Suvla and Anzac, except that there was a marked increased activity in aerial reconnaissance over our positions, and the islands of Mudros and Imbros, and that hostile patrolling of our trenches was more frequent and daring. The most apparent factor was that the number of heavy guns on the European and Asiatic shores had been considerably augmented, and that these guns were more liberally supplied with German ammunition, the result of which was that our beaches were continuously shelled, especially from the Asiatic shore. I gave it as my opinion that, in my judgment, I did not regard a feint as an operation offering any prospect of success. Time, the uncertainty of weather conditions in the *Ægean*, the absence of a suitable locality, and the withdrawal of small craft from the main issue for such an operation were some of the reasons which influenced me in the decision at which I arrived. With the concurrence of the Vice-Admiral, therefore, it was decided the Navy should do their utmost to pursue a course of retaliation against the Turkish batteries, but to refrain from any unusually aggressive attitude should the Turkish guns remain quiescent.

General Sir W. Birdwood had, in anticipation of being ordered to evacuate Helles, made such complete and far-seeing arrangements that he was able to proceed without delay to the issue of the comprehensive orders which the consummation of such a delicate operation in war requires.

He primarily arranged with General Brulard, who commanded the French forces on the Peninsula, that in order to escape the disadvantages of divided command in the final stage, the French infantry should be relieved as early as possible, but that their artillery should pass under the orders of the General Officer Commanding VIIIth Corps, and be withdrawn concurrently with the British guns at the opportune moment.

On December 30th, in consequence of the instructions I had received from the Chief of the General Staff to hand over my command at Alexandria to Lieut.-General Sir A. Murray, who, it was stated, was to leave England on December 28th, I broke up my headquarters at Mudros and proceeded with a small staff, comprising representatives of the General Staff, the Quartermaster-General and Adjutant-General branches, on H.M.S. "Cornwallis" to Alexandria. The rest of the staff were sent on in front so as to have offices in working order when my successor should arrive.

In the meantime the evacuation, following the same system as was practised at Suvla and Anzac, proceeded without delay. The French infantry remaining on the Peninsula were relieved on the night of January 1st-2nd, and were embarked by the French Navy on the following nights. Progress, however, was slower than had been hoped, owing to delays caused by accident and the weather. One of our largest horse ships was sunk by a French battleship, whereby the withdrawal was considerably retarded, and at the same time strong winds sprang up which interfered materially with work on the beaches. The character of the weather now setting in offered so little hope of a calm period of any duration, that General Sir W. Birdwood arranged with Admiral Sir J. de Robeck for the

assistance of some destroyers in order to accelerate the progress of re-embarkation. They then determined to fix the final stage of the evacuation for January 8th, or for the first fine night after that date.

Meanwhile the VIIIth Corps had maintained the offensive spirit in bombing and minor operations with which they had established the moral superiority they enjoyed over the enemy. On December 29th the 52nd Division completed the excellent work which they had been carrying out for so long by capturing a considerable portion of the Turkish trenches, and by successfully holding these in the face of repeated counter-attacks. The shelling of our trenches and beaches, however, increased in frequency and intensity, and the average daily casualties continued to increase.

The method of evacuation adopted by Lieut.-General Sir F. J. Davies, K.C.B., Commanding VIIIth Corps, followed in general outline that which had proved successful in the northern zone. As the removal of the whole of the heavy guns capable of replying to the enemy's artillery would have indicated our intentions to the enemy, it was decided to retain, but eventually destroy, one 6-inch British gun and six French heavy guns of old pattern which it would be impossible to remove on the last night. General Brulard himself suggested the destruction of these French guns.

The first step taken as regards the withdrawal of the troops was the formation of a strong embarkation staff and the preparation of positions covering the landings, in which small garrisons could maintain themselves against attack for a short time should the enemy become aware of our intention and follow up the movement.

Major-General the Hon. H. A. Lawrence, commanding the 52nd Division, was selected to take charge of all embarkation operations. At the same time the services of various staff officers were placed at the disposal of the General Officer Commanding, VIIIth Corps, and they rendered very valuable assistance.

The General Officer Commanding, 13th Division, selected and prepared a position covering Gully Beach. Other lines were selected and entrenched, covering the remainder of the beaches from the sea north of Sedd-el-Bahr to X beach inclusive. Garrisons were detailed for these defences, those at Gully Beach being under the General Officer Commanding, 13th Division, and those covering the remainder of the beaches being placed under the command of a selected officer, whose headquarters were established at an early date, together with those of the General Officer Commanding, Embarkation, at corps headquarters.

As the withdrawing troops passed within the line of these defences they came under the orders of the General Officer Commanding, Embarkation, which were conveyed to them by his staff officers at each beach.

In addition to these beach defences four lines of defence were arranged, three being already in existence and strongly wired. The fourth was a line of posts extending from De Tott's Battery on the east to the position covering Gully Beach on the west.

The time fixed for the last parties to leave the front trenches was 11.45 p.m., in order to permit the majority of the troops being already embarked before the front line was vacated. It was calculated that it would take between two and three hours for them to reach the beaches, at the conclusion of which time the craft to embark them would be ready.

The naval arrangements for embarkation were placed in the hands of Captain C. M. Staveley, R.N., assisted by a staff of naval officers at each place of embarkation.

On January 7th the enemy developed heavy artillery fire on the trenches held by the 13th Division, while the Asiatic guns shelled those occupied by the



Royal Naval Division. The bombardment, which was reported to be the heaviest experienced since we landed in April, lasted from noon until 5 p.m., and was intensive between 3 p.m. and 3.30. Considerable damage was done to our parapets and communication trenches, and telephone communications were interrupted. At 3.30 p.m. two Turkish mines were sprung near Fusilier Bluff, and the Turkish trenches were seen to be full of men whom their officers appeared to be urging to the assault. No attack, however, was developed except against Fusilier Bluff, where a half-hearted assault was quickly repulsed. Our shortage of artillery at this time was amply compensated for by the support received from fire of the supporting squadron under Captain D. L. Dent, R.N. Our casualties amounted to two officers and 56 other ranks killed, and four officers and 102 other ranks wounded.

January 8th was a bright, calm day, with a light breeze from the south. There was every indication of the continuance of favourable conditions, and, in the opinion of the Meteorological Officer, no important change was to be expected for at least twenty-four hours. The Turkish artillery was unusually inactive. All preparations for the execution of the final stage were complete.

The embarkation was fixed at such an hour that the troops detailed for the first trip might be able to leave their positions after dark. The second trip was timed so that at least a greater portion of the troops for this trip would, if all went well, be embarked before the final parties had left the front trenches. The numbers to be embarked at the first trip were fixed by the maximum that could be carried by the craft available, those of the second trip being reduced in order to provide for the possibility of casualties occurring amongst the craft required to carry them.

The numbers for the third trip consisted only of the parties left to hold front trenches to the last, together with the garrisons of the beach defences, the naval and military beach personnel and such R.E. personnel as might be required to effect the necessary repairs to any piers or harbour works that might be damaged.

About 7 p.m. the breeze freshened considerably from the south-west, the most unfavourable quarter, but the first trip, timed for 8 p.m., was despatched without difficulty. The wind, however, continued to rise until, by 11 p.m., the connecting pier between the hulks and the shore at W beach was washed away by heavy seas, and further embarkation into destroyers from these hulks became impracticable. In spite of these difficulties the second trips, which commenced at 11.30 p.m., were carried out well up to time, and the embarkation of guns continued uninterruptedly. Early in the evening reports had been received from the right flank that a hostile submarine was believed to be moving down the Straits, and about midnight H.M.S. "Prince George," which had embarked 2,000 men, and was sailing for Mudros, reported she was struck by a torpedo which failed to explode. The indications of the presence of a submarine added considerably to the anxiety for the safety of the troop carriers, and made it necessary for the Vice-Admiral to modify the arrangements made for the subsequent bombardment of the evacuated positions.

At 1.50 a.m., Gully Beach reported that the embarkation at that beach was complete, and that the lighters were about to push off, but at 2.10 a.m. a telephone message was received that one of the lighters was aground and could not be refloated. The Naval Transport Officer at once took all possible steps to have another lighter sent in to Gully Beach, and this was, as a matter of fact, done within an hour, but in the meantime, at 2.30 a.m., it was decided to move the 160 men, who had been relanded from the grounded lighter, to W beach and embark them there.



From 2.40 a.m. the steadily increasing swell caused the Naval Transport Officer the greatest anxiety as to the possibility of embarking the remainder of the troops if their arrival was much deferred.

At 3.30 a.m. the evacuation was complete, and abandoned heaps of stores and supplies were successfully set on fire by time fuzes after the last man had embarked. Two magazines of ammunition and explosives were also successfully blown up at 4 a.m. These conflagrations were apparently the first intimation received by the Turks that we had withdrawn. Red lights were immediately discharged from the enemy's trenches, and heavy artillery fire opened on our trenches and beaches. This shelling was maintained until about 6.30 a.m.

Apart from four unserviceable 15-pounders which had been destroyed earlier in the month, ten worn-out 15-pounders, one 6-inch Mark VII. gun, and six old heavy French guns, all of which were previously blown up, were left on the Peninsula. In addition to the above, 508 animals, most of which were destroyed, and a number of vehicles and considerable quantities of stores, material, and supplies, all of which were destroyed by burning, had to be abandoned.

It would have been possible, of course, by extending the period during which the process of evacuation proceeded to have reduced the quantity of stores and material that was left behind on the Peninsula, but not to the degree that may seem apparent at first sight. Our chances of enjoying a continuity of fine weather in the Ægean were very slender in the month of January; it was, indeed, a contingency that had to be reckoned with that we might very probably be visited by a spell of bad weather which would cut us off completely from the Peninsula for a fortnight or perhaps for even longer.

Supplies, ammunition and material to a certain degree had therefore to be left to the last moment for fear of the isolation of the garrison at any moment when the evacuation might be in progress. I decided therefore that our aim should be primarily the withdrawal of the bulk of the personnel, artillery and ammunition in the intermediate period, and that no risks should be taken in prolonging the withdrawal of personnel at the final stage with a view to reducing the quantity of stores left.

The entire evacuation of the Peninsula had now been completed. It demanded for its successful realization two important military essentials, viz., good luck and skilled disciplined organization, and they were both forthcoming to a marked degree at the hour needed. Our luck was in the ascendant by the marvellous spell of calm weather which prevailed. But we were able to turn to the fullest advantage these accidents of fortune.

Lieut.-General Sir W. Birdwood and his corps commanders elaborated and prepared the orders in reference to the evacuation with a skill, competence and courage which could not have been surpassed, and we had a further stroke of good fortune in being associated with Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck, K.C.B., Vice-Admiral Wemyss, and a body of naval officers whose work remained throughout this anxious period at that standard of accuracy and professional ability which is beyond the power of criticism or cavil.

The line of communication staff, both naval and military, represented respectively by Lieut.-General E. A. Altham, C.B., C.M.G., Commodore M. S. Fitz-Maurice, R.N., principal Naval Transport Officer, and Captain H. V. Simpson, R.N., Superintending Transport Officer, contributed to the success of the operation by their untiring zeal and conspicuous ability.

The members of the headquarters staff showed themselves, without exception, to be officers with whom it was a privilege to be associated; their competence, zeal and devotion to duty were uniform and unbroken. Amongst such a highly

trained body of officers it is difficult to select and discriminate. I confine myself, therefore, to placing on record the fine services rendered by :—

Colonel (temporary Major-General) Arthur Lynden Lynden-Bell, C.B., C.M.G., Chief of General Staff, G.H.Q. ;

Colonel (temporary Major-General) Walter Campbell, C.B., D.S.O., Deputy Quartermaster-General, G.H.Q., M.E.F. ;

Lieut.-Colonel (temporary Brigadier-General) W. Gillman, C.M.G., D.S.O., Brigadier-General, General Staff ;

Brevet Major (temporary Lieut.-Colonel) G. P. Dawnay, D.S.O., M.V.O., General Staff ;

and, whilst bringing to notice the names of these officers to whom I am so much indebted, I trust I may be permitted to represent the loyal, cordial, and unswerving assistance rendered by General J. M. J. A. Brulard, Commanding the French Troops in the Peninsula.

Before concluding this inadequate account of the events which happened during my tenure of command of the forces in the Eastern Mediterranean, I desire to give a brief explanation of the work which was carried out on the line of communications, and to place on record my appreciation of the admirable work rendered by the officers responsible for this important service.

On the Dardanelles Peninsula it may be said that the whole of the machinery by which the text-books contemplate the maintenance and supply of an army was non-existent. The zone commanded by the enemy's guns extended not only to the landing places on the Peninsula, but even over the sea in the vicinity.

The beaches were the advanced depôts and refilling points at which the services of supply had to be carried out under artillery fire. The landing of stores as well as of troops was only possible under cover of darkness.

The sea, the ships, lighters and tugs took, in fact, the place of railways and roads, with their railway trains, mechanical transport, etc., but with this difference, that the use of the latter is subject only to the intervention of the enemy, while that of the former was dependent on the weather.

Between the beaches and the base at Alexandria, 800 miles to the south, the line of communications had but two harbours, Kephalos Bay on the island of Imbros, 15 miles roughly from the beaches, and Mudros Bay, at a distance of 60 miles. In neither were there any piers, breakwaters, wharves or store houses of any description before the advent of the troops. On the shores of these two bays there were no roads of any military value, or buildings fit for military usage. The water supply at these islands was, until developed, totally inadequate for our needs.

The Peninsula landing places were open beaches. Kephalos Bay is without protection from the north, and swept by a high sea in northerly gales. In Mudros Harbour, transshipments and disembarkations were often seriously impeded with a wind from the north or south. These difficulties were accentuated by the advent of submarines in the Ægean Sea, on account of which the Vice-Admiral deemed it necessary to prohibit any transport or store ship exceeding 1,500 tons proceeding north of Mudros, and although this rule was relaxed in the case of supply ships proceeding within the netted area of Suvla, it necessitated the transshipment of practically all reinforcements, stores and supplies—other than those for Suvla—into small ships in Mudros Harbour.

At Suvla and Anzac disembarkation could only be effected by lighters and tugs, thus for all personnel and material there was at least one transshipment, and for the greater portion of both two transshipments.

Yet notwithstanding the difficulties which have been set forth above, the Army was well maintained in equipment and ammunition. It was well fed, it

received its full supply of winter clothing at the beginning of December. The evacuation of the sick and wounded was carried out with the minimum of inconvenience, and the provision of hospital accommodation for them on the Dardanelles line of communication and elsewhere in the Mediterranean met all requirements.

The above is a very brief exposition of the extreme difficulties with which the officers responsible were confronted in dealing with a problem of peculiar complexity. They were fortunate in being associated in their onerous and anxious task with a most competent and highly trained naval staff. The members of the two staffs worked throughout in perfect harmony and cordiality, and it was owing to their joint efforts that the requirements of the troops were so well responded to.

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I have the honour to be,

Your Lordship's most obedient servant,

C. C. MONRO, General.

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[NOTE.—In the issue of the JOURNAL for August, 1915, p. 229, 13 lines from end of page, for 1st Royal Fusiliers read 2nd; in the issue for November, 1915, p. 539, line 14 from top of page, for 1st Royal Fusiliers read 2nd; and the same in the issue for February, 1916, p. 235, line 4 from top of page.]

## PRINCIPAL ADDITIONS TO LIBRARY.

February—March—April, 1915.

- WHAT TO OBSERVE AND HOW TO REPORT IT. By the late Colonel Sir Lonsdale Hale. 8th Edition. Revised by E. W. Sheppard. 12mo. 9d. (Presented by Miss Margaret Hale). (Hugh Rees, Ltd.). London, 1915.
- DESCRIPTION DE LA MITRAILLEUSE PORTATIVE HOTCHKISS. 8vo. (Presented by Major F. V. Longstaff). n.p., n.d.
- DESCRIPTION DE LA MITRAILLEUSE AUTOMATIQUE HOTCHKISS. 8vo. (Presented by Major F. V. Longstaff). n.p., n.d.
- SELECTED TRANSLATIONS PERTAINING TO THE TACTICAL USE AND VALUE OF MACHINE GUNS. 8vo. (Presented by Major F. V. Longstaff). (Issued by U.S. War Department). Washington, 1906.
- HISTORY OF THE GATLING GUN DETACHMENT, FIFTH ARMY CORPS, AT SANTIAGO. By First-Lieutenant J. H. Parker, U.S.A. Crown 8vo. (Presented by Major F. V. Longstaff). (Hudson-Kimberly Publishing Co.). Kansas City, 1898.
- THE WAR MANUAL. Vols. 1 and 2. By Lieut.-Colonel C. C. Anderson. 8vo. 10s. (Presented by the Author). (T. Fisher Unwin, Ltd.). London, 1915.
- THE YOUNG OFFICER'S GUIDE TO MILITARY LAW. By F. J. O. Coddington, M.A. 12mo. 2s. 6d. (Presented by the Publishers). (Gale & Polden, Ltd.). London, 1916.
- IN MEMORIAM—KING EDWARD VII. THE PEACEMAKER. By Colonel Sir James Gildea, K.C.V.O., C.B. 4to. (Presented by the Author). (Eyre & Spottiswoode, Ltd.). London, 1914.

- A HISTORY OF THE ROYAL WELSH FUSILIERS (LATE 23RD REGT.). By Howel Thomas. Crown 8vo. (3s. 6d.). (Presented by the Publishers). (T. Fisher Unwin, Ltd.). London, 1916.
- MOLTKE'S CORRESPONDENCE DURING THE CAMPAIGN OF 1866 AGAINST AUSTRIA. Précis by Spenser Wilkinson. Crown 8vo. 1s. (Presented by the War Office). (Harrison & Sons). London, 1915.
- THE CAPTURE OF DE WET—THE SOUTH AFRICAN REBELLION, 1914. By P. J. Sampson. 8vo. 10s. 6d. (Edward Arnold). London, 1915.
- THE MAXIMS OF THE LATE FIELD-MARSHAL VISCOUNT WOLSELEY, K.P., G.C.B., G.C.M.G., AND ADDRESSES ON LEADERSHIP, ESPRIT DE CORPS AND MORAL. By Lieut.-Colonel R. J. Kentish. Crown 8vo. 1s. (Presented by the Publishers). (Gale & Polden, Ltd.). London, 1916.
- THE RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN, APRIL TO AUGUST, AND THE EVACUATION OF WARSAW, 1915. By Stanley Washburn. 8vo. 7s. 6d. (Andrew Melrose, Ltd.). London, 1915.
- FIELD NOTES FROM THE RUSSIAN FRONT. By Stanley Washburn. 8vo. 6s. (Andrew Melrose, Ltd.). London, 1915.
- AN ENGLISHMAN IN THE RUSSIAN RANKS—TEN MONTHS' FIGHTING IN POLAND. By John Morse. 8vo. 6s. (Duckworth & Co.). London, 1916.
- THE LOG OF H.M.S. "BRISTOL," MAY, 1914, TO DECEMBER, 1915. By William Buchan. Crown 8vo. 4s. (Westminster Press). London, 1916.
- CANADA IN FLANDERS. By Sir Max Aitken. Crown 8vo. (Hodder & Stoughton). London, 1916.
- BETWEEN THE LINES. By Boyd Cable. Crown 8vo. 5s. (Smith, Elder & Co.). London, 1916.
- CATALOGUE OF THE BOOKS, MANUSCRIPTS AND PRINTS, AND OTHER MEMORABILIA IN THE JOHN S. BARNES MEMORIAL LIBRARY OF THE NAVAL HISTORY SOCIETY. 8vo. (U.S. Naval History Society). New York, 1915.
- J'ACCUSE. By a German. Translated by Alexander Gray. 8vo. 5s. (Hodder & Stoughton). London, 1915.
- ORDEAL BY BATTLE. Abridged Edition. By F. S. Oliver. Crown 8vo. 1s. (Presented by the Publishers). (MacMillan & Co., Ltd.). London, 1916.
- LETTERS AND PETITIONS AND CORRESPONDENCE OF JOHN, DUKE OF MONTAGU, AS MASTER-GENERAL OF THE ORDNANCE, 1740-1749. Manuscript. (Presented by His Grace the Duke of Buccleuch).
- A PRACTICAL ESSAY ON ENGINEERING, EXHIBITING THE METHOD OF THE FORTIFICATION OF BERGENOPZOOM, WITH PARTICULAR DETAIL OF THE DEFENCES OF THE SEVERAL WORKS. Circa 1747. Manuscript. (Presented by His Grace the Duke of Buccleuch).
- ATLAS DES PLANS ET CARTES POUR SERVIR À L'INTELLIGENCE DES MARCHES ET POSITIONS DU 7<sup>e</sup> CORPS DE LA GRANDE ARMÉE, PENDANT LA CAMPAGNE DES ARMÉES, 1808 ET 1809. Engraved by Alexandre Blondeau. Oblong fol. (Presented by His Grace the Duke of Buccleuch).
- THE NEUTRAL MERCHANT IN RELATION TO THE LAW OF CONTRABAND OF WAR AND BLOCKADE UNDER THE ORDER IN COUNCIL OF MARCH 11TH, 1915. By Sir Francis Piggott. 8vo. 2s. 6d. (University of London Press). London, 1915.
- TWELVE MONTHS WITH THE AUSTRALIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE. By an Anzac. Crown 8vo. 1s. (George Newnes, Ltd.). London, 1916.
- WHAT THE IRISH REGIMENTS HAVE DONE. By S. Parnell Kerr. Crown 8vo. 1s. 6d. (T. Fisher Unwin, Ltd.). London, 1916.

- AIRCRAFT IN WAR AND PEACE.** By W. A. Robson. Crown 8vo. 2s. 6d. (MacMillan & Co., Ltd.). London, 1916.
- ZEPPELINS AND SUPER-ZEPPELINS.** By R. P. Hearne. Crown 8vo. 2s. 6d. (John Lane). London, 1916.
- THE FIRST SEVEN DIVISIONS, BEING A DETAILED ACCOUNT OF THE FIGHTING FROM MONS TO YPRES.** By Captain Lord Ernest Hamilton. Crown 8vo. 6s. (Hurst & Blackett, Ltd.). London, 1916.
- FROM MONS TO YPRES WITH FRENCH.** By Frederic Coleman. Crown 8vo. 6s. (Sampson Low, Marston & Co., Ltd.). London, 1916.
- NOTES ON THE MILITARY VALUE OF ROADS.** By Major-General Sir J. R. L. Macdonald, K.C.I.E., C.B. 8vo. (Presented by the Author). (W. & J. Mackay & Co., Ltd.). Chatham, 1915.
- JOURNAL OF THE BRITISH FIRE PREVENTION COMMITTEE.** 10 vols. 4to. (Presented by the British Fire Prevention Committee). London, 1904-13.
- 1805 DER FELDZUG VON ULM.** By Major-General Alfred Krauss. 8vo. 18s. (L. W. Seidel & Sohn). Vienna, 1912.
- VERDUN TO THE VOSGES.** By Gerald Campbell. 8vo. 10s. 6d. (Presented by the Publisher). (Edward Arnold). London, 1916.
- NELSON'S HISTORY OF THE WAR.** By John Buchan. 11 vols. Crown 8vo. 11s. (Thomas Nelson & Sons). London, n.d.
- THE LIEUTENANT AND OTHERS.** By Sapper. Crown 8vo. 1s. (Hodder & Stoughton). London, 1916.
- A GUIDE TO KEEPING COMPANY ACCOUNTS IN THE NEW ARMIES.** By Colonel Campbell Todd. 8vo. 1s. 6d. (Presented by the Publishers). (Gale & Polden, Ltd.). London, 1916.
- NOTES FOR LECTURES ON MAP READING AND SKETCHING.** 2nd edition. By 2nd Lieut. Courtney Terrell. Oblong 8vo. 1s. (Presented by the Publishers). (Gale & Polden, Ltd.). London, 1916.
- TACTICAL NOTES FOR SCHEME PROBLEMS OR OUTDOOR EXERCISES.** By Major W. F. Trydell. 8vo. 5s. (Presented by the Publishers). (William Clowes & Sons, Ltd.). London, 1916.

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## NOTICES OF BOOKS.

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**War Medals and their History.** By W. Augustus Steward: Stanley Paul & Co.

The collecting of war medals is one of the most interesting, though, unfortunately, also one of the most costly, of hobbies, and it is probable that the forming of medal collections will receive a new fillip at the close of this war, from the increased interest which has been aroused in the soldier and in the recognition he officially receives for his share in a campaign. All of us will probably feel the regret expressed by the author at the fact that the war medal is so comparatively



modern an institution that we know nothing of the names of the men who took part in our early Continental wars, who fought on board those cockle-shells which struggled with the Spanish ships for command of the seas; and that it is only permitted us to know the names of the gallant seamen and soldiers who served by sea and land with our grandparents at an earlier crisis than the present in the history of our country. The collecting of war medals is a pursuit in which one may easily be imposed upon, for since the value of medals varies according to the paucity of the issues made or to the number of bars attached to the medal, the amateur collector is very likely to find himself in the unenviable position of having paid a large price for a "fake." The medal rolls for our campaigns are to be found in the War Office, but the officials do not lend these readily for examination by those who wish to inspect merely for purposes of verification of intended purchases, and the collector may make up his mind to suffer much in pocket when he first begins to form his collection. Mr. Steward has here taken great pains to make more easy the work of the beginner, who will learn from these pages all about the different naval and military medals and decorations of our own and foreign countries, and also—of great importance to the young collector—the manner in which the recipients' names were engraved on medals issued for different campaigns. In few books on medals will so much information be found about the issues made by foreign governments, which is interesting in view of the fact that when the war is over and our warriors come back to us, we shall see many foreign decorations and medals on their breasts.

The author gives a list—very useful to collectors—of the prices at which British medals may be picked up at sales. The colours of the different ribbons are not always given, which is to be deplored, since none of the medals are reproduced in colour, while the actual descriptions of the medals are sometimes slightly confusing, e.g., that for the "Sudan, 1910," on page 265. A book of this kind is no doubt primarily intended for collectors, but it will be found of rare interest to our soldiers and sailors, since it is thoroughly up to date and includes such new decorations as the Military Cross, specially instituted for this war. There are over 250 illustrations of medals, and these are all very clearly and accurately reproduced.

**What to Observe and How to Report it.** By the late Colonel Sir Lonsdale Hale, revised by E. W. Sheppard: Hugh Rees, Ltd.

Many years ago this collection of useful notes was published by the late Colonel Sir Lonsdale Hale, to whom the British Army was, during his life, so greatly indebted for help of an educational character; and now, after having been for some time out of print, the little book has been revised by Lieutenant E. W. Sheppard, of the Royal West Kent Regiment, to take its place among the large number of military aids and guides which have been published for the assistance of the hosts of young men who have answered the call to arms from all parts of the United Kingdom, and from every distant portion of the British Empire. The late Sir Lonsdale Hale was a born instructor, and he had enhanced the ability which was natural to him, which came to him so easily, by constant study and practice. He knew exactly how much information was wanted and how best such knowledge should be imparted. His little book is a model of what such a collection of notes should be, and the instruction he has to offer is afforded in such a manner as to arrest the attention and to fix details in the mind of the student. Mr. E. W. Sheppard has done his work of revision right well, and, with his help, the men of the young armies should learn much from the professor of the military art, at whose feet sat many of the leaders who are to-day helping to make history.

**The History of the Royal and Indian Artillery in the Mutiny of 1857.** By Colonel Julian R. J. Jocelyn: John Murray.

Colonel Jocelyn has not been overlong in following up the account he so recently provided of the services of the Royal Artillery in the Crimean War, with an equally interesting, complete and arresting narrative of all that the regiment did during the bloody months that the mutinies in India endured. There is, however, this one distinction between this volume and the one by which it was preceded; the artillery record of the Crimea dealt only with the services of the Royal Regiment, but the author states that when he began to trace the history of the artillery happenings during the years 1857-8 he found them to be so interwoven with those of the Bengal, Madras and Bombay artillery, that he considered it necessary to compile a narrative of the services of all four. The result is a volume which covers more ground than either Colonel Jocelyn, or the Committee of the Royal Artillery Institution, could well have foreseen; the author has in effect written a history of the Indian Mutiny from the artillery point of view, but he has endeavoured, and has largely succeeded, in making clear the interdependence of every event, of the action of every isolated battery, with the general operations of the different campaigns. Nor can it be said that Colonel Jocelyn has been over "previous" in treating of the different regiments as though they were at the date of the Mutiny the one regiment into which they were later united; the amalgamation did actually take place three years after the Mutiny was quelled—in 1861—but the Royal, the Bengal, the Madras and the Bombay artillery had virtually served, and been regarded as, the one regiment throughout the operations in which all four had played their several parts.

The book may be said to be divided into four main divisions—the outbreak of the Mutiny, the Delhi, the Lucknow and the Central Indian campaigns; and it is good to note that Colonel Jocelyn is inclined to allot its proper value in the whole scheme of suppression to the last-named of these difficult and hard-fought operations of war. The ordinary historian cannot get over the fact that the Delhi and Lucknow campaigns involved the rescues of large and hardly-trying garrisons; the objectives were clear and conspicuous and contained in themselves much of the heroic element; but Colonel Jocelyn shows us how great also were the difficulties with which Sir Hugh Rose and his disconnected forces had to contend, how ably he triumphed over them, and how much his success contributed to the general result. To the gunner this book will be a real delight; there can hardly be a battery which is not mentioned, which does not receive its due meed of praise; the names of many officers and men are rescued from semi-oblivion, and we hear again from old diaries and letters what fine things were done and who were their performers. The book contains many engravings, plans and maps, while in the appendices will be found a mine of detailed information of a most useful kind. The standard of regimental histories has during recent years been very appreciably raised, and this History of the Royal and Indian Artillery in the Mutiny will take high rank among those others which have immediately preceded it.

**Verdun to the Vosges.** By Gerald Campbell: Edward Arnold.

This deeply interesting book takes us out of the track which has so generally been followed by those war correspondents who have told us of the scenes which they have witnessed, and of the operations in which as observers they have taken part. Mr. Gerald Campbell had, however, already seen something of the first fighting in Belgium, and then, early in September, he was commissioned by *The Times* to go to France and represent that paper on the eastern frontier; and some of us have probably not yet forgotten certain very vivid letters which appeared written from that front. For some months he was the only British newspaper

correspondent on the long section of front between Verdun and Belfort, while after January, 1915, no correspondents at all were allowed in the zone of the armies. He tells, from information gathered on the spot—for he was not himself present at the time—of the early French offensive into the surrendered provinces, of the mistakes of leadership, and of the rendition of the ground which initially had been captured. There is a long account of the Battle of the Grand Couronné, of the bombardment of Nancy, and of the French recovery; and the author has himself no doubt that the French advance into Alsace did not, as some have thought, attract thither German forces intended for employment further north, but that the somewhat belated German offensive on this eastern frontier was actually part of the original plan of campaign, was so timed as to be delivered concurrently with the dash on Paris via Belgium, and that if the Germans had not been so stoutly resisted in the east, the fighting on the Marne might easily have resulted to the disadvantage of the Allies. One must regret that so keen and so practised an observer was not longer permitted to remain about Nancy and tell us more of all that there afterwards came to pass. Some of Mr. Campbell's later chapters are especially informing; of the work of the French prefects in the shattered districts, of the courage and spirit of the people, of the effect of the famous *soixante-quinze*; and he tells us some stories of the unnatural bestialities of the German officer which would be incredible in these days of civilization were their truth not so well vouched for. M. Léon Mirman, Prefect of the Department of the Meurthe and Moselle, contributes a graceful, a telling and an appreciative epilogue, and his words as to what France demands—"to-day reprisals for defence—to-morrow compensations—finally, to save the future, punishment"—may be recommended for careful study to those remarkably-minded persons who so continually bleat that "we must be careful not to humiliate Germany and Germans."

1.—*The Story of the Royal Welsh Fusiliers*. By H. Avray Tipping: the offices of *Country Life*.

2.—*The History of the Royal Welsh Fusiliers*. By Howell Thomas: T. Fisher Unwin, Ltd.

Many regimental "stories" and histories, large and small, have recently appeared, as is indeed only natural when all men desire to know something about the past lives and services of those units of the British Army, whose present day representatives are so gallantly fighting for us in various theatres of war; but it has been given to few regiments to find more than one history of their lives appearing in any one year. Of the two books now before us that of Mr. H. Avray Tipping is the more ambitious, and it issues from the offices of *Country Life*, whence other regimental histories, planned on the same lines, have already come or where they are still in preparation. These histories do not pretend to emulate or enter into competition with the larger and fuller history of the regiment under record which have already been published by a regimental committee and at the hands of some specially-selected regimental historian, and which Mr. Tipping regards both as works of reference and as domestic histories. He is content to deal almost solely with the campaigns of the Royal Welsh Fusiliers, relying for his facts rather upon the work of those historians who have gone before him, than seeking himself for such fresh records as are still to be gathered from the dusty shelves of the Public Record Office or of other places where original information is still to be obtained. The author has produced an eminently readable book, convenient in size, and thoroughly satisfying to the general reader, and he has certainly gained the end which he set before himself of trying to fit the record of the regiment into the general framework of English history. The narra-

tive virtually ends with the Boer War, but there is some mention of that now in progress.

The smaller work by Mr. Thomas is the outcome of an attempt to satisfy a widespread and eager desire in Wales particularly, for information of the past deeds and adventures of a famous regiment specially linked with the Principality; this book, too, makes no claim to originality, and the narrative is almost wholly based upon those records which have before been published, and which are either long since out of print or are not easily obtainable; while the little volume is issued at a low price so as to be within the reach of all and to ensure a sale sufficiently large to hand over a substantial sum to the funds of the regimental "Old Comrades' Association"—organizations which are doing at this moment so much good work among soldiers and their families. Considering the limits of space which Mr. Thomas has set himself, it is wonderful how full are the descriptions he has been able to set down of services which began in 1689, and which have been rendered all the world over and wherever the units of the British Army have penetrated. The narrative is brought to a close with the termination of the Boer War, and it is to be hoped that there will be no lack of historians like Messrs. Tipping and Thomas to chronicle the share which all the many battalions of the old 23rd are taking in the great war in which the British Army is now engaged.



JOURNAL  
OF THE  
Royal United Service Institution,  
WHITEHALL, S.W.

PUBLISHED UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF THE COUNCIL.

*Authors alone are responsible for the contents of their respective Papers*

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VOL. LXI.

FEBRUARY AND MAY, 1916.

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LONDON:  
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—  
1916.

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LONDON :

J. J. KELIHER AND CO., LIMITED,  
1916.



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**The Journal**  
OF THE  
**Royal United Service Institution.**

VOL. LX. 1915-1916.

APPENDIX.

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**THE EIGHTY-FIFTH  
ANNIVERSARY MEETING.**

**MARCH 7th, 1916.**

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THE JOURNAL

Royal United Service Institution

THE EIGHTY-THIRD

ANNIVERSARY MEETING

MARCH 1904



# Royal United Service Institution.

THE EIGHTY-FIFTH ANNIVERSARY MEETING OF THE ROYAL UNITED SERVICE INSTITUTION WAS HELD AT WHITEHALL, LONDON, S.W., ON TUESDAY, 7TH MARCH, 1916.

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL H. D. HUTCHINSON, C.S.I. (Chairman of the Council) presiding.

THE CHAIRMAN : Gentlemen, I will ask the Secretary to read the Notice convening the meeting.

THE SECRETARY (Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Arthur Leetham) read the Notice which, in accordance with the Bye-Laws, appeared on two separate dates in "The Times," the "Daily Telegraph," the "Morning Post," and the "Army and Navy Gazette."

## ANNUAL REPORT FOR 1915.

### COUNCIL.

The Council regret to report the death of Major-General F. D. V. Wing, C.B., R.A., who was killed on Active Service during the latter part of last year. General Wing joined the Institution in 1904, and became a Member of the Council in 1910, and while he was at the War Office he rendered much valuable assistance to the Institution.

Lieut.-General Sir H. C. Sclater, K.C.B., the Adjutant-General to the Forces, has been elected to the Council vice the late Major-General F. D. V. Wing.

### TEMPORARY ALTERATION OF A BYE-LAW.

A proposal, which has been unanimously passed by the Council, will be brought before the Annual Meeting on Tuesday, March 7th, for confirmation, to the effect that Chap. III., para. V., of the Bye-Laws, which reads as follows : "Members joining after the 3rd March, 1900, pay as follows :—

- (1) Annual Member, £1 1s. ; Entrance Fee, £1 1s.
- (2) Life Member, £15 "

shall be suspended for the time being ; the proposal being that the Entrance Fee, at present £1 1s., shall be in abeyance, and the Life Membership temporarily reduced to £10 or by two instalments of five guineas each.

## MEMBERSHIP.

The Council beg to report that during the past year *only* 55 Officers joined the Institution (against 107 in 1914). There were 123 withdrawals and 270 deaths (of which 66 were Life Members), making a decrease of 338 on the year. It is greatly to be regretted that the Membership should have shown such a large falling off, but this is chiefly owing to the war, as no less than 321 Officers who were Members of the Institution have either been killed or died of their wounds since the commencement of the same to the end of December, 1915. The Council trust, however, that the Members will assist in introducing new Members during the coming year.

The details of Members joining were :—

Regular Army	...	...	...	...	...	40
Royal Navy	...	...	...	...	...	9
Territorial Force (including Yeomanry)	...	...	...	...	...	3
Special Reserve	...	...	...	...	...	2
Royal Marines	...	...	...	...	...	1
Total	...	...	...	...	...	55

The total number of Members on January 1st, 1916, was 5,000.

## CLOSING OF THE INSTITUTION.

The Council beg to report that the whole of the Institution Building, with the exception of the Banqueting Hall, the Secretary's Office, the Library, and a portion of the Crypt, is still in the occupation of His Majesty's Government.

## FINANCE.

It will be seen from the accounts that the year's working has given a balance credit of £3,743 10s. 8d. The somewhat large increase to the revenue over last year is chiefly caused by a full year's rent (which includes the repayment of the Ground Rent and Rates, £1,277 4s. 10d.) having been received from His Majesty's Government for the use of the Building against one-quarter last year, and the saving which has been effected in the printing and postage of the Journal, Purchase and Binding of Library Books, Wages, Fuel, Lighting, Repairs, House Expenses, Stationery, etc. This must be considered satisfactory in view of the fact of the decrease in Members' subscriptions.

The Council have pleasure in reporting that out of the balance credit they have invested £2,000 in the 4½ per cent. War Loan.

The invested funds now amount to £14,276 1s. 5d., which with the exception of the 4½ per cent. War Loan, is the valuation of these Investments at the minimum price in the Stock Exchange Official Price List on December 31st, 1913; as no reliable valuation can be obtained at the present time.

## MUSEUM.

During the past year there have been added 30 new Exhibits, all of which have been catalogued and duly recorded in the JOURNAL, and placed on exhibition in the Museum. These include a certain number of exhibits from the War, such as shells, machine-gun, trench mortar, etc. The Council would be glad if Members would contribute such exhibits, provided they are not of large dimensions, as the space in the Museum is now so very limited. The Council desire to express their thanks to the several Donors for these valuable additions.

The total number of persons who passed through the turnstile amounted to 53,601, against 43,174 in 1914. This includes a very large number of Soldiers and Sailors, Boy Scouts, etc., who were granted free admission. This total does not include a very considerable number of Visitors who were introduced by Members personally. The total amount taken at the turnstile was £701 14s. This compares very favourably with last year, as, although the total receipts amounted to £787 8s. 3d. in 1914, no less a sum than £192 14s. 3d. of this total was taken in October, owing to the interest created by the first German field-gun captured by the 1st Bn. The Lincolnshire Regiment, which was placed on view during that month.

During the year 54 Schools were granted free admission to the Museum, and attendants were especially detailed to conduct these visitors and explain the principal Exhibits. The amount standing to the credit of the Museum Purchase Fund is £10 11s. 0d., and the Museum Committee hope that this Fund will continue to receive support from the Members of the Institution, especially those who are interested in the Museum.

## LIBRARY.

Owing to the closing of the Institution, the Library is not accessible to the Members, but Subscribers to the Lending Library can obtain books on written application to the Librarian.

The number of books added to the Library during the past year was 92, bringing the total number of volumes up to 31,862.

The number of Members subscribing to the Lending Library during the past year was 78 as against 207 in the previous year. The number of books issued on loan to Members was 278.

The falling off in the number of Subscribers to the Lending Library, their subscriptions, and in the number of books issued to Members, is due to the present war.

At the request of the War Office, the Library has continued to issue journals to units of the New Army and of the Territorial Force, for lecture purposes. During the year 1915, 635 journals were so issued.

Donations of books and maps have been received from our own and various foreign Governments, as well as from private individuals, and the thanks of the Council have been conveyed for these donations.

## JOURNAL.

At the Council Meeting held in June, the Council considered the proposal of the Journal Committee that the publication of the JOURNAL be resumed, and decided that re-publication should commence with the August number. Issues of the JOURNAL accordingly appeared for August and November, 1915, and there seems no reason why they should not continue regularly to be published, especially in view of the decision of the Council, expressed at the above-mentioned Meeting, that a sum of £30 per issue be placed at the disposal of the Journal Committee for the payment of contributors.

The thanks of the Institution are due to the following persons for Papers contributed by them: the Hon. John Fortescue; Colonel the Right Hon. Sir John Macdonald, K.C.B.; Francis H. Skrine, Esq., F.R.Hist.S.; Commander W. F. Caborne, C.B.; R.N.R.; C. R. B. Barrett, Esq.; D. Hastings Irwin, Esq.; C. Case-Horton, Esq.; Assistant-Paymaster P. Smiles, R.N.; Colonel F. H. Mount-steven, C.M.G.; Admiral the Hon. Sir E. R. Fremantle, G.C.B., C.M.G.; Colonel A. C. Yate, late Indian Army; Colonel Cyril Field, late R.M.L.I.; Captain C. T. Atkinson, Oxford University O.T.C.; and Mrs. de Wend; J. D. F.; and G. D. H.

The thanks of the Institution are also due to the following authors of articles in foreign publications, translations of which have appeared in the JOURNAL:—Maggiore Commissario G. Laghezza, Royal Italian Navy, and M. René Paux of *Le Temps*.

The Institution is indebted to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, to the Army Council, the Secretaries of State for the Colonies and for India, and to the Civil Service Commissioners, for translations, communiqués, and copies of various works issued by their respective departments.

The exchange of the JOURNAL with Foreign Governments, and with many Societies in this and other countries, has been continued so far as this has been possible.

## MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL.

The following Members of the Council retire, and offer themselves for re-election, having completed three years' service, viz. :—

*Royal Navy (1 vacancy).*

Admiral of the Fleet Sir A. D. Fanshawe, G.C.B., G.C.V.O.

*Regular Army (1 vacancy).*

Major-General Sir T. Fraser, K.C.B., C.M.G.

A. LEETHAM, Lieut.-Colonel,

Secretary and Chief  
Executive Officer.

Whitehall,

January 31st, 1916.





DR.

## BALANCE SHEET, 31st DECEMBER, 1915.

CR.

	£	s.	d.		£	s.	d.
To Excess of Assets over Liabilities ..	...	...	...	By Outlay on New Building ...	...	...	...
" Sundry Creditors ...	...	...	...	" Furniture, Museum Cases, etc., as at December 31st, 1914 ...	453	12	0
" Museum Purchase Fund ...	...	...	...	" Additions during the year ...	14	15	0
" Leasehold Redemption Fund ...	...	...	...	" Library Books, Pictures, Maps, etc., as valued for Insurance ...	...	...	463 7 0
				" Museum Investments, as valued for Insurance ...	...	...	10,222 0 0
				" Investments ...	...	...	21,711 9 0
				" £2,421 18s. 8d. India 3½ p.c. ...	2,053	12	10
				" £23,044 17s. 11d. India 3 p.c. ...	2,192	6	6
				" £1,471 8s. 6d. Nottingham Corporation 3 p.c. ...	1,147	14	3
				" £1,161 10s. 6d. Oxford Corporation 3 p.c. ...	921	11	5
				" £5,060 10s. 6d. Barnsley Railway Ordinary 4 p.c. (Trent & Great Ouse Navigation Co.) ...	3,350	0	0
				" £473 17s. 9d. Canada 3½ p.c. (Hooker Bequest) ...	426	10	0
				(The above investments are valued at Market Price, 31st December, 1913).	...	...	...
				" £25,000 0s. 0d. 4½ p.c. War Loan, at cost ...	...	...	10,096 15 0
				" Leasehold Redemption Fund Investment ...	...	...	1,989 6 0
				" £1,329 18s. 11d. Ceylon 3 p.c. ...	1,083	1	0
				" £1,494 3s. 1d. London County Council 3 p.c. ...	1,101	13	11
				" Sundry Debtors ...	...	...	2,190 0 5
				" Cash at Bank ...	1,678	11	11
				" " in hand ...	5	3	6
					...	...	1,683 15 5
					£71,909	4	5

We have examined the above Balance Sheet with the Books and Vouchers and certify the same to be correct.

All our requirements as Auditors have been complied with. We have verified the Cash Balance and Investments set out in the Balance Sheet, and, subject to the Leasehold Redemption Fund being sufficient to provide for the depreciation of the Lease, we are of opinion that the Balance Sheet is properly drawn up and correctly shows the position of the Royal United Service Institution on the 31st December, 1915.

WILDER AND FERGUSON DAVIE, Chartered Accountants,  
Auditors.

611, Fove Street, London, E.C., 24th January, 1916.

## CHESNEY MEMORIAL MEDAL FUND.

31st DECEMBER, 1915.					CR.
DR.		£ s. d.	1915.	By Balance in favour of Fund...	£ s. d.
		31 2 7	Dec. 31.	...	38 0 9
1915.					
Jan. 1.	To Balance, 31st December, 1914	...			
June 7.	" 6 mths. Div., £230 Bengal & North-Western Ry. Pref. Stock	...			
		3 10 5			
Dec. 6.	" " " " " "	3 7 9			
		<u>£38 0 9</u>			<u>£38 0 9</u>

We hereby certify the above Account to be correct,

61½, Fove Street, London, E.C.,  
24th January, 1916.WILDE AND FERGUSON DAVIE, Chartered Accountants,  
Auditors.

## TRENCH GASCOIGNE PRIZE FUND.

31st DECEMBER, 1915.				CR.
DR.		£ s. d.	1915.	
			Dec. 31.	By Balance in favour of Fund
1915.				
Jan. 1.	To Balance, 31st December, 1914	33 8 7	...	...
May 17.	" 6 mths. Div., £1,262 19s. North Brit. Ry. Deb. Stock	24 13 2	...	...
Nov. 12.	" " " " " "	23 12 1	...	...
		<u>£81 13 10</u>		<u>£81 13 10</u>

We hereby certify the above Account to be correct,

61½, Fove Street, London, E.C.  
24th January, 1916.WILDE AND FERGUSON DAVIE, Chartered Accountants,  
Auditors.

## TABULAR ANALYSIS OF THE STATE OF THE INSTITUTION.

[A full analysis for each year from 1831 will be found in the Report for 1897.]

Year 1st Jan. to 31st Dec.	Annual Subs. received.	En- trance Fees.	Receipts (from all sources).	Life Subs. re- ceived.	Invested Funds at Cost.	Invested in the pur- chase of Books, &c.	No. of Vols. in Library.	No. of Members on the 31st Dec.
	£	£	£	£	£	£		
1831	654	...	654	1,194	...	...	...	1,437
1841	1,450	...	1,643	186	6,000	243	5,850	4,243
1851	1,136	181	1,292	66	666	34	10,150	3,188
1861	2,122	305	2,899	266	2,846	99	11,812	3,689
1871	2,455	237	3,677	538	7,748	202	15,501	3,922
1881	2,893	238	4,967	645	13,670	240	19,920	4,577
1891	2,640	189	5,004	454	21,942	153	23,845	4,204
1892	2,930	605	9,429	1,572	24,805	142	24,099	4,657
1893	2,929	468	8,334	1,095	22,172	157	24,471	4,961
1894	3,598	215	6,625	606	12,840	200	24,680	5,016
1895	3,760	353	7,117	921	8,761	204	25,947	5,198
1896	3,802	351	7,225	876	8,761	245	26,161	5,347
1897	3,910	401	10,902†	959	12,386	381	26,381	5,550
1898	3,964	265	6,935	493	12,386	376	26,592	5,620
1899	3,834	167	6,646	251	12,841	430	27,142	5,583
1900	3,879	174	7,170*	235	13,791	264	27,492	5,491
1901	3,816	197	6,955	358	14,192	289	27,792	5,443
1902	3,806	188	7,063	449	14,491	309	28,167	5,427
1903	3,743	178	6,597	409	15,459	299	28,387	5,361
1904	3,684	184	6,707	448	15,459	301	28,636	5,313
1905	3,713	253	7,756	611	15,459	324	28,851	5,369
1906	3,714	226	6,803	519	16,488	204	29,114	5,404
1907	3,733	211	6,615	573	16,549	256	29,427	5,408
1908	3,741	220	7,205	502	16,612	213	29,667	5,420
1909	3,806	312	7,354	789	16,676	167	29,917	5,535
1910	3,893	269	7,407	573	16,742	326	30,182	5,611
1911	3,988	254	7,319	372	16,810	374	30,624	5,649
1912	4,018	225	7,125	330	16,881	305	31,043	5,654
1913	3,928	159	7,113	266	**12,141	384	31,425	5,580
1914	3,780	101	7,570	98	**12,216	231	31,770	5,338
1915	3,534	46	8,332	77	††14,276	92	31,862	5,000

† A donation of stock, valued at £2,323 and £1,301, realized by the letting of seats to view Her Majesty's Diamond Jubilee Procession, are included in this amount.

\* This amount includes a donation of £500.

\*\* Value on December 31st, 1913.

†† This includes £2,000 4½ per cent. War Loan.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, it is my duty to propose: "That the Report and Accounts, as circulated, be taken as read and adopted." I should like to say, before putting the Motion to the Meeting, that you all have copies of the Annual Report, and I think you will find it entirely satisfactory. On the financial side, as you will hear later from my friend Sir William Hill, who is the Chairman of the Finance Committee, there are special reasons why the year has been a good one. Nearly the whole of the building has been let to H.M. Government, and in that way we have avoided certain expenditure, such as rates and taxes and so forth, which have been paid by them instead of by ourselves. This has given us a financial advantage which will be exceedingly useful when the war is over and we want a fund with which to go ahead. I will now ask the Chairman of the Finance Committee to say a few words dealing with the finances, and then I will ask the Chairman of the JOURNAL and Library and Museum Committees to address you.

Colonel SIR WILLIAM HILL, K.C.B. (Chairman of the Finance Committee): Mr. Chairman and Gentlemen, it has always been the custom at the Annual General Meeting for the Chairman of the Finance Committee to explain to the Members present the various items in the Financial Report, and to give the reasons for any variation from those of the previous year. The variations this year have been entirely owing to the war and to the occupation of the greater part of the Institution buildings by the authorities. The chief alterations in the Balance Sheet are the following:—The JOURNAL printing is less by £719, which of course is accounted for by the abolition of the issuing of the JOURNAL until it was resumed in its quarterly form, and the postage also is less by £251. Literary services are less by £11, and library expenses are less by £152. You will observe that all the expenses, with the exception of two items that I am coming to presently, are less. The reduction in the Museum expenses was £64, while wages and uniforms were £321 lower. Fuel and lighting cost £267 less, and repairs were £577 lower. We had during the past year none of those very large expenses that we have had in previous years connected with repainting, renewing of boilers, electric light, etc. Advertising and shorthand notes cost £61 less, and printing, stationery and postage are less by £144. The only two items on which there is any increase in expenditure are rates and taxes, which are up by £51, and insurance by £48. On the receipt side fewer JOURNALS were sold to the amount of £155. The advertisements were less by £226, the lending library produced £66 less, and the museum admissions were £86 less. On the other hand, the museum catalogues produced £24 more, while the rent received for the premises was greater than in the previous year by £1,631. The reason of that is that in the previous year's accounts only a quarter's rent was included, but in the present accounts a full year's rent is included, which causes this excess compared with last year. The receipts from Members' subscriptions, extra subscriptions, entrance fees and life subscriptions were less by £313, and the rebate of income tax was less by £39, owing to the fact that in last year's accounts we had received two years' rebate instead of one. The general result is that we carry to the Balance Sheet an increase of £3,387 more than we did last year, when the sum was £356. In the Balance Sheet our debtors and creditors nearly balance each other, and the investments have, as the Report shows, satisfactorily increased. In all the financial arrangements with

the authorities the unremitting vigilance of your Secretary has resulted in perfect satisfaction to both parties (hear, hear), and while no undue advantage has been taken of the situation, the proper interests of the Institution have always been kept in view. (Hear, hear.)

Commander W. F. CABORNE, C.B., R.N.R. (Chairman of the Museum and General Purposes Committee): General Hutchinson and Gentlemen, I have very little to say this afternoon with regard to the Museum and General Purposes Committee. Everything connected with the Museum has gone on in a very satisfactory manner, as has always been the case for years past. A few more exhibits have been added, and they have been duly noticed in the JOURNAL from time to time. We are suffering, as you can see, from an exceptionally abnormal want of space. We have been wanting space for many years, but we are abnormally restricted now, on account of a great portion of the crypt having been taken up by the Press Bureau. In fact, so much is that the case that we have been obliged to ask certain would-be donors to keep their exhibits for a time, until the end of the war, when we shall be very happy indeed to receive them. It is particularly gratifying to have to record that the largest number of visitors that ever passed through the turnstiles of the Institution passed through in 1915, the figures being 53,601 persons. In 1904 they were 43,174, the next highest being in 1905, the year of our Nelson and Trafalgar Exhibition, when they were 32,000. During a portion of that latter year we charged double fees for admission to the Museum, and made a very good sum of money out of it. A very large proportion of the visitors during the past year came in absolutely free, the majority being sailors and soldiers in uniform. Quite a number of schools have been admitted, as usual, free, and this is a branch of work in which we take very particular interest indeed, because there is nothing like teaching the young people who visit this place the necessity for loyalty to their Sovereign and for patriotism and love of country, which I am sorry to say in the past has not been always so greatly displayed as it might have been. We hope that, with the objects we put before the youngsters here, and with the object-lesson of the great war which is now raging, patriotism in the future will be by no means a dead letter. Lastly, it only remains for me, on behalf of the Museum and General Purposes Committee, to express to this meeting our deep appreciation of the services rendered by Colonel Sir Arthur Leetham, Mr. Pinhey and the Staff during the year under review. (Hear, hear.)

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, after what has been said by the Chairmen of the Finance Committee and the Museum Committee, it is only necessary for me to say that the Library and the JOURNAL, two of the important departments of this Institution, are now flourishing and going strong. The JOURNAL has been resuscitated during the past year; it is now issued quarterly, and I am sure all those who have seen it are fully satisfied that it has attained a very high standard under its present Editor. The Library is well up to date in all respects, and, under a new rule which has just been passed by the Library Committee, reducing the annual subscription for borrowing books from 10s. a year to 5s. a year, I hope its sphere of usefulness will be more widely extended.

Colonel W. H. JAMES: I should like to say a word or two in regard to the work of the Institution. I quite recognize the state which we are in at present, in



common with everybody else in England, but everybody must admit—even the Government must admit—that there is a good deal of inconvenience caused to Members by the occupation of this building for the very long time it has been held by the Press Bureau. Now, next door there is an excellent institution known as the Hotel Metropole, which contains a vast number of rooms, and I should have thought, with great respect, that we might suggest to the Government that the Press Bureau could be moved to that palatial building. That would free this building for the use of the Members again. If this is the only place in which the Press Bureau can be accommodated, of course I should be the very last person to say that we should turn the cold shoulder to them, but I think it is possible that some other arrangement could be made, and, if so, it would certainly be to the advantage of the Members. I am prepared to admit that the Council have done everything they can to meet the wishes of the Members. Some of us are engaged in matters which involve research, and you have endeavoured to meet us as far as possible, but I think the time has come when the Government hold on this building might be a little relaxed, not in view of an immediate peace, Sir, but in view of the large accommodation that is available elsewhere. I do not move any amendment; I merely throw this out as a hint to the Council, which perhaps they might see their way to repeating in the right quarter, with a view to liberating this building once more for its Members.

Colonel E. T. R. WILDE: I suppose, Sir, we may take it for granted that the reduction in the amount payable for Life Membership is quite a temporary arrangement, because I think it is rather a serious suggestion. Under those circumstances the Life Members will not be supporting the Institution to the extent that the Annual Members do. I have no doubt the Council have fully considered the point with the figures in front of them, but I want to be quite sure that it is thoroughly understood that this is only a temporary measure, and that the fee will be put up again when circumstances are normal. That is the only part of the Report I do not like.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, the Council will bear in mind what Colonel James has said on the question of the use of these premises by the Government. I should think it is improbable that any change could be made in the middle of the war, while operations are still going on; you cannot swap horses while crossing the stream. I want to emphasize the point that the Council have done all they can to make matters easy for those who still wish to use the building. (Hear, hear.) They still have the Museum to wander through, to admire, and from which to learn; the Lending Library is open and in full working order; the JOURNAL is prospering exceedingly and doing very useful work. However, I quite understand your point of view and it will be borne in mind by the Council. With regard to what Colonel Wilde said about the change in the amount of the Life Membership subscription, it is strictly only a temporary arrangement, and it will probably come to an end directly the war is over. I shall speak about that later on in another Resolution which has to be put by me.

I will now put the Motion to the Meeting: "That the Report and Accounts as circulated be taken as read and adopted."

The Motion was carried unanimously.

General A. F. GATCLIFF, Royal Marines : General Hutchinson and Gentlemen, I have great pleasure in proposing the second Resolution : " That the thanks of the Meeting be accorded to the Auditors, Messrs. Wilde and Ferguson Davie, for their services, and that they be re-elected Auditors for the ensuing year at a fee of twenty-five guineas." You will notice in the Report that there have been 270 deaths of Members of this Institution, mostly on Active Service, during the past year. Our Auditors have also given toll of their best in the service of King and Country, because Mr. Ferguson Davie, a member of the firm of Messrs. Wilde and Ferguson Davie, at the age of 42 sought and obtained a commission in the Royal Marines, and gave up his life gallantly in the hard fighting at Gallipoli. (Cheers.) It is very right and proper, therefore, that that should be taken into consideration. Messrs. Wilde and Ferguson Davie have established a kind of claim on the Institution, because, although Mr. Ferguson Davie was not a Member of the Institution, yet he was a member of the firm of Auditors whose re-election I propose. The firm have carried out the work of auditing the Institution's accounts for many years, and the manner in which they have performed their duties has invariably been found thoroughly satisfactory by the Council and the Members of the Institution. I have great pleasure in proposing their re-election.

Major-General M. H. SAWARD : I beg to second that Resolution.

The Resolution was then put and carried unanimously.

The CHAIRMAN : There are two vacancies on the Council, for which there are only two candidates, and those candidates are therefore elected without further preliminaries, namely, Admiral of the Fleet Sir A. D. Fanshawe, G.C.B., G.C.V.O., on behalf of the Royal Navy, and Major-General Sir T. Fraser, K.C.B., C.M.G., on behalf of the Regular Army. Sir Thomas Fraser has been an old and valued Member of the Council for many years, and I am glad that he will still continue to occupy that position. Will you kindly signify your approval of their election ?

The Resolution was carried unanimously.

The CHAIRMAN : The next Resolution stands in my name, and is a very interesting and important item, namely : " That Chap. III., para. V., of the Bye-Laws, which reads as follows :—' Members joining after the 3rd March, 1900, pay as follows :—(1) Annual Members, £1 1s. 0d. ; Entrance Fee, £1 1s. 0d. ; (2) Life Members, £15,' shall be suspended for the time being ; and it is proposed that the Entrance Fee, at present £1 1s. 0d., shall be in abeyance, and the Life Membership temporarily reduced to £10 or by two instalments of five guineas each." The present Bye-Law lays down that Members joining this Institution shall pay an Entrance Fee of one guinea and an Annual Subscription of one guinea, and it is proposed, as a temporary arrangement only, which will be altered again whenever the Council and the Members think fit, that from the present time the Entrance Fee shall be abolished. In consequence of the war we have lost a very large number of Members. Upwards of 321 Officers who were Members of the Institution have either been killed or died of their wounds since the commencement of the war to the end of 1915, and the usual stream of incoming Members has been interfered with

by the pre-occupations of the struggle in which we are engaged, so that, although we are losing Members at a great rate, we are getting very few new ones. I believe, therefore, it will be to the great advantage of the Institution to temporarily suspend the Entrance Fee, because I have no doubt that will attract a great many new Members, and that is what we want. You will understand that it is not that we want their subscriptions so much, but because the Council thinks it will be a great opportunity for real usefulness. There is at the present time a very widespread interest in military and naval matters. All strata of society are permeated with the military and naval spirit, and we have in this Institution an admirable lending Library, an excellent Journal which is full of useful information, and a most interesting Museum. This Institution affords many opportunities to Officers to study their profession, to acquire information and to become more fit and useful as Officers, and we think the present time is a great opportunity for the Institution to come forward and help those who will be glad to have this assistance. We therefore propose, as a temporary arrangement, to suspend the payment of the Entrance Fee, so that new Members will only have to pay the one guinea Annual Subscription. At the same time we propose to reduce the Life Membership Fee, which hitherto has been £15, to £10, or to 10 guineas if paid in two instalments. That makes it easier all round, and offers the most advantageous terms to Officers in the Army and Navy. I am confident myself that large numbers of young Officers and others will take advantage of this offer as soon as it is made public, which I hope it will be through the medium of the Press. As this is an alteration of the Bye-Laws, it is necessary for it to be carried by a General Meeting, and I therefore propose the alteration I have already read.

Commander W. F. CABORNE, C.B., R.N.R.: I have very great pleasure indeed in seconding the proposal made by the Chairman, and I thoroughly agree with his remarks. The Chairman has not told you, however, that he was the original proposer of this suggestion, which is a very excellent one. (Hear, hear.) We shall be very curious indeed to see how it will work out. Personally I hope it will work out exceedingly well. There is no doubt that, although our finances are flourishing to-day, if peace were declared to-morrow we should find, with our falling Membership, that our revenue account would not be quite so satisfactory in the future as it should be. We want more Members and we must get them if we possibly can, and this seems to me to be the best system we can adopt at the present moment with that object in view.

Colonel JAMES: As before, I do not propose to move any Amendment. I recognize all you have said, Sir, about the desirability of spreading abroad the advantages of this Institution, but it also confirms what I previously said about the desirability of letting the Members have the use of their own house as soon as possible. I am going to throw out a suggestion to the Council. The London Library has a regular tariff for commuting its Annual Subscription according to age—a sort of weight for age arrangement—and I am not sure it would not be a good thing to adopt the same principle in this Institution. For instance, I have been a Member of the Institution going on for 45 years, but I am not prepared to pay even £10 at my age to become a Life Member; whereas if there was some compensation for age, such as the London Library adopts, and which is most successful with them, I think it might

prove advantageous to the Institution. When we get to a certain age all of us are willing to speculate on living an extra two years beyond the expectancy of life, but when it comes to five or six years we are not prepared to do so, and I think the Council of the Institution might make a comfortable sum of money if they followed the idea which the London Library has found so successful. I do not propose to move an Amendment to this effect, but I hope once more I may suggest to the Council the propriety of taking this suggestion into consideration.

Colonel WILDE : Might I point out that if you pass this Resolution, if circumstances permitted and you wished to go back to the old rate of subscription, you could not do so without holding another General Meeting of Members. (Hear, hear.) You could not put the subscription back to the old figure until the Meeting is held in March. Would not it be well to say in the Resolution that we adopt this until such time as the Council thinks fit ? Supposing, for instance, the circumstances were different, and you wanted to increase the amount to the old rate next April, you could not move in the matter till the following March.

The CHAIRMAN : Oh, yes. We can always call a General Meeting at the shortest notice.

Colonel WILDE : You would have to call a Special Meeting for it.

The CHAIRMAN : Yes. There would be no trouble about that.

Colonel WILDE : It seems to me it is rather troublesome.

The CHAIRMAN : I do not think there will be any trouble of that kind. It is, as a matter of fact, only contemplated that this reduction should last while the war continues.

Colonel WILDE : If you reduce the Life Subscription to £10 and want in the future to bring it up again to £15, you might find it troublesome, whereas if you put in the Resolution, "As long as the Council thinks it desirable," then you will not have to bring it up before the Members again and ask for their permission.

Colonel W. T. DOONER : I think what you have mentioned, Sir, is quite right, namely, that we could have a Special Meeting and go back to the old figure if necessary. I think it would be as well to leave the Resolution as it is on the paper. Objection might be raised, for instance, if the Council suddenly raised the fee again without giving considerable notice. Do not you think it would be better to leave it as in the Resolution, "for the time being," and then, when you wish to raise it again, call a Meeting of the Members ? (Hear, hear.)

The Resolution was then put and carried unanimously.

The CHAIRMAN : Thank you, gentlemen. I believe we have inaugurated a change which will have the best results both for the Institution and for the Officers who avail themselves of the privileges of this new Rule.

Colonel DOONER : Gentlemen, the very pleasant duty has been conferred upon me of proposing : "That the thanks of the Institution be accorded to the Chairman,



Lieut.-General H. D. Hutchinson, for presiding at this Meeting, and for his arduous services during the past year." From all that we have heard from the Chairmen of the different Committees, I think we can congratulate ourselves very much indeed on the state of the Institution. I remember attending Meetings about 30 years ago in the little theatre across the street, when we were often in very considerable difficulties as to how we were to carry on. We sometimes wondered what would happen in the future, but to-day it has been announced to us, in spite of what my friend Colonel James has said, that we have a credit balance of £3,743. Colonel James wishes that that should be brought to an end. (Laughter).

Colonel JAMES : I totally deny that. (Laughter.)

Colonel DOONER : What Colonel James proposes is that you should open negotiations with the Government, as I understand it, to give up the arrangement—which I think is an excellent arrangement (Hear, hear)—for renting this place to the Government, and that we should ask them to remove the Press Bureau to the Hotel Metropole. I would ask Colonel James to remember that, though he is here with us, the greater part of our Members are fighting in different parts of the world and cannot make use of the Institution now. It is quite impossible for them to come in here as they always do when they are at home on home service. They are now fighting in the Garden of Eden, at Kut-el-Amara, and all over the world, and they cannot possibly use the Institution. I therefore hope, Mr. Chairman, you will keep on, on the same lines that you have adopted during the past year, and try and maintain this excellent arrangement with the Government, which gives us such a splendid balance of £3,743. I am sure we are much indebted to the Secretary for the unremitting attention he has given to the Institution's affairs ; he has worked very hard for us indeed. One speaker alluded to the fact that we want more Members here. I do not think you need fear that we shall not have plenty of Members in the future. The Army will never go back to the wretched little 170,000 men that Viscount Haldane used to talk of—an expeditionary force. We shall have to keep an Army of a proper strength, and all the Officers, you may be quite sure, will come and join this Institution. You will have a tremendous field from which to get Members. My friend Colonel James made a very bad bargain when he continued to pay his subscription here for 45 years. I did not know he had been on this planet for so long. (Laughter). He certainly should have made a better bargain. Why he did not do what I did about 35 years ago I do not know. I only paid £10, and I am sure I never made a better investment in my life. (Laughter.) Gentlemen, I beg to propose : " That the thanks of the Institution be accorded to the Chairman, Lieut.-General H. D. Hutchinson, for presiding at this Meeting, and for his arduous services during the past year."

Colonel WILDE : I have much pleasure in seconding the Resolution. We have seen the able conduct of the Chairman in the Chair, and we can judge what his power of management has been when he has presided over the Council. We know that those in authority have a great many more anxieties to face in bad times than when things are normal, and in spite of those difficulties we have had a very good account submitted to us to-day. I hope that, notwithstanding the present trying



circumstances and inconveniences, the Council will be able to present as good a Report at the end of next year as they have on the present occasion.

The Resolution was put to the Meeting by Colonel Dooner and carried unanimously.

The CHAIRMAN : I thank Colonel Dooner and Colonel Wilde very much indeed for their remarks, and you, Gentlemen, for this vote of confidence in me that you have passed. It has been a great pleasure to me to do my best in the interests of the Institution, but I could not have done it if I had not been most ably, cordially and loyally supported by all the Members of the Council and the Staff. Colonel Sir Arthur Leetham has been very busy in the War Office, but he has at the same time exercised daily a general and able supervision over the work of the Institution. (Hear, hear.) I should like particularly to mention in that connection the Assistant Secretary, Mr. Pinhey (Hear, hear), who has had a great deal of extra work thrown upon him, and who has been most assiduous and loyal in carrying out his duties. He has a thorough grasp of the financial side of the question, which is of great importance in this Institution. The Librarian, too, looks thoroughly well after his department. (Hear, hear.) It is in a most excellent condition, and should prove most useful to those who are engaged in reading or studying any works of reference. The JOURNAL is issued quarterly, and you can judge for yourselves of its quality. (Hear, hear.) Under its present Editor it is flourishing exceedingly, and I hope we shall soon be called upon, owing to the new Members who will flow in under the arrangement that has been agreed to to-day, to print a very largely increased number of copies, which will do a great deal to spread much useful information and to help those who are studying military questions. Gentlemen, I thank you all very much indeed.

The Meeting then terminated.

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
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